Caroline Johnson MP: speeches 2026

Speeches

• 25 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am afraid I do not know the answer to that question. The key point is that it is not logical to abolish a three-tier structure and recreate it with taxpayers’ money to do exactly the same thing. If NHS England is replaced by the Secretary of State, the regional NHS England is replaced by the OPICs and the ICBs are at the bottom—the more local tier—what has changed? The middle tier will be doing the same thing.

• 25 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 57, in clause 12, page 10, line 10, at end insert— “(4A) Before making regulations under subsection (1)(b) that would alter the range of services or facilities which the Secretary of State is required to commission nationally, the Secretary of State must— (a) prepare and publish a commissioning transition plan in accordance with subsection (4B), (b) consult in accordance with subsection (4C), and (c) lay the commissioning transition plan before Parliament. (4B) The commissioning transition plan must set out— (a) a description of each service or facility that the Secretary of State proposes to add to, or remove from, national commissioning responsibility under section 3B(1)(b), and the reasons for each proposed change; (b) a description of the body or bodies to which commissioning responsibility for each such service or facility would transfer and the basis on which that body is considered capable of commissioning that service or facility effectively; (c) an assessment of the impact of each proposed change on patients who rely on the affected services or facilities, including— (i) patients with rare diseases or conditions, (ii) patients whose needs cannot be met by a single integrated care board area, and (iii) patients who may face differential impacts on account of a protected characteristic within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010; (d) the transitional arrangements to be put in place to ensure continuity of service for patients during any transfer of commissioning responsibility; (e) the workforce and capacity implications for the bodies to which commissioning responsibility would transfer; (f) the financial arrangements for the transfer of commissioning responsibility, including the funding to be allocated to receiving bodies; and (g) the proposed timetable for implementation of each change. (4C) Consultation under this subsection must include— (a) integrated care boards that would assume commissioning responsibility under the proposed changes; (b) NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts providing the services or facilities affected by the proposed changes; (c) patient groups and representative organisations for patients likely to be affected by the proposed changes; (d) clinicians with expertise in the services or facilities affected; and (e) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. (4D) Consultation under subsection (4C) must— (a) run for a period of not less than twelve weeks, and (b) begin no earlier than the date on which the specialised commissioning transition plan is published under subsection (4A)(a). (4E) Following the consultation period, the Secretary of State must publish a response to the consultation that— (a) summarises the representations received, (b) sets out the Secretary of State's response to the key issues raised, and (c) describes any amendments made to the specialised commissioning transition plan in light of consultation responses. (4F) No regulations under section 3B(1)(b) that alter the range of nationally commissioned services or facilities may be made until at least 60 days have elapsed after the consultation response required by subsection (4E) has been published.” This amendment requires the Secretary of State to publish and consult on a commissioning transition plan before making any regulations under the new section 3B of the National Health Service Act 2006 (inserted by Clause 12) that would alter which services are commissioned nationally.

• 25 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We Conservatives share the hon. Lady’s desire to ensure that patients get their appointments as soon as they need them to be had, but she is talking about a difference between urgent appointments, within 24 hours, and non-urgent appointments, within a week. Who is going to make the decision about whether the appointment is urgent? Will it be the clinician? Will it be the patient themselves? Has she thought about where that responsibility lies?

• 25 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  One thing that my hon. Friend mentions is the Government’s stated intention to bring things closer to home, as opposed to the reality of the Bill as drafted. Does he agree with me that the document that explains what will happen to the commissioning of specialist services, and that talks about seven regions and how ICBs could collaborate within those regions, might imply that the Government are looking forward to having seven areas in which most commissioning takes place? These are even larger areas than have been described in the mergers so far.

• 25 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree with much of what the hon. Lady has said. Does she therefore support amendment 57, which would ensure that such a consultation takes place?

• 25 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 14 is very straightforward: it states that schedule 1 “confers functions on integrated care boards in relation to commissioning primary care services…transfers related functions from NHS England to the Secretary of State, and”— perhaps most interestingly— “contains other amendments relating to primary care services.” Schedule 1 essentially makes the following changes to the NHS Act 2006: it makes ICBs responsible for commissioning pharmacy services instead of NHS England; it amends section 99 to make ICBs responsible for commissioning dental services instead of NHS England; it amends section 83 to make ICBs responsible for commissioning primary medical services such as general practice instead of NHS England; and it amends section 115 to make ICBs responsible for commissioning ophthalmic services. Largely, this change is formalising existing delegation and the risk of disruption is therefore relatively low. Local commissioners can tailor decisions to local need, and it is better if decisions are taken closer to users. However, there are a few other things in there as well. Paragraph 12(2) amends section 97 of the 2006 Act containing local medical committees, which are statutory committees. The way it is phrased, “the whole or part of the ICB’s area”, does not allow for overlap. Is that the Government’s intention? The Government, in a broader sense, talk about the strategic authorities and having the mayoral authority level involved in the ICB. But in Lincolnshire, for example, an area that I represent part of, the local medical committee could not work in conjunction with the mayoral authority under this legislation, as far as I read it, because it essentially covers two ICB areas and two regions. The mayoral authority is the Greater Lincolnshire mayoral authority. That includes Lincolnshire’s upper-tier area, the Lincolnshire county council area. It also includes the areas around Scunthorpe, Grimsby and Immingham, which fall into the Yorkshire region as opposed to the midlands region, and therefore not a whole or part of any given ICB area. I wonder whether the Minister has any comment on whether that was the intention, because it is also the case with paragraph 24(2) of schedule 1, which amends section 113 of the 2006 Act on local dental committees. Again, although the ambition stated and discussed in the Health and Social Care Committee yesterday by the Minister for Care, who is responsible for primary care, was that ICBs were to be covered at strategic level, that would not be possible for local medical committees or local dental committees under my reading of paragraph 12(2).

• 25 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Of course, my hon. Friend is right. One challenge with the Bill is that although not all the measures are a problem individually, the way they are being brought in is a problem. The planning and organisation that has gone into it has not been coherent. A 50% cut has been made to the budgets of ICBs, which has required many of them to merge, but that has been done before the local government reorganisation has been finished, which means that ICBs have been melded together in a way that is not the same as the local government reorganisation. Let me again give the example of Lincolnshire. Lincolnshire had an excellent ICB, run by chief executive John Turner. That has now merged with Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire form the East Midlands mayoralty, but Lincolnshire ICB, as was, forms part but not all of the Lincolnshire mayoralty—which, as I said, also includes part of what was the Yorkshire region. Because the cuts were done before the local authority reorganisation, and the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing, we have ended up with an incoherent pattern, which does not help, particularly for social care services that are delivered by local authorities. We will come back to that when we talk about who is on the ICB. The risk is that we end up spending money doing this twice—being forced to do it at short notice, because of the 50% cuts brought in overnight by Government, and then doing it again to try to sort out the mess and bring things back into line with the new local authorities as and when it is decided what they will be. Going on to the pharmaceutical arrangements—I should probably declare at this point that my brother is a rural dispensing GP—I share the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket in relation to rural dispensing GPs. Let me give the Minister an example from my constituency. The Cliff Villages medical practice was an excellent medical practice. However, there was a doctor retirement and the illness of a doctor, and as a result the service reduced in quality quite substantially. The ICB was working alongside the surgery and the one remaining practice doctor—not swiftly enough, it must be said. What happened in the end was that the Care Quality Commission came in, found that the service was really not good enough and closed the surgery down overnight, in the middle of the week. It was closed with immediate effect and there were no appointments for any patients in my constituency. Then, because the surgery had been closed, the ICB worked very hard to get a new practice in straightaway, and it got that opened on the Monday, which was pretty quick in the circumstances; but people lost their dispensing GP. Living in a rural area—I have a dispensing GP myself, living in a rural area—people can go to the doctor’s, see the doctor and, if the doctor perhaps says, “You need some antibiotics,” they can go back to the waiting room and sit there for 10 minutes, be given the antibiotics and then leave. That is significantly more helpful to a rural constituent than having to drive eight or nine miles into the centre of town, park the car, find somewhere to get the prescription and then go all the way home again, which would take much longer. People really value that service—I saw how much when I held a public meeting with the ICB and the new provider to talk about what had happened at the surgery, and 250 people turned up to an evening event in the village hall at short notice. It is hugely important to people. Will the changes allow the Secretary of State to step in in such circumstances, where the medical contract has been lost due to that cut-off by the CQC? Will that sudden loss of service be able to be replaced with a new dispensing service? Could Ministers have therefore given dispensing rights to the new provider? At the moment, those rights are not transferable, and it means that the only way that my constituents who live in that area and attend that practice can maintain dispensing rights is either to move house—perhaps to next door and back again, but they have to move house—or to change practice immediately, that same day, to another dispensing practice. To be honest, that seems ridiculous. Could the Minister make any comment on how the provisions in the Bill will help that situation and what her views are? I am confused by new clause 23 and new schedule 1; the Minister has introduced them later than the rest of the Bill, but they seem quite significant. They would move pharmacy appeals from the first-tier tribunal to an NHS body specified by regulations made by the Secretary of State. I presume the regulations are not yet written, so we do not know what form that would take, but the first-tier tribunal is part of an independent judicial system and the appeals will now be under political control, within the Department. Could the Minister explain why they think that is fair? Why do the Government want to do that? Is it just about saving money? How will the judgments made by that new authority be properly enforceable and give people confidence, given the change from the first-tier tribunal in the judicial system to something more politically controlled? I move on to new clause 2, which would require the Secretary of State to establish within six months a scheme to give patients the right to a GP appointment within seven days of seeking one, or 24 hours if urgent. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on that and how she thinks it could be achieved. Modelling by the Health Foundation suggests that 6,500 full-time equivalent GPs—37,800 in total—will be needed by 2030-31 to meet greater clinical need. We have already talked about the doubling of medical school places; I presume the Minister has sought correction since we last spoke on whether the Government have a plan to double those places or not, but the Government are not on track to have that number of GPs. Is it simply that they do not have the resources to deliver it? I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments.

• 25 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In essence, the clause confers the commissioning duties of NHS England on to the Secretary of State, because NHS England is being abolished. In that respect, it is quite straightforward. In the existing National Health Service Act 2006, which is to be amended, section 3 sets out the duties of integrated care boards as to commissioning health services, and section 3A similarly. Section 4 is about NHS England’s responsibility for the provision of high-security psychiatric services. In essence, clause 12 replaces the references to “NHS England” in sections 3 and 3A with “the Secretary of State”. The ICBs now must act consistently with the discharge by the Secretary of State of the section 1 duty to promote a comprehensive health service. That is consistent with the aims of the Bill. I have concerns, which I have expressed previously, about how the Government ensure that the Secretary of State can make those decisions fairly, on the basis of clinical need, rather than because of pressure from a lobby group, a celebrity campaign or such like, but again, that seems consistent. The clause also replaces entirely section 3B of the 2006 Act. Under the previous section 3B, the Secretary of State could direct NHS England to commission the service nationally; the proposed new section 3B confers a regulation-making power to require the Secretary of State to arrange nationally services for members of the armed forces and their families specifically, as well as such services or facilities as may be prescribed. Perhaps the Minister will comment on what sort of services or facilities might be prescribed under that proposed new section. In doing that, the Secretary of State must have regard to the number of people needing the service, the cost and the number of possible providers. That reflects a balance. Some services, such as hip replacements, are very common. They occur in all areas of the country, perhaps at different rates, but they are broadly a common service. Accident and emergency is another common service. Some people, however, have the misfortune to have a condition that is rare and requires specialist care, in small numbers. That needs to be commissioned on a more national basis, because of the need for specific expertise among commissioners and health professionals. In subsection (4), proposed new section 3B(5) modifies section 4 of the 2006 Act so that the duty to arrange high-security psychiatric services transfers from NHS England to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State gains a new power to direct the providers of those bodies—but only non-public bodies—if he is satisfied that the provider is already licensed under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and would be required by its licence to obey the direction. In one respect, as I said, it is necessary to transfer powers to Secretary of State, now that NHS England is to be abolished, but I have a couple of questions. NHS England published a direct commissioning update on 2 March, which describes a new commissioning structure. At the moment, NHS England commissions regional NHS England bodies and the ICBs at a more local level. The update suggests that we will have the ICBs commissioning services, and the Secretary of State instead of NHS England, but that each of the seven regions will have an office for pan-ICB commissioning, known as an OPIC, to support ICB commissioning services—both standard commissioning and at-scale commissioning in some instances. How is that more efficient than the old structure? Are we just going to see the people working in the regions of NHS England get made redundant, at a huge cost to the state, only to be re-employed by the OPIC? What is the estimated cost of that? Is that the intention? We are going to either lose the expertise of the regional advisers in NHS England or end up re-employing them having paid them redundancy. Can the Minister explain which she thinks it is? There is a hugely long list of specialist nationally commissioned services. Can the Minister guarantee that those services will not be moved locally? The ICBs only have so much capacity. It will be a challenge for an ICB to deal with conditions that may affect only one or two people in its area in a given year, particularly given the 50% budget cut; obviously, it will prioritise things that affect more of its population. People who have the rare conditions that are currently commissioned nationally may be worried that they will not get the same level of service that they are getting at the moment. The direct commissioning update talks about prisoners and the justice system. At the moment, NHS England works directly with the Ministry of Justice to commission healthcare for those in the justice system. That includes adults in the custodial system, children in secure children’s homes, non-custodial care, sexual assault and abuse centres, and abuse referral centres. There are eight high-security category A prisons in England. Instead of being specially commissioned as one batch, they are going to be commissioned specially by their local ICBs. Where are the ICBs going to get the advice and expertise to do that? Dealing with category A prisoners is about not only managing the prisoner and providing them with healthcare, but keeping the people providing that healthcare safe while they are working. This is a specialist area. I am interested to understand why the Minister thinks it will be managed best locally. If, under her new system, it is to be managed locally and the prisoner’s home address ICB is different from the prison address ICB, where will the funding move from and to? Will the prison’s ICB be reimbursed by the prisoner’s home ICB or will it bear the brunt locally? What will happen to the sexual abuse referral centres? It is perfectly possible, particularly in some areas of the country, that an individual is sexually assaulted in one ICB area, lives in another and reports a crime in a third. Will local commissioning have an impact on where the individual needs to go for their pretty intimate examination and assessment? Has the Minister considered that? What is her view? What happens to healthcare for migrants? That is another area that is dealt with partly by the justice system at the moment. Can the Minister update us on that? There are over 100,000 people in asylum accommodation, including 30,000 in hotels, and many members of her party are keen to welcome even more. Who will be responsible for commissioning their care? The Government are also delegating the child health information services, which are the record of whether children have been vaccinated and such like. Given that they are planning to have a single patient record and the electronic red book, why do they want the services to be commissioned locally rather than nationally? Do they expect commissioning for a uniform service, such as a screening service, to lead to differential outcomes—and if it does not, what is the rationale for it? A particular example is blood spot screening. The Minister will be aware that there was a Westminster Hall debate earlier in the week on spinal muscular atrophy, in which blood spot screening was mentioned. Metachromatic leukodystrophy is another condition for which people want blood spot screening. If blood spot screening is to be commissioned on a local ICB level, will ICBs be required to do it in line with Government guidelines, or will they be able to vary the service they provide to those patients? By delegating more to ICBs, Ministers are creating variation. On one hand, they want local differentiation and variation; on the other hand, they have put in a clause that requires the Secretary of State to limit local variation. Again, there is a tension there. Will the Minister talk about that? Moving to some technical points, I noticed that “hospital premises” is defined in section 4 of the 2006 Act, but I cannot find it defined in the Bill. Under the original section 3B of that Act, the Secretary of State had to obtain appropriate advice before making regulations about commissioning services; when services were commissioned locally or nationally, the Secretary of State had to take expert advice. That seems like a sensible thing that we want the Secretary of State to do. One would hope that if the Secretary of State were doing his job properly, he would do that, but it seems a little odd that that requirement has been taken out, as though there is an intention for the Secretary of State not to do that. I would appreciate the Minister’s comments on that. Proposed new section 3B provides that a direction can be given to a person other than a public authority regarding high-security psychiatric services. The Minister knows that high-security psychiatric services are currently provided at Broadmoor, Ashworth and Rampton, which are still stand-alone units run by NHS providers. Does she plan to ask a private provider—someone other than a public authority—to run those facilities? If not, what is the purpose of the clause? There is a secure children’s unit in Sleaford in my constituency. What will happen to those children if it is commissioned locally, and where will the money flow from? We asked in a previous sitting whether the Minister thought that the new Prime Minister will want to continue with this Bill. When it comes to the OPICs, in essence the Government will be firing staff from one job, paying them redundancy, and rehiring them, potentially on different terms and conditions, to do a similar job in the OPICs. Is the Minister aware that the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) used to speak out against firing and rehiring staff, and abolishing and recreating organisations? That is essentially what is happening, so will she have to abandon these changes?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 58, clause 6, page 4, line 10, leave out from “promote” to end of line 11 and insert— “(a) innovation in the provision of health services and in the arrangements made for their provision; (b) take steps to ensure the timely adoption and spread of clinically effective innovations across the health service in England; (c) identify and seek to remove barriers to the uptake of innovation by NHS bodies, including procurement barriers, regulatory barriers and cultural barriers to change; (d) promote access to innovation so that patients in all parts of England, and patients from all socioeconomic backgrounds, have equivalent access to effective new technologies, medicines and care models; and (e) have regard to the economic and industrial benefits to the United Kingdom of developing and deploying healthcare innovation in the NHS.” This amendment would further define the meaning of promoting innovation in health services in England.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is describing something a little like “Dragons’ Den”, which is a very good TV programme—perhaps it will be televised or livestreamed. How will the Government ensure that there is no conflict of interest?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 59, in clause 5, page 4, leave out lines 2 to 4 and insert— “(1) In exercising functions in relation to the health service, the Secretary of State must act with a view to enabling patients to make choices with respect to aspects of health services provided to them, including to make choices as to the provider of those services. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the Secretary of State must ensure that patients who are referred for a service to be provided outside a hospital setting (‘out-of-hospital services’) are offered a choice of provider of that service from among the providers available in their integrated care board area and, where relevant, in neighbouring areas, in accordance with regulations made under section 14Z45B. (3) Regulations under section 14Z45B must provide that, where an out-of-hospital service is to be provided to a patient, the integrated care board must— (a) offer the patient a meaningful choice of at least two providers capable of providing the service, which may include NHS bodies and independent sector providers approved to provide that service under arrangements with the integrated care board; (b) provide the patient with information to support an informed choice, including for each available provider— (i) indicative waiting times; (ii) the location at which the service would be provided; (iii) the quality ratings or outcomes data applicable to that provider for that service where such data is available; and (iv) whether any costs would be incurred by the patient in travelling to or receiving the service at that provider; (c) not exclude from the list of available providers any provider approved solely on grounds of commercial interest or organisational type; and (d) take all reasonable steps to give effect to the patient's choice within a clinically appropriate timeframe. (4) For the purposes of this section, ‘out-of-hospital services’ means services— (a) provided in community, primary care or ambulatory settings rather than in a hospital inpatient or outpatient department; and (b) which the Secretary of State specifies by regulations as being within the scope of the choice obligation under subsection (2), and may include diagnostic services, audiology and hearing aid care, podiatry, dietetics and nutrition, physiotherapy, ambulatory cardiac monitoring and such other services as the Secretary of State may specify. (5) In specifying services under subsection (4)(b), the Secretary of State must have regard to— (a) the potential for the expansion of choice to reduce waiting times for the relevant service; (b) the availability of sufficient independent and NHS providers to make genuine choice meaningful; and (c) the desirability of ensuring access to choice for patients in all parts of England, including in rural and deprived areas. (6) The Secretary of State must publish, and lay before Parliament, within 12 months of the date on which this Act is passed, a statement setting out— (a) the out-of-hospital services for which choice obligations under subsection (2) will initially apply; (b) the timetable for extending the choice obligation to further services; and (c) the support that will be made available to patients, in particular those with limited digital access or literacy, to exercise the choices to which they are entitled under this section. (7) The Secretary of State must review and update the statement required by subsection (6) at intervals of not more than two years.” This amendment strengthens the new patient choice duty inserted by Clause 5 from a general aspiration into a specific, enforceable right to choose between providers for out-of-hospital services.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend, as ever, puts things very succinctly. Much of what is said about the Bill is different from what it seems to mean in practice. We have heard the Government talk about the decentralisation of power so decisions are made locally, but in the oral evidence session, even the union rep said that the Bill is more of a centralisation of power. I agree that creating new bureaucracy to replace old bureaucracy—particularly if that involves redundancies—does not help to save money or to make the system more efficient. I tabled amendment 58 to make the duty on innovation more robust. It would make clause 6 specifically require the Secretary of State to promote innovation in the provision of services, ensure that innovations are spread and adopted across the NHS, tackle barriers to innovation and consider the wider economic benefits of innovation. That is important, because when we talk to people in the life sciences industry, they tell us that one of the biggest challenges is the roll-out of innovation. They can develop innovations in the UK, but it can take a long time to get them on to the shop floor, which is a disincentive to innovating in the United Kingdom. That process needs to move more quickly. As currently drafted, the clause does not make it clear what innovation is for or whom it is meant to benefit. Amendment 58 would make it clear that innovation should be to benefit patients, no matter their location or socioeconomic status. I welcome the principle of keeping innovation on the statute book, but innovation is an organic process, and it does not begin in the Department of Health and Social Care or in NHS England—that is a fundamental principle that I think the Government fail to understand across many areas. Innovation begins with the frontline workers: the scientists, the technologists and the people who have ideas about better ways to care for patients. I am encouraged that the Minister understands that. The Government’s vision for ICBs is that they will have more responsibility and more freedom to innovate—although we will discuss whether the legislation actually delivers that later in the Committee’s consideration—and I hope that vision extends to other areas of health policy. The clause is not disagreeable, but it must be made more robust. If Committee members agree, I hope they will support amendment 58.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I declare an interest as a member of the NHS workforce and an NHS consultant paediatrician. In England, around one in every 17 working people is employed by the national health service. That is quite a shocking statistic. It is the largest employer in the country and, indeed, in Europe. It has grown significantly over time, in part because the needs of the population have changed. Life expectancy is longer, which is something to be cherished—that is a good thing—but it brings challenges to the health service, as people are more likely to be living with multiple chronic conditions rather than easily treatable ailments. They require more tests, medicines and clinical care. Demographic change requires a larger NHS workforce, particularly in secondary care. The previous Conservative Government not only recognised the scale of that challenge but took swift action to increase staffing levels across the board, adding more than 42,000 doctors and 55,000 nurses, health visitors and midwives. Conservative Ministers also supported the pipeline responsible for producing the next generation of medical practitioners. They funded 1,500 additional medical school places and opened five new medical schools, including in Sunderland, Lancashire, Chelmsford and Canterbury, and one just outside my constituency in Lincoln. Emergency care became the fastest-growing specialty, with the number of emergency care doctors doubling. That is what support for the NHS workforce looks like. Conservative investments in the workforce helped to improve survival rates for cancer, increase the number of GP appointments and deliver the fastest vaccine roll-out in Europe. Under existing legislation, the Secretary of State has a responsibility to ensure that there is an effective system for planning and delivering education and training to current and potential staff. Health Education England has been rolled into NHS England, so it is ultimately NHS England that has the duty to ensure sufficient and appropriately trained staff to meet NHS workforce needs. Now that NHS England is to be abolished, it is right that this duty is to be given to the Secretary of State through clause 7, although to some extent it is a statement of the obvious that that is part of his job. The job of members of this Committee is to improve the Bill, not just wave it through, and that means recognising that the existing legislation had some inadequacies. Clause 7 states: “The Secretary of State must exercise functions…with a view to ensuring” several things about the workforce. It is not a cast-iron requirement; the Secretary of State must just think about it, but actually he should not just think about his job; he should get on with it. I have a bit of a bee in my bonnet about legislation that creates obligations that are easy to proclaim and that are virtuous but are difficult to measure. Such legislation makes legislators feel good about themselves because they are writing nice things into legislation, but they are not really robust. What does “sufficient people with appropriate education” mean? What is “sufficient”? One reason concerns are particularly acute is the Government’s shambolic record on workforce planning. They came to power saying that they had a plan, but their workforce plan has still not been published, almost two years since they came into office. I heard the Minister say “imminently”, but I had a written answer last week, I think, saying “imminently”. I appreciate that “imminently” is probably better than “soon”, but what does it really mean, and how soon can we expect the plan to be published? Does she mean that it is coming this week or next? Can she guarantee that it will be published before the summer recess? Has the Prime Minister’s resignation yesterday put all this up in the air once again? The Royal College of Radiologists has said that the shortfall in clinical radiologists has grown from 29% to 32% since 2024, and the Royal College of Nursing has released data showing that the growth in the nursing workforce slowed last year to its lowest level in eight years. Newly qualified midwives are finding themselves with no jobs to go to in the health service, despite the fact that there is a maternity staffing crisis in some areas. Will the Minister explain the reason for the delay? She said earlier in this sitting that it was not NHS England, but what is causing the delay? We were told that stakeholders wanted more time to have conversations, test ideas and work together. One would think that after the many months of deliberation, Ministers would have put together an exceptional workforce plan, but the Royal College of Nursing, the British Medical Association, of which I am a member, Unite the union and several other organisations wrote to the Health Secretary earlier this month to urge for the plan, which they have but which has not been published, to be “paused”, because they are “concerned that the current direction falls significantly short of the scale of workforce growth required to meet patient need and relies too heavily on assumptions about the current state of NHS services, productivity and technology that are not borne out of frontline experience.” I recently tabled a question asking who had been given advanced sight of the workforce plan, and I received confirmation that the royal colleges and unions have been involved. As I mentioned, I am a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. We now have a situation where a workforce plan is being delayed, and it has been brought before other organisations for discussion rather than elected Members of this House. It is taking far too long. In the meantime, things are going backwards. It is simply not good enough. Ministers are now about to roll out a plan that has mortified seemingly everyone who has seen it, while expecting members of the Committee to rubber-stamp a rather flimsy legal duty. In May, the Financial Times reported that plans drawn up under this Government would see recruitment cut back. The article reads: “A workforce plan being finalised by health officials says the NHS in England will have to use technology to get by with hundreds of thousands fewer staff than envisaged under the previous Conservative government.” Is that clinical staff? Are we going to have fewer doctors? It is not clear because we have not seen the plan and it has not been published. A draft of the plan seen by the newspaper said that the NHS “does not need anything like the…numbers…set out in its 2023 workforce plan.’ Will the Minister confirm whether those press reports are accurate? She previously said that her plan “will ensure that the NHS has the right people in the right places with the right skills for patients when they need them”. —[ Official Report , 13 January 2026; Vol. 778, c. 737-738.] Does that mean fewer people and more AI?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister talked about the flexibility of the committee, and my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon explained why it is helpful to have some direction. Could the Minister explain why there is no stipulation for the chief medical officer or the chief scientific officer to be part of the committee?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In healthcare, as in many parts of life, innovation is the way in which new ideas, products and services are developed to solve problems and improve patient outcomes. Here, the entire country has a record to be proud of that goes back a long time. Dr John Preece, a GP and research fellow at the University of Exeter, was the first general practitioner to use a computer in a patient consultation. He co-designed a model with IBM in 1969, and his work led to the creation of the electronic patient record, the forerunner of the electronic patient record that we will discuss later. Innovators working with NHS England have also been seeking to reduce single-use plastic in gastrointestinal procedures, improving outcomes for haemodialysis patients, as well as improving the environment.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I agree. The amendments include, in many cases, a statement of what someone’s job is. Does the Member who tabled them think that the Secretary of State is not doing his job and therefore needs to be told what his job is? That could create a whole load of bureaucracy detracting from the actual job in hand. Amendment 34 concerns transport access. I understand that that is a problem for many people in rural areas, such as my constituency. They often have a harder time, as the distance they need to travel is longer and public transport services are infrequent. Healthwatch, which will be cancelled by this Bill if the Government get their way, has heard from patients who struggle to book transport online, and whose transport turned up several hours early or was cancelled with little or notice at all. Those problems are well documented. I visited Lincoln county hospital, which has a unit for renal dialysis, where I heard that although transport is provided for individuals having dialysis, which is good, it often does not turn up when it should or does not pick people up at the time that it is supposed to. More concerning is the fact that if they need a transplant and transplant assessments, most have to go to Leicester to have that done, which is several hours’ drive from some parts of Lincolnshire. Most disturbingly, I heard concerns that some people would choose not to go through the transplant programme, and a factor in that decision would be the ability to get to the transplant centre to have the significant amount of testing and follow-up that needs to be done. Clearly, that is not equal access, so I urge the Minister to look at that. Imposing a duty on the Secretary of State to consider reducing inequalities is a good thing, but it does not magic up the resources necessary to fix them. In exercising his functions, it is a problem the Secretary of State is already capable of addressing. I am sure the Secretary of State, like the Minister, is a good person and wants people to be able to access the services. If Members believe the Government are failing in that regard, I would advise that adding another legislative duty is not likely to bring about the change desired. If we are being honest with the public, we must challenge the premise that every disparity is evidence of a policy failure. The duty placed on the Secretary of State should be to ensure that care is of an equally high standard across the board.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to speak to clause 4 and this group of amendments. Health inequalities are commonly defined as the systemic differences in health status and distribution of health resources between different population groups. There are limits to how far the state can equalise health in a free society, but I am sure all Members would agree that the service should not preside over differences in access to health resources. Unequal access runs contrary to the vision of the NHS as a comprehensive service, available to all and based on clinical need, not ability to pay. Those principles are violated when people without fixed addresses struggle to access general practice, or patients in rural areas, such as my constituency, miss out on treatments—for example, specialist cancer treatments—that are available in more urban areas. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 inserted section 1C in the National Health Service Act 2006, placing a duty on the Secretary of State to consider the need to reduce inequalities in the benefits that people obtain from the health service. As the explanatory notes to the 2012 Act made clear, the intention of that was to “include consideration of the need to reduce inequalities in access...and the outcomes”. Clause 4 of this Bill takes that which was understood and makes it more explicit. The Minister will be pleased to hear that I support updating that duty—she is smiling. The word “benefits” in the original section is a nebulous and subjective term. The wording introduced by the clause is less imprecise and requires the Secretary of State to consider the whole health pipeline. None the less, I have some questions about the lens that clause 4 and its predecessor, section 1C of the 2006 Act, invite the Secretary of State to look through, particularly in relation to other statements made by the Government. In the Government’s policy paper “ICBs as strategic commissioners”, they say that increasing the commissioning responsibilities of integrated care boards will result in them being “better placed to support innovation” and “design new models of care”. Innovation can produce disparities; that is true in healthcare as well. If one ICB decides to innovate and produces a better service, that area will have a better service than another, and the Secretary of State will have the job of undoing that. That could be done by spreading the innovation across the whole of the country, but if the innovation is expensive or difficult to roll out, it could in effect be quashed. Does the Minister recognise that empowering health leaders to innovate and do things differently could widen inequalities, at least in the short term? Is she willing to accept that? A problem with using inequalities as a stand-alone metric is that it does not really tell you whether things are getting better or worse; it must be taken into consideration alongside a wide range of other metrics. An often forgotten fact is that disparities can be reduced by levelling down as well as by levelling up. Fixating on determining the size and cause of disparities can, in some cases, come at the expense of eliminating them. I recently tabled a written question to ask the Government if and when they plan to “set an explicit target to close the Black and Asian maternal mortality gap.” I note that the Minister stood on a manifesto pledge to close that gap. The Government response to my question indicated that they are waiting for Baroness Amos to finish looking at the drivers of inequalities before they do anything. It is possible to produce tomes on the nature of disparities; I suggest that energy would be better spent on addressing them. Amendment 13 would require the Secretary of State to consider health inequalities arising from differences in general health determinants. I understand the sentiment behind the amendment, as statistically, those with lower earning capacity, limited access to green space or unhealthy lifestyles have comparatively worse health outcomes, but would placing a duty to take stock of that on the Secretary of State make the health service any better for such groups, or for the population as a whole? What would be the practical purpose of the amendment? As somebody said to me yesterday evening, do we have a section in education legislation stating that the Education Secretary has to consider that their job is to ensure that people are educated? Do we have clauses in defence Bills saying that the Defence Secretary must consider the defence of the realm? I cannot be sure, but the amendment seems to be a statement of the blindingly obvious, so what effect would it have? Does the Member who tabled the amendment think that the Secretary of State will not consider those factors—essentially, that he will not do his job properly? Do they not have confidence in him or in future Secretaries of State? Under the amendment, the Secretary of State would need to consider inequalities arising from people’s employment, environmental conditions and lifestyle choices, which his Department has little to no control over. If poverty is the problem, the solution is employment and welfare policy, which is not in his gift. If poor environment is the problem, the solution is environmental policy. If a well-informed adult chooses, despite knowing the detriment it may cause them, to consume unhealthy food or an excessive volume of alcohol, or not to exercise, what can and should the Minister do about it in a free society? Amendment 13 would risk distracting from the focus of clause 4, which is, as I see it, to ensure equal access to health resources regardless of a person’s standing in society. What is the practical effect of making it a duty on the Minister to do these things? Will it cause a whole load of bureaucracy? Will the Minister have to produce impact statements for every new hospital? If, for example, one opened on the Isle of Wight—my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East was talking about that—would we need to consider what effect it would have on smokers, people who do not exercise or people who have a lower earning capacity, and produce an endless list of assessments? It would take a lot of money and effort and not really add anything. The amendment would also risk the Government getting bogged down in litigation, as people who disagreed with the Government’s or the ICB’s decision would spend their time litigating the question whether something that may or may not even be relevant was considered properly. Members will not be surprised to hear that my thoughts on amendment 29 are similar to those on amendment 13. I do not doubt for a minute that its supporters have the best intentions, but this type of public sector equality duty language does not do anything to improve public services. Too many arms of the state have been so concerned with disparities that they have become incompetent at getting on with the job that they are actually meant to be doing; they are distracted by trying to measure all these different equalities. Amendment 30 would require the Secretary of State to involve all Departments in reducing health inequalities and take all reasonable steps to ensure that all other Departments “consider the impact of their policy proposals on health inequalities.” Is this spreading the bureaucracy and the impact assessments more widely? If the Government decide to buy a new submarine, do they have to consider what effect it would have on people who smoke on the Isle of Wight? It does not make sense to me. It is a statement of the obvious that members of the Cabinet and Government have to work together to deliver better health for the country. Of course that is true, but what would be the practical effect? The Minister may be able to tell us. New clause 19 would require the Secretary of State to publish a health improvement and health inequalities strategy within six months, and an annual report thereafter. Again, that would invite more glossy brochures from the Government, using the precious time of civil servants. The new clause seeks a cross-Government approach by mandating that all Ministers of the Crown must have regard to the strategy when carrying out their functions. Again, it is basically stating what their job is.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady is absolutely right. When I was a very junior doctor, whether one wanted to work in a small hospital in the countryside or a large teaching hospital in a big city mostly related to whether one wanted to study a specialist, narrow field of medicine or a wider, broader field of medicine with a variety of different conditions. During my career, I have seen consultants make choices that meant they had to move from their district general hospital to a teaching hospital in order to make progress—in one case, a consultant was told he would not get a professorship unless he moved. The hon. Lady is right: we need to carefully consider how we support innovation. I have concerns with the clause as it is drafted. Section 13K of the NHS Act 2006 gave NHS England the power to award prizes in support of innovation. Clause 6 ensures the Secretary of State has that power, but there is a big difference between an arm’s length body of technocrats awarding prizes and a political office holder awarding prizes, because then the prizes come out of taxpayers’ money and Governments are particularly short of that—not because they are not taking higher rates of tax, but because they are squeezing the economy. There is a risk that those awards, and funding for innovation more broadly, become exposed to political cycles. When Governments face a fiscal straitjacket, Ministers are often quick to slash discretionary spending, even though it provides a long-term return on investment. There is also a risk that prizes will be awarded on the basis of who shouts loudest. Certain charities will want the Government to focus on awarding innovations in cancer care, for example; some unions will want the Government to focus on awarding innovators who achieve greater equity in service delivery. There is little doubt that Ministers will have a tough time batting away lobbyists calling for more funding to incentivise this or that type of innovation. Clause 6 also gives the Secretary of State the power to set up a committee to provide advice on awarding prizes. It is right that the Health Secretary should solicit expert advice when determining which trusts, teams or individuals deserve incentive payments, but does that require the power to set up what is effectively a whole new quango? The Government created more than 25 arm’s length bodies and advisory councils in their first six months. Does the Secretary of State require the power to pay members of the advisory committee when there are many experts in their field who can give their time charitably? I notice there is no requirement for any prize committee to include the chief scientific officer or representatives from ICBs. It is ultimately an unchecked spending power.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is right, but there are pressures and challenges for clinical academics, which he will be aware of. I am sure the Minister, in summing up, will tell us what she is doing about those. We need to support innovation in all parts of the health service, not just in university hospitals. One of my concerns is that there has been a drive towards a hub and spoke model. There are good reasons for that, and there have been some good outcomes for patient care, but in some cases it restricts innovation in the peripheral parts of the model; it can disincentivise innovation and make it more difficult. We need to consider how we support innovation in all areas of the NHS.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  When I met surgeons, they said that one reason they like working in elective independent sector hospitals is that they can do more operations on a given day. The shadow Secretary of State visited a provider of cataract treatment yesterday. It is able to perform more treatments on a given day, partly for organisational reasons. The NHS, which is quite frustrating for surgeons, could learn from that. Does my hon. Friend agree?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This group is about how patients can exercise choice. When the national health service was founded in 1948, patients could select their own GP, but it was difficult to change things and exercise choice elsewhere in the system. The health service has come a long way since then. Successive Governments believed that they could make state institutions more responsive by treating the public, to some extent, like customers. Today, patients can choose their GP, hospital, consultant and different types of end-of-life care and mental health service, but choice is about more than just selecting among providers.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is perhaps the oddest provision in the Bill. Since time immemorial, the Labour party has accused its political rivals of wanting to privatise the health service. In the early 2010s, the then shadow Ministers indulged the idea that the Health and Social Care Act 2012 was a Trojan horse for privatisation. Several years later, after the Minister had herself joined the House, claims continued. The then leader of the Labour party urged the previous Government to “undo the very damaging privatisation of so much of our NHS”. —[ Official Report , 23 October 2019; Vol. 666, c. 960.] In the 2019 election, the public were even presented with a dodgy dossier—not Labour’s first—that purported to show that the NHS was on the table in negotiations for a trade deal. We now have a trade deal and the NHS is still intact. Even though Members know full well that no sensible opposition party is advocating for abandoning our NHS system, they keep saying that Governments have been selling off the health service through the back door. Today, private providers deliver only about 10% of NHS care and the system continues to be free at the point of use. That brings us to the deep irony of today’s debate. After years of peddling the NHS privatisation myth, the Labour party has introduced legislation to make privatisation possible. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 inserted a safeguard against privatisation, section 12E, into the NHS Act 2006. That section prohibits the Secretary of State from exercising his functions for the purpose of “causing a variation” in the proportion of services provided by the public or the private sector. Clause 10 substitutes the text in that section and makes two small but significant changes. The first change is to expand the type of providers beyond public and private to “different kinds of legal entity”. That is probably a good change, because it encompasses the mutual and voluntary sectors, which do have an important role to play in health provision going forward. The second change is what has caused alarm. The Secretary of State cannot alter the provider mix unless they deem it to be “in the interests of the health service.” Could the Minister set out some scenarios when it would be deliberately beneficial to privatise provision or, indeed, when it would be beneficial to deliberately nationalise provision? I cannot recall an instance where Ministers needed to privatise an entire service to ensure patients did not lose access to care. In February, the Minister of State for Secondary Care told the House that lessons had been learned from private finance initiatives. Yet the Government announced that 80% of neighbourhood health centres will be privatised through public private partnerships. The Government are able to use these partnerships to loan money outside their limits, but it tends to be more costly than public sector borrowing. Essentially, it is borrowing, but not borrowing on the balance sheet. What is the effect of these private initiatives? I remember receiving my own office on being promoted as a doctor to consultant. It is quite an exciting moment; before that, resident doctors share an office. I had my own space, my own desk, my own computer and a big whiteboard for notes. When I asked whether I could place the whiteboard on the wall, I was told I could not—it was £800 to stick it on the wall under the private finance initiative contract. So my great big whiteboard sat there, propped against the wall. Periodically, I would move a piece of paper, knock the bottom of the whiteboard and it would tip and fall on me when I was sat at my desk. I did suggest putting it up myself, but that would also incur a charge through the PFI contract—for modifying things without getting them to do the modifications—so I just had to sit there with it propped up against the wall, ad infinitum. The Government are on the hook for more than £100 billion of payouts, simply for the use and maintenance of PFI facilities. The Labour scheme was a shambolic waste of taxpayers’ money that could have been spent on improving care. When my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans) asked the Minister about public private partnerships, she told him she was “very proud of the capital investment under the last Labour Government”. —[ Official Report, 4 March 2026; Vol. 781, c. 386WH.] But is clause 10 simply a mechanism for Ministers to develop further private finance initiatives? If Government spending is under pressure, may Ministers seek to shift provision even if it proves more costly in the long run? There is another side to the conundrum of clause 10. Instead of a Health Secretary intent on privatisation, what if we get one intent on squeezing out private sector provision? Who our new Prime Minister will be, we do not know, but one of the candidates has called for the country to abandon 40 years of neoliberalism. Perhaps the Minister could elaborate on what that means, since the tax take as a percentage of GDP is the highest it has been in 40 years. To me, it signals a potential hostility towards choice and competition. We do not want to be in a situation in which the decision is made to alter the provider mix in service of ideology, rather than in the best interests of patients. I am aware of several private firms that provide services to the NHS and are concerned that clause 10 could be wielded against them. If a future Health Secretary decided to reduce private provision on the basis of ideology, what would happen to the 10% of planned activity that is currently delivered by for-profit entities? NHS providers could not feasibly handle such a surge in demand, waiting lists would increase further, and patient choice would suffer. It would also be expensive. If private providers fear that the NHS is no longer a reliable customer, and that they may suddenly lose their contract if this clause is invoked, they will charge a risk premium on their services—that is what firms do when they face shifting regulatory goalposts. That would only damage the public purse. Under clause 10, it would be legally possible for the Health Secretary to alter the provider mix. As a result, it would be worth it for several types of providers and ideologically motivated groups to spend vast sums of money hiring lobbyists to convince Ministers that their sector deserves favourable treatment and that they serve the interests of the NHS. Organisations would invest less in resources and more in influencing the rules, which is not a good outcome either. All those issues are compounded by the fact that clause 10 is imprecise. What does the Minister define as “the interests of the health service”? I am not trying to catch the Minister out; I just want to illustrate the problem with legislation drafted in such terms. It is difficult to prove that the Health Secretary has not acted in what they thought were the best interests of the health service. What could that refer to? It could refer to the interests of patients, to the interests of NHS staff or to the financial stability of the health service—it is entirely subjective. What is the health service there for? It is there for patients, which is why I tabled amendment 53. Amendment 53 would revise clause 10 to specify that the Secretary of State must not alter the provider mix unless doing so is in the interests of patients. I would like to place patients at the centre of the Bill’s changes, in recognition that we do not have the numbers on the Committee to change the clause altogether. My revision would make it harder for the Health Secretary to justify altering the provider mix if it harms patient access or reduces their choice. It would make NHS providers less fearful to know that the Health Secretary would be subjected to a better defined legal threshold.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  If I heard the Minister right, she said that the clause did not provide for changes on the basis of ideology. However, it says that changes are not to be made “unless the Secretary of State considers that to do so is in the interests of the health service.” A Secretary of State whose ideology is that the private sector is bad, good or whatever else could well believe that it is in the interests of the health service to be private or not private. How does the clause prevent an ideologically driven Secretary of State from changing the health service on the basis simply of his ideology, rather than of patient or clinical need?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am talking predominantly about clinicians working in trusts who are trained and very experienced, but then move to work in the same trust but in a more managerial role that does not involve clinical care. I am not saying that every single person needs to be delivering clinical care—there may be exceptions, of course; people do have career changes—but I encourage the Government to reflect on the number of posts being created that take people away from the clinical arena, and on the effect that that has. When the Minister is presented with the number of nursing or midwifery-qualified staff working in a particular department, that may not reflect the number who are delivering clinical care and, by their own admission, the Government do not know which is which. Amendment 33 would place a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that the workforce is trained on the wider determinants of health, such as housing standards, air pollution and the use of harmful substances. In my many years as a paediatrician, I have yet to meet a nurse, doctor, surgeon, porter or care co-ordinator who does not know that damp and mould are bad for people’s health, and I have yet to meet a fellow employee who does not know that air pollution causes asthma, or that tobacco use increases the risk of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, cancer and a whole host of other ailments. Considering the many pressures on NHS workers, I do not believe that mandating a new programme on health determinants is a good use of time. I fear that it is rooted in the agenda of creating more and more mandatory training, and I would actually encourage the Minister to look at rationalising mandatory training to that which is absolutely necessary. Control of the curriculum for such staff is dealt with separately, so I object to amendment 33.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister is talking about flexibility. I understand that if a Minister is responding to an unforeseen circumstance, he or she may be very busy, but where a direction has been made, it should not take very long for a member of staff to publish it, because it will already have been written and sent. I understand that a Minister might take a day or so to sign it off because they are so busy, but it should not take months. The addition of a deadline is therefore not an unreasonable request.