Chris Philp MP: speeches

Speeches

• 11 Feb 2026 · Police Grant Report · Hansard source

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  Roger Hirst, in common with many police and crime commissioners, has done a valiant job in the face of inadequate funding. However, as he said himself: “The Government settlement is insufficient to cover rising costs.” Let us look at outcomes, which the Minister mentioned. It is a matter of deep concern that, under this Labour Government, shoplifting has gone up by 10%, to record levels, robbery from business premises is up by 66% in the past year, antisocial behaviour has gone up, rape has gone up by 7%, and sexual offences have gone up by 8%.

• 11 Feb 2026 · Police Grant Report · Hansard source

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  I will happily give way quite a lot, but I have not even started, and I have given way a couple of times already. I was going to start by echoing the Minister’s tribute to police officers up and down the country who, every day, put themselves in the line of danger. I have attended the annual police memorial service and met the families of officers who have tragically lost their lives while keeping us safe, and I think they should remain at the front of our minds during the debate. The Minister threw around some big numbers earlier in respect of the increase in police funding that has been announced, but the 4.5% increase for frontline police forces—the increase being given to police and crime commissioners—is not enough to meet the funding and cost pressures that they face. Earlier today I spoke to Roger Hirst, the Essex police and crime commissioner, who is, as the Minister knows, the finance lead for the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners. He told me that, according to his assessment, this funding settlement is about £100 million short of the cost pressures that police forces will face, which means that they will have to find cuts—but it is not just Roger. The National Police Chiefs’ Council, the body that represents chief constables, said on 28 January: “Many forces are planning service reductions, with consequences for officer numbers, staff capacity and…resilience.” In other words, both police and crime commissioners and the NPCC say that the settlement is inadequate to maintain police resources. But it not just them either. The Labour police and crime commissioner for Avon and Somerset has just had to cancel the recruitment of 70 new officers because of “lower than expected” Government funding. The Cambridgeshire police and crime commissioner says that the settlement falls short of what is required. The chief constable of Cleveland says that his force faces a £4 million funding gap. The Essex police and crime commissioner, whom I mentioned a moment ago, says that “the Government…settlement…is insufficient to cover rising costs”, and Greater Manchester police say that they face a £32 million funding gap. In summary, this settlement is not enough to enable police forces up and down the country to maintain their level of service. They will shrink, and their services will be diminished. The Minister mentioned the money being provided for the 1,750 neighbourhood policing officers, but did not say how much it was. In fact, the Government are providing £50 million for that purpose. If we divide the one number by the other, we find that it comes to £29,000 per officer. As the NPCC has pointed out, the cost of an officer is, on average, £68,000, so the Government are funding only 42% of the cost, leaving the other 58% completely unfunded. The Minister also forgot to mention that the Government are cancelling the funding for antisocial behaviour hotspot patrolling, which was introduced by the last Government and should have been continued. As for the way in which the money is distributed, it remains the case that the funding formula is deeply unfair. Changes are long overdue, and I ask the Minister to introduce those changes to make the formula fairer. The Metropolitan police receive by far the highest amount in the country. Even if we account for the national capital city grant and counter-terrorism funding, they receive £439 per head. As for the lowest-funded forces, Dorset receives £255 a head, Essex £236, Cambridgeshire £237 and Wiltshire £235. They are inadequately funded, and the formula urgently needs to be updated. I ask the Minister—or her colleague the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), when she sums up the debate—to address that point. The consequence of this inadequate funding settlement is just the same as the consequence of last year’s inadequate funding settlement, when my hon. Friend the Member for Brigg and Immingham (Martin Vickers), my shadow ministerial colleague, stood at the Dispatch Box and warned the Minister’s predecessor that the settlement would lead to reductions in police numbers. We now know that that has come to pass. The most recent figures, published only a few weeks ago, show that in the year to September 2025—an entire year in which Labour was in government—the number of police officers fell by 1,318. Numbers are being cut under this Labour Government. The Government say that they want to hire staff instead, to do jobs behind desks, but the number of police staff fell as well, by 529. They talk about police community support officers. Well, the number of PCSOs fell by 204. Special constables are down by 514 and police volunteers are down by 429. That is a reduction of 3,000 in the police workforce in just one year under this Labour Government. They are not funding the police properly, and they should be ashamed of themselves.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Chinese Embassy · Hansard source

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  Let us be in no doubt about the threat that China poses: MI5 has warned that Chinese intelligence is actively trying to disrupt our democracy; bounties have been placed on the heads of Hong Kong campaigners; Members of this House have been directly spied on by China; China actively supports Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine; and China is infiltrating universities and businesses to acquire sensitive technology, as well as stealing it directly. Yet this Government have failed again and again to take the action needed. This Government failed to place China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. This Government failed to properly support the case against two men accused of spying for China on MPs in this House. And now this Government have shamefully approved plans for a Chinese super-embassy. Despite everything China has done on our soil, China has been rewarded with exactly what it wants: a super-embassy that will be a base for espionage, not just in the UK but likely across Europe as well. The Government have capitulated to Chinese demands. The Prime Minister himself said to President Xi at the G20 in November 2024, “You raised the Chinese embassy building in London when we spoke on the telephone and we have since taken action by calling in that application.” In other words, the Prime Minister did precisely what President Xi told him to do and then he faithfully reported back afterwards. The decision has serious implications. Last week, The Telegraph published plans showing 208 secret rooms and a hidden chamber just 1 metre from critical data cables. Our economy depends on those cables, so what assurance can the Minister give that those cables will be secure from Chinese interference? In paragraph 97 of his decision notice, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, who made the decision, admits that he had not even seen unredacted plans before making his decision. How can he possibly have assessed the risk, as the decision maker, without having seen those plans? He also admits in paragraph 13 that he did not follow our suggestion to hold section 321 closed hearings to take evidence. Once again, how can the Secretary of State possibly have taken the decision in an informed way without having personally assessed the risk? It gets worse, because paragraph 8.63 onwards of the inspector’s report admits that China can legally refuse to allow UK authorities to inspect the building during or after construction—so we are going to have no idea what is being built in there in any event. The Minister referred to the ISC. He said that someone in Government has seen unredacted plans, although we know that that was not the decision maker, the Secretary of State. Has the ISC seen those unredacted plans? It has been suggested to me that it has not. The ISC says that the risks can be mitigated, but mere mitigation is not enough. Mitigation entails only a partial exclusion of risk, and nothing is said about how to manage future developments in China’s capabilities—developments that we cannot anticipate today. The Minister for some reason forgot to quote this, but the ISC also says that the Government process was not robust enough. It says that it lacked clarity on national security, that the key reports lacked the necessary detail and that the Government do not have the “dexterity” required to handle China. Does the Minister accept those elements of the ISC report? Others share those concerns. A US Government source was recently quoted as saying that the UK had “downplayed” the risks. Last week, the White House was reported to be “deeply concerned”, and the chair of the US House of Representatives China committee says that he opposes the plans on the grounds that Americans’ data may be “at risk”. Does the Minister agree with our American allies? It is clear that this decision is timed to be shortly before a planned trip by the Prime Minister to China. He apparently intends to seek some kind of economic deal with China to fix the mess he and the Chancellor have created here, with jobs down and unemployment up since the election. From its timing and from President Xi’s clear demands, this planning consent appears to be linked to the Prime Minister’s imminent visit and to the economic deal. It seems clear to me that the Government are trading national security for economic links, and that this is a shameless capitulation to China’s demands. China is spying on us. It is subverting our democracy, it is repressing people on our soil and it is stealing our technology. Is the truth not this? In those circumstances, giving them what they want is simply the wrong thing to do.

• 4 Dec 2025 · Dawn Sturgess Inquiry · Hansard source

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  I thank the Security Minister for advance sight of his statement. Let me set out straightaway that the Opposition of course fully support the Government’s work in keeping our country safe. I think I agree with and support everything the Security Minister said in his statement. I particularly welcome the additional sanctions that he announced on certain members of the Russian security services. I join the Security Minister in remembering Dawn Sturgess, who lost her life as a result of this reckless and barbaric attack. Leaving highly dangerous chemical weapons lying around was a reckless undertaking by those Russian agents, and Dawn Sturgess’s death lies squarely at their door. I pay tribute to Sergei and Yulia Skripal for the bravery they have shown when faced with targeting by agents of the Russian state, who came to this country specifically with the purpose in mind of killing them. I also pay tribute to the emergency services and security services, as the Security Minister did, who responded so bravely, and some of whom, such as Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey, were themselves harmed as they responded to the attack. The emergency services and security services, on that day and in the days following, distinguished themselves greatly, and I know the whole House will want to thank them for the work they did. The chair of the inquiry concluded, as the Security Minister said, that this operation would have been signed off or agreed to at the very highest level of the Russian state by President Putin himself. I think that makes the important point that Russia is a dangerous and hostile state, and that Vladimir Putin is a dangerous and hostile leader—a man who, as this inquiry has found, personally sanctioned the assassination of civilians on British soil. Of course, the atrocities that the Russian state and President Vladimir Putin have perpetrated are not confined to those we are discussing today. We have seen, on its own soil, the Russian state murder domestic political opponents such as Alexei Navalny. We have seen them shoot down civilian airliners, and we have seen them interfere across Africa. We have seen Putin support former President Assad of Syria in persecuting civilians in Syria, including supporting the use of chemical weapons. So we should be in no doubt at all about the threat that Russia and President Putin pose not just in Russia or Ukraine, but on our soil and across the whole world. I think there is a lesson there for the way in which we in the west collectively consider the Ukraine conflict, which the Security Minister spoke about. I think the actions we have been discussing are one of many reasons that we in the west should be steadfast and unwavering in our support for Ukraine. The lessons of history are quite clear: appeasement does not work, and showing weakness when faced with aggressive dictators simply emboldens them. I hope people in our Government and other Governments, particularly the American Administration, keep that in mind as they conduct negotiations in the coming days and weeks. I know that, quite rightly, the Security Minister will not be able to comment on details, but the House would appreciate an update and assurances about the work being done to protect us domestically against Russian threats. He did not mention cyber-threats in his statement — [ Interruption. ] I do apologise. He did mention them, and we know that Russia repeatedly and deliberately targets both governmental infrastructure and private sector IT infrastructure. So far as he is able to provide one, an update on the work he is leading to counter that would be welcome, as would any indication about whether we are proactively engaged in degrading Russia’s capability in that area. I appreciate that there are severe limitations around what he can say, but any indication he can provide to the House would be very much appreciated. The lessons we can draw from this episode relate not just to Russia, but to any state where we have intelligence or information that they are engaged in aggressive hostile acts. We know, of course, that it is not just Russia: other states, including China, are engaged in different but potentially equally damaging espionage and other activity on our soil. The lesson that this episode teaches is that we cannot be complacent. We cannot, for example, prioritise economic links above national security. We need to be on the front foot when it comes to these threats. In that spirit, and drawing that lesson from this episode, perhaps the Security Minister can explain to the House why China is not in the enhanced tier of FIRS, which in my opinion it should be, and why the Government appear to be contemplating granting planning consent for a super embassy for China on a very sensitive site close to sensitive communications infrastructure, and from which it is very likely China will conduct large-scale espionage activities? The lesson that this episode teaches us is that we cannot be complacent, and we must be active and energetic in protecting our national interest. In general terms, I fully support the direction of travel the Security Minister has set out, and, of course, the Opposition will support him personally and the Government in the work they are doing to keep our country safe.

• 20 Nov 2025 · Migration: Settlement Pathway · Hansard source

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  As always, I thank the Home Secretary for advance sight of her statement. She has had a busy week. I wonder whether this burst of hyperactivity has anything to do with her leadership bid. As her shadow, I will say this: I am rooting for her in her tussle with the Health Secretary as to who gets to replace the Prime Minister, although I fear my endorsement may not be entirely helpful to her! Immigration under successive Governments has been far too high. That has included illegal immigration across the channel, which has surged since the general election, with 10,000 illegal immigrants crossing just in the 75 days that the Home Secretary has been in post. Last year—the first year of a Labour Government—there were a record number of new asylum claims. The number of illegal immigrants accommodated in hotels has gone up under this Labour Government, even though they promised they would reduce numbers. Besides illegal immigration, on which this Government are so clearly failing, legal migration has been far too high, too, absorbing the equivalent of half the new housing supply in recent years. Allowing mass low-skilled migration is bad for the economy, not least when we have 9.5 million working-age people out of work. Mass low- skilled migration without integration has placed all kinds of pressures on society, not least because there are a million people here who do not speak English properly or at all and 10,000 foreign citizens in prison. Where I suspect we and the Government agree is that very limited, high-skilled migration is a good thing, but the days of mass, low-skilled migration must come to an end. There is much in this statement that I support, not least because so much of it is so familiar. The idea of a 10-year route to indefinite leave to remain is something that we proposed in amendments to the Government’s Bill around nine months ago. Inexplicably, the Labour party voted against those measures, and now they have adopted them. We also proposed removing benefits from foreign citizens, including those on ILR who do not have British citizenship, and this consultation document now looks at doing the same thing. I am delighted to see that the Home Secretary, upon arrival at 2 Marsham Street, got out her laptop and started copying and pasting Conservative policies. I have one or two detailed and specific questions, which I ask in a spirit of constructiveness, given that the Home Secretary has adopted so many Conservative policies. Importantly, she said that these policies on ILR qualification would apply to those people here already. She is absolutely right to say that, and I support it. She mentions transitional arrangements. I just urge her to be cautious about those, lest they create loopholes. Can she give the House an estimate as to when these new measures will be implemented? I think the previous rules around legal migration took effect in January 2021, so the people who arrived under them will become eligible under present ILR rules from January 2026—just a few weeks’ time. When will these changes be implemented? I hope it is as soon as possible. The Home Secretary also says that to qualify for ILR at 10 years, people will need to have made national insurance contributions. I have tried to get through the consultation document in the past half hour, and I think I am right in saying that the qualifying threshold is to have earned £12,570 for a period of three years. She can correct me if I have got that wrong, but that strikes me as a very low level of earnings—some £12,500 for three years would not represent a net economic contribution to this country—and I urge her seriously to consider setting the threshold a great deal higher. The Home Secretary also mentions the possibility of volunteering meaning that people get ILR at five years, rather than 10. We know how people game the system when it comes to immigration, such as by pretending to convert to Christianity to get asylum. I urge her to draft those rules carefully and to be extremely cautious, lest she creates some loopholes. Will the Home Secretary consider adopting one last Conservative policy, since she appears so enthusiastic about them, by introducing a binding cap on legal migration? It could be voted for by Parliament each year so that this House can democratically decide the level of inward migration. She has adopted so many of our other policies, and I strongly urge her to adopt that last one too.

• 5 Nov 2025 · Employment Rights Bill · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker, at Prime Minister’s questions earlier today, the Justice Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) no fewer than five times whether he was aware of any prisoner being released early, having claimed asylum. We now know that he had in his possession at that time a folder containing details of the accidental release of Brahim Kaddour-Cherif from Wandsworth prison last week—a man previously convicted of sex offences and who is, as we speak, at large and posing a risk to the public. It has emerged since then that another man, William Smith, was accidentally released on Monday. The Deputy Prime Minister failed to disclose that relevant information to this House. The House and the public are entitled to be told about such things, but the Deputy Prime Minister withheld that information. The police have subsequently confirmed that they have no objection to that information being released, contrary to briefings from the Government. Will the Justice Secretary come to this House before the close of business and make a statement so that Members can question him? We cannot wait until the House returns on Tuesday for a proper account.

• 28 Oct 2025 · China Spying Case · Hansard source

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  “In my opinion, China poses an active and current threat to the United Kingdom.” That is all that the Government needed to say to the Crown Prosecution Service in order to secure this conviction, and yet they did not. As recently as 12 days ago, the director general of M15 said that China posed a daily threat. In July 2022, he and his FBI counterpart said that China was posing a growing threat. The former Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), said it in April 2024, from that Dispatch Box, and the July 2021 integrated review said that China posed the “biggest state-based threat to the UK’s economic security.” It is pretty simple. I have said it, and the Government could have said it, but they did not. The Government’s commentary on this case has been evasive and sometimes misleading. For example, the Prime Minister claimed in India, on 7 October, that what mattered in this case was the previous Government’s designation of China. He said it again, from that Dispatch Box, on 15 October. He said that the issue was the position of the last Government, and the Paymaster General said it again in his opening speech. That claim, made by the Prime Minister and made again by the Paymaster General earlier today, is categorically untrue. We know it is untrue because on page 4 of his letter, the Director of Public Prosecutions said it was untrue. He said: “The test was therefore positively not what the then Government was prepared to… say in public…whether framed as…policy or otherwise…but…whether China was—as a matter of fact—an active threat to national security.” He said it again in evidence yesterday. He said: “We were looking to the DNSA to provide evidence of the actual threat…and not what government policy was.” The DPP has said that categorically in writing and in evidence yesterday. What the Prime Minister said was misleading, and I ask this Minister, the Security Minister, to retract it on the Prime Minister’s behalf. Moreover, the Security Minister himself said on 15 September that the collapse of the case had come as a big surprise to the Government, and that they heard about it only that morning. He said: “the decision was communicated this morning”. —[ Official Report , 15 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 1187.] That, I am afraid, was not true. The decision was communicated on 3 September at the latest, and it most certainly did not come as a surprise to the Government. It was not the case that, as the Minister claimed, he could not comment on why the case had collapsed, as if he did not know about it, because on no fewer than nine different occasions, according to the DPP, the Crown Prosecution Service pleaded with the Government—begged the Government—to say those simple words that I said a couple of minutes ago and the Government, over two years, refused to say. In June 2024, December 2024, February 2025, May 2025, July 2025—twice, on 3 and 10 July—August 2025, 3 September 2025 and 9 September 2025, the CPS begged the Government to say those simple words, and the Government would not say them. Why exactly was the Security Minister acting all surprised on 15 September, claiming that he did not know what was going on, when on nine separate occasions the CPS had pleaded with the Government? Now we come to the meeting of 1 September, a meeting that the Home Secretary, quoted in The Telegraph on 5 October, claimed did not happen. Well, we now know that it did happen. What we do not know, however, is precisely what was discussed at that meeting. We have not seen the minutes of it, and we do not know the actions arising from it. We do know that it was chaired by Jonathan Powell, the National Security Adviser. We know that many people were there. We know that the deputy National Security Adviser, Matt Collins, was there. We also know that on 14 August, two and a half weeks before that meeting, he attended a conference that included the First Treasury Counsel, at which it became clear that Mr Collins would not change his evidence, and the case would therefore collapse. So Mr Collins went into that meeting on 1 September, most likely knowing that the case was unlikely to proceed. Was that discussed? Was the possibility of providing more evidence discussed in that meeting? We do not know. That is why the minutes need to be published. We know for a fact that, on 3 September, the Director of Public Prosecutions informed the Cabinet Secretary and the DNSA that the case was not going to be proceeding on the evidence as it stood. The DPP also said in page 6 of his letter: “It was agreed that” the Cabinet Secretary “might inform a limited group, including some ministers.” I therefore ask the Security Minister to tell the House now which Ministers were informed pursuant to that meeting on 3 September, and whether they took any action as a result—for example, deciding to provide better evidence, which they could have done. It was recently reported in The Sunday Times that the Home Secretary got wind of this around that time, and decided to try to intervene. I did ask the Security Minister this in an urgent question last week, and many of my hon. Friends did as well, but he did not answer the question, so perhaps he now can: when did the Home Secretary become aware of the collapse of the trial? Did she try to intervene? If so, how? It is quite clear that the Government, had they wanted to, could have intervened between 3 September, when the Cabinet Secretary was informed and was given permission to inform Ministers, and the meeting on 9 September, six days later, when the CPS tried, one last time—at least the ninth time—to get the evidence it needed, but, once again, it was not forthcoming. Did the Government have any discussions in that period, between 3 and 9 September, about further evidence that they might have provided? If they did not, why not? A few simple words were all that were needed—words not about the previous Government’s policy, but about the facts as they stood on the ground. I uttered those words just a few minutes ago—it was simple enough—and if this Government had said what I said a few minutes ago, this case would have proceeded. Why did they choose not to do that? Members of this Parliament have been spied on by a hostile state: a state that has stolen intellectual property on an industrial scale, both covertly and through acquisition; a state that plans to build a large embassy, probably for espionage purposes among other things; a state that has opened secret police stations; a state that has put bounties on the heads of people living in the United Kingdom; and a state that has actively supported Russia in its war against Ukraine. The Government could not produce evidence that it was an active and current threat, even though I think it is quite clear to everyone in this Chamber that it was. Why did the Government not provide the evidence they were asked to provide at least nine times? Is it because they are more interested in getting some sort of economic bailout from the Chinese, to fix the mess they have created, than they are in our national security? That is the question they need to answer. If this House and the country are to understand exactly what happened with this case, we need full transparency and full disclosure: the minutes of those meetings, the actions arising from them, and the correspondence with the CPS. If they really want transparency—as the Minister for the Cabinet Office said earlier—all they have to do is support this motion and put this material where it belongs: in the public domain.

• 15 Sept 2025 · Official Secrets Act · Hansard source

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  Let me start by thanking the Security Minister for the briefing and information he provided ahead of his statement. Let me also join him in paying tribute to the officers in our police force and in the security service. They work so hard and take personal risks to keep us safe. Let us start with Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee’s assessment of China, published a year or two ago. It found that China had penetrated every sector of our economy. When the Security Minister a moment ago said that China merely posed a “challenge”, he was wrong I think to use that word. China poses a threat. It poses a threat because it participates and organises systemic espionage into our public institutions, including Parliament. It purloins intellectual property from universities and from companies, particularly in the technology sectors, and it routinely spies on the UK as a state. They also engage in transnational repression of Chinese citizens here, for instance running secret, undeclared police stations and putting bounties on the heads of individuals. The word “challenge” is not strong enough; the state of China poses a threat. The Security Minister said that the Government would “robustly challenge China”, but let me gently point to some of the decisions that the Government have taken in practice. We saw a signal back at the G7 last year, when the Prime Minister was, I am afraid to say, obsequious in dealing with President Xi, appearing to prioritise economic links above security considerations. We have not seen any decision to place China in the enhanced tier of the FIRS scheme, although that regime has been in place for several months, and the Government seem to be viewing with favour the application for a new super-embassy in London, to which our allies, including America, are urging us not to consent and which many of our intelligence services say will be used as a base for espionage activities. So the Government’s record on China causes deep concern, but of equal concern is this specific case—and, Mr Speaker, you explained why that is of particular concern to Parliament, given that the alleged espionage activities touch directly on Parliament and the way in which Members of Parliament do their duty. I have in front of me a briefing provided to the press by the Crown Prosecution Service, dated 26 April 2024, when these charges were first laid. That briefing states that one of the subjects was commissioned over a period exceeding a year, between December 2021 and February 2023, by a Chinese intelligence asset. There are 34 reports on what this note describes as “very specific topics”, some of which relate directly and personally to Members of Parliament. One of the deputy national security advisers told the Crown Prosecution Service that he assessed this information to be “directly or indirectly, useful” to the Chinese state, and said that it was “prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.” Given the gravity of that assessment, it is astonishing that these charges have now been withdrawn. The Crown Prosecution Service clearly assessed these allegations, and the evidence, against the law—against the 1911 Act —in 2024, and found the test to have been met; so why today, more than a year later, have we suddenly been told that the test is no longer met? My question to the Security Minister is a simple one: given the gravity of the charges that I have just read out, what has changed between last year and this year? Why has a case that met the threshold and met the test in April 2024 all of a sudden been determined not to do so? May I ask specifically whether anyone in the Government put any pressure on the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to this case? Did the Government co-operate fully with the police, the security services and the CPS in providing the information required, including information relating to the definition of “an enemy”? Can the Security Minister give the House those express assurances? I certainly share your concern, Mr Speaker, and, I am sure, the concern of many others, that what appears to be extremely serious espionage, assessed as such in the written disclosure that I read out—assessed by the deputy national security adviser as being prejudicial to our national interests—has all of a sudden, and with no explanation, been dropped, even though previously, just a year and a bit ago, it was assessed that this case did meet the threshold. The House and the country need to know what exactly has changed.