Chi Onwurah MP: speeches

Speeches

• 9 Sept 2026 · Personal Data (Digital Twins) · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move, That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make provision about the regulation of software or algorithms which use or hold personal data for the purpose of modelling the preferences or behaviours of a person; to make provision about the rights of individuals in respect of the holding and use of their personal data by such software or algorithms; and for connected purposes. We know that tech companies collect data on everything that we do—every click we make, every photo we share, every sandwich we buy and every post we like. But now that data is being combined with AI to turn an individual—you, for example, Madam Deputy Speaker—into an algorithm to predict your behaviour, to target advertising at you and to persuade you to watch a particular video or believe a dodgy news report. Think about it: who is best able to persuade someone to do or say something, if not an automated version of themselves? When tech platforms have processed every action that we make and applied AI to it, that is what they have. It is called a digital twin and this Bill will require explicit consent before digital twins of individuals can be made. In recognition of both the speed of technological change and the inventiveness of lawyers, the Bill will use a technology-agnostic definition to capture a range of technologies that may be used to create digital twins. I may on occasion have mentioned that I am an engineer. I also want to put on the record that I am a tech evangelist—I believe tech can and should make life better for everyone. But this stealth digital twinning violates the integrity, uniqueness and very personhood of our constituents and of all of us. Digital twins can take many forms, from content creation algorithms and deepfakes to chatbots that reflect aspects of our personalities back at us. It is particularly worrying when children are the target. These days, kids are exposed to tech literally from the cradle—an AI camera in their cot, a smart toy on their pillow, chatbots that listen to what they say, smartphones teeming with apps to track their every move. Imagine if your child had a stranger who wanted to make money out of them, following them around continuously from birth with a clipboard noting everything they say and do, what they smile at, what they frown at, what makes them angry, because that is what is happening. The automated version of our kids will grow with them, using the power of AI to target advertising and products at them, and worse. The Science, Innovation and Technology Committee has heard about some of the tragic consequences of online grooming by algorithms and chatbots—a vulnerable boy persuaded to kill himself; a vulnerable girl fed more and more extreme dieting advice; children hooked and reeled into extreme behaviours and views. My Bill would expressly protect children from digital twinning. It is not possible for a child to meaningfully consent to the creation or use of a digital twin of themselves, and parental consent cannot provide a substitute for this. His Holiness Pope Francis was the subject of one of the very first deepfake memes when a fake photo of him in a puffer jacket went viral. Since then, deepfakes have proliferated. The hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman) was shown crossing the Floor in Parliament to join Reform, to his constituents’ consternation and his own—it was a fake. Then there were the horrendous photos of naked women and girls that Elon Musk’s AI created on demand. I want to place on the record my thanks to the Government for taking action on that so quickly, but deepfakes in general are not illegal. My Bill would ensure that malicious deepfakes are tackled by protecting each of us from someone digitally replicating and altering our likeness without our consent. I want to be clear that this Bill does not ban digital twins; it simply requires that the actual human being who is being copied has to consent. In the arts, entertainment and tech industries, many performers are agreeing to the creation and use of digital replicas as part of their work—think of ABBA Voyage. But performers increasingly encounter unauthorised digital replicas of themselves, which pose a threat to their career, livelihood and reputation. There is no clear and reliable means of controlling and licensing likeness. Instead, performers must piece together a degree of protection from existing frameworks, all of which are uncertain and ill-suited. For those in the arts industry, the trade union Equity would like to see a contractual requirement. My Bill does not go that far, but it would establish the principle that someone cannot be impersonated. The current regulatory framework also does not address deepfake misinformation. My social media feed was absolutely full of adverts showing Andrew Bailey and the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) fighting on “Question Time”. There may be good reasons why they disagree, but the fact is that this kind of deepfake harms public trust in media, undermines democratic institutions and can be used by state and non-state actors to foment unrest. Last year, my Select Committee’s report on social media harms and algorithms called for the right to reset algorithms. We also recommended addressing the digital advertising that drives misinformation and for which so much data is collected. This year, my Committee has heard from experts in child development about the impact of digital devices and from the young people themselves. I place on the record my thanks to the organisations and individuals from across academia and civil society who have contributed to ensuring that the Bill would protect as many people as possible. I am delighted to have the support of Equity, the Center for Countering Digital Hate, 5rights, the Online Safety Network, Professor Ghislaine Boddington from the University of Greenwich and Professor Luke McDonagh from the London School of Economics law school, among many others. I was also influenced by His Holiness Pope Leo’s recent encyclical, “Magnifica Humanitas”. He chose protecting the uniqueness of real people from AI impersonation as the subject of his first letter to Catholics around the world. The Pope also highlighted how the billions of online digital twins constitute an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of a small number of men. Among the many consequences of the 40 years of neoliberalism repeatedly called out by the Prime Minister is a libertarian attitude to technology. We are told that Governments are too slow and too stupid to shape tech, and that the market knows best—the market will ensure the best, most innovative products and services are delivered to the people who need them and keep them safe in the process. I hope that we can all agree now that neolibertarian complacency has not worked. The tech giants are hubs of amazing innovation but, as my Committee has heard, they are controlled by a small number of extremely wealthy men without the usual corporate governance or competitive constraints. We need to limit their power with our democratic power to protect our citizens. What better way to do that than by giving people the power to control whether we are being copied by companies looking to make money out of us? There is only one you, Madam Deputy Speaker—we need to keep it that way. Question put and agreed to. Ordered, That Dame Chi Onwurah, Jess Asato, Rachel Gilmour, Neil Duncan-Jordan, Graeme Downie, Gareth Thomas, Adam Jogee, Sir Roger Gale, Wera Hobhouse, Ayoub Khan, Dame Caroline Dinenage and Siân Berry present the Bill. Dame Chi Onwurah accordingly presented the Bill. Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time on Friday 13 November, and to be printed (Bill 144).

• 9 Jul 2026 · Science, innovation and technology Committee · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for allocating time for this statement from the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee on our report, “Science diplomacy: Sovereignty, strategy and the global race”. I am pleased to see members of the Committee in the Chamber. I want to put on record my thanks to the Committee Clerks and specialists who have supported this inquiry, as well as the many witnesses who gave evidence. I may have mentioned before that I am proud to be a chartered engineer with over 20 years of experience in industry, and for 16 years, I have been an engineer in the House, but as my friends, family and perhaps too many of my colleagues will attest, I am not a diplomat. In chairing this inquiry, I have learned much about the essential work of our diplomatic service and the international work of so many organisations and institutions, from the Royal Society to our armed forces. I thank them for their contribution. We found—the football analogy I am about to use was in the report even before England’s amazing win over Mexico—that the UK is in the premier league when it comes to scientific strengths and our global diplomatic network, but we do not know where we stand when it comes to science diplomacy. We launched our inquiry in April last year to examine how the UK Government should leverage scientific research and innovation to support its diplomatic goals, growth missions and national security. We held five public sessions and received over 50 written submissions. As the topic is so broad, we chose to look at the issues through three lenses: health and life sciences, quantum, and space. We also chose to focus on the UK Government’s strategy for science diplomacy, and its implications for sovereignty and research security, as part of the wider topic. First of all, we found that the UK has failed to adapt to the pace of geopolitics. The geopolitical landscape has been turned upside down in recent years. Alongside rapid technological advancement, this has made science diplomacy more important than ever. I will give three quick examples to illustrate this. First, the global talent fund was the UK’s attempt to capitalise on the US retreat from science funding, but as it does not address the huge up-front costs faced by researchers, it is unlikely to have the impact that the Government desired. As of June this year, just 18 researchers had been announced as taking up new roles through the fund. That is not going to move any dials. Secondly, while the Committee recognises that overseas development assistance spending has been reduced to allow the defence budget to be increased, our report highlights the short-sighted nature of some of the cuts that followed, and the impact on ODA for research and development. Thirdly, the UK-US pharmaceutical agreement has secured benefits—notably, exemptions from tariffs—but it also appears to have involved significant commitments affecting core elements of UK domestic policy. Although the global nature of the pharmaceuticals sector means that trade negotiations will inevitably have an impact on it, surely decisions about NHS spending, pricing and access to medicines should primarily be driven by the needs of UK patients, and balanced with the sustainability of the life sciences sector. Our second key finding was that there is a lack of overarching strategy. Witnesses consistently cited the strengths of the UK’s research base. Though we have less than 1% of the worldwide population, we have 6% of global publications and receive one 12th of global citations. We found that the Government have not articulated a coherent strategic framework for science diplomacy, despite those strengths. Such a framework should set out priority partners and technologies, and the intended outcomes of partnerships. For the six frontier technologies in the digital and technologies sector plan, and for space, the Government should bring forward detailed cross-governmental strategies, accompanied by clear delivery plans. The forthcoming plan for space provides an important opportunity to do that. The report also describes the Government’s approach to international scientific agreements and science diplomacy as “opportunistic”. Thirdly, we found that in a geopolitical landscape that, as I said, has been turned upside down, the UK is in a global race for sovereign capability, whether it acknowledges it or not. The US’s decision to ban foreigners’ access to Anthropic’s most powerful artificial intelligence models was a watershed moment that proved—to mix metaphors, perhaps—that there is actually a kill switch. The Government must reflect on this when considering our ambitions for secure sovereign capability. Although the own-collaborate-access framework provides a useful foundation for prioritising the UK’s approaches to critical technology, it is applied at too high a level to actually influence and guide decision making. There are so many definitions of “sovereignty” circulating. That impedes our ability to give our international stakeholders clear signals, and prevents businesses from getting the signals that they need to apply their resources—skills, investment, research and development—to the technologies that the Government will procure on a sovereign basis. The UK is highly successful at generating world-leading research and innovation, but less so in turning that strength into the growth of high-tech domestic companies. Too many UK-developed technologies are forced to look abroad to scale. The private sector needs clearer investment signals. Yesterday at the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee’s evidence session, the Secretary of State emphasised frontier models, computer chips and compute as parts of the AI tech stacks that she would like to have sovereign capability in. We need more clarity like that. To finish, we have four areas of recommendation. On global policy, our report calls on the Government to strengthen the UK’s international science and technology position through a clearer strategy, greater investment and improved resilience. On strategy, we call on the Government to publish a coherent science diplomacy strategy, with clear criteria for decisions on science partnerships, and with explicit strategies for engagement with the US and the EU, Commonwealth partners, other middle powers and competitors such as Russia and China. On sovereignty, the Government should define what “technological sovereignty” means when it comes to critical technologies and particularly AI, identify key dependencies in supply chains, and use that analysis to guide investment and procurement decisions. To support innovation, we recommend improving scale-up capital, expanding specialist investment funds and using public procurement more strategically to help UK technology firms grow. Finally, on research security, and with the recent Biobank leak in mind, our report calls for stronger research security guidance, improved information sharing between Government and institutions such as universities, and a cross-Government plan to develop a sustainable domestic skills pipeline in critical scientific and technological fields. The UK’s excellence in research and innovation is a distinct strategic advantage. To sustain it, we urge the Government to outline a science diplomacy strategy. Through such a strategy, we can ensure that science diplomacy remains a driver of progress, as well as a pillar of soft power.