Chris Bryant MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  And are hated by others.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  If an area of research does not currently count as scientific research, it will not do so under the Bill. Researchers will benefit from having a clearer definition in legislation that reflects the language buried in the recitals and the current ICO guidance. We believe that improving clarity will reduce uncertainty, the risk of misinterpretations and misapplication of the law. The Government will of course monitor the reform’s impact and how researchers navigate the data protection framework. We think that will help us better understand if further changes are required. The fundamental point is that their lordships inserted a public interest line that we are seeking to take out. They inserted it because they believed it would mean that no data would be used in a way that did not lead to eventual good outcomes. The truth is that when someone starts a piece of research based on curiosity they might have no idea what the final outcome will be. That is an important part of how most researchers work, whether in a commercial or non-commercial setting. That is why the Royal Society has unambiguously stated that if we retain their lordships’ public interest provision, it will have a chilling effect on research in the UK. That is why I commend the amendment to the Committee.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  As we have several provisions here, it might be worth me making some comments. Clause 80 strikes the right balance between helping organisations to make the most of emerging technologies that drive up economic growth and productivity, while maintaining public confidence. Organisations will be able to make decisions that have significant effects for individuals based solely on automated processes in wider circumstances than presently, but they must implement stringent safeguards. Those safeguards include individuals’ right to challenge and obtain human intervention if they are not satisfied with the decision. Where law enforcement agencies process personal data for a law enforcement purpose, they will be able to apply an exemption to the safeguards in very limited circumstances, such as to safeguard national security. Where that happens, a human must reconsider that decision as soon as reasonably practicable after it is taken, and that review must be meaningful. For the intelligence services, where entirely automated decision making is used, we are making clarifications to provide greater confidence to controllers and the public. Schedule 6 contains minor and consequential amendments to UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act. Those amendments repeal and replace references to the current rules on automated decision making with the reformed rules in clause 80 of the Bill to provide legal clarity. On new clauses 1, 4 and 24, the Government’s algorithmic transparency recording standard, or ATRS, enables public authorities to publish information on how and why they are using algorithmic tools. That includes a description of the human role in the wider operational process of which the tool is part. More than 50 ATRS records are now published in the repository, with more to follow shortly. Where these amendments seek to ensure that such tools are evaluated, the blueprint for modern digital government, which was laid in Parliament in January, makes it clear that part of its role will be to offer specialist assurance support, including a service to rigorously test models and products before release. I hope this provides reassurance to the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted. I will address new clauses 7 and 26 together, as they intend to achieve the same effect. I would again like to reassure hon. Members—I am trying to offer a lot of reassurance to the hon. Lady and to the hon. Member for North Norfolk—that the data protection framework has stringent safeguards in place for solely automated decision making. The UK GDPR transparency obligations already require organisations to notify individuals about the existence of solely automated decision making and to provide meaningful information about the logic involved. Under our reforms, after a decision has been made, organisations must also provide data subjects with information about that decision. These information requirements enable individuals to exercise the safeguards I mentioned earlier, and are in addition to the wider transparency requirements of the framework. The safeguards in the reformed article 22 are unnecessary for partly automated decision making, since these decisions already include meaningful human involvement by definition. When it comes to high-risk decisions, there are already additional requirements for processing that can result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals, including automated decision making. Controllers must carry out an impact assessment for such processing activities and consult the Information Commissioner’s Office where such an assessment indicates a high risk to individuals in the absence of effective measures. That process ensures that potential risks are identified and addressed. I therefore hope that the hon. Members for Harpenden and Berkhamsted and for North Norfolk feel that they do not need to press their new clauses to a vote.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thought the debate might stray a little from the precise point my hon. Friend just made to into broader issues about young people’s use of smartphones and social media in general, and inevitably it has. This is a very live issue, of which the Government are painfully aware, as I tried to say in the debate last Friday. We are trying to work out the best way forward to a place where the rules that were implemented in the Online Safety Act, some of which only come into force in the spring—some have yet to get parliamentary approval; that will probably come in April—bed in properly and are adhered to before we take further action. That is simply because it is difficult to know otherwise whether the Online Safety Act has gone far enough. I wish that the Online Safety Act had been not the Online Safety Act 2023, but the Online Safety Act 2021 or 2019. Had it been, we might now be in a position to assess its effects. In the debate on Friday I referred to the feasibility study commissioned by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology from the University of Cambridge, which is working with other researchers. Work on that will finish in May, so I hope to have further information then. There is already a lot of guidance out there for parents, teachers and schools, but if we need to provide more informed guidance in the future, we will certainly look into that. The precise targeting of young people by algorithms and so on is, at least theoretically, already dealt with by the Online Safety Act. That is why I do not think that new clause 21 is an appropriate measure to take forward at this time. Whether the age limit should be 13 or 16 was decided by the previous Government and agreed by Parliament after quite extensive consultation during the passage of the Data Protection Act 2018. All these matters have to be kept under review, and we are doing so in an urgent way, not least because a lot of Members are bringing up concerns raised by their constituents, families and so on. I sometimes worry that the concentration solely on schools is to the detriment of the wider issues we are facing, not least because, as teachers readily admit, they only ever see children for about 20% of their time, and we need to set this in a wider context. I understand the motivation behind the new clause, but I will still resist it. Question put and agreed to. Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause s 82 to 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedules 7 to 9 agreed to. Clauses 86 to 88 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 89 Joint processing by intelligence services and competent authorities Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am afraid I do not accept the characterisation the hon. Lady has put on the clause. There is currently an exemption from notifying data subjects if it would constitute a disproportionate effort to do so or prove impossible—obviously, there are cases where it is impossible to notify somebody. At the moment, that exemption can be used only when data was not collected directly from the data subject. Clause 77 will create a new exemption for when data was collected directly from the data subject. It will be limited to processing only for research purposes, and only when there is a change of purpose. We believe that that will help longitudinal studies that originally obtained data from data subjects but that would struggle to notify them about a change in purpose of the study—for instance, due to having lost contact over years or due to a deterioration in the data subject’s condition. The clause is therefore essential to our research facilities in the UK, and I urge Members to support it. Question put and agreed to. Clause 77 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 78 and 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 80 Automated decision-making

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have often wondered whether Kylie’s song “Padam Padam” is a reference to Edith Piaf’s “Padam padam…” because they are also quite similar. This is, of course, a well traversed space for people working in the copyright sphere: trying to make sure that people are not passing off or using other people’s work without permission. The economic and moral rights of rights holders are well established in UK law. We started the process of legislating for that in 1709, under Queen Anne. Dickens had an ambition to make sure that people could not just take copies of his books to America and sell them for free without any payment to him, which is part of why we ended up with an international copyright regime. We do not want to undermine that. Transparency is key, and it was one of the elements that we put into our consultation. We need to be careful about precisely how that transparency works out. The hon. Gentleman referred to proposed new clause 18, which he wants us to do something on within three months. As ambitious as he may be for me, that is a remarkably short period of time for parliamentary drafting. After all, a version of the Bill was first introduced four years ago, yet it still does not have Royal Assent. He refers to the terms “proportionate and effective” in that proposed new clause. To go back to “Hamlet”, aye, there’s the rub. What do proportionate and effective mean, and how do you balance the two? Different sectors will have difficult and competing sets of agendas and we may, in some shape or other, have to arbitrate. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that no one, anywhere in the world, has come to a proper settled position on this issue. In the United States of America, for instance, a lot of AI companies have been relying on fair use, under the slightly different copyright system there, but the most recent federal case found in favour of Reuters against an AI company—the court said that scraping material was not fair use. The EU has not yet fully developed its proposals and has not decided how to implement its transparency requirements. It could be argued that that is one reason why there has not been much additional licensing, which was one of the EU’s declared goals. There is also the question of how to enforce transparency. The clause—in a provision tabled by the admirable Baroness Kidron—specifically gives that enforcement power to the Information Commissioner. I am not sure that is the right place to put that power, or that the Information Commissioner has the expertise or resources for it. Undoubtedly, if there are to be new transparency requirements, we must have some form of enforcement. All those things suggest to me that it is not right to put this power as an addendum to this Bill. The matter should be seen in the round, after a consultation, and there should be a proper primary legislation process, which may not happen for another 12 to 18 months, or even two years. I do not know. The Secretaries of State for Culture, Media and Sport and for Science, Innovation and Technology, and myself, are keen to get to a place where there is more licensing of copyrighted material by AI companies. I do not think anybody expects that the labour of others should be handed over to third parties without recompense or control. That, in itself, is not simple. It might be simple for the Design & Artists Copyright Society to do all the licensing for artists and photographers, but how could that be done for people who works as individuals, rather than as part of a collecting society? That is another set of issues that need to be addressed. I know there are places in the world where one can buy an AI-generated book, and it might be perfectly readable. We might all have authors who we think have worked in that way in the past. But when I read a book, watch a film, or listen to a piece of music, I want to know that it has a human involved in it. Human creativity is a vital part of what renders that process of creativity so important. I think of humans as fundamentally social beings. One of the worst things that can be done to a human being is to put them in solitary confinement, because that denies our fundamental social being. What is so special about all the creative industries is that they enable a connection from human being to human being. I am passionate about not losing that or the value inherent in that. Amendment 22 agreed to. Clause 95, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 96 to 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 10 agreed to. Clauses 104 to 108 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 11 agreed to. Clause 109 to 112 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 12 agreed to. Clauses 113 to 115 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 13 agreed to . Clause 116 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered , That further consideration be now adjourned. — (Kate Dearden.)

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  The new lawful ground of recognised legitimate interest in clause 70 and schedule 4 have been designed to give organisations greater confidence when processing personal data for important public interest objectives, such as preventing crime, safeguarding vulnerable individuals and protecting national security. They also ensure that non-public bodies can share information with public authorities where it is necessary and proportionate to do so without having to conduct a complex balancing test in situations where timely action is essential. Amendment 49 would remove that provision, making it harder for organisations to share data confidently and swiftly for those public interest purposes. I recognise that the hon. Lady might be concerned that the removal of the need to do a detailed legitimate interest balancing test in this narrow set of circumstances could reduce protections, but strong safeguards remain in place, as was recognised in the House of Lords, which did not approve such an amendment. Any processing must still be necessary and proportionate and comply with data protection principles under UK GDPR to ensure that individuals’ rights continue to be protected. Amendment 50 would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to amend the list of recognised legitimate interests using regulations, and delete the list itself from schedule 4 of the Bill. We believe that the ability of the Secretary of State to amend the list is a necessary safeguard to future-proof the framework. This power is not unrestricted. It is subject to strict safeguards, including parliamentary approval by the affirmative resolution procedure and the requirement that any additions must serve public interest objectives under article 23(1) of the UK GDPR. Removing the power would make it more difficult to adapt the framework over time. I have also considered amendment 53, which would prevent health data being processed under the new lawful ground, and I would argue that it conflicts with amendment 49. Health data would be processed under this new ground only in so far as that was necessary for one of the specified recognised legitimate interests in schedule 4 to the Bill. Any processing of health data would also have to meet one of the relevant criteria for processing specific category data in article 9 of UK GDPR and schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act 2018. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Lady will feel able to withdraw her amendments.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady has tabled another amendment that calls for the Secretary of State to report to Parliament. I hope that I am proving that the requirement to put those reports in the Bill is unnecessary. The amendment would introduce a new duty on the police to review the retention of biometric data under clause 127, and a duty for the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the use of that data. Clause 127 does not alter the existing duty in the Data Protection Act 2018, which ensures that the police retain only personal data, including sensitive personal data such as biometrics, as long as it is considered “necessary and proportionate”—precisely the terms that she advocated. The biometrics commissioner already has independent oversight of biometric data retained under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, and has a statutory duty to report to Parliament annually. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation also has statutory oversight of all the powers in the 2008 Act, and reports annually to Parliament. For those reasons—without doubting the hon. Lady’s intent—I hope that she will not press the amendment to a vote. Question put and agreed to. Clause 126 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 127 to 134 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 135 Compliance with UK copyright law by operators of web crawlers and general-purpose AI models Q uestio n put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Excellent: we all agree that Baroness Owen has done a great piece of work for us, and we are grateful. Incidentally, I am also grateful to Ministry of Justice officials who worked with DSIT officials on the amendments before us today, which provide a more comprehensive version of what was originally argued for. The hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge asked me about the difference between solicitation and requesting. Often, it is considered that solicitation would require some form of exchange of money. Obviously, that would not necessarily be the case in this context, which is why we have “requesting”, a broader category than solicitation. A request includes doing an act that could reasonably be taken to be a request—for example, nodding or otherwise indicating agreement in response to an offer or complying with conditions of an offer. It also includes both making a request directed to a particular person or persons and making a request available to one or more people, or people generally, without directing it to a particular person or people. In other words, that is broader than what solicitation would have required. I think Baroness Owen agrees with us that this is therefore a more comprehensive offence. The hon. Gentleman asked about the “reasonable excuse” defence. Let us say that a software developer wants to ensure that he or she—probably “he” in this case—has developed the right safeguards in his software to stop people generating intimate deepfakes without the consent of the person depicted. In some circumstances, he will have a reasonable excuse where, in the course of the testing to ensure that the software does not create such images, he creates a purported intimate image. That might be an instance of a reasonable excuse. I do not want to lay out what reasonable excuses might be, because the courts are so used to dealing with the concept of a reasonable excuse. There are many offences to which it applies, and the courts, as I have said, are used to dealing with them. The hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted asked me about sharing—is sharing a deepfake an offence? Sharing a deepfake intimate image without consent is already an offence under section 66B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. I hope that, without further ado, we can agree the amendments and the clause. Amendment 28 agreed to . Amendments made : 29, in clause 141, page 173, line 35, leave out from beginning to end of line 8 on page 174. This amendment removes a new offence of soliciting the creation of a purported intimate image of an adult. For a replacement offence, see Amendment 31. Amendment 30, in clause 141, page 174, line 26, at end insert— “(7A) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for creating the purported intimate image.” This amendment adds a defence of reasonable excuse to the new offence of creating a purported intimate image of an adult. Amendment 31, in clause 141, page 174, line 29, at end insert— “66EA Requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult (1) A person (A) commits an offence if— (a) A intentionally requests the creation of a purported intimate image of another person (B) (either in general or specific terms), (b) B does not consent to A requesting the creation of the purported intimate image, and (c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. (2) A person (A) commits an offence if— (a) A intentionally requests that, if a purported intimate image of another person (B) is created, it includes or excludes something in particular (whether relating to B’s appearance, the intimate state in which B is shown or anything else), (b) B does not consent to A requesting the inclusion or exclusion of that thing, and (c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. (3) References in this section to making a request (however expressed) include doing an act which could reasonably be taken to be a request (such as, for example, indicating agreement in response to an offer or complying with conditions of an offer). (4) References in this section to making a request (however expressed) are references to— (a) making a request directed to a particular person or persons, or (b) making a request so that it is available to one or more persons (or people generally), without directing it to a particular person or persons. (5) References in this section to consent to a person requesting something are— (a) in a case described in subsection (4)(a), references to consent to a request being made that is directed to the particular person or persons, and (b) in a case described in subsection (4)(b), references to consent to a request being made so that it is available to the person or persons (or people generally), as appropriate. (6) An offence under this section is committed— (a) regardless of whether the purported intimate image is created, (b) regardless of whether the purported intimate image, or the particular thing to be included in or excluded from such an image, is also requested by another person, and (c) regardless of where in the world the person or persons mentioned in subsection (4)(a) and (b) is or are located. (7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for making the request. (8) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both). (9) In this section, references to a purported intimate image, to creating such an image and to a person shown in an intimate state have the same meaning as in section 66E.” This amendment makes it an offence to request the creation of a purported intimate image of an adult without consent. Amendment 32, in clause 141, page 174, line 30, leave out “soliciting” and insert “requesting”. This amendment is consequential on Amendments 29 and 31. Amendment 33, in clause 141, page 174, line 32, leave out “section 66E” and insert “sections 66E and 66EA”. This amendment provides that the definitions in new section 66F of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 apply for the purposes of new section 66EA of that Act (see Amendment 31) (as well as for the purposes of new section 66E). Amendment 34, in clause 141, page 174, line 33, leave out “the creation of a purported intimate image” and insert “an act”. This amendment, and Amendments 35 and 36, adjust the definition of “consent” in new section 66F of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 so that it works for the purposes of new section 66EA of that Act (see Amendment 31) (as well as for the purposes of new section 66E). Amendment 35, in clause 141, page 174, line 34, leave out “of creation”. See the explanatory statement for Amendment 34. Amendment 36, in clause 141, page 174, line 35, at end insert “(and see also section 66EA(5))”. See the explanatory statement for Amendment 34. Amendment 37, in clause 141, page 175, line 10, at end insert— “(8) The “maximum term for summary offences” means— (a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months; (b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.” This amendment explains what is meant by the “maximum term for summary offences” in new sections 66E and 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. (New section 66EA is inserted by Amendment 31). Amendment 38, in clause 141, page 175, line 10, at end insert— “66G Creating, or requesting the creation of, purported intimate image of adult: time limit for prosecution (1) Notwithstanding section 127(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, a magistrates’ court may try an information or written charge relating to an offence under section 66E or 66EA if the information is laid or the charge is issued— (a) before the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the day on which the offence was committed, and (b) before the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which evidence which the prosecutor thinks is sufficient to justify a prosecution comes to the prosecutor’s knowledge. (2) A certificate signed by or on behalf of a prosecutor stating the date on which evidence described in subsection (1)(b) came to the prosecutor’s knowledge is conclusive evidence of that fact.” This amendment extends the period during which a person may be prosecuted for an offence under new section 66E or 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (creating, or requesting the creation of, purported intimate image of adult). Amendment 39, in clause 141, page 175, line 12, after “66E” insert “, 66EA”. This amendment provides that references to an image of a person in new section 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (see Amendment 31), like references to such an image in new section 66E of that Act, do not include an image of an imaginary person. Amendment 40, in clause 141, page 175, line 12, at end insert— “(3A) In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 177D insert— ‘ 177DA Purported intimate images to be treated as used for purpose of certain offences (1) This section applies where a person commits an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is an offence under section 66E of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (creating purported intimate image of adult). (2) The purported intimate image to which the offence relates, and anything containing it, is to be regarded for the purposes of section 177C(3) (and section 94A(3)(b)(ii)) as used for the purposes of committing the offence (including where it is committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring).’” This amendment provides that deprivation orders can be made under the Armed Forces Act 2006 in connection with an offence under new section 66E of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (creating purported intimate image of adult). Amendment 41, in clause 141, page 175, line 12, at end insert— “(3B) In Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the Serious Crime Act 2007 (offences to be disregarded in reckoning whether an act is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence: England and Wales), after paragraph 38 insert— ‘ Sexual Offences Act 2003 38ZA An offence under section 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult).’” This amendment provides that a person cannot be guilty, under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, of encouraging or assisting the offence under new section 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (requesting the creation of a purported intimate image) (see Amendment 31). Amendment 42, in clause 141, page 175, line 17, leave out “or soliciting the creation of”.— (Chris Bryant.) This amendment is consequential on Amendment 29. Clause 141, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 142 Power to make consequential amendment Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 124 delivers on the Labour manifesto commitments to further support coroners, and procurators fiscal in Scotland, to access information held by online services after a child’s death. This is a very sensitive issue, and we have tried to address it as such. The provision will require Ofcom, when informed by a coroner, to issue a data preservation notice to specified online service companies. That will help to ensure that those online service companies retain all the relevant data they have on a child so that it will be available on request should a coroner later require it as part of an inquest into a child’s death. The clause demonstrates the Government’s commitments to keeping children safe online and supporting families that have endured unimaginable losses. I am conscious that some might want us to go further; further to the conversation we had earlier, we might be able to have a fruitful discussion on that before we reach Report. On new clause 29, I reassure the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted that there are already strong powers to ensure that companies comply with data preservation notices. Those include the power to issue fines for non-compliance of up to £18 million, or 10% of qualifying worldwide revenue, and the ability to hold senior managers criminally liable for non-compliance. Those sanctions will help to ensure that online services comply with any notice issued under section 101 of the Online Safety Act 2023. Under a provision in that Act, the Secretary of State must already review the effectiveness of the Act’s regime, including the data preservation measures, between two and five years after it comes into force and must produce a report detailing his findings, which will then be laid in Parliament. I therefore hope that the hon. Member will not feel the need to press her new clause to a vote.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Further to that point of order, Mr Turner. The reason new clause 30 has not been selected is not that anybody has wanted to rule it inadmissible; it is simply because we are cracking through the Bill at such a speed that, although it was anticipated we would still be sitting on Thursday, it seems likely we will finish today, and new clause 30 therefore cannot be reached today because of its late tabling. I know that Ellen is in the room, and I am very happy to facilitate a meeting with her, which I think is still outstanding with the Department. We will make sure that happens before the Bill gets to Report stage. If the hon. Member for Cheltenham or other Members want to be present at that meeting, I will make sure that happens. This is not a slight of any kind; it is just an accident of fortune in terms of the tabling of amendments.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 141, page 173, line 27, leave out “or soliciting the creation of”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 29.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge nearly caught me out because I had to look up “iatrogenic”. Basically, I think it means that when someone is being treated for something, it can lead to harmful effects. I am worried about that, because I have a PET CT scan tomorrow afternoon and an MRI scan on Saturday, so I am worried that I am being subjected to more risk because of all this imaging. The truth of the matter is that a patient wants to be able to access as many of their records as possible—whether it is their blood tests or whatever else. That is a significant change that has happened in the last few years. It is about putting the patient back in a key role in the NHS, and them being able to manage their own data, but that simply cannot happen unless we pass this legislation and roll out changes across the whole of the NHS. The hon. Gentleman asked me a specific question, although he admitted that it is not really my plan to develop these things; I might have to get the Department of Health and Social Care to write to him to lay some of that out. That is part of the work that we need to do at the moment. This is not in the Bill, but as a Welsh MP, I would like us to have shared standards across the whole of the United Kingdom, because there are people using different parts of the NHS across the different nations. That would make simple, common sense. I also worry sometimes about cyber-security, with every different part of the NHS buying its own systems, and whether those systems all have the necessary cyber-security to make sure that data is preserved safely. I believe that the Bill will enable us to get a much more secure set of data provisions on the way health information can be shared between different parts of the NHS in England. Question put and agreed to. Clause 121 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 15 Information standards for health and adult social care in England Amendment made: 14, in schedule 15, page 255, line 35, at end insert— “(5) This section does not authorise the processing of information if the processing would contravene the data protection legislation (but in determining whether it would do so, take into account the power conferred by this section). (6) In this section, ‘the data protection legislation’ has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3 of that Act).” —(Chris Bryant.) This amendment provides that information may not be processed for the purposes of new section 251ZC of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (public censure of relevant IT providers) if that would contravene the data protection legislation. Schedule 15, as amended, agreed to. Clause 122 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 16 agreed to. Clause 123 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 124 Retention of information by providers of internet services in connection with death of child Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The amendments are the result of considerable discussion between officials, who have suddenly joined me as my inspiration, and the noble Baroness Owen. As promised in the other place, we have tabled further amendments relating to the offence that was included in the House of Lords. Recognising how crucial time limits are in this sensitive area, we made a commitment that is fulfilled by amendment 38, which would extend the statutory time limits to enable prosecutions to be brought at any date that is both within six months from when sufficient evidence comes to the prosecutor’s knowledge to justify prosecution, and within three years from when the offence was committed. By doing that, perpetrators will not be able to get away with creating a deepfake just because no one knew about it in time for the prosecution to commence within six months. Amendment 31 will ensure that the law comprehensively criminalises asking someone to create a deepfake, regardless of where they are based or whether the image was made. We absolutely agree with the policy rationale put forward by Baroness Owen, which is why we did not oppose the amendment on solicitation. Our amendments replace the term “solicitation” with a new requesting offence, which has been drafted to ensure that it is comprehensive and functions as it should, and that it is clear to the courts how it should be understood and applied in practice within the wider criminal law framework.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I should have put on the record, as the shadow Minister did, my gratitude and congratulations to Baroness Owen for her tenacity; that point was absolutely right.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak only to Government amendment 16, which is highly technical—there will be a test on it afterwards. It removes the privilege amendment inserted at Lords Third Reading to clause 147, which was necessary given the Bill was introduced in the Lords. Question put and agreed to. Clause 142 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 143 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 144 Extent Amendments made: 43, to clause 144, page 177, line 25, leave out “141” and insert “141(1) to (3) and (4)”. This amendment, and Amendment 44, are consequential on Amendments 40 and 41. Amendment 44, in clause 144, page 177, line 26, leave out “extends” and insert “extend”. See the explanatory statement for Amendment 43. Amendment 45, in clause 144, page 177, line 26, at end insert— “(d) section 141(3A) (amendment of the Armed Forces Act 2006) extends to— (i) England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, (ii) the Isle of Man, and (iii) the British overseas territories, except Gibraltar;” This amendment provides for the amendment of the Armed Forces Act 2006 made by Amendment 40 to have the same extent as that Act. Amendment 46, in clause 144, page 177, line 26, at end insert— “(d) section 141(3B) (amendment of the Serious Crime Act 2007) extends to England and Wales and Northern Ireland only.” This amendment provides for the amendment of the Serious Crime Act 2007 made by Amendment 41 to have the same extent as that Act. Amendment 47, in clause 144, page 177, line 26, at end insert— “(5A) The powers conferred by section 384(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (powers to extend provisions to the Channel Islands and to make provisions apply with modifications as they extend to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and British overseas territories other than Gibraltar) may be exercised in relation to section 177DA of that Act (inserted by section 141(3A) of this Act).”— (Chris Bryant.) This amendment provides that the new section inserted in the Armed Forces Act 2006 by Amendment 40 may, like the other provisions of that Act, be extended to the Channel Islands and modified as it extends to those Islands, the Isle of Man and British overseas territories other than Gibraltar. Clause 144, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 145 and 146 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 147 Short title Amendment made: 16, in clause 147, page 179, line 10, leave out subsection (2).— (Chris Bryant.) This amendment removes the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords. Clause 147, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. New Clause 2 Impact of this Act and other developments at national and international level on EU data adequacy decision “Within three months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must carry out an assessment of the likely impact on the European Union data adequacy decisions relating to the United Kingdom of the following— (a) this Act; (b) other changes to the United Kingdom’s domestic frameworks which are relevant to the matters listed in Article 45(2) of the UK GDPR (transfers on the basis of an adequacy decision); (c) relevant changes to the United Kingdom’s international commitments or other obligations arising from legally binding conventions or instruments, as well as from its participation in multilateral or regional systems, in particular in relation to the protection of personal data.”— (Victoria Collins.) This new clause requires the Secretary of State to carry out an assessment of the impact of this Act and other changes to the UK’s domestic and international frameworks relating to data adequacy. Brought up, and read the First time.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I propose that the clause does not stand part of the Bill. Clause 140, which was tabled in the House of Lords, is a regulation-making power that would enable terms relating to core personal data attributes to be defined consistently across data held by public authorities. The intention behind this measure is that the power could be used to define the term “sex”. We seek to overturn this clause for the following reasons. The Government believe that public sector data, including data about sex and gender, should continue to be collected based on the specific data requirements of those collecting the data, and their users, which differs across contexts. That is in line with the data minimisation principle set out in the data protection legislation. We do not think it is appropriate to have core personal data attributes defined in regulations in the way that is proposed. Furthermore, setting out such definitions using secondary legislation could create confusion where terms are already defined in legislation, and so—depending on the approach taken—could cut across the existing definitions. For example, defining sex could cut across the existing legal framework and undermine protections in the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Equality Act 2010. I am, however, keen to reassure the Committee that the Government recognise the importance of harmonising data and have already commenced important work on standards across Government—via a cross-Government working group led by the Data Standards Authority—to define the core attributes of a person. Last year, the Office for Statistics Regulation published guidance on collecting and reporting data about sex and gender identity, and in December 2024 the Government Statistical Service published a work plan for harmonised standards in this space. The Government’s belief is that such matters are crucial and more appropriately considered holistically outside the Bill. The intention of the Bill is not to define or remark on the definitions of sex and gender, or other core personal data attributes. I therefore recommend that the clause does not stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted said that this is her last contribution to the debate, so in the words of the “The Little Mermaid”, I suppose we are poor, unfortunate souls. I thank her for tabling these new clauses, and she raised issues that were also discussed in the other place. On new clause 6, as my noble Friend Baroness Jones noted in the House of Lords, the Government support giving individuals greater agency over their data and a robust regime of data subject rights. We have already announced our intention to publish a call for evidence on the potential role of data intermediaries. It is important that we establish a firm evidence base before we make any changes to people’s data rights, so I hope that that makes new clause 6 unnecessary. On new clause 25, as I have just said, we have already published a call for evidence on the potential role of data intermediaries, which is why we need to proceed carefully before going down the route offered by the new clause. Finally, on new clause 28, the Government acknowledge that there are various models of data intermediaries, including those that manage voluntarily contributed personal data for the common good, such as data co-operatives and trusted research environments. We have already announced our call for evidence, which will seek views on various aspects relevant to data intermediaries, including the delegation of data subject rights to third parties, barriers preventing data intermediaries from operating at full capacity and risk factors associated with significant growth in their activities. This will also include views on different models of data intermediaries, including those focused on data altruism, as the hon. Lady mentioned. Given that we have already announced our intention to act in these areas, I very much hope that the hon. Lady will be content to withdraw the motion.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I note that before the break we had the Sugababes, and that now we have “The Tempest”—I think the hon. Gentleman managed to get in a very brief quote, or I guess his version of it: O brave new world that has such data in it. The hon. Gentleman excoriates the Government for moving too slowly and for not taking enough powers to be able to move faster, and yet several of the amendments that the Liberal Democrats have tabled have been ones that insist that we should have more accountability to Parliament and a slower process, and should not have such regulation-making powers. It is often difficult to decide between those two because we want enough parliamentary scrutiny, but in an area of rapid technological change it is important that legislation is able to move fast enough to adapt. The hon. Gentleman rightly refers to digital inclusion as a key aspect of the Bill. If we are going to take forward a digital nation and a digital Government plan, we have to factor in the fact that some people will simply not be able to take part unless we take radical action to include them digitally.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Government are, of course, committed to the independence of the ICO. As the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge said, the recommendations about changing the structure were entirely ones that were advanced in the previous version of the Bill and supported by the previous Government. We think that it will just make it more efficient, more effective and more transparent. As I have said, we are committed to the ICO’s independence; it is a vital part of its role. That is why the new role of the chair of the information commission will be appointed by His Majesty, by letters patent— the same approach taken for the current Information Commissioner role. Furthermore, the Secretary of State has agreed with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster that the role of chair will be listed as a significant appointment with the Commissioner for Public Appointments and be subject to pre-appointment scrutiny by the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee. The shadow Minister’s questions about how the Information Commissioner can balance those two requirements are perfectly legitimate. I think that they are questions for the Information Commissioner, and they are the kind of questions that could legitimately be asked in a pre-appointment session with the Select Committee. I do not, therefore, believe that the amendment from the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted is necessary. However, I would like to put on record that the Government intend to maintain the title of the Information Commissioner in respect of the chair of the information commission, acknowledging the fact that the identity and brand of the Information Commissioner is valued and recognised domestically and internationally. We do not want to lose that, so we intend to preserve it. Question put and agreed to. Clause 117 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 14 agreed to. Clauses 118 to 120 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 121 Information standards for health and adult social care in England Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 121 and schedule 15 make clear that information standards published under section 250 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, as amended by the Health and Care Act 2022, will include standards relating to information technology or IT services used, or intended to be used, in connection with the processing of information related to the provision of health and adult social care in England. For the health and adult social care system to work effectively, data needs to be processed in a standardised way using common specifications, which goes to some of the points made by the hon. Member for North Norfolk in quoting Government publications. These provisions are an important step towards creating a modern health and adult social care service, where systems are integrated and staff have quicker access to patient data, freeing up time that can be spent with patients. In previous debates, several Members have referred to physical records, and I have referred to one hospital in Doncaster that employs 42 members of staff solely to carry around physical records. There are still departments in many parts of the NHS in England that are producing more physical, handwritten notes every day of the week. That must be nonsense; it must make it more difficult for us to deliver connected services in future and it cannot be in the interests of the patient, because we would want the patient to be able to hold in their hand an app with everything that relates to their own medical health, almost like a medical passport of their own. That simply is not possible if all the different bits of the NHS in England cannot work together. Government amendment 14 is a technical change to ensure that any personal data processed in the exercise of the public censure power, set out in schedule 15, is subject to the relevant existing data protection legislation. New clause 3 would require researchers to keep and publish records about the health and social care data that they have processed for research. There are already extensive transparency requirements for health data, and the Information Commissioner’s Office provides detailed advice to the public on their data rights. The law only allows confidential patient information to be used for research without consent when it has been approved by the Health Research Authority. There are detailed arrangements for this approval, based in law, and the transparency arrangements include published registers of approved applications showing what data is used for what purpose and by whom. I hope therefore that the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted will accept that this means her new clause is not necessary.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Mr Turner, I have confidence in confidence alone; I have confidence in you—if we are going to do Julie Andrews. This is obviously a serious matter. The clause pretends to be just a regulation-making power that would allow the Government to publish a data dictionary by regulations. It is framed as a means to promote data consistency, but its actual intent is to push the Government to set a single definition of the term “sex” through a public authority data dictionary that public authorities would need to have regard to when processing data. As I have said several times in debates already, that is inappropriate. The whole purpose of data is that it is set within a context and that that context changes. For instance, the data that is required for the running of a hospital or prison is different from that required for the hiring of a car or the purchase of a property. That is why we think it is important that we do not go down this route. The Opposition are again trying to give the Secretary of State more powers to do things by regulation, but it would be completely inappropriate to develop this data dictionary by secondary legislation, which would be unamendable and therefore subject to only minimal debate. I completely agree with the noble Lord Vallance that data has to be consistent and accurate, but it also has to be in the context for which it is being used. That is the key determinant that some Members have not understood in the Government’s argument. I still suggest that clause 140 does not stand part of the Bill. Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  First, I should have also thanked the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones), because she has been intimately involved in bringing forward the measures that we debated in the last group. My apologies for forgetting that, Mr Turner. On new clause 2, I completely agree that EU data adequacy is vital, but I completely disagree with the new clause, because I think it is technically deficient. One reason for that is the timeline that it lays out of three months, by which time I hope we might be able to have made progress. I also think that it undermines the independence of the process that the European Commission has to go through. The European Commission has already confirmed that its review of its two adequacy decisions for the UK are currently under way—ahead of the deadline, which is good. As Lord Vallance stated in the House of Lords, DSIT and the Home Office have dedicated teams supporting the European Commission’s technical review, as required. I acknowledge the unilateral nature of the adequacy assessment made by the European Commission. For that reason, it is important to provide the European Commission with the discretion needed to complete its process, which I am afraid new clause 2 would undermine. So, for that reason, I am resisting the blandishments of the Liberal Democrats.

• 10 Mar 2025 · Draft Grants to the Churches Conservation Trust Order 2025 · Hansard source

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  I will run through the various points that the hon. Member made. Some were not strictly speaking anything to do with the measure before us, but none the less I am happy to try to accommodate him. First, the hon. Member knows that this is solely about redundant churches. It would be impossible for the trust to take on all the new redundant churches every year; it can take on only two or three or so. We do not want to overload the trust, and make it impossible for it to do its work. It is a sad fact that vast numbers of churches are passing into redundancy. They do not have a congregation, or certainly not one that is able to maintain them financially. There are churches that were built in areas where—and eras when—more people went to church, or it was hoped that more people would go to church than ever actually did, and some of them are very difficult to maintain. The hon. Member is right that the heritage at risk register is problematic. This is not the only place that money comes from: the Church of England itself provides roughly 34% of the trust’s funding and the heritage lottery has committed something like £110 million over the next few years towards listed places of worship, so there are other means of trying to maintain listed places of worship that are also at-risk heritage sites. The hon. Member asked about the listed places of worship scheme, which, as I say, is nothing to do with the draft order. He asked why a funding commitment is made one year at a time. To be honest, it has always been made one year at a time. When he was a Minister, the situation was exactly the same under his Government, year after year. That is why we have been able to make a commitment only for next year. The hon. Member could have asked why the draft order is only a one-year commitment, because in previous years Governments have been able to make three-year commitments in relation to such orders. The reason is simply because we want to fit in with the spending review process. As he knows, the next spending review will cover the next three years, so we hope that the next time we lay an order, we will be able to match that three-year spending review process. I cannot guarantee that that is what we will do for the listed places of worship scheme, but the idea behind trying to go back to three-year spending review processes is that it would give much more security for people to make longer-term decisions, whether that is a local authority or a piece of heritage at risk—ecclesiastical, cultural or whatever it may be. The hon. Member asked about the £25,000 cap on the scheme. Before we introduced that cap, which leads to an overall cap of some £23 million for the whole listed places of worship scheme for the year, we assessed what previous bids had led to, and 94% of bids were for less than £25,000, so we estimate that 94% of bids would be accounted for. Obviously, if multiple schemes are engaged, people can make multiple claims. Any claims that are received up until the end of this financial year are of course not subject to that cap. The hon. Member asked about advice. I am afraid that I am unable to provide any further advice today, but we will certainly want to do so as soon as we can so that people can make secure decisions before 1 April. He will know that virtually every church in the land that has already made long-term commitments to rebuilding and restoration work has written into the Department, so we are well aware of the issues that many churches face. Without the measure, we would be unable to give the £3 million and a bit that we will give to the trust in 2025-26, so I hope that the Committee will approve the measure. Question put and agreed to.

• 10 Mar 2025 · Draft Grants to the Churches Conservation Trust Order 2025 · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft Grants to the Churches Conservation Trust Order 2025. What an utter delight it is to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, Mr Stuart. I do not suppose one could find a more esoteric or recherché piece of legislation than this one, but I hope everybody will endorse it. I am pleased to speak to this order, which was laid before the House in draft on 28 January. It is required under law so that the Government may continue to provide funding for the Churches Conservation Trust, known as the CCT, though not by anybody other than the people who write notes for Ministers. The CCT takes into its care over 350 of the most impressive examples of our churches that are no longer required for regular worship. All these churches are listed, mostly at grade I and II*, and some are scheduled ancient monuments. The trust keeps these buildings open to the public and does not charge an entry fee, instead believing that historic buildings belong to everyone in the community. More importantly, the CCT works to bring these buildings back to life. Its regeneration team delivers major new-use projects for historic places of worship, working with local people to deliver award-winning projects such as the Seventeen Nineteen in the former Holy Trinity church in Sunderland. In addition to restoring the buildings in its own care, the trust is taking the exciting opportunity to move its headquarters into a new space in Northampton: the derelict, grade II listed Old Black Lion pub, which will be brought back to life as a pub through an innovative regeneration project that will support the management and maintenance of St Peter’s church next door, while also becoming home to the trust’s national team. The trust is supported through funding from both the Government, which is what we are approving today, and the Church of England. It has also sought to diversify its income streams in order to further support its activity at a time of pressure on public funding, including through donations, legacies and grant-giving foundations. I hope the Committee shares my enthusiasm for the important work of the trust and the key role it plays in preserving and promoting a vital aspect of our nation’s heritage. The draft order will provide funding of over £3 million to the trust for 2025-26, and I commend it to the Committee.