Dan Jarvis MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 11 Dec 2025 · Foreign Interference · Hansard source

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  This has been an excellent debate. I extend my gratitude to the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) for securing this debate on the pervasive challenge of foreign interference. The hon. Member made a very good speech, in which he spoke knowledgably and authoritatively about the complex nature of the threats we face, which, along with the range of points raised by Members, illustrates the diverse and evolving nature of the foreign interference threat landscape. In just the last few years, we have seen attempts to influence our political system through: covert donations, as we saw with MI5’s disruptive alert on Christine Lee and the conviction of Reform UK’s leader in Wales, Nathan Gill, for bribery offences in November; the issuing of arrest warrants and bounties by the Hong Kong police on individuals for exercising their freedom of expression; Russian information operations spreading false pro-Kremlin narratives online to undermine support for Ukraine; and the recent and much-publicised concerns about activities in this place. As the Prime Minister said just last week, the Government are clear that China poses national security threats to the UK. When these threats are left unchecked, they place at risk the things we value most about our country: our democratic values and freedom of expression, and our ability to pursue long-term economic growth. Upholding national security is the first duty of Government, and we continue to take all the measures necessary to disrupt these threats. As Security Minister, I am deeply committed to using my position to cohere cross-Government efforts to make our country a harder target for these threat actors. The legislative foundation of the UK’s defence against foreign interference lies in the National Security Act 2023. The Act has overhauled our espionage laws and introduced a crucial new foreign interference offence, equipping our security and law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to disrupt state threats in the UK. The Prime Minister is absolutely committed to strengthening the resilience of our democratic institutions. That is why he renewed the mandate of the defending democracy taskforce, and I am leveraging that taskforce to co-ordinate the delivery of the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan.

• 11 Dec 2025 · Foreign Interference · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member. I would gently say that his intervention is not in keeping with the tone of what has been a good-natured and constructive debate, but he has asked the question and I can give him the assurances he seeks. The action plan will deliver a protective security campaign to support those at risk to recognise, resist and report attempts of foreign interference, to strengthen existing legislation to mitigate the threat, and to co-ordinate action to disrupt the use of proxy actors. In line with our pledge to strengthen legislation, we are also introducing tougher rules on political donations through the elections Bill in order to protect our democracy. The Government believe that foreign money has no place in the UK’s political system, which is why the law is clear that foreign donations are not permitted. Yet as the tactics and techniques of foreign interference actors evolve, UK rules and safeguards also need to adapt. Cross-Government work also continues at pace to counter foreign information operations. Our immediate focus is getting the Online Safety Act 2023 implemented quickly and effectively. The foreign interference offence in that Act places clear requirements on platforms to tackle illegal state-linked disinformation targeting the UK and our democratic processes. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology is also driving a whole-of-society response to strengthening UK resilience against the threat, and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has demonstrated relentless international leadership in imposing costs on Russian state-linked threat actors that seek to undermine our democratic elections and spread malign content through deceptive means.

• 11 Dec 2025 · Foreign Interference · Hansard source

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  That is an entirely fair challenge. Like every Member of this House, I suspect, I would like social media companies to do more. I am working closely, through the defending democracy taskforce, with colleagues across Government, including in DSIT, to ensure that that is the case. Since October 2024, the Government have sanctioned 31 organisations and individuals responsible for delivering Russia’s information warfare. Just yesterday, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary announced a further package of sanctions against five entities and two individuals for their role in attempting to destabilise international democracies and undermine international support to Ukraine through the spread of false and divisive narratives. Efforts are also under way to improve data collection on experiences of transnational repression in the UK and to ensure that victims receive appropriate support. Hon. Members have made a number of very useful contributions. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) brought to bear a generation of service, and spoke powerfully about a number of issues, including the importance of our support for Ukraine. The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (John Cooper) made clear his concerns about the threats from China and elsewhere. I think it fair to say, based on his contribution, that he is not a fan of the First Minister of Scotland. I will look closely at his letter. I was only sorry that today there was no quote from Sun Tzu—maybe next time. My hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (Peter Swallow) made a very thoughtful contribution and rightly raised his concerns about Russian attempts to undermine our democracy. Although I did not agree with the comments made by the hon. Member for Dundee Central (Chris Law), who is not in his place, about the nature of the special relationship, I agreed with what he said about Russia and Ukraine. It is absolutely vital that we maintain that cross-party agreement. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) spoke incredibly well and in a very considered way, as he always does. I am grateful for his words about the publication just this week of the Government’s anti-corruption strategy. I pay tribute to Home Office officials for their work to deliver on that strategy and our commitments. He spoke powerfully and authoritatively about the impact of the Nathan Gill scandal. I am grateful for the work that my hon. Friend does in support of our national security, and I can tell him that the elections Bill will introduce tough new rules on political donations, including cryptoassets. The hon. Member for North Herefordshire (Dr Chowns) expressed her concern about Reform and sought to clarify her party’s position on NATO membership—although I confess that I am still a bit confused about whether the Greens are in or out. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller), spoke about the threats from China and Russia. He raised a number of entirely reasonable and constructive points. I hope that he will understand that I simply do not have the time to address them all today, but I can assure him of the seriousness with which we take them, and of our absolute commitment to working with him and Members across the House to address them. Finally, I warmly welcome the hon. Member for Bridlington and The Wolds (Charlie Dewhirst), in what was a very assured debut at the Dispatch Box; no doubt we will be seeing much more of him in that position. He will not be surprised to hear that I did not quite agree with his assessment of the collapse of the recent China trial, but let me say something about the point he made with regard to the embassy. As Members will know, I have to be incredibly careful about what I say, because there is a quasi-judicial process under way, but should the embassy be approved—and that is very much a decision for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government—it will replace the seven different sites that currently comprise China’s diplomatic footprint. That is one to ponder on further, I think. To conclude, the threat from foreign interference touches on almost every part of our national life, and this Government are steadfast in their commitment to disrupting these threats while also ensuring that those at the greatest risk are able to recognise, resist and report suspicious activity. From the comprehensive powers of the National Security Act 2023 and the protective work of the defending democracy taskforce to our focused efforts against disinformation, we are deploying a whole-of-Government approach to make the UK a harder target. This Government’s clear commitment to upholding and restoring trust in standards and integrity in public life are not merely bureaucratic pledges; they are a vital line of defence, ensuring that the UK is not a permissive environment for foreign interference and safeguarding the sovereignty of our democratic future. On this Government’s watch, we will do whatever is required to disrupt, deter and defeat foreign interference, protect our national security and keep the public safe—nothing matters more.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  I am, as always, grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the expertise and experience that he brings to these matters, not least given his very long-standing service on two relevant Committees in this place. He mentioned Counter Terrorism Policing. Let me take this opportunity to pay tribute to the work that they do. I have a very good and close working relationship with CTP. They do extraordinary work and it is a privilege to stand alongside them. They are exceptional in the work that they do. It is in part a symptom of the work that the previous Government and this Government have done to make the UK the hardest possible operating environment that increasingly Russia and other malign states are seeking to use criminal proxies to do their bidding and business in the United Kingdom. There is a lot of work taking place, not only across Government but with our allies in Europe, who we are working very closely with, and further afield to ensure that we are best placed to target malign states that are using criminal proxies. The director general of MI5 referenced that in his recent annual lecture on the threats we face. On the right hon. Member’s point about the UK being a hard target, he will understand better than most that I am very limited in what I can say about that, and that it would be unwise to give detail that would be helpful to our adversaries. However, I can give him an assurance of the seriousness with which we take these matters. He raised an important point about dissidents. It is an issue that I keep under very close review. We make sure that we have the right mechanisms in place to provide security. The right hon. Member’s point about chemical weapons was well made. We work very closely with our international allies to ensure that we are doing everything that we can to minimise the risk and threat. It is not easy work, and there are no guarantees of its success, but I give an assurance of the seriousness with which we take it. Our approach is to work closely with our allies.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right about the importance of keeping our country safe. I assure him that we take that incredibly seriously. We will of course look very carefully at the detail of this report. He asked about the accountability mechanisms in Government. I assure him that the Home Secretary and I take our responsibilities to hold the security services to account very seriously indeed—that is a process that the new Home Secretary and I dedicate a significant amount of time to every single week. But we have to be crystal clear that the inquiry’s report states unequivocally that responsibility lies with the Russian state. The chair of the inquiry found that the operation to assassinate Sergei Skripal was authorised at the highest level, and concluded that it would not have taken place without the approval of President Putin. The use of a military-grade nerve agent on British soil was a violation of international law and a truly despicable act, and the responsibility for that lies with Russia, and Russia alone. The hon. Gentleman asked, entirely reasonably, about the confiscation of sovereign Russian assets. I assure him that we take that incredibly seriously as well. Our priority is to ensure that all the options that we consider with regard to that matter are in line with international law and are economically and financially responsible, but Russia must be held accountable for the terrible damage it has done in Ukraine. We will do whatever we can to ensure that Russia is held accountable and made to pay for its actions. The hon. Gentleman’s final point was an important one about Russian interference in our democracy. I chair the defending democracy taskforce, which has recently had its mandate renewed by the Prime Minister. These are matters that we take incredibly seriously. We use the taskforce as the fulcrum point across Government to ensure that we have a whole-of-system response that draws together Government Departments and law enforcement, and I assure the hon. Gentleman of the priority that we attach to that work. It is something that I believe should be a cross-party endeavour, so if he or other Members of this House wish to discuss it with me further, I am always very happy to do so.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  I completely agree with my hon. Friend, who puts it very well. The greatest legacy, as well as remembering the tragic loss of life in this case, would be to ensure that our collective defences as a country are tightened to the extent that such an attack could never happen again. Of course, the Russian regime will constantly test our defences and we will have to remain incredibly vigilant. It is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that we have the appropriate levels of resource, and that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible operating environment for Russia and its proxies, but he is right to remind us of where responsibility for this heinous act lies: with President Putin.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  I thank the shadow Home Secretary for his response and for the tone of it. I am very grateful. I think he will have noted, from my opening remarks, the gravity and seriousness I attach to the matter at hand. I know that he and other Opposition Members will have noted that in my opening statement I spoke seamlessly about the work done by the previous Government and this Government. I believe that standing against Russia and the threat it poses to our national security should be, and is, a shared endeavour across this House. I pay tribute to the work the previous Government did, in 2018 and beyond, in standing against the threat we face. Wherever possible, we should work closely together on it. The shadow Home Secretary very accurately characterised the nature of the threat. I agree with what he said with regard to Russia and Putin. It is impossible to overstate the seriousness of this attack and the other activity he characterised. The right hon. Gentleman spoke about Ukraine and I am grateful to him for doing so. Again, I want to take the opportunity to pay tribute to the previous Government for the commitment they made to defending Ukraine. It should be a matter of great pride across the House that, perhaps above almost everything else, it is something that binds this House together. There is a unity of purpose among us all in ensuring that we stand together to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. I give him and the House an absolute commitment that we will continue the work of the previous Government. Genuinely, I was really pleased that the right hon. Gentleman asked about cyber, because I am particularly keen to ensure that we co-ordinate our activity across Government as effectively as we possibly can. In truth, it was one reason why the Prime Minister made the machinery of government change back in September so that the Security Minister sits across both the Home Office and the Cabinet Office and can more effectively co-ordinate that work. He will know that the Government introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill just a couple of weeks ago. From a Home Office perspective, we are working hard on the ransomware proposals that we consulted on earlier this year. He was right to make the important point about the work we do with regard to positively degrading the nature of the threats he described. He knows I am very limited in terms of what I can say about that, but I know he will join me in paying tribute to the very important work that the National Cyber Force does. It did not come as a huge surprise that the shadow Home Secretary—in truth, I do not blame him for doing so—took the opportunity to raise the issue of China. I hope he has had the chance to look at what I said this morning at Cabinet Office oral questions and what I said in response to an urgent question from my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) yesterday with regard to the Government’s position on China. I hope he has had the opportunity to look precisely at what I said about the embassy. With regard to FIRS, I completely understand the points the shadow Home Secretary made. The Government continue to keep that under very close review and I hope we will have more to say about it in due course.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Member for the very sensible and constructive nature of his remarks. I recognise his service as a Wiltshire MP and his obvious constituency interest in this matter. I also genuinely welcome his condemnation of the treachery that we have seen recently, and I am glad that he made that point. He raises a sensible and constructive point with regard to the NHS, and I can give him the assurances that he seeks regarding the Government’s attention to these matters. One of the reasons why the Prime Minister took the machinery of Government change back in September to ensure that I, as Security Minister, sit across both the Home Office and the Cabinet Office was to maximise the leverage and co-ordination across Government with regard not only to national security policy, but to our resilience, and we have recently undertaken the largest ever resilience exercise across Government. He is right to raise that point. I give him an assurance of the seriousness with which we take these matters. We will, of course, look very carefully at the report’s recommendations in that regard. I am grateful to him for his comments today.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  I commend the right hon. Gentleman for the dignified and diligent way in which he represented his constituents and his constituency at the time, and for his service since, including today’s. I know that it will be hugely appreciated across the House, and certainly in the great city of Salisbury and across the wider great county of Wiltshire. He is absolutely right: responsibility for this dreadful attack rests at the top of the Russian regime with President Putin. I give the right hon. Gentleman the assurance that he seeks that this Government, and I am sure—I certainly hope—any successor Governments or Ministers, will be incredibly vigilant and pursue whatever measures are required. I have noted the point he made about the cloud, which I think is a good one. On his specific point about regular written assessments, I will take that away and look at it closely. Again, I commend him for his service to the great city of Salisbury.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a statement on the Dawn Sturgess inquiry, which has today published its report. I start with Dawn Sturgess. The untimely and sudden death of a much-missed mother, partner, daughter, sister and friend is a deeply personal tragedy, and today we keep her and her loved ones in our thoughts and prayers. On 4 March 2018, Sergei and Yulia Skripal were targeted by the GRU, the Russian military intelligence service. Three GRU agents flew to the UK intent on killing Sergei Skripal. Two agents, known as Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov, travelled to Salisbury and contaminated the door handle of Sergei’s house with the nerve agent Novichok, with callous and despicable disregard for others who might enter or leave that address. Sergei and Yulia were poisoned, and spent weeks in a critical condition. Others, including Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey, were harmed as they responded to the incident. On 30 June 2018, Charlie Rowley gave his partner Dawn Sturgess a gift of a Nina Ricci perfume bottle. She sprayed her wrists with the contents. Tragically, the bottle contained Novichok and had been recklessly thrown away by Petrov and Boshirov as they left Salisbury four months earlier. Dawn died at Salisbury hospital on 8 July 2018. An inquest was opened, but it was clear that a proper examination of Dawn Sturgess’s death would require a statutory public inquiry, which has been chaired by Lord Hughes. Today, after an extensive and painstaking process, the inquiry has published its report. The inquiry has found that those who were involved in the assassination attempt against Sergei Skripal were “morally responsible” for Dawn’s death, and that “deploying a highly toxic nerve agent in a busy city was an astonishingly reckless act.” The chair concludes that the operation must have been signed off at the highest level of the Russian state, including by President Putin. In respect of the emergency services’ treatment of Dawn, the inquiry found that she received “entirely appropriate medical care” but that, tragically, her condition was “unsurvivable”. On preventability, the chair has concluded that the Government’s public health advice following the attack on the Skripals was reasonable. He also found that although there were failings in the management of Sergei Skripal, the risk of assassination by Russian personnel was reasonably assessed and, based on that assessment, he did not need a new identity. The inquiry has been clear in its findings of responsibility, and we must respond equally unequivocally. I have previously described to hon. Members the acute threat that Russia poses to the UK and our national security. Its recent acts have ranged from murdering Alexander Litvinenko and using a deadly nerve agent in Salisbury to espionage, arson, cyber-attacks and the targeting of UK parliamentarians for interference operations. Since 2018, the UK has been at the forefront of the response against Russia. In direct response to the poisonings, the then Government expelled 23 undeclared Russian intelligence officers. This triggered the expulsion of over 150 Russian diplomats by 28 countries, including NATO allies. The UK has subsequently committed to prevent the rebuild of Russian intelligence and to remove Russian dirty money in the UK, developed legislative powers to harden the UK’s defences against state threats, and delivered new port and border powers, increased security checks on goods from Russia, and banned Russian-owned or linked aircraft from entering the UK. The invasion of Ukraine introduced a stark new reality and demonstrated Russia’s intent to undermine European and global security. The UK has led the way in standing by Ukraine and providing unprecedented military, humanitarian and diplomatic support. In total, the UK has committed £21.8 billion for Ukraine and sanctioned over 2,900 individuals, entities and ships. This Government are proud to be at the forefront of the coalition of the willing to support Ukraine in defending its sovereignty and security. This has inevitably made the UK a target for increased hostile activity by Russia. Following an arson attack in east London in May 2024, the then Home Secretary warned of a pattern of Russian malign activities across Europe that had reached UK soil. In response, the UK expelled the Russian defence attaché and removed diplomatic status from Russian properties believed to have been used for intelligence purposes. We are determined that the UK remains a hard operating environment for the Russian intelligence services. In October last year, we sanctioned three Russian agencies and three senior figures who were attempting to undermine and destabilise Ukraine and its democracy. In July, the UK sanctioned and exposed three GRU units and 18 of its military intelligence officers for the targeting of Yulia Skripal and cyber-operations in support of Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine. Yet we are now grappling with an increasingly reckless methodology. The director general of MI5 recently highlighted Russian state actors turning to proxies “for their dirty work”, and “recruiting proxies on social media platforms, instructing them via encrypted apps, and offering payment in cryptocurrencies.” UK law enforcement has secured convictions in several significant cases just this year: six individuals spying for Russia; six men involved in an arson attack on a warehouse supplying Ukraine; an individual who attempted to offer services to Russian intelligence; and a former MEP who accepted bribes to promote pro-Russian narratives in the EU Parliament. These cases serve as a strong reminder for anyone—anyone—seeking to facilitate or undertake hostile activity for Russia on UK soil. This Government remain committed to providing our law enforcement partners with the tools they need to tackle these threats. We have specified Russia on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme to make it even more challenging to conceal relationships with the Russian state. I can now announce that the Government are going further. Today, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has imposed a further cost on the Russian regime by sanctioning the GRU under the Russia sanctions regime, along with several associated individuals. These sanctions recognise the continued reckless and destabilising activity of the GRU, which seeks to undermine Ukraine, European security and the safety of the United Kingdom. They will include sanctions against eight GRU officers under the cyber sanctions regime and three GRU officers under the Russia sanctions regime who have been implicated in hostile activity across Europe. We are also summoning the Russian ambassador to hold Russia to account for its responsibility for the tragic death of a British citizen. There has been extensive misinformation and disinformation relating to these horrific and barbaric poisonings. This inquiry has categorically rejected those falsehoods, and this Government continue to reject the lies spread by Russia through its propaganda and paid mouthpieces. I wish—I am sure on behalf of the whole House—to wholeheartedly thank Lord Hughes and his team. This was a considerable task of great importance, and they have collectively approached it with diligence, care and sensitivity. I also want to take this opportunity—I am again sure on behalf of the whole House—to thank the first responders, military personnel, scientists, medical practitioners and all those who responded to the attack. They are the very best of us, and I know that Members right across the House will join me in paying tribute to them for the important work they do to keep us safe. Dawn Sturgess was the victim of an utterly reckless and dangerous act—a chemical weapons attack perpetrated by Russia on British soil—and the pain and suffering it has caused can never be undone, but we must honour Dawn Sturgess’s memory, uphold truth and justice, and keep everyone in our country safe. I commend this statement to the House.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the threat. It is not a distant matter; it quite literally impacts the lives of our citizens every single day. I give him an assurance of how seriously we take these matters. He is also right to raise the issue of misinformation and disinformation. Again, through the defending democracy taskforce, these are matters that we keep under very close review. He is right to mention the important contribution that is required of DSIT. We work very closely with DSIT and other Government Departments on these matters. We keep a constant vigilance. I think that, in truth, there is more that we need to do, and I will have further conversations with ministerial colleagues about that particular matter.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his contribution and the work he does in chairing the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. The quote he described is chilling. In response to the point he made yesterday about the coverage in the i newspaper, I can give him the assurances he seeks and tell him and the House that we take all national security threats incredibly seriously. The Government have acted decisively by introducing tougher legislation, enforcing sanctions and working closely with our international partners to make the UK one of the most challenging environments for our adversaries to operate in. That continues to be an absolute priority in terms of securing our national security. I am absolutely determined to ensure that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible target for our adversaries.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to the hon. Member for his comments, and I can give him the assurances that he seeks. As he will acknowledge, the report was published less than a couple of hours ago, but the Government will look very carefully at its findings. I give him and the House an assurance that where there is a requirement to act, we will not hesitate to do so. The hon. Member’s point about our EU partners was well made. We value our relationships with our neighbours, EU partners and Five Eyes colleagues, and I recently met members of the G7 to discuss these matters. When it comes to standing up to the threats that we face, we are much stronger when we join up with our international partners, and that is the right approach. I completely agree with what the hon. Member said about the rules-based order; I am sure that all Members of this House do. That is the right approach. Respecting international law and standing with our allies is the best way to defeat Putin.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  That is an entirely reasonable challenge, and I can give the hon. Gentleman the assurances that he seeks.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  The right hon. Gentleman knows the very high regard in which I hold him. He has asked me some important questions, but they are not necessarily questions that it would be in the interests of our national security for me to get into in any great detail. I can say that I have formed a view about the motive that underpinned this particular attack, but I am not going to get into it today. The point he made about the detail of the report was also raised by the hon. Member for Woking (Mr Forster). I can give him an assurance that we will go very carefully through the all the detail of the report, and I will consider what he has said today. The conclusion that I draw, which I think is the conclusion that Lord Hughes has drawn, is that responsibility for the attack lies with the Russian state. It is the Government’s responsibility to do everything we can to guard against the threat posed, mindful of the nature of that threat.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady raises an entirely reasonable point. She will understand that I will not want to get too much into the detail of that. We look at these matters carefully, and we work across Government and with law enforcement and the intelligence agencies on them. Again, one reason why I sit across two Departments is to ensure that our response is co-ordinated as effectively as possible. She is right to raise this issue; we are doing everything we can to counter it.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Food Security · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend speaks with great authority on these matters. The Cabinet Office is strongly supportive of the work that DEFRA is undertaking on food security, including mapping critical food supply chain assets to provide a greater understanding of potential vulnerabilities. We have also published the first ever chronic risks analysis to support decision making on longer-term cross-cutting and interconnected risks, such as climate and geopolitical change.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Food Security · Hansard source

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  Through the national security risk assessment, the Cabinet Office engages closely with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to continuously assess risks to the security and resilience of the food sector, as well as interdependencies between critical national infrastructure sectors. The Government have published the results of the first annual public survey on risk and resilience, and we provide resilience advice to the public on gov.uk.

• 4 Dec 2025 · National Infrastructure: Cyber-security · Hansard source

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  I understand why the hon. Gentleman raises this issue, and he is right to do so. The Government take the threats we face incredibly seriously. That is one of the reasons why the Prime Minister took the decision back in September to ensure that the Security Minister sits across both the Cabinet Office and the Home Office, so we are better placed as a Government to co-ordinate our national security response in the areas the hon. Gentleman outlined. I can give him and the House an absolute assurance on the seriousness we attach to these issues. We take them very seriously and we are working at pace to address them.

• 4 Dec 2025 · National Infrastructure: Cyber-security · Hansard source

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  The Government recently introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill to strengthen the resilience of UK critical national infrastructure. Yesterday, I visited BT, which has worked with the National Cyber Security Centre to block almost 1 billion attempts to access malicious content in just six months. In spring, the Government will publish a business-first national cyber action plan, and we have already engaged with over 400 stakeholders as part of its development.

• 4 Dec 2025 · National Resilience · Hansard source

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  I am grateful to my hon. Friend, not just for his question today, but for the important work that he has done in this particular area, in his constituency and across Scotland. I have listened carefully to what he has had to say this morning, and I would be happy to discuss it with him further.

• 4 Dec 2025 · National Resilience · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady and the House will understand that I am limited in what I can say in my response, but I can assure her that Russia is a top national security priority for the Government, and UK law enforcement has recently secured a range of convictions in this area. I will have more to say about this later today.

• 4 Dec 2025 · National Resilience · Hansard source

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  The Government published the resilience action plan in July to set out their strategic approach to improve the UK’s resilience to the full range of risks that we face. One of the actions we have taken is to conduct the largest ever pandemic exercise, which involved all regions and nations of the UK and thousands of participants.

• 4 Dec 2025 · National Resilience · Hansard source

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  I join the hon. Gentleman in paying tribute to the important work of the UK Hydrographic Office and its vital contribution to the UK’s maritime security. The Cabinet Office plays a central role to cohere cross-Government efforts to secure the UK’s undersea infrastructure. Given the growing prominence of this issue, lead Departments are engaging with industry partners, and we will continue this inclusive approach as we support the Royal Navy to take a leading role to secure our undersea infrastructure.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Proposed Chinese Embassy · Hansard source

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  The decision to call in the planning application for the proposed Chinese embassy was made by the former Deputy Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner), in line with the current policy on call-in. The decision is subject to a quasi-judicial process and independent from the rest of Government. No private assurances have been given to the Chinese Government regarding the embassy application.