Charlie Dewhirst MP: speeches

Speeches

• 28 Apr 2026 · Referral of Prime Minister to Committee of Privileges · Hansard source

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  I am mindful of Mr Speaker’s advice about repetition. I will keep my remarks short and to the point. We have had a number of speeches in which Labour Members have debated whether the threshold for referring this matter to the Privileges Committee has been met. If we look at the evidence, there are clearly some very concerning issues arising from the documents that have been released into the public domain, and from what has been said on the Floor of this House and what has not. Let us take the advice given by Simon Case in November 2024, when he was Cabinet Secretary. It is clear from that document, which was released following the Humble Address motion, that the Prime Minister was advised that if he wanted to make a political appointment, vetting should be done before the appointment was made. We now know that did not happen. We can also take the letter that Chris Wormald, as Cabinet Secretary, sent to the Prime Minister in September 2025, asserting that the process that was followed was in line with the advice given by Simon Case to the Prime Minister. That is important, because the Prime Minister has referred back to that letter as a reason to accept that due process was followed, yet that letter seems, on the face of it, to be inaccurate. We in this House need to investigate that. We then come to the Prime Minister’s answer at Prime Minister’s questions on 22 April, in which he replaced the word “that” with “any”; he implied that there had not been “any” pressure, instead of saying “that pressure”. When that was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart) at Cabinet Office questions last Thursday, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster asserted on the Floor of the House: “I think the difference between the words ‘that’ and ‘any’ is not of material relevance”. —[ Official Report , 23 April 2026; Vol. 784, c. 420.] Anyone with a basic grasp of English, having heard the testimony of Olly Robbins and the Prime Minister’s answer, would clearly say that the Prime Minister has tried, at least in my view, to misrepresent what Mr Robbins told the Foreign Affairs Committee. That, too, is an extremely powerful reason why this matter needs to be referred. I come to the matter of the unanswered questions, or the evidence that we do not have. I refer again to Simon Case’s advice to the Prime Minister back in 2024. What was released following the Humble Address motion is just Mr Case’s evidence; the box for the Prime Minister’s comments remains blank. Are we expected to believe that the Prime Minister did not respond to the advice given to him by the Cabinet Secretary, or has that advice been withheld from this House? I think that question needs to be answered. There are other matters, such as the evidence regarding Peter Mandelson that the Prime Minister did see; he confirmed to the House at Prime Minister’s questions that he did see some of it, regarding Jeffrey Epstein. However, he has refused to say whether he was aware of Mr Mandelson’s business links, particularly with Russia, and his directorship of Sistema, even after Russia invaded Ukraine. Then there is the matter of documents of which the Government are unwilling to confirm even the existence, such as Mr Mandelson’s declaration of interests. We have asked repeatedly whether that document exists—we are not asking whether it will be published in full at this point—and we have not received answers. Then today we find Morgan McSweeney giving evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee and confirming that the first meeting regarding the potential appointment of Mr Mandelson as ambassador to the United States took place in December. The Cabinet Office has said that it has no record of the meeting. Were there no minutes taken of that meeting? If not, why not? Or have those minutes somehow vanished? All those are very good reasons why this matter needs to be referred.

• 26 Feb 2026 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  I am sure you are aware, Mr Speaker, that the armed forces parliamentary scheme provides Members of this House and the other place with the unique opportunity to get a better insight into the military so that we are better informed in debates and decision making. Yesterday, Wing Commander Greg Smith finally retired from the RAF after not only 10 years of running the armed forces parliamentary scheme for that service but a very distinguished active service with the RAF fast jets in the cold war, the middle east and the Balkans, before taking on multinational operational roles with NATO. He then took on the most challenging role of all, which is, of course, herding Members of Parliament to bases in the UK and abroad. Will the Leader of the House join me in thanking Wing Commander Smith for his extraordinarily distinguished service and wishing him all the very best in his retirement?

• 4 Feb 2026 · Points of Order · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Mr Speaker. The Prime Minister, in response to my question, appeared to deny ever being instructed by the disgraced lawyer Phil Shiner, yet I have here the 2007 case of Al-Jedda v. the Secretary of State for Defence, where it quite clearly says that the appellants were instructed by public interest lawyers including one Keir Starmer QC. Perhaps the Prime Minister might want to return to the House and clarify his earlier remarks.

• 2 Feb 2026 · China and Japan · Hansard source

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  Further to that point, Russia has been able to triple its ballistic missile production because it has access to Chinese rocket fuel, Chinese machine tools and Chinese microprocessors. In return, China is receiving vast quantities of discounted oil, gas, aluminium and other natural resources. China is quite literally fuelling the war in Ukraine, so I ask the Prime Minister once again: what specific guarantees did he receive from the Chinese Government that they will work to de-escalate the conflict in Ukraine?

• 13 Jan 2026 · Iran · Hansard source

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  Not only is the despotic Iranian regime gunning down protesters in the street, but it continues to support terrorist proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah, it provides drones to the Russian military in Ukraine and it remains a very real threat to this country. While I welcome the statement, will the Foreign Secretary assure the House that the police and the security services have all the tools that they need to keep Britain safe from Iran and its proxies?

• 7 Jan 2026 · Rural Communities · Hansard source

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  It very much feels like we are back to the future, and like the Minister is channelling her inner Charli XCX and just wants to go back to 1999, because 27 years later, here we are with a Labour Government who are at war with the countryside, discussing issues like hunting, potentially enormously damaging changes to the pig industry, and enormous changes that could affect our countryside and rural economy. We had the hammer blow of the family farm tax and family business tax over a year ago. I pay tribute to the Labour Members who quietly campaigned against those taxes and have achieved some changes, but the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away: although changes were announced just before Christmas, we also saw the arrival of the Government’s animal welfare strategy, a document that could have been written by the non-governmental organisations and animal rights activists themselves, and which contains some potentially extraordinarily damaging measures that could harm farming well into the future. These are often technical and quite complex matters. I mentioned 1999 because it is very important to remember what happened then. The Government at the time rightly took the view that there should be an end to sow stalls, but instead of phasing them out, they banned them overnight and destroyed 50% of the British pig industry. When we consider animal welfare matters, such as farrowing, it is very important that the Government work with the industry, so that any changes and transitions do not affect our ability to produce fantastic British pork and support our farmers, or affect British food security. There are other measures that need to be discussed, such as the use of CO 2 in stunning, another technical matter that needs to be worked through with food processors and abattoir owners to ensure that we do not damage our food security. There are lots of other things to discuss. My hon. Friend the Member for North Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) mentioned the issues with shooting, and the changes to firearms and shotgun certification and licensing. He said that 67,000 people are employed in that industry; there are over 600,000 people engaged in it. It is hugely important to my constituency of Bridlington and The Wolds, and to neighbouring constituencies such as that of my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake). A town like Helmsley brings in around £1.5 million a week from shooting alone. It is very important that we take that into account. It is important that we mention the sanitary and phytosanitary deal—that wonderful thing that is being trumpeted by the Government and the Liberal Democrats, and for which we sold out our fishing industry for 12 years. It has yet to be negotiated, and farming representatives tell me that it is likely to cost farmers hundreds of millions of pounds, reduce our food production and increase our reliance on imports. I will always stand up for our farming community and for our rural economy, and I commend the Opposition motion.

• 5 Jan 2026 · Northern Ireland Troubles Bill: Armed Forces Recruitment and Retention · Hansard source

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  The Government’s troubles Bill contains no provisions to prevent former members of the IRA or other paramilitary groups from sitting on their proposed legacy commission. Northern Ireland veterans and victims are rightly outraged, so will the Minister use this opportunity to assure the House that the Government will table amendments ensuring that terrorists will not sit on that commission alongside the families of victims?

• 11 Dec 2025 · Foreign Interference · Hansard source

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  First, I congratulate the hon. Member for Lewes (James MacCleary) on securing today’s very important and timely debate. We live in unprecedented times, in which those who wish to undermine this great nation are doing so daily, and on multiple fronts. The need to co-operate more closely with our global allies is as strong as it has been since the second world war, and the United Kingdom must be prepared to combat the ever-evolving threats of tomorrow. In the aftermath of the cold war and following the end of the conflict in the Balkans, we perhaps took peace in Europe for granted. The prospect of tank battles on the plains of Germany and the ever-present threat of a nuclear holocaust suddenly seemed like a distant memory, as though they were from another era. That illusion was shattered in 2014 when Russian paramilitaries crossed the border into Ukraine and took control of towns in the Donbas. Since then, Europe has been at war with its enemies, not just on the battlefields of Ukraine but in cyber-space and trade, and we have seen continued efforts to degrade our national security. We should not shy away from who the malign actors are. Let us be quite clear that China, Russia, Iran and North Korea represent a very real threat to the United Kingdom. While their methods may vary, their intention is the same: to weaken our security, disrupt our democratic institutions, and undermine British values. China’s actions present an evolving challenge to our national security. Its activities span espionage, cyber-attacks, political influence operations, and exerting pressure through its trade, supply chain and investment decisions. We saw that very clearly in the spying case involving British citizens Chris Cash and Christopher Berry; the Government’s failure to clearly label China a threat collapsed a prosecution that had been years in the making. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy said that the handling of aspects of that case was best described as “shambolic”, and that the episode exposed “systematic failures”, and created “a crisis of public confidence and fuelled allegations of conspiracy at the highest levels of government.” The Committee exposed gaps in communication, process and backbone at the heart of our Government. The implications for our national security are profound. We come to the frankly extraordinary saga of the Chinese super-embassy at the Royal Mint Court. Tower Hamlets council rejected the plans on entirely legitimate grounds, yet unlike the previous Conservative Government, this Government chose to call in the application and seem determined to approve it. That is despite warnings from MI5, which is concerned about the site’s proximity to major communications cables. When that is paired with the fact that the embassy blueprint submitted to the council has basement rooms blanked out for security reasons, it raises serious questions. At a moment when China is increasing its activities against Britain, the Government should not be supporting this; instead, they should be firmly defending our national security and critical infrastructure. I come to Russia. Though this threat is sadly more familiar to us, it is no less serious. The Intelligence and Security Committee described Russian interference as “the new normal”, and that should be a constant consideration for British security. It uses a combination of cyber-attacks, disinformation, covert influence and grey-zone and sub-threshold operations to attempt to destabilise western democracies and test our resilience. We saw that recently, when the Yantar vessel intentionally positioned itself near undersea cables and energy infrastructure and aimed lasers at RAF planes. Such provocations are designed not only to intimidate us, but to test how we respond. Beyond those actions—the actions we are supposed to see—the Intelligence and Security Committee also notes that the business interests and financial activities of Russian oligarchs in the UK continue to provide opportunities for influence that must be robustly guarded against. That is why my party brought in the National Security and Investment Act 2021 and strengthened sanctioning powers. That has certainly improved our resilience, but the Kremlin’s methods are adaptive, and we must remain vigilant. The threat from Iran is also increasing, and stems from an ideological opposition. That requires a tailored approach—one that does not allow Iran to be overlooked —in the context of wider disruption outside the middle east. MI5 has confirmed that more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots were identified in the last two years alone, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, operating both at home and abroad, has demonstrated a willingness to target perceived opponents on British soil. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s recent report on Iran highlights the extent of the challenges, which include, but are not limited to, a nuclear programme inching closer to capability, sophisticated espionage networks, credible kidnap and repatriation schemes, and a pattern of operations that disregards international standards. Despite the recent success of Israel in degrading the capabilities of Iranian proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah, we must continue to confront the reality that Iran is an acute threat with its own global networks and its own methods of exerting pressure on Britain. North Korea is often overlooked in debates about our national security, yet it poses a significant and evolving threat. Its cyber-activities go beyond the attack on NHS systems in 2017 and extend to attempts to access contract specifications, design drawings and project details from defence, aerospace, nuclear and engineering entities, as well as from medical and energy companies. Pyongyang’s covert digital operations have been used to distort public perceptions abroad, and to influence narratives in ways that serve its own interest. The regime has sought to deepen military links with other authoritarian states, complicating the broader strategic landscape, and its involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine is well documented. North Korea operates largely outside international norms. It is driven by secrecy and control, and is willing to exploit vulnerabilities wherever they arise. We have heard some excellent contributions from across the House. I particularly thank my hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries and Galloway (John Cooper) for his excellent contribution and the concerns that he raised about the SNP Government in Edinburgh. We should not underestimate the severity of the threats posed to this country by the likes of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Will the Minister outline the work that the Cabinet Office is doing with other relevant Departments to protect and enhance our national security? Will he pledge to build on the work of the last Government, who introduced measures such as the Counter-terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, which provided powers to stop, question, search and detain people entering and exiting the UK to determine whether they had been engaged in hostile state activity? As mentioned, the National Security and Investment Act introduced powers to investigate and intervene in company mergers, acquisitions and other deals that could threaten the UK’s national security. Other measures included the defending democracy taskforce, which aims “to protect the democratic integrity of the UK from threats of foreign interference”; the Elections Act 2022, which tightens rules to prevent foreign money from influencing UK elections; the National Security Act 2023, which introduced new offences relating to foreign interference and the foreign influence registration scheme; and finally the Procurement Act 2023, which introduced enhanced powers for public bodies to exclude suppliers from procurement on national security grounds. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to contribute to the debate. Defence of the realm, and therefore national security, is the No. 1 priority of any Government. While we will continue to debate and scrutinise the detail, it is something that unites us all. His Majesty’s official Opposition will continue to work with the Government to ensure that we keep British people safe at home and abroad, and that we protect the United Kingdom from those who wish to harm us.

• 24 Nov 2025 · Maccabi Tel Aviv FC: Away Fans Ban · Hansard source

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  The whole House recognises the challenge posed by football hooliganism, but anyone with the slightest knowledge of football would accept that this hooliganism is restricted to a very small minority of fans of clubs and countries across the world. Will the Minister work with colleagues in the Home Office and police forces across the country to ensure that next time an Israeli club draws a British club in a European competition, or the Israeli national side draws one of the home nations in a qualifying competition—or, indeed, if Israel were to qualify for Euro 2028—those fans would be welcome in the United Kingdom to enjoy our football and our hospitality?

• 20 Nov 2025 · Russian Ship Yantar · Hansard source

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  In the light of this recent escalation, what specific and immediate steps is the Minister taking to ensure that UK armed forces are equipped both to protect critical underwater infrastructure and to respond rapidly and effectively to direct threats from Russia and others?