Dan Jarvis MP: speeches
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Speeches
- 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source
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I am grateful to the hon. Member, as always, for his words about our commitment to these matters. I know he shares that commitment, and he has been a tireless champion for the freedom of people to practise their religion. He has raised some important points, and he will understand if I want to reflect on them more closely. We have a close working relationship with the Republic of Ireland, but I will look carefully at what he said and get back to him.
- 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source
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Let me take this opportunity—on behalf, I am sure, of all Members in this House—to thank those whose vital work keeps our country safe. They are the best of us, and our national security is underpinned by their endeavours. The hon. Lady makes several important points. She is right to raise concerns about foreign money in our politics. The Government take these concerns incredibly seriously. That is precisely why we have commissioned Philip Rycroft to conduct an independent review into this issue at pace. She might be aware that we debated these matters in Westminster Hall just a couple of weeks ago, when I encouraged her colleague, the hon. Member for Thornbury and Yate (Claire Young), to make formal representations to Mr Rycroft. I am grateful for her confirmation that they have done so. That is very much appreciated, because this is an important body of work that will provide recommendations to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and myself in the next couple of weeks, in time to inform the Representation of the People Bill. This is a timely piece of work and a good opportunity to ensure that that Bill provides the protections that we—I think, collectively—want it to. The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) mentioned FIRS, and I understand why. FIRS is a useful tool, but it is still a new tool and we are working to ensure that it provides the maximum operational capability. We are looking carefully at how we can use it to best effect. She also mentioned the embassy; again, I understand why she did so. She knows the Government’s position with regard to the embassy. Again, I am a bit limited in what I can say about that because of ongoing legal proceedings, but I refer her to the remarks that I have made previously. There is a strong national security case for the embassy. She will have noted the letter that was sent to the Government from the directors general of MI5 and GCHQ, and I am confident that this is the right thing to be doing.
- 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source
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The hon. Gentleman makes some important points. He will have heard what I said about FIRS. It is an important capability, and we need ensure that it is deployed in the right way, but we have introduced a number of measures in recent months to ensure that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible operating environment for those who seek to undermine our democracy. We are doing lots of things that I am unable to talk about, but I give him the assurance that we are taking these matters incredibly seriously, and will do everything that we need to do.
- 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source
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My hon. Friend has raised important points with regard to our democracy on countless occasions, and I am grateful to him for doing so again today. I can assure him that the police have the resources they need to do a difficult and complicated job, and of course I would be happy to meet him at the earliest available opportunity.
- 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source
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With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement regarding three arrests that took place this morning as part of a Counter Terrorism Policing investigation into suspected offences under the National Security Act 2023. I can confirm that this relates to China. I can also confirm that this relates to foreign interference targeting UK democracy. Mr Speaker, for reasons that you will understand, it would not be appropriate for me to comment on any aspect of what is now a live investigation. It is absolutely critical that we do not hamper the work of the police or prejudice any future legal processes by what we say in this House today. I would, however, point the House to what Counter Terrorism Policing has just said in its own statement, which is that, this morning, its officers arrested three men as part of an investigation into suspected offences under the National Security Act. All three men were arrested on suspicion of assisting a foreign intelligence service, contrary to section 3 of that Act. Any decision as to whether to proceed with a prosecution would be a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service. The Government stand resolute in our resolve to counter foreign interference activity targeting the UK from any state actor. The Government have been consistent and unambiguous in our assessment that China presents a series of threats to the United Kingdom. We remain deeply concerned by an increasing pattern of covert activity from Chinese state-linked actors targeting UK democracy. This involves attempts to obtain information on UK policymaking and interfere with our sovereign affairs. From the November MI5 espionage alert warning about Chinese intelligence officers targeting individuals with access to sensitive information on Parliament and Government to the attempted interference activities of Christine Lee in 2022, this Government will not tolerate it. I can confirm to the House that British officials have formally démarched Chinese counterparts in London and Beijing about these allegations to raise our strong concerns. However, as this is a live investigation, it would not be appropriate to comment further. But let me be clear: if there is proven evidence of attempts by China to interfere with UK sovereign affairs, we will impose severe consequences and hold all actors involved to account. In the meantime, the Government are taking robust action to ensure that the UK’s democratic institutions and processes are a hard target for this activity. The National Security Act 2023 provides our intelligence agencies and law enforcement with the modern legal tools they need to deter, detect, and disrupt the full range of state threats. The action that Counter Terrorism Policing has been able to take this morning is an example that shows that the legislation working well. The political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act also provides an essential framework for ensuring that those who seek to undermine our democracy are held to account. I continue to drive across Government the delivery of our counter-political interference and espionage action plan, which I announced to Parliament on 18 November. This is being co-ordinated in strong partnership with the parliamentary security authorities. Our aim is to forge a cross-party and whole-of-society shield to safeguard UK democracy. This includes strengthening our legal defences, cutting off channels for interference, and supporting those on the frontline of UK politics to recognise, resist and report the threat. Members should have seen the guidance that the National Protective Security Authority and the National Cyber Security Centre published last year, which included what to look out for in terms of malicious foreign targeting and some basic steps that Members can take to protect themselves. I urge all Members to read carefully through the guidance that was issued. If hon. Members do experience any suspicious or out-of-the-ordinary interactions, whether in person or online, they should report it to the Parliamentary Security Department. The Government will continue to work in collaboration with the Parliament Security Department to set up a range of more tailored, bespoke briefings for those at greatest risk. In January, I joined the director general of MI5 and the chief executive of the NCSC to brief the chief executives of the UK political parties on the developing threat picture. I can confirm that officials are now focused on developing a programme of work to engage with the UK’s think-tanks and non-profit sector to discuss the threats that they face from foreign interference. Our intent is to work with them to strengthen their resilience, ensuring that their hard-won reputations and networks are not exploited by our adversaries as platforms for covertly influencing UK public discourse and policymaking. In February, we introduced the Representation of the People Bill, which will further strengthen safeguards against foreign interference through political funding. Our proposed Bill includes introducing tougher rules for donor recipients to conduct risk assessments before accepting donations, as well as increasing the powers of the Electoral Commission to ensure that it has the tools necessary to fulfil its duties. The Government eagerly await the report of Philip Rycroft, following his independent review of regulations and safeguards against foreign financial interference in UK politics. The review was commissioned to rigorously test the financial safeguards we currently have in place and will specifically consider safeguards against illicit funding streams, including the use of crypto-assets. The review’s findings will be delivered to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and me by the end of the month. I confirm that recommendations, where appropriate, will inform the Representation of the People Bill. We are also working on new powers to counter foreign interference, including a proscription-style tool to disrupt proxy organisations undermining our security. It continues to be in our long-term strategic interest to engage with China. We are engaging with China confidently and pragmatically on areas where engagement is in the UK’s national interest, including climate, global health, trade, scientific research, illegal migration and serious organised crime—to name just a few. But let me be crystal clear: this is not a question of balancing economic and security considerations. We do not trade off security for economic access. Instead, by taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to co-operate in other areas. We will always challenge any country, including China, that attempts to interfere with or undermine the integrity of our democratic institutions, and we will always prioritise UK national security. That is why the Prime Minister’s visit opened up a direct channel of communication to deliver in the national interest, enabling us to raise frank concerns about activities that impact our national security, including domestic security issues, at the most senior levels of the Chinese system. I assure Members of the House and the public that further steps can and absolutely will be taken to defend our democracy. The Government are steadfast in our commitment to disrupting and deterring China’s interference activity wherever it takes place. I commend this statement to the House.
- 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source
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Of course the Government will do everything to ensure that the counter-terrorism police and intelligence agencies have whatever they need to conduct this investigation. As the right hon. and learned Lady will understand from her time as Home Secretary, that is conducted independently of Government, and it is not for the Security Minister, the Home Secretary or any Minister to get involved in the business of an investigation. That would not be appropriate, and I hope she would acknowledge that. Let me also say something positive to her. She was Home Secretary when the National Security Act 2023 was introduced, and that vital piece of legislation is making a real difference to our ability to counter those who would seek to do us harm. It is a valuable tool in our armoury, but where there is a view that we need to add more tools to that armoury, we will definitely do so.
- 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source
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With great respect to the hon. Lady—I always listen carefully to what she has to say, because she represents a part of the United Kingdom that I have a long-standing interest in—she is not right in what she says about the embassy. I refer her to comments made by the Intelligence and Security Committee and the director generals of our security services. The arrangement that underpins the Chinese embassy involves the reduction of the diplomatic estate in London from seven sites down to one. I hope that when she looks at it in those terms, she will understand that there are national security advantages from that proposal.
- 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source
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On the hon. Gentleman’s first point, he will understand that membership of a Select Committee is not a matter for the Government, but Mr Speaker will have heard the point he raised, as have I. On his second point, he will understand that we are dealing with events that took place a couple of hours ago. I have not seen what is being reported online, because I have obviously been here, but I will give consideration to the matter he has raised.
- 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source
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The hon. Gentleman is right: I do take these things incredibly seriously. I am grateful for his point about Hongkongers in his constituency. I have personally raised our concerns about arrest warrants and bounties directly with Chinese authorities, and he will have heard what I said earlier about officials being démarched. The Hongkongers make an important contribution to our country. He knows the Government’s position on transnational repression. A lot of work has taken place through the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that people are, and feel, protected, but if he thinks that we should be doing more, I would always be very happy to discuss it with him.
- 4 Mar 2026 · Points of Order · Hansard source
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indicated assent .
- 9 Feb 2026 · Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy · Hansard source
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The hon. and gallant Member makes an important point. I hope that Mr Rycroft is listening, because that is something that he will want to consider. I give an assurance that I will take it away and look at it as well. My hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith) made several important points. She is right that there is nothing new about the use of propaganda. She is also right about the information age that we are now living through. I am pleased that she mentioned Ian Lucas’s book, and I am grateful for the other points that she raised, including an important one about support for members of the LGBT+ community. I assure her of the priority we attach to the issues that she raised. I am also grateful for the contribution made by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Thornbury and Yate (Claire Young). I say gently to her that the Rycroft review provides a vital opportunity to look at these issues, so I hope that she and her party will engage. I think there was an invitation, which I reiterate, from my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West to do so, and I hope that she will take it up. It is important that, where we can, we seek to maintain a cross-party consensus on these issues, which is precisely why, along with the director general of MI5, the other day I briefed the political parties on these matters, including the Lib Dems. I hope we can keep that conversation going. The hon. Member for Spelthorne made a number of reasonable and fair-minded points. He nodded to the Scots Guards without actually mentioning them, so let me do that on his behalf. He also took the opportunity to mention Clausewitz, which was appreciated. I know that he takes these matters seriously. I was pleased to see him at the recent JCNSS meeting, to which the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells has just referred, and at which I gave evidence on national security the other day. He made an important and fair-minded observation about the threat perception. He is broadly right about that. The hon. Member for Spelthorne will understand that a difficult balance has to be struck, informing the public while not alarming them. He is right that we need to debate these things in this House and more generally, not least because of the grave nature of the threat that we face and the potential requirement—I will be careful about what I say—of public resource that will have to be dedicated to these matters in the years to come. I welcome the comments he made. I hope he would agree—I think he would—that we should work collaboratively across the House on these most important matters. It is in that spirit that I always endeavour to engage with hon. Members. The threats that the UK and our allies face are immediate and evolving. Russia views our democratic openness as a vulnerability to be exploited. Through the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan, we are equipping everyone, from local councillors to parliamentary staff, with the tools that they need to help to disrupt and detect foreign espionage activity wherever we find it. This Government’s clear commitments to upholding and restoring trust in standards and integrity in public life are not merely bureaucratic pledges. They are a vital line of defence, ensuring that the UK is not a permissive environment for foreign interference and safeguarding the sovereignty of our democratic future. From the comprehensive powers of the National Security Act 2023 to the protective work of the defending democracy taskforce, we are deploying a whole-of-Government approach to make the UK a much harder target. On this Government’s watch, we will do whatever is required to disrupt and degrade foreign interference operations and keep the British public safe.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy · Hansard source
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I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention and for his important work on the Joint Committee. I welcome the scrutiny that it provides, and I assure him of the seriousness with which we take such matters. I think he will have heard the comments that I made specifically about the Rycroft review. The scheduling of the review has been designed to ensure that it reports by the end of March, in order to inform further legislation. It is not for me, as the Security Minister, to talk about the scheduling of further legislation; that is very much a matter for the Leader of the House. That piece of legislation is being led by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, working closely with colleagues across Government. However, I owe the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) a response to the important point that he made about when those legislative tools will impact on our evolving democratic process. I give him an absolute assurance that, working through the defending democracy taskforce, which I chair, we have already done a lot of work in this Parliament to ensure that for the elections that will take place this May in Wales, Scotland or England, and the elections taking place in Northern Ireland in 2027, the local institutions in those areas are as prepared as they possibly can be. There are very close working relationships between central Government and the devolved institutions to ensure that those elections are as free and as reasonably and fairly contested as they possibly can be. Let me turn to some of the other contributions. The hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) represents a beautiful part of the world, which I know and remember fondly from my time at Aberystwyth University. He rightly and entirely reasonably urged the Government to act at pace and not to waste any time. I repeat the point that I have just made about the Rycroft review: it will report by the end of March in order to inform the legislative agenda, including the elections Bill. Again, however, I give him the same assurance I did earlier: the elections that will take place in Wales are part of a process being led by the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that all the devolved institutions have the support that they need to make sure that the elections take place in the way that we would all want them to. I am working very closely with colleagues in Wales to ensure that that is the case. My hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell) speaks with great authority on such matters. I am grateful for all his work, including in the all-party parliamentary group. He spoke rightly about the important use of sanctions. He will understand that it would be unwise of me to signal from the Front Bench further intent with regard to such matters, but he has heard the recent words of the Prime Minister, and let me reiterate them: if Roman Abramovich fails to act quickly, we are fully prepared to go to court to enforce the commitment that has been made, if that is necessary. The hon. Member for North Herefordshire (Dr Chowns) made a number of points, including specific concerns about the conduct of Reform, but also about the EU referendum that took place back in 2016. We completely recognise the enduring and significant threat that Russia poses to our UK democracy. Of course, we are absolutely committed to ensuring that we are well protected against all forms of foreign interference. That is why we are doing work through the defending democracy taskforce; that is why before Christmas I launched the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan; and that is why we have now commissioned an independent review of foreign financial interference in UK politics. The hon. Member specifically mentioned the ISC, as did a couple of other hon. Members. Reports produced by the Intelligence and Security Committee, including the Russia report, contain highly classified material that could damage the operational capabilities of UK intelligence agencies if published unredacted, so I hope she understands that we have to be very careful with the publication of those reports. She also asked specifically about the elections Bill, which she will understand is an MHCLG lead. The Bill is an important opportunity to strengthen our legislative response to the threats that we face, and we very much welcome her contribution to that process. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) knows a lot about these matters. I am pleased that he will take the opportunity to engage directly with Philip Rycroft. My hon. Friend raised important points about the funding of Reform; I have to say that it is disappointing that no Reform Members are here to defend their record. Of course, it is absolutely right that all decisions taken by Government are scrutinised not only by this House but by the media: that is important, and I would not have it any other way. But it is also important that those individuals who aspire to serve in the highest office are similarly subjected to meaningful scrutiny. I am pleased that this House has done so this afternoon, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the critique that he helpfully offered. The hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) made an important point about the importance of acting in concert with our allies. She is absolutely right: that is why we seek to work very closely with our international partners on these matters. She raised a number of other helpful and constructive points. I believe that some of her questions were being addressed in the statement given to the House by the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister at precisely the moment that she was asking them. I hope she might find a moment later to check the record, and I hope her questions have been answered. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) speaks with great authority on these matters. I know that the whole House appreciates his important work to support Ukraine and ensure that our friends and allies prevail in their struggle against Putin’s illegal invasion. I am particularly proud of the cross-party support for that endeavour, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the leadership role that he has played. The hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) was the first but not the only Member to quote Clausewitz; I particularly enjoyed his reference. Like other hon. Members, he raised deeply concerning points about Reform. I have to say that it speaks volumes that not one Reform Member—not even one of their keenly recently recruited Members—is here to respond. That is a great shame. The hon. Member will have heard my response to the point that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire made about the ICS report, but I firmly believe that addressing the issue should be a cross-party endeavour, so I would be happy to discuss the matters further with him. My right hon. Friend the Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds), made a good point about bots in her excellent contribution, and rightly raised activity in Moldova specifically. She is right to assert the need to ensure that our legislative framework and wider response are geared to the nature of the threat we face now, not the one we faced in the past. I can give her an assurance of how seriously the Government take such matters. She will know that the Government have introduced the cyber-security action plan; I heard the comment from the hon. and gallant Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) about that a moment ago, and I will take it away. I hope that my right hon. Friend is also aware of the work the Cabinet Office is leading on the production of a national cyber action plan. I know that my right hon. Friend is proud to represent one of our country’s finest universities. She nodded to the particular challenge that has been experienced recently around lawfare. Her point on that was well made, and I am grateful that she welcomes the new reporting route announced by the Government, which is an initial step. We are working towards developing a more proactive advisory service alongside training to support our higher education sector, using the new money we have identified. I am grateful for her contribution. I very much agree with the analysis and the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis). It is telling that we have heard from a number of Members from Wales. My hon. Friend emphasised the impact of Nathan Gill’s treachery, which cannot be overestimated; I know that my hon. Friend has raised the issue on several occasions, but I assure him again that the work that the Government lead through the defending democracy taskforce is aligned with our devolved institutions, which—as we have seen recently, not least in the case of Nathan Gill—are just as much on the frontline as those of us in this place. My hon. Friend made some important points about the elections Bill, and of course I agree with his important points about NATO.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy · Hansard source
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The hon. Member has only just entered the Chamber, but in an act of generosity, I will give way.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy · Hansard source
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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I begin by thanking my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for introducing this debate. He did an excellent job of providing the context we need to have a good discussion, and the House owes him a service for the work he has done. I also extend my gratitude to all the hon. Members who have spoken—I will try to reflect on their comments in a moment—and, as others have done, I extend the Government’s gratitude to all those who signed the e-petition that has brought us here today. This has been a good, timely and useful debate and it provides an important opportunity to strengthen awareness of the threat, and to signal the resolve that exists across the House to confront the work of Russian threat actors. The Government’s first duty, as I hope any Government’s would be, is to keep the country safe. We are absolutely committed to taking all necessary measures to expose and disrupt any attempt to interfere with our sovereign affairs. That is why on 18 October last year I set out the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan, to ensure that our democracy is the hardest possible target for foreign threat actors. [ Official Report, 23 February 2026; Vol. 781, c. 2WC.] (Correction) Just last Thursday, I joined the director general of MI5 and the chief executive of the National Cyber Security Centre in briefing the chief executives of the UK political parties on the developing threat picture. On Wednesday last week, I joined the Skills Minister and the directors general of MI5 and the NCSC in hosting nearly 100 representatives from universities and sector bodies to discuss the risks that they face from foreign interference. I am pleased to announce today that the Government will invest £3 million over the next three years to support the higher education sector to strengthen its resilience. That will include setting up a new foreign interference reporting route for UK universities and co-designing best practice guidance that will help universities to make proportionate, risk-based decisions on the threats to which they are exposed. As part of this work, we will also be considering the role of think-tanks, to which my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk referred specifically, given that they will share many of the same interference risks. This e-petition calls for a public inquiry into Russian influence in UK democracy. As the Security Minister, I am proud to have the opportunity to work very closely with our intelligence and security agencies, who are working tirelessly to monitor and disrupt Russian threats to UK politics. Those threats range from cyber-espionage operations targeting sensitive or classified information to divisive information operations and attempts to influence UK policymaking through bribery and coercion, as we have seen with the shocking case of Nathan Gill. Hon. Members will understand that it will not always be appropriate for the Government and our intelligence agencies to publicly reveal the extent of our understanding of Russian operations, due to the obvious importance of protecting the sources of that information and maintaining a competitive advantage over our adversaries. However, the UK Government continue to work tirelessly alongside our allies to expose Russian cyber-threats and information operations targeting democracy in the UK and worldwide. For example, since October 2024, the Government have exposed and sanctioned 38 organisations and individuals responsible for delivering Russian information warfare to undermine global democracies. The guidance that the National Protective Security Authority published in October also specifically highlighted the full range of vectors and tactics that foreign actors, including Russia, are using to target individuals working in UK politics. Indeed, in the light of the deeply concerning evidence of Russia targeting our democratic system, the Government commissioned Philip Rycroft to deliver an independent review of foreign financial interference in UK politics. The review will primarily focus on foreign interference via funding because that is an area of particular concern. However, to inform his recommendations, Philip Rycroft has been provided with a threat briefing that covers the full range of vectors used by states to target UK politics. It is the Government’s position that launching a new inquiry at this time would be premature. It would risk prejudging the conclusions of the ongoing review and duplicating its efforts. However, the final report will be presented to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and to me by the end of March, after which there will be significant opportunity for further parliamentary scrutiny and debate. Let me address some of the points that have been raised in this debate. My hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk asked about cryptocurrency tools. As he will know, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 makes it clear that foreign money is not permitted in UK politics. However, as tactics behind foreign interference operations develop, the Government recognise that our response also needs to evolve. The UK Government therefore reaffirmed their leadership and resolved to stamp out corruption and dodgy money in UK politics through the Home Office’s refreshed anti-corruption strategy. Corrupt insiders and criminal networks will be brought to justice by a strengthened specialist police unit and tougher safeguards across the public sector. The forthcoming elections Bill will also further strengthen safeguards against covert political funding. Our proposed Bill includes introducing tougher rules for donor recipients to conduct risk assessments before accepting donations, as well as increasing the powers of the Electoral Commission to ensure that it has the tools necessary to fulfil its duties. The Rycroft review into foreign financial interference will assess opportunities for further improvement. Let me just say a word specifically about cryptocurrency, because the Bill specifically includes safeguarding against the potential use of cryptocurrency by foreign actors to obfuscate the source of their donations. My hon. Friend also asked about media literacy education. Building media literacy skills for young people to critically engage with and assess information from a range of sources is a priority for the Government. Since 2022, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology has provided £3 million of funding for media-literacy projects that empower users to navigate the online world safely. My hon. Friend also asked about a dedicated disinformation agency. This issue will always require a co-ordinated, cross-Government effort. DSIT leads the Government’s policy on countering disinformation, but works closely with the national security secretariat in the Cabinet Office. The Home Office is the departmental lead for state threats, working closely with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which leads on the Government’s efforts to counter foreign interference. A lot of meaningful activity is taking place across Government.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Money Laundering: High Street Businesses · Hansard source
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We are taking more steps. The new high streets taskforce will look at whether the current data sharing between agencies in supporting enforcement teams is appropriate in order to maximise our response to be as effective as possible. The Government will also publish a new anti-money laundering and asset recovery strategy this summer, which will set out further ambitious measures to strengthen our fight against money laundering, including through better sharing and exploitation of financial information across the system.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Money Laundering: High Street Businesses · Hansard source
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My hon. Friend is a great champion for Huddersfield’s high street, and I am pleased to be able to tell her that tackling money laundering is key to delivering on this Government’s mission to make our streets safer and to deliver economic growth. The new high streets illegality taskforce will bring together Departments and agencies to systemically disrupt money laundering and related crime on the high street, while new funding will boost trading standards capabilities and fund an increase in law enforcement officers.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Money Laundering: High Street Businesses · Hansard source
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I am grateful to the Chair of the Committee for setting out the work it will be doing. I have long believed in the importance of working closely with the National Crime Agency to tackle serious organised crime, which is a blight on all our communities. We are working closely with the NCA to ensure it has the appropriate level of resourcing and the correct strategic priorities, and I meet the director every single week. We would be very happy to co-operate closely with the right hon. Lady on the work that her Committee is doing. She is right to mention the importance of police reform; we are obviously looking carefully at that process, and will ensure that we configure ourselves in a way that will maximise the ability of the National Crime Agency to tackle serious organised crime.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps · Hansard source
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We work very closely with our allies, but EU designations are a matter for the EU. It is the Government’s long-standing position not to comment on the detail of intelligence and security matters—for instance, whether specific organisations are being considered for proscription in the UK—but I can say that in concert with our international partners, we will use all appropriate tools at our disposal to protect the UK from state threats.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps · Hansard source
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My hon. Friend is right to raise his concerns in the way that he does. I can inform him and the House that on 13 January the Foreign Secretary set out the action that the Government are taking in co-ordination with allies, in response to the consistent threat that the Iranian regime poses to stability, security and freedom, and that last week the Foreign Secretary announced a further sanctions package targeting 10 individuals and one organisation involved in human rights abuses in Iran. We are continuing to monitor the situation very closely, and we urge Iran to protect fundamental freedoms, including access to information and communications.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps · Hansard source
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We are very grateful to Jonathan Hall for the work that he has done. We are taking forward all his recommendations on strengthening our state threats powers, including the development of a proscription-like tool that will allow us to ban the activity and operations of foreign state-backed organisations.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source
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I hope the hon. Gentleman will understand if I do not get into the specifics—we do not comment on individual cases—but I can tell him that the Home Secretary will use all the tools at her disposal to ensure that we keep the public safe.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source
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The defending democracy taskforce is the fulcrum point that co-ordinates activity across Government. We work very closely with other Departments specifically on the issue of countering misinformation and disinformation, not least as we move towards the important elections taking place in May. This is an important body, which has recently had its mandate renewed by the Prime Minister. We work very closely with law enforcement to make sure that our democracy is properly protected.
- 22 Jan 2026 · Emergency Preparedness · Hansard source
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The Government’s Prepare website provides emergency preparedness advice to the public, including information about signing up for emergency alerts and warnings and preparing their home for emergencies. By using this advice, including the downloadable household emergency plan, people can improve their emergency preparedness, regardless of the cause of the emergency.
- 22 Jan 2026 · Emergency Preparedness · Hansard source
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I could, and I welcome my hon. Friend’s interest and expertise in this area. The Government’s Prepare website includes a suggested list of supplies to improve household resilience, including non-perishable food. I take a close interest in the messaging of our partners in Europe on this subject. The Government are committed to ensuring that the whole of society—particularly the most vulnerable—are best prepared for and supported during crises.
- 22 Jan 2026 · Emergency Preparedness · Hansard source
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I am grateful for the points the hon. Lady raises. We look very carefully at what international allies are saying about these matters. I am concerned to hear about the situation in her constituency. The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero works closely with industry, regulators and other stakeholders to improve and maintain the resilience and security of energy infrastructure. When incidents occur, as they have in her constituency—even exceptionally disruptive ones—industry has tried and tested response plans to minimise disruption to customers as quickly as possible. That said, I am keen to further increase our resilience, so if she would like to write to me, I will look closely at what she has to say.
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