Caroline Johnson MP: speeches

Speeches

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think it is about balance. I agree that we need to ensure that the data is kept safely. Using British technology where we can is a good thing, but we have to be reasonable about it. For example, there are alternatives to Microsoft Outlook, but how much more would that cost the NHS and how much would it affect patient care? There is a balance to be struck. I understand what the hon. Gentleman is trying to do in protecting our data. That is an extremely important issue, and I am sure the Minister will tell us about the work she is doing to ensure our data is kept safe. New clause 43, in my name, is about private providers’ data. We often do freedom of information requests about, for example, surgical procedures, but one in 10 procedures are performed in private settings and are not subject to FOI, which means that less data is available to the public. Data from private independent providers is less transparent than that of standard NHS provision. This is a probing amendment to find out the Minister’s thoughts about how to ensure people can access transparent data on operations performed in local independent hospitals, particularly as the Government have signalled their intention towards more and more of those being provided.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The Minister talked about changing the time period in which proceedings can be effected from three to five years, but once the CQC is aware that an investigation could be brought and there is evidence that needs to be looked at, it will still get only 12 months. That has not been changed. I wonder what the rationale is for that. I am not criticising it; I am just asking the question. The other issue is that clause 63 is prospective, so if an offence were committed immediately after the Act was passed, for the first three years things would effectively be as they are now; the change from three years to five would be relevant only after three years. Clause 71(2) on commencement provides that clause 63 will not come into force until two months after the Act is passed. I just wonder in practical terms why, given that it will take three years to come into effect in any case, it will not come into force on the day the Act receives Royal Assent. The impact assessment talks about the CQC prosecuting two or three additional cases a year, and a cost of £4.3 million over 10 years with fines of £2.7 million over 10 years. Will the regulator keep the fines, or will they go back into the Treasury? Can the Minister guarantee that the additional funds that are estimated to be required for the additional cases under this new regulation will be provided so that the CQC can do the investigations that she is giving it the opportunity to do?

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We talked about clause 1—on the abolition of NHS England—at the beginning of the Bill. The Minister was keen at that time to take unelected individuals out of the picture and create accountability by returning things to democratic control through the abolition of NHS England and putting them back in the Secretary of State’s hands. However, this proposal essentially does the reverse with maternity care, taking it out of the hands of Ministers and the Secretary of State and putting it into the hands of a commissioner. Could the Minister explain that?

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to discuss new clauses 3 to 5 and 43, which I am sure that the Whips will not let me forget. I understand the sentiment behind the Liberal Democrat new clauses. The hon. Member for Winchester is keen to ensure that uses of NHS data are limited to uses for which people can consent, uses in relation to their care or specifically approved research. Having heard examples of this data being tracked or leaked by accident, the hon. Gentleman is keen to ensure that that does not happen. He is particularly concerned about the risk of that happening in another jurisdiction where we have less control of the system. I am not sure that the new clauses have been properly thought through, however. New clause 3 says: “Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must conduct and lay before Parliament a risk assessment of all contracts between NHS organisations and suppliers based outside of the UK.” That is “all contracts”. In subsection (2), it says that the Secretary of State must “pay particular regard” to contracts with technology companies, but not only to those. I am being a bit pedantic here, but has the hon. Member for Winchester considered the wording of “all contracts”? The NHS does not just provide drugs and medical technology; it provides bedding, blankets, pillows, bananas for people to eat at lunchtime, bedpans and loo roll. There is a whole range of things procured as supplies by the NHS that may or may not be procured from overseas. It would be cumbersome and completely unnecessary to include all of those. Even with the tech companies themselves, there is a risk for small contracts for small pieces of tech to create a huge amount of bureaucracy. I am not sure that it would specifically improve data quality or data protection. It is reasonable that the Minister would consider risk assessments, and I hope that she would automatically consider them before contracts that are particularly sensitive or contain patient data, but I am not sure that the new clause works. Moving on to new clauses 4 and 5, the hon. Member talked about Palantir. It may even have been his intention for these new clauses to target one specific American firm, but the actual impact would erect costly barriers to trade. The NHS contracts IT functions to firms based in other countries when the business case is strong. It uses Microsoft, an American company that offers software, cloud services and Outlook for emails; Oracle for standardising and automating financial processes; Sectra, a Swedish company, for transferring medical images and reports; and Dedalus, an Italian company, for migrating services to the cloud. To echo the point made by the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, should the NHS prioritise a British company over an international company if the service has better functionality and a lower cost and is safe? The hon. Member for Winchester spoke about the vibrant life sciences and tech sector in this country, but if we close off our markets to those from overseas, will others not do the same? Would he want those life sciences companies to be unable to export? There is a barrier to free trade here.

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Is there not a third issue: that the local authority and the ICB will no longer have congruent areas and will therefore look at different populations?

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  No, I am not. Schedule 8 Transfer of HSSIB’s Functions to CQC

• 7 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have just a couple of questions. Clause 62 will update the CQC’s power to conduct special reviews of NHS commissioning to cover ICBs and the Secretary of State’s commissioning functions, and the requirement for ministerial approval before the CQC can investigate will be retained. How will that apply when HSSIB is moved into the CQC? Is it the Minister’s intention that HSSIB will need the Secretary of State’s approval to complete investigations?

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Before my hon. Friend moves on, may I ask him about security? It might also be possible for someone who looked at the records to identify where guns are kept. That information is currently is more protected than that.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  If we use the example of Southport, the people who could access those records worked in the Liverpool trust, because that is where the records were stored. With the single patient record, as planned, people would be able to access those records from across the country, if they had a clinical reason to do so. However, someone behaving badly could also potentially do so, even if they did not have a reason.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 47 amends the existing legislation to facilitate the single patient record. We have heard about the many benefits that it may bring, for example for patients who find themselves telling the same story again and again and having to repeat themselves because caregivers cannot see the records that they need to see. That can be frustrating and sometimes very distressing for patients. I caution the Minister against saying that the single patient record will completely fix that issue, because from a clinical perspective, particularly in certain presentations, hearing the story again from the individual can be helpful for a diagnosis, but the principle is a good one, and it will make things easier for clinicians, particularly if the patient is in an area away from home. Records may be kept in a particular geographical location or hospital, and if someone is away on holiday and they come in, we may not have access to their records. In paediatrics, we often give the parents of children with complex problems letters to carry that have the necessary information in them. That would not be necessary if the record were more accessible, so there are benefits to the single patient record. There are, however, a lot of questions about it. One problem is that the single patient record has not really been designed yet, so we are being asked to approve something that is a hazy vision in the distance. On 1 June, the Minister said that “although the Bill establishes the legal framework for the SPR, much of the detail will be in secondary legislation.” —[ Official Report , 1 June 2026; Vol. 786, c. 957.] I appreciate that it will be subject to the affirmative procedure, but we are being asked to make a decision now on something that is unfortunately very woolly. Will the Minister reassure us that she will address the following questions in the secondary legislation? Who will have permission to edit the information in the single patient record? When will they have access to it? Will it tell us who has edited it—will there be a record of who, when and where? If the record is not accurate when it is edited, how will that be addressed? How will people know that it is inaccurate, and how will it be improved? In 2025, Healthwatch reported that 23% of adults who had seen their medical records reported inaccuracies or missing details, 12% said they had been refused treatment because of inaccurate information, and 10% said they had received inappropriate medication as a result. This is important. In recent years, there have been several incidents of patients dying after doctors used incorrect medical histories and prescribed medication that they should not have. This information needs to be available, but also accurate. I am interested in what the Minister has to say about that. The other question is: what is going to happen to the records people have now? I am 48. I am sure the Minister is much younger than that, but we have records: our vaccination records, our childhood records, and records of any admissions or treatment we have had. Will those be added to the single patient record, or will the SPR start from day zero and go forwards? If it does, how will people access their historical records? If it goes backwards, what provision has been made to ensure that the data that is input is accurate, and for the cost and personnel required to do it? Is the intention that the SPR will be one-size-fits-all? The Secretary of State talked about people not being asked to have a one-size-fits-all but being able to access the various systems around the country, but there are so many different systems. In my own practice, if I want to look at the notes of somebody I am caring for, I go to Evolve, where the notes are scanned in and I can look at the pages one at a time. If I want to look at blood results, I go to ICE, which is a different system where I can see the test results. If I want to look at the films of an X-ray, they are on a different computer system again. If I want to follow the patient’s pathway through the hospital, see when their next appointment is with me or see who is next in my clinic, I go on to e-Track. There is a different system for maternity, and there is Symphony in A&E. Each hospital trust has a lot of different computer systems and information, and they do not all use the same systems, as I know having rotated through a number of hospitals during my training. How will the single patient record work with that? Will people be able to access all those different systems, and will they need to be trained to use them, or will there be a homogeneous system—and if so, what does the Minister envisage that looking like? The Government say the single patient record will be more efficient, reduce the number of A&E attendances and hospital admissions, and make £20 million in annual savings to the NHS. Those are quite small margins compared with the scale of the project. Is the Minister satisfied that the savings will not be obliterated by the cost of the project running away? The other thing is the public view of this. Polling published in January 2025 by the Tony Blair Institute found that 69% of people are willing for their anonymised data to be used to help plan NHS delivery, 71% are willing for it to be used for research into drugs and new treatments, and 75% are willing for it to be used for speeding up and making better diagnoses. There is an amendment—amendment 11—that make data available only for patient care, but patient audit and research can be quite important. Does the Minister have any comments on how audits and patient research might be used in a clinical context to improve care using anonymised or non-anonymised data? Proposed new section 250E(3) of the National Health Service Act 2006 says: “The regulations may provide that the processing of information in accordance with the regulations does not breach any obligation of confidence owed by the person processing the information.” As one of my hon. Friends said earlier this afternoon, if the Government put a clause into a Bill, they normally have a reason for wanting to use it. Can the Minister expand on the circumstances in which they might want, in essence, to bypass patient confidentiality in pursuit of that provision? In addition, the regulations may make information “available to people involved in the provision to patients of health care or social care anywhere in the British Islands,” which means it will not all be provided in England, and it will not necessarily all be provided within the United Kingdom. Will there be reciprocal arrangements with the self-governing territories? If not, how will the Government ensure that the data is properly protected once it has been shared? I also want to mention cyber-security. On 30 June—just earlier this week—it was reported that the UK healthcare sector experienced a tenfold increase in attacks during January to May 2026 compared with the whole of 2025, recording 264,000 individual events compared with just 27,000 in 2025. In June 2026, Bedfordshire hospitals NHS foundation trust revealed that data relating to 33,000 hospital patients was stolen and shared online two years ago. Mid and South Essex NHS foundation trust reported the theft of 2,380 records in the same attack. The Secretary of State said earlier in June that “the situation with the single patient record is…different from that of the federated data platform, because it is likely that we will let a series of contracts to de-risk the delivery of the single patient record.” —[ Official Report , 1 June 2026; Vol. 786, c. 891.] That suggests that the Government are aware of the problem but have not yet nailed down the detail of how to contract the delivery of the single patient record or worked out how they are going to keep data safe once they have. How can patients have confidence when their health data—their most personal data—is on the line and the Government have not yet made the key decisions for protecting it? Does the Minister have any comments on that? What will happen to private providers? The Government are increasingly using private healthcare providers to try to improve the waiting lists, but will they have access to the single patient record? If they will, will they have to contribute to it financially or get it for free? How will the data be protected if it is not in NHS hands and not necessarily under the same regulation? What plans do the Government have to monetise the data? In December 2025, the then Under-Secretary of State for Health, Innovation and Safety, the hon. Member for Glasgow South West (Dr Ahmed), was reported in the Financial Times as having said that the UK should make money from patient data for the “benefit of the Treasury coffers”. Can the Minister expand on her Department’s plans to monetise patient data? Can she guarantee that personal data will not be exposed or leaked? Can the Minister give assurances that the tendering process for contracts to set up and run the single patient record will be fair and transparent? It has been said that companies that donated to Labour before the general election were awarded contracts worth almost £138 million during this Government’s first year. It has also been reported that Peter Mandelson had links to Palantir, which secured a £240 million deal with the Ministry of Defence. It is important that people have confidence in the contracts. Does the first person to get a contract get locked in? Once the system is set up with one provider, will it be prohibitively difficult to change provider? Will the contracts become more and more expensive as time goes on because of the difficulties in redesigning a system? Who will own the intellectual property of the system that is designed? Will it be the Government or the private company? If it is the private company, how will that work going forwards? The other question is: can we trust this Labour Government to deliver this? In 2005, the previous Labour Government launched a digitisation project called the NHS national programme for IT. In 2007, the Public Accounts Committee found that the Government had not sought to keep a detailed record of expenditure and there was no evidence that officials had carried out an examination to see whether the benefits exceeded the cost. The Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), described the project as “one of the biggest IT disasters of all time”. Costs ballooned to more than £9 billion, leading a member of the PAC to say in 2013 that it was one of the “worst and most expensive contracting fiascos” in the history of the public sector. How will the Minister convince the House and the public that the contract is being provided fairly, that it will be useful, that it will deliver what it said it would at the prices it said it would, that the data will be held securely once it is delivered, and that provisions will be in place to record access, decide who gets access and limit access? Who gets access to sexual health records is particularly important. At the moment, sexual health records are kept separate. If someone attends a sexual health clinic specifically for sexual health screening, those records do not appear in their general medical record, in order not to disincentivise people from attending those sorts of appointments. If everything will be in one single patient care record, will sexual health records appear within that record? That is an important issue; indeed, it was raised during the Committee’s evidence sessions, when it seemed that the Government had not yet made a decision.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  My point was that this can sometimes be beneficial. If a clinician sees a young lady who has collapsed at school, she might have fainted or had a fit. There are a lot of different potential causes, such as cardiac syncope, and lots of different potential diagnoses. A lot of the detail in making the diagnosis is in the history. The patient will probably already have been asked their story when they arrived at A&E, but it is still important for a senior clinician to ask for it again. My caution was against presuming that we can, in all cases, prevent repeated asking of questions. There would clearly be a benefit when there are particularly sensitive pieces of information, about which we need not ask two, three or four times, but we cannot stop all cases in which a patient is asked for the same story.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Is it not also the case that anyone who is aware that an employee or relative has a licence and is concerned about their mental health can make such a report?

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am advised to declare that, although I am not a licence holder of a shotgun or a rifle, my husband has both a shotgun and a firearms licence.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have a couple of questions. In lots of ways the provisions derive from clause 1 and the abolition of NHS England. Schedule 7 refers to operating a system in the interests of the health service, which is not the same as operating it in the interests of the patients. Does the Minister have any comments on that? The Nuffield Trust has pointed out that schedule 7 would not pass over to the Secretary of State NHSE’s duty to report to Parliament. Is that because the Minister thinks that duty is duplicated elsewhere and is therefore not necessary? Under the previous legislation, the Care Quality Commission was slightly stronger and could make a mandatory request that NHS England establish a system, and NHS England had to comply with that unless it related to an existing exception. Now if the CQC makes a request, it goes to the Secretary of State, and whether it is agreed to is then somewhat more optional. Will the Minister say why she needs to change that power?

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am interested in what the hon. Gentleman is saying. Does he agree that, in many ways, the NHS dataset will be one of the most valuable datasets in the world, not only to patients themselves—in terms of the value to them and their privacy—but in the ability to analyse it and perhaps understand parts of medicine that we do not understand at the moment and so improve patient care?

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  We think this is an important issue, so we would like to divide the Committee. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  There is no detail in the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East said, there is nothing in the legislation requiring the computers in his local area to talk to the computers in my local area.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause says that information could be made available “to people involved in the provision to patients of health care or social care anywhere in the British Islands”. That implies that the English system will be used to share information with people outside England—in the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland—but it does not imply that those areas will necessarily have the same systems to share information with us.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  If it is to include both, who will translate it into the simplest form and how much will that cost?

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have a couple of questions about amendment 71 for the hon. Member for Winchester. First, can he comment on why the amendment refers to firearms, which have stricter licensing conditions than shotguns? Also, the GP should be aware, because all relevant medical information should filter back to them, that the person has a firearms licence, which, as I say, has stricter criteria. It is essentially harder to get a firearms licence than a shotgun licence. I am interested to hear the hon. Gentleman’s thoughts on that. On amendment 72, I have a large veteran population in my constituency, and I am very grateful to all those who have put their lives on the line to keep us safe, both today and in the past. I can see that there may be benefits to the amendment in respect of the delivery of the armed forces covenant and aspects of veterans’ care, but I am curious about how it is written. Proposed new subsection (3A) of proposed new section 250E of the National Health Service Act 2006 says that “regulations must make provision for prior membership…to be visible to all relevant healthcare workers under the establishment of a single patient record”, but proposed new subsection (3B) requires a report on the potential merits of doing that. It seems slightly counterintuitive to do it and then decide whether it is a good idea, rather than decide whether it is a good idea, consider the pros and cons, and then do it afterwards. I am interested to understand why the hon. Gentleman thinks the amendment is drafted in that way.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 48, in clause 47, page 36, line 1, at end insert— “(4A) Regulations may not be laid under this section unless the Secretary of State has published a plan setting out the measures to be taken to prevent clinicians and other persons involved in the provision of health care or social care from accessing patient information made available through the system otherwise than for the purposes of the care of the patient concerned (an ‘inappropriate access prevention plan’). (4B) The inappropriate access prevention plan must include— (a) a description of the technical controls to be applied to restrict access to patient information to those with a legitimate care relationship with the patient; (b) the system of audit logging to be applied to record each instance of access to patient information, including the identity of the person accessing the information and the time and circumstances of access; (c) the sanctions applicable to persons who access patient information without lawful authority or without a legitimate care relationship with the patient; (d) the arrangements for detecting and investigating suspected cases of inappropriate access; and (e) the role of the Care Quality Commission, the Information Commissioner and any other regulatory body in enforcing compliance with access controls. (4C) The Secretary of State must lay the inappropriate access prevention plan before both Houses of Parliament.” This amendment prevents the Secretary of State from making regulations to establish the single patient record unless a plan to prevent inappropriate access by clinicians and other care workers has first been published and laid before Parliament. Amendment 48 would prevent the Secretary of State from “making regulations to establish the single patient record unless a plan to prevent inappropriate access by clinicians and other care workers has first been published and laid before Parliament.” This is about trust. It is about people being able to trust that the records that will now be more widely available will remain confidential and be looked at only by those who need to look at them. We have seen that people can be uniquely nosey when it comes to accessing medical records. For example, 48 staff members at the University Hospitals of Liverpool Group were found to have looked at the records of those involved in the Southport attack without any medical basis to do so. Almost a dozen staff members were sacked from the Nottingham University Hospitals trust because they had looked at the records of the victims in Nottingham. It is important that we address this, because it is happening already and needs to be tackled. Paul Arnold, the chief executive of the Information Commissioner’s Office, said that trust is being “jeopardised”. The amendment seeks to ensure that proper thought goes into making sure that people cannot access records they should not be able to look at—for example, those of the Prime Minister or members of the Royal family—before the single patient record is live and can be used. We have Public Department 1 for HMRC; is there an intention to have something similar to close off records to reduce their accessibility where the public may be particularly nosey, either because of the person’s job or because of an event such as a terrorist attack, where we have seen people look at records when they should not have? There were reports that staff at The London Clinic, a private clinic, had been trying to sell records of the Princess of Wales online, so there are examples where this has happened before. In addition, it is important that people know what the penalties are for deliberately misusing these records. My final question for the Minister is this. If a record has been viewed and there is a data log of it having been viewed, how long will that data log last for? Will it last for six months or a year, or will I be able to look back in 10 years’ time and see who accessed my records today? It is a case of understanding the Minister’s intentions and pushing the Government to ensure that these records are truly private to those who need to see them, not accessible to anyone who just happens to be curious.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is making a very important point. Does he also think that it is possible for the system to have some designs built into it that identify that someone from another area of the country, or from another department or different profession is unexpectedly looking at results? Perhaps AI could help with this.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  In the event that someone from Scotland comes into the hon. Gentleman’s hospital near Dover and a doctor wants to look at their healthcare record, does the hon. Gentleman envisage that the doctor will log on to their local system and see the records from Scotland, or that they will have access to the Scottish system to look at the records directly there?

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying, which is that there are processes in place already and that the fact that someone got sacked for looking at the records is a sign that the systems work to an extent. However, does the fact that they could look at them at all suggest that the systems are not working well enough? Because it is a computerised system, there are methods for identifying whether someone is likely to need to look at that record. By knowing the profession of the person looking at it, and the department they are in, the computer can help to limit the number of people who look at those records when they should not.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Eleventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendment 70, as the hon. Member for North Shropshire said, would require the Secretary of State to publish a risk assessment on the potential for digital exclusion in the single patient record. That is important because, as our lives become more electronic and online, there are people who are getting left behind. That could be because they have a disability that prevents or makes it more difficult for them to access online facilities, because they do not have the resources, because they live an area of the country that is less well served by digital or broadband provision, or because they are elderly and have decided that they will not get involved in the digital world. In fact, according to the Good Things Foundation, 7.9 million people in the UK lack basic digital skills and 1.6 million adults do not have a smartphone, tablet or laptop. Of those with no basic digital skills, 77% are over 65. People need more healthcare as they get older, yet those individuals have fewer digital skills, so this issue needs to be addressed. The NHS Alliance published a report on digital inclusion in March 2026, which found that rural and coastal areas typically have higher levels of digital exclusion than urban areas. Lincolnshire ICB, which covers the area that I represent, estimates that 21.3% of Lincolnshire’s population live in the most digitally deprived areas. The ICB has a digital inclusion strategy for 2025 to 2028, which includes efforts to try to reduce digital exclusion; I am interested in the Minister’s thoughts on how she might expand that sort of initiative across the country. The Government’s equality impact assessment for the single patient record recognises that digital exclusion is a significant challenge in several groups with particular protected characteristics and other characteristics. I am interested in learning more from the Minister about how she intends to mitigate that challenge. In many ways, digital availability is a good thing, and it makes things much easier for many people—I am not knocking it in any way—but we need to ensure that people do not get left behind. I understand that NHS England is supporting public libraries to signpost users to the NHS website and help them navigate it. What will happen to that support as NHS England gets abolished? Does the Minister intend the Department of Health and Social Care to provide something similar? Amendment 49, tabled in my name, is basically about public awareness. Although we get immersed in what we are doing here, the public are not necessarily following every word that is said in Committee or in this House—or even necessarily every word that appears in the press—so when the single patient record is launched, it is important that they are aware of it, and in particular, aware of their rights. We have talked about whether a person might want to let a carer see the single patient record or whether they might want to let someone see part but not all of the record. If the record goes live before people are aware of their rights and abilities in relation to it, they might find that things are available to people, or can be viewed by people, who they would not have wished to see them, which could lead to a number of problems. The amendment would allow people to be more aware of the single patient record for a period of time before it is brought in to try to make sure that that sort of problem is mitigated, and I am interested to understand the Minister’s view on it.