Caroline Johnson MP: speeches

Speeches

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I note that proposed new section 223GA to the 2006 Act, inserted by clause 43, includes the duty to “publish any directions” but there is no timing for that. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is important to understand how soon after the direction is made we should expect the Minister to publish it?

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I rise to talk about amendment 8. I essentially understand what the hon. Member for Winchester is trying to do—to make sure that carers are provided with the information that they need to provide the best possible care—and I think we would all agree with that ambition. However, I have a couple of questions for him. The Bill, as drafted, discusses “making” information “available to people other than a patient on the patient’s behalf”. I am not quite clear why would that not encompass a nominated carer. My hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon made an important point about privacy. The single patient record will encompass a patient’s entire medical history, medical notes and medical information, but every person who provides that patient with medical or social care does not need to see all of that, and in some cases, the patient may not want them to. My hon. Friend gave a good example of that; another example would be an elderly lady who does not want her carer to see that she had a termination at 23. There are lots of things that are private to people that they do not want others to see. I am interested in the Minister’s comments on this issue. Access to the record is seen as a binary choice, but in some respects, it needs to be a much more nuanced affair than that, while still allowing someone access to the areas of the record that are required for them to complete their duties.

• 2 Jul 2026 · Health Bill (Tenth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 43 is particularly long: it runs to almost two pages of text. Essentially, clause 43 transfers the responsibility for funding ICBs, and deciding how they use the resources, from NHS England to the Secretary of State. In many cases, that is consistent with the Government’s plan to abolish NHS England, take decisions and responsibility in-house, and get some more control. One thing that does not make sense to me is that the Government are talking about devolving control and decision making, yet this clause gives the Secretary of State powers to control spending, direct how ICBs spend money in different areas, and penalise them if they do not do what they are told. The Minister has also talked in this Committee about a vision for the future in which ICBs are consistent with mayoral authority areas, and mayors sitting on ICBs to provide some sort of democratic accountability. But how can mayors be held democratically accountable if they are, or might be, overruled by the Secretary of State? How does the Minister see that working? Also, greater financial intervention powers for the Secretary of State, if used, could expose ICB budgets to short-term political pressure, such as funding for a specific health area that has received celebrity or media attention. How would the Minister guard against that? If the Secretary of State is able to contest financial decisions taken by ICBs, will that slow down decision making and make things more “sticky”? Essentially, the changes seem to go against the Government’s stated aim of a more devolved and autonomous operating model for the health service. I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that. Clause 44 is a little shorter. It essentially makes changes to the joint duties of ICBs and providers. Some of those changes are again necessitated by the abolition of NHS England; keeping some of the sections would result in overlapping systems, so those make more sense. But the duties requiring ICBs and their partner trusts to achieve overall system balance are repealed. That goes against the collaborative principle behind the creation of integrated care systems, and makes it more difficult to manage financial pressures across a geographical footprint. If, in a particular year, there is financial pressure in one area of an ICB but less so in another, it is not able to transfer things so easily between those areas. How does the Minister expect that to work? Clause 44 also allows the Secretary of State to set objectives for “one or more” partners. Is that discretionary or are there criteria for it? If it is discretionary, what would prevent the Secretary of State from selectively choosing which trusts are bound by joint objectives and which are not? How will that decision be made? How will trusts know whether it is likely to be made, or in what circumstances it could be made? This could undermine consistency of treatment across different ICBs and trusts. I will be interested in the Minister’s comments on those points.

• 1 Jul 2026 · Points of Order · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. On 15 October 2024, the former Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting), said: “This Government are committed, as we were in opposition, to doubling the number of medical school places.” —[ Official Report , 15 October 2024; Vol. 754, c. 683.] On 22 April 2026, in a Westminster Hall debate, the current Minister for Care, the hon. Member for Aberafan Maesteg (Stephen Kinnock), said: “Yes, it is still our intention to double the number of medical school places.” —[ Official Report, 22 April 2026; Vol. 784, c. 134WH.] However, on 27 April, some five days later, the Minister for Care issued a somewhat bizarre ministerial correction. He said: “The Government have never committed to doubling medical school places.” —[ Official Report, 27 April 2026; Vol. 784, c. 3MC.] Given what was said by so many Ministers before the election, and by the former Secretary of State at the Dispatch Box, how can that be accurate? I raised this issue with the Minister for Secondary Care, the hon. Member for Bristol South (Karin Smyth), in the Health Bill Committee last week, but there has still been no response. How can I establish whether that is still Government policy?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 24 puts neighbourhood health plans on a statutory basis. Currently, section 116A of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 requires local authorities and partner ICBs to prepare a joint local health and wellbeing strategy once they have received their integrated care strategy. Essentially, that means that the ICBs and local authorities produce their overall strategy, then it devolves down, and then the joint health and wellbeing strategy looks at how it will be delivered. The local authority and its partners must give regard to the integrated care strategy, the NHS England mandate and any guidance issued by the Secretary of State. The strategy must be published and local people and the local Healthwatch must be involved in its development. Section 116B of the 2007 Act places a duty on local authorities and partner ICBs to have regard to various strategies when exercising their function, specifically, a joint strategic needs assessment, an integrated care strategy and a joint local health and wellbeing strategy. NHS England also has regard to these when providing healthcare for a specific area. Clause 24 changes the JLHWS to a neighbourhood health plan. In many ways, that aligns with the shift in the Government’s 10-year health plan from hospital to community. As they have described it, more care in the neighbourhood will allow hospitals to focus on the more specialist care that may be needed, so more people can be cared for closer to home, which seems a reasonable aim. However, if local authorities and partner ICBs have to give regard to what the centre is doing when developing neighbourhood health plans, to what extent does the Minister envisage that being directed? Local authorities and partner ICBs giving regard to the centre could mean there being a very loose requirement from the centre to provide for the local population, and then they get on with it; it could also be very prescriptive—my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) has talked about the pros and cons of having targets—with a whole litany of targets in the plans. Whether that squares with the Government’s claim to be devolving power, or whether it strikes as a centralising power, depends on how that is done and to what extent the Secretary of State plans to direct it. I would appreciate it if the Minister could talk about that. As has been said, Sir Andrew Dilnot told the Committee that “we cannot really address many of the fundamental problems facing the NHS if we do not sort out social care.” –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 84, Q131.] The Government have asked Baroness Casey to review social care, but they have developed this measure in the meantime. Is that because they have been talking to her and know that it is the sort of thing that she will recommend—or are they putting the cart before the horse, as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon suggested? Later in the Committee’s considerations, we will come to Healthwatch, its benefits and the concerns that I and, I am sure, many other Committee members have about its abolition. What mechanisms does the Minister envisage there being for local people—local patients—to contribute to the neighbourhood health plans? A local Healthwatch currently contributes to the equivalent, the joint local health and wellbeing strategy, as a way of ensuring that it captures patient and community voices. How will that be done otherwise? Some 80% of the Government’s new neighbourhood health centres that will deliver these plans are expected to be funded through public-private partnerships. Does the Minister have any comments on that, particularly in the light of the expensive private finance initiative that the last Labour Government entered into and left us stuck with? In March 2026, the Government produced a neighbourhood health framework policy paper, which identified the goal of reducing non-elective admissions for those with severe frailty. Given that goal, why are the Government not on track to deliver the fracture liaison service improvements that they promised? The policy paper also commits to what it calls “a diversion rate of at least 25% by March 2027 for at least 10 high volume specialties”. What is a “diversion rate”? It essentially requires more GP referrals to be rejected, so let us be clear about what that means. When someone, either hon. Members or constituents, goes to see their GP, they are referred to a consultant for care; I should declare an interest as a consultant in the NHS. The consultant will then review that referral and decide whether they think it is clinically appropriate to see the patient, whether a different specialty may be more appropriate, or whether they can give advice or make suggestions about treatment that could be given in primary care instead. When a patient is given an appointment in secondary care, it essentially means that the GP has decided that they clinically need it, and the consultant has decided that they clinically need it too. If the Government want a diversion rate of at least 25% by March 2027 for at least 10 high volume specialties, are they suggesting that patients who the GP and consultant agree clinically need an appointment should not get one? If so, why?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is, as ever, correct. The mayors are also not all responsible for health and social care—the local authorities are, in most cases. There could therefore be a mayor directing proceedings with the ICB who is a political opponent of those actually democratically elected to look after social care. ICBs are supposed to be apolitical commissioners accountable to the Secretary of State, but now, instead of working with social care directors, they will work with an elected mayor instead. I can see a positive to that in terms of democratic accountability, but what happens if they all disagree? There is some incoherence about who is in charge. We have the local authority tasked with delivering social care, which may be led by one political party; the mayor directing the ICB, who may be of a different political party; and the Secretary of State who can also direct the ICB, who may again be of a different political persuasion. How does it work if they disagree? Does the mayor actually have authority, given that the Secretary of State can override them anyway? How does the Minister see that working in practice? It feels like some people will be in power without responsibility and others will have responsibility without the power to exercise it.

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The civil servants will be under the direction of the Minister, so how does the hon. Lady envisage it working? Presumably, civil servants are there to deliver for their Ministers or Secretary of State? Is she suggesting that makes the decision more impartial? Can she give us some detail on how that will work?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the hon. Lady give way?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is quite a large group. First, clause 29 introduces schedule 3, which will make changes to the constitution of NHS foundation trusts. Currently, chapter 5 of the National Health Service Act 2006 establishes NHS foundation trusts as public benefit corporations in accordance with schedule 7 to the Act. That schedule, “Constitution of public benefit corporations”, sets out, among other things, the requirements for a constitution, the eligibility for membership, and the council of governors. Schedule 3 to the Bill, introduced by clause 29, has a number of functions. First, it modifies the 2006 Act so that a foundation trust will no longer be a public benefit corporation, but will now be a body corporate—I would be interested in the Minister’s explanation of that change. It also modifies section 33(4) of the 2006 Act to remove reference to councils of governors, so that trusts no longer need to set those up, and modifies section 37 so that an NHS foundation trust can amend its constitution with the approval of the Secretary of State, where previously, that would have required a vote of more than half the members of the board of directors and more than half the members of the council of governors. The schedule also deletes section 39A of the 2006 Act, “Panel for advising governors”, because one presumes if there are no governors, they do not need advice. It modifies section 43, “Provision of goods and services”, so that if a foundation trust wishes to raise its non-NHS income by 5% or more, the Secretary of State must approve it—previously that would have required local decision making from more than half of the members of the council of governors. It also deletes section 51A, “Significant transactions”, which states that an NHS foundation trust may enter into significant transactions, as defined in its constitution, only if more than half the members of the council of governors voted to approve it. The schedule also deletes sections 56(1A), 56A(2), 56B(2) and 57A(2) of the 2006 Act. That means that governors will no longer have to approve a trust merging, being acquired, splitting or being dissolved. The Bill’s explanatory notes say that the Secretary of State will take on those approvals via schedule 11. Schedule 3 also deletes section 59, “Conduct of elections”, section 60, “Voting and standing for election” and section 61, “Representative membership” of the 2006 Act, which set out the democratic machinery for foundation trusts. Schedule 3 also substitutes schedule 7 to the 2006 Act with an entirely new version. Elements of that new schedule 7 are as follows: the Secretary of State will now be able to appoint, suspend or remove the chair and non-executive directors—previously that was a governor’s role—and they can set the pay, allowances and terms of non-executive directors, and may regulate their tenure. The chief executive will be appointed by the non-executive directors, and the other executives will be appointed by a committee of the chair, the chief executive and non-executive directors, but the Secretary of State may set when those powers may be used. As the council of governors and its membership will be abolished, there are no members, elections or constituencies anywhere in the new schedule. Constitutional amendments will need the Secretary of State’s approval, not the approval of members and governors. The Secretary of State may make regulations on director eligibility, beyond the standard disqualifications. Directors owe a duty to promote the trust’s success, to maximise benefits for the public, with respective interests, duties and registers of interest. Board meetings must be open to the public. Accounts and audits are aligned with NHS trusts and ICBs. The Secretary of State may direct the form, content and timing as we have talked about before. Annual reports and forward financial plans go to the Secretary of State in the form that the Secretary of State decides, and trusts must publish their constitution, register, accounts and annual reports and hold a public meeting on them. The council of governors was intended to feed in democratic input. Does the Minister have any comment on where democratic input will be held? Will it be solely through the Secretary of State, or is there any intent for local patient voice, now Healthwatch is being abolished too? How will local decision making be informed, and how will they understand their local area, particularly if it is to be directed largely by the Secretary of State? Removing the council of governors will save money on administration, as noted in the impact assessment. The impact assessment also notes the Secretary of State does not have the ability to intervene in serious instances of foundation trust failure. Could the Minister comment on that? Foundation trusts were intended to be independent. If the council of governors is removed and many things, as I have listed, are put under the control of the Secretary of State, they become increasingly more like an ordinary NHS trust, pre-foundation. Will they be independent in name only? Non-executive directors are meant to be there to hold the leaders of the trust to account, but the Secretary of State can now appoint, pay and fire every non-executive director so a foundation trust’s internal watchdog can now be controlled by an elected politician who is potentially quite remote from that area. Does the Minister have any comment on how she sees that working? Foundation trusts may have failed to increase democratic involvement in so far as there has not been huge interest in some of these elections for chairs of governors. But the answer to that would be a better version of local involvement rather than removing local input entirely. The theme right across the schedule and the changes I listed is that foundation trusts are looking up to the Minister rather than out to local communities. Many NHS inquiries have reported back that frontline concerns did not reach the highest tiers of leadership. The Government are now closing an independent channel for sounding the alarm. Will the Minister comment on that? I welcome Government amendment 19 because the idea that you need medical expertise on the board of a trust that delivers medical care seems to me fairly obvious, because otherwise you will get decisions that are not grounded in medical knowledge. I do recognise what the Minister says about it was not having been her intention to demote the voice of clinicians, but that was the effect. This amendment will go some way to correcting that, by having an executive director who is registered medical practitioner or a dentist, and another who is a registered nurse or midwife. Could the Minister be clear if a foundation trust wanted a nurse and a midwife, perhaps because they had a specific issue with the midwifery area, or a medical practitioner and a registered dentist, could they have both? The Minister suggested that an exemption would be ambulance care, but there are medical practitioners, consultants, with expertise in out of hospital care. Does the Minister feel their expertise is not useful in some way? I will speak to amendment 36 once it is moved. On clause 30 stand part, that clause removes the requirement for NHS England to consult prospective members or governors of a prospective foundation trust before its authorisation. Getting a new foundation trust without NHS England because it has been abolished is a consequence of earlier clauses that we have already voted on. Therefore, I will not go further on that issue.

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 70 talks about a certain range of primary care providers being consulted by the ICB. Can the hon. Member clarify whether it is his intention for all providers of those services in a defined area to be consulted, or would it be a representative selection? If it is the latter, how would they be chosen?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister said, the clause removes the need for ICBs and their partner trusts to produce a joint forward plan. The existing legislation requires ICBs and their partner trusts to prepare a plan setting out how they propose to exercise their functions over five years, which is reviewed and/or revised each financial year. Joint forward plans address objectives in the Government mandate regarding the ambitions in the NHS long-term plan and planning guidance. Section 14Z52 of the 2006 Act sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts have to prepare such a plan before the start of each financial year and specifies what the plan must give regard to, including the ICB’s discharge of its duties—general duties and financial duties—under other sections of the Act. The plan must also cover steps that will be taken to implement the local health and wellbeing strategy, the particular needs of young people, and the particular needs of victims of abuse. ICBs and their partner trusts must publish the plan and give it to a set of specified authorities, and NHS England may give directions for that. Section 14Z54 sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts must consult people when developing such plans and that health and wellbeing boards must be involved. Section 14Z55 sets out that the relevant health and wellbeing board may give an opinion, and that when it does so, it must provide it to the ICB and its partner trusts. Section 14Z56 sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts must prepare a joint capital resource use plan before the start of each financial year, and that the period may be determined by direction from the Secretary of State. Section 14Z57 sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts may revise the joint capital resource use plan, but if it is revised significantly, it must be published and given to the list of specified authorities. Section 14Z58 sets out that an ICB must produce an annual report on how it has discharged its functions. It must explain how it has discharged its duties under other specified sections of the Act, review the extent to which it has exercised its functions in accordance with the forward plan and its capital resource use plan, review the extent to which it has exercised its functions consistently with NHS England’s views, and review steps it has taken to implement any joint local health and wellbeing strategy. The report must include details of expenditure and be given to NHS England by a specified date and then published. In essence, the clause deletes sections 14Z52 to 14Z57. In some respects, it is legislative plumbing, to remove plans that are no longer necessary. The Government’s impact assessment notes that “there is some duplication across planning documents. For example, the Joint Forward Plan covered the integration of services, which the Better Care Fund plan also considers, as does the Joint Local Health and Wellbeing Strategy.” It goes on to note that duplication delivers an administrative burden, as staff “complete parallel planning returns and fulfil competing data requests,” so that is a positive aspect of the clause. Will the Minister please address the following points? Section 14Z52 contains specific requirements to address the particular needs of young people and of victims of abuse. Where do they fall now? The NHS has a large maintenance backlog. What is the new mechanism for transparency of capital prioritisation decisions between the ICBs and the trusts? Can the Minister remind me and the Committee of other areas in which local democracy will be able to input into ICB planning once these planning documents are no longer required? Under the Government’s strategic commissioning framework, ICBs have to develop population health improvement plans. Essex ICB published a document that is 148 pages long, with a particular focus on inequality. Is the Minister concerned about the length of some of the plans, the time it takes to produce them and the amount of bureaucracy involved, or does she think this is an improvement? What is the key objective in delivering these plans? Do the Government plan to introduce population health improvement plans through legislation? If they do not, Parliament will have scrutiny of the bureaucracy being removed but not of the bureaucracy that the Government replace it with. As the Minister once said: “Local taxpayers deserve to know how their money is being spent.” —[ Official Report, 13 June 2023; Vol. 734, c. 122WH.]

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Does my hon. Friend think that this leaves a bit of a gap? The Secretary of State will not have the level of local oversight that the governors had, so how will that local oversight feed into the Secretary of State so that he or she can make the decisions instead?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Special health authorities are, in essence, specialist health authorities set up by the Secretary of State, usually to provide an England-wide service of some form. Examples include NHS Blood and Transplant, and the NHS Business Services Authority, which provides NHS pensions—I should declare that I have an NHS pension—admin for prescription exemptions and other such business-type functions. We also have NHS Resolution, which deals with clinical negligence claims, and the NHS Counter Fraud Authority. In principle, special health authorities are useful in some cases, but they are effectively a form of quango. Can the Minister explain when she thinks the Government might want to set up a special health authority, rather than using a department within the DHSC to deliver the same thing? There are plenty of other nationally delivered services, and although the Government have suggested that some services, such as screening, will become localised as part of the Bill, some things will remain national. Can the Minister give some examples of what the new provision will be used for? I can see there is provision for flexibility, but the special health authorities would require setting up, and there are set-up costs and costs associated with branding and those sorts of things. How does the Minister envisage those costs being provided for, and when will it be necessary for the Government to use them rather than just using the Department? Special health authorities have been created, reconfigured and shelved many times. For example, the National Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse became part of Public Health England in 2013, and the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement was closed in the same year. The functions of the National Patient Safety Agency went to the NHS Commissioning Board Special Health Authority, later known as NHS England, in 2012 and then to NHS Improvement in 2016. Widening the scope could leave us with more quangos than are necessary. Which specific functions do the Government plan to move into special health authorities under this widened power? Have the Government just decided that they need this power and are increasing the scope because they are abolishing NHS England without a proper plan? Is this power just to cover themselves in the event that, as they start to make a plan, they find out they need it? Clause 28 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations for the transfer of staff from one special health authority to another, or to an ICB. Paragraph 3(8) of schedule 6 to the National Health Service Act 2006 states: “Regulations may provide for the transfer of officers from one Special Health Authority to another”, or to NHS England, “and for arrangements under which the services of an officer…are placed at the disposal of another Special Health Authority”, or NHS England, or a local authority. Paragraph 3(12)(a) states that the Secretary of State may give directions “to place the services of any of its officers at the disposal of another Special Health Authority”, or NHS England. Paragraph 13 states: “Provision may be made by regulations with respect to the recording of information by a Special Health Authority, and the furnishing of information by a Special Health Authority to the Secretary of State, another Special Health Authority”, or NHS England. Clause 28 modifies that paragraph such that regulations can now provide for the transfer of an officer to an ICB—that is a new power—as well as a special health authority and a local health authority, but no longer to NHS England because NHS England is being abolished. Regulations can now provide for an officer’s services to be placed at the disposal of the ICB and the Secretary of State, which is a new power, as well as the special health authority or local authority, but no longer NHS England. The clause modifies paragraph 3(12)(a) of schedule 6, so that directions may be given about placing the services of officers at the disposal of the special health authority and, newly, the Secretary of State or an ICB, but not NHS England. As the Minister said, the clause also modifies paragraph 13 of schedule 6, so that a special health authority can be required by regulations to pass information to integrated care boards, which is a new power, but no longer to NHS England. NHS England is to be abolished, so it is sensible to say that staff can no longer be placed there—that seems an entirely reasonable exercise—but the legislation providing for special health authorities essentially contains open-ended spending power. Remuneration of the special health authority chairman and staff can be determined by the Secretary of State, with the approval of the Treasury. Does the Minister foresee an upper limit to those sorts of salaries? People will essentially be able to transfer from one special health authority to another, or to an ICB—or be placed at the disposal of another special health authority, an ICB, a local authority or the Secretary of State. Will the Minister talk about the location, pension and salary of those individuals? We heard yesterday that the future Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham), may want to move a whole load of civil servants from London up to Manchester. That will clearly be within his gift if he becomes Prime Minister, but for individuals who work in one location to be asked to move to another is disruptive to their family and social lives, and involves significant relocation costs. If people are moved in the way that clause 28 describes, particularly by transfer, what choice will they have? What will happen to their pension, salary and other terms and conditions, and will they have a choice of location or not?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As has been said, clause 25 specifies how NHS trusts should handle their accounting. Paragraph 11A of schedule 4 to the NHS Act 2006 sets out the current obligations, which are that the trust must keep proper accounts, that the Secretary of State may give directions about how the accounts are held, and that the accounts must be prepared annually, may be examined by the Comptroller and Auditor General, and must be submitted to NHS England. Clause 25 replaces paragraph 11A entirely. Under the new provisions, the reporting goes to the Secretary of State, instead of NHS England—which seems sensible, because the Government are abolishing NHS England—and the Secretary of State may give directions about “methods and principles”, as well as the “form and content”. The Secretary of State may also give directions about specified periods in which accounts are to be prepared. Will the Minister explain why those provisions are felt to be necessary? There will be suspicion among some more cynical people that the power to specify periods could be used to be more flattering for the Government, or that methods and principles could be used to change the perception of the position. Can the Minister give an example of where she thinks such periods would be useful, and also say why she thinks it is necessary to enable the Secretary of State to give directions about methods and principles, and form and content, in a way that is not done at the moment? The exception for charitable trusts of which the NHS is a trustee is being removed. Will the Minister explain why she thinks that is important, and in what situation she thinks that power would be used? Finally, will she say whether the financial directors of NHS trusts have been consulted about these changes? If so, what was their feedback? Clause 26 tidies up relevant provisions in two pieces of legislation, as the Minister has described.

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In essence, the clause abolishes integrated care partnerships and strategies, which are where ICBs come together with local authorities to discuss how they can make their services more integrated. We know that many of the challenges facing the NHS are caused by difficulties in social care provision and some of the difficulties in social care provision are caused by issues with health provision, and that if those commissioning services in those two areas work together, we can see an improvement in both. The Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 made changes to local government structures and enhanced public involvement in health services. Section 116 requires local authorities to produce joint strategic needs assessments for the local authority and its partner ICB. When preparing the assessment, the local authority and its partner ICB must “co-operate with one another…have regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State…involve the Local Healthwatch organisation”, and involve local people and the relevant district councils. I note that later in the Bill we will also come to the abolition of Healthwatch. Section 116 of the 2007 Act has been modified by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and the Health and Care Act 2022 to ensure that references match the current NHS structure. For instance, in 2008 there were primary care trusts, rather than ICBs. Section 116ZA of the 2007 Act requires ICBs and local authorities whose areas coincide or overlap to create integrated care partnerships, which consist of a member appointed by the ICB, one from each responsible local authority and any other members that they choose to add; to some extent, they can determine their own procedures. Section 116ZB of the 2007 Act requires ICBs to prepare an integrated care strategy “setting out how the assessed needs in relation to its area are to be met by the exercise of functions of…the integrated care board…NHS England, or…the responsible local authorities”. When developing that integrated care strategy, the integrated care partnerships must have regard to NHS England’s mandate and any guidance issued by the Secretary of State. Clearly, that would now apply only to guidance issued by the Secretary of the State, because NHS England is also being abolished. An integrated care partnership must publish its integrated care strategy and give it to each local authority and partner ICB. Integrated care partnerships must reconsider and, where necessary, revise the strategy each time they receive a new needs assessment. Clause 23 deletes section 116(5A) of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. That subsection required the local authorities to give a copy of the needs assessments to the ICBs, which is of course no longer necessary because they are being abolished. Clause 23 also deletes sections 116ZA and 116ZB of the same Act, which established ICBs and defined integrated care strategies respectively. As Conservatives, we believe that streamlining bureaucracy is sensible, and I am sure that this is a well-intentioned reform. However, a survey conducted by the NHS Alliance in November indicated that a quarter of integrated care system leaders are likely to keep the integrated care partnerships anyway on a non-statutory basis, and 40% plan to fold them into health and wellbeing boards and working partnerships with the authorities. It is not really a ringing endorsement of the policy if a sizeable number of people intend to keep it anyway. Like many other elements of the Bill, these changes are uncosted—if we read the impact assessment, it says “N/A” for the cost. Clearly, there will be a cost incurred by the abolition of the process, but there will also be an opportunity cost to services if ICBs and commissioners are not working together in the provision of social care as effectively as they were before. That will cost people in social care, and it will cost people in healthcare. As recognised by the impact assessment that the Government have produced themselves, there is a risk of reduced focus on the wider determinants of health at system level. Committee members on both sides of the House have already stressed the impact that other health determinants can have on the health service and social care, and we have previously considered amendments to that effect. Overall, it is regrettable that local government does not have the direct feed into ICBs that the design of those integrated care partnerships provided. Whether or not I agree, I can follow the theory or principle behind making the area covered more local, in line with the strategic authority. However, if the Government wanted to do that, I do not understand why they did not decide the mayoral areas first. At the moment, we do not know where the mayors will be, and where they are now is not where the ICBs are. The Government have decided to cut ICB budgets and force mergers before they have decided where the mayoral authorities will be in some cases. Even where there are mayoral authorities already, the Government have not mandated that the ICBs be coherent with them, and, therefore, in many cases, they are not. We have a very confusing pattern emerging, which may require further reorganisation of ICBs to line them up, with a further cost down the line.

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 39 broadens the Secretary of State’s ability to delegate or jointly exercise health service functions with NHS bodies and local government. Currently, section 7A of the National Health Service Act 2006 enables the Secretary of State to arrange for any of their public health functions to be exercised by relevant bodies, such as NHS England, ICBs and local authorities. Section 65Z5 sets out how relevant bodies may jointly exercise delegated functions, and section 65Z6 sets out how funds may be pooled for such purposes. Section 65Z7 sets out that NHS England may issue guidance for exercising functions under those two sections and that relevant bodies must have regard to any guidance. Section 75 then sets out that the Secretary of State can make regulations to enable NHS bodies and local authorities to enter into arrangements related to the delivery of health functions. Clause 39 deletes section 7A, removing the separate power for the Secretary of State to delegate public health functions. It amends section 65Z5 to create a wider power that allows the Secretary of State to arrange for any health service-related function in England to be exercised by or jointly with relevant bodies, local authorities, combined authorities, combined county authorities or other prescribed persons. It removes outdated references in section 65Z5 linked to NHS England and updates the wording so that arrangements can be made with a wider range of persons and not just bodies. Clause 39 also replaces section 65Z6 so that where functions are exercised jointly, the parties can use joint committees and pooled funds. It provides that pooled funds can include payments from relevant bodies and the Secretary of State, and can be used for expenditure connected to jointly exercised functions. It amends section 65Z7 so that guidance on joint working and delegation is issued by the Secretary of State rather than NHS England. It makes consequential amendments to provisions on directors of public health and local authority public health functions, reflecting the removal of section 7A. It also makes consequential amendments to section 75 partnership arrangements and the Local Government Act 1974, again removing references to section 7A. Once again, it is necessary to move functions to the Secretary of State when NHS England is abolished—somebody else needs to do the work. The changes introduce more flexibility for joined-up working between the Secretary of State and other entities in the health system, which could support integration and the shift to place-based care, with localised approaches to prevention, integration and service planning in line with the Government’s 10-year plan. However, the power is very broad, relating to any function in the health service. The Secretary of State could arrange for functions to be exercised by or jointly with any person prescribed, which could mean anyone. How will it be possible to determine who is responsible for things that have gone wrong when joint committees are established and funds are pooled? The Minister has spoken a number of times during our sittings about the importance of clear accountability. In the event that the work, funds and activities are pooled, how will it be made clear who is responsible and therefore accountable for the activity that occurs? Melanie Williams, the then president of the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, told the Health and Social Care Committee that we spend “a lot of time debating about who pays, rather than having a conversation about how, in the longer term, we can invest in people’s outcomes to enable better health and wellbeing.” Is it the Government’s intention to decide the allocation of money for social care and health providers, or that whoever they decide will work together? The Government have said that this is all about the devolution of power. This morning, we discussed the abolition of integrated care partnerships, on which ICBs and local authorities work together on projects that they choose locally. The Government are now introducing another power that will enable the Secretary of State to direct them to work together on things that he or she chooses. That does not sound terribly like the devolution of power. Could the Minister explain that to me? I shall leave new clause 26 to the Liberal Democrats. Government new clause 20 ensures that there is a complete list of authorities that may be included. I think some were missing from the first iteration. I just make the point that the more actors there are in the mix, the harder it may be to see who is responsible overall. We also need to discuss how to maintain the balance between clinical need and political priorities in the choice of what healthcare is provided.

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 40 prepares for the preparation of the annual accounts of NHS trusts and integrated care boards. Existing legislation in section 65Z4 of the NHS Act 2006, “Consolidated accounts for NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts”, requires NHS England to prepare a set of accounts every financial year and consolidate the accounts of all the trusts and NHS foundation trusts. The Secretary of State can give directions about the content for methods and principles, and the accounts must be accompanied by reports or other information as directed by the Secretary of State. A copy may be sent by NHS England to the Secretary of State and the Comptroller and Auditor General. The latter must then examine and certify those accounts before sending a copy to the Secretary of State and NHS England, and NHS England must then lay a copy of the consolidated accounts and the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report before Parliament. That is how it works at the moment. Clause 40 rewrites section 65Z4 and the duty to prepare the consolidated accounts every financial year moves to the Secretary of State, and the list of what gets consolidated now includes the ICB accounts. The power to give directions to NHS England about accounts is removed, which is fair enough because there would be no need for it, as the Secretary of State is now preparing them and NHS England will cease to exist. The requirement for the accounts to be accompanied by such reports or other information as the Secretary of State may direct has been removed. The accounts go straight to the Comptroller and Auditor General, who reports back only to the Secretary of State. At the end, the Secretary of State lays the accounts before Parliament. The changes are necessary owing to the abolition of NHS England. I want to ask about the consolidation, including the ICB accounts, which was not there before, and what impact that will have. Will the accounts be sufficiently detailed so that it is possible to disaggregate that information if people are interested in doing so? Clause 41 changes which NHS companies can be covered by the scheme that meets certain losses, legal claims and liabilities. Currently, section 71, “Schemes for meeting losses and liabilities etc of certain health service bodies”, of the NHS Act 2006 enables the Secretary of State to establish schemes to meet the losses of NHS England, ICBs, trusts, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, the CQC and several other bodies. The list of bodies includes “(ha) a company formed under section 223 and wholly or partly owned by the Secretary of State or NHS England”. In the new legislation, clause 41 rewrites paragraph (ha) so that it is “a company formed under section 223 other than by an integrated care board by virtue of section 223A”. That narrows the scope of the liability scheme by preventing ICB-created companies from automatically gaining protection, presumably to encourage ICBs to manage risk responsibly.

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not think the Bill is very clear on that. It says that the Secretary of State “may by order impose limits on the expenditure that may be incurred by an NHS foundation trust in respect of a single financial year.” However, it does not say whether that is an overall limit, whether it is for capital or revenue or whether it is a limit on a specific item, so the degree to which the Secretary of State has control is not clear. I presume it is an overall limit and that it is for dealing with budgets, but perhaps the Minister can provide some clarity for my hon. Friend. Clause 34 requires foundation trusts that have been newly authorised, or that have recently acquired another trust or another foundation trust, to prepare the final accounts for their predecessor trust or foundation trust. It does that by modifying section 36 of the NHS Act 2006 to add new provisions that require foundation trusts to prepare accounts for the final period for which they were an NHS trust, establish that part of schedule 7 and part of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 apply in relation to those accounts, and define the final accounting period. It does the same for section 56AA of the 2006 Act.

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 31 introduces schedule 4, which essentially makes series of amendments to other Acts. It amends the Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000 to remove a cross-reference to other categories, and it amends the Audit and Accountability (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 and the Public Audit (Wales) Act 2004 for similar purposes. It also amends the National Health Service Act 2006 by deleting section 62 and schedule 10, relating to the audit of accounts of NHS foundation trusts, to end the old audit scheme. Schedule 4 amends section 3 of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 so that foundation trusts are now included in the list of bodies that must keep accounts in the standard way, it amends section 4 to specify which documents count as accounts of foundation trusts for the purpose of auditing, and it amends sections 8 and 10 so that the auditor appointment procedure and the auditor panel’s role now cover foundation trusts. In addition, schedule 4 rewrites section 13 of the 2014 Act so that if a trust fails to appoint a local auditor, it is the Secretary of State’s job to step in. Previously, that was NHS England’s job; clearly, that needs to change, because NHS England is being abolished. The schedule also amends section 21 so that the auditors’ general duties now apply to foundation trusts too, and it amends section 30, relating to unlawful expenditure and activity, and section 32B, relating to the independence requirement, to remove a now-redundant item from the list. Schedule 4 also amends schedule 2 to the 2014 Act to formally add foundation trusts to the official list of audited bodies; schedule 5 so that the rules on who can be a local auditor now cover foundation trusts too; schedule 6 to remove an outdated segment from the audit practice code rules; schedule 7 to tidy the reporting rules and extend them to foundation trusts; schedule 9 to realign data matching rules that apply to foundation trusts in the new system; and schedule 11, relating to the disclosure of information, to remove a reference to NHS England, which is no longer necessary because NHS England is being abolished. In general, clause 31 aligns the audit process for accounts of foundation trusts with those of standard trusts and integrated care boards. Clause 32 removes the need for NHS England to maintain a register of foundation trusts and the fees associated with maintaining it. Section 39 of the NHS Act 2006 requires NHS England to maintain a current register of NHS foundation trusts and specifies what must be in that register. Section 50 states that an NHS foundation trust must pay NHS England a fee that NHS England may determine in respect of exercising its functions under section 39, which relates to keeping the register, and section 39A, relating to a panel for advising governors. Clause 32 deletes sections 39 and 50. The explanatory notes say that the requirement to maintain a register does not need to be transferred to the Secretary of State when NHS England is abolished because, the Government argue, the information will already be available centrally, and there is no need for a fee to keep that in place. That seems sensible to me. Clause 33 enables the Secretary of State to impose limits on a foundation trust’s annual capital or revenue expenditure. Section 42B of the 2006 Act allows NHS England to make an order imposing a limit on the capital expenditure of a foundation trust in a single year. Section 42C sets out that NHS England must publish guidance about the exercise of its power under section 42B, including about the circumstances in which it is likely to make an order and the method it will use to determine the capital expenditure limit. Clause 33 entirely replaces sections 42B and 42C with rewritten sections, with some notable changes. The wording is changed from “capital expenditure” to “expenditure”. The power is therefore widened from capital expenditure limits to limits on any expenditure—capital and revenue. The Secretary of State replaces NHS England as the entity with the power to impose limits, which makes sense, and the subsection requiring an order to specify the trust, the financial year and so on has been removed in full. The change gives the Government financial control to stop overspending by NHS foundation trusts. I note that in financial year 2023-24, NHS trusts overspent by £1.2 billion, so presumably this is the Secretary of State getting a tighter grip on spending. In some respects that is sensible, but overspending is often due to staffing costs and day-to-day pressures, not capital expenditure, so there is an argument that the capital limits themselves are not sufficient to deal with the problem. Under the new governance model, the Secretary of State has oversight and responsibility for the health service, and financial control aligns with those changes. The new power could prevent one organisation’s failures from undermining the health service’s wider financial position or impacting other providers. However, the purpose of foundation trusts is supposed to be that they have greater independence over spending, and the Government have stated that their aim is to create a more devolved and autonomous health system. How does broadening the Secretary of State’s ability to interfere in expenditure devolve power or make foundation trusts more independent? Imposing expenditure limits may control overspending on paper, but it does not address the reasons why it is happening, so limits could lead to a deterioration in the health services delivered by some trusts. What plans does the Minister have to deal with that? Because the power moves from an arm’s length body to the Secretary of State, interventions could be politically motivated, rather than in the best interests of the NHS. How does the Minister consider that that will be managed? The power for the Secretary of State to impose expenditure limits at any time during or before the financial year could create uncertainty among trust leadership and undermine long-term planning. If a trust is given a budget for the year, it knows what it has to work with, but if somebody says halfway through the year, “Actually, you are going to have to work with less money than that,” it is very difficult for the board to plan its expenditure, because it is always looking the other way. Why does the Secretary of State need that power? Can the Minister clarify that, if there is a change in the expenditure limit during the year, it will always be revised upwards, and never downwards?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Ninth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 35 essentially establishes the right of the Secretary of State to convert a foundation trust into an NHS trust in certain circumstances. Currently, section 25 of the NHS Act 2006 establishes trusts and introduces schedule 4 of the same Act, which makes provision about NHS trusts. Section 56AA sets out how additional requirements concerning acquisitions of a trust or foundation trust are to work. Clause 35 deletes section 25(2), which specifies that an order in this context is referred to as “an NHS trust order”, and amends subsection (3), so that no order under section 25—previously no “NHS trust order”—can be made until any consultation that has been prescribed is complete. Clause 35 introduces proposed new section 57B into the 2006 Act, “Conversion of failing NHS foundation trust into NHS trust”, which provides the Secretary of State with the power to convert if the foundation trust breaches its licence or other legal duties. The trigger is broad and includes non-compliance with any statutory requirement. The proposed new section requires an order to specify when it takes effect and also requires the Secretary of State, when deciding to issue an order, to consider among other things “the seriousness of the failure…the health and safety of patients…the quality of the provision by the trust of goods and services…the financial position of the trust, and…the way that the trust is being run.” Before making an order, the Secretary of State will be required to consult the trust, any ICB where the trust has facilities and “any other person to whom the trust provides goods or services…whom the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult.” The proposed new section also provides the Secretary of State with the power, when the conversion order is made, to “terminate the appointment of the chair or any executive or non-executive director”, and to “appoint a person to be the chair or an executive or non-executive director”. It also time-limits the powers to intervene with management to one year after the order is made. Clause 35 also introduces proposed new section 57C into the 2006 Act, “Guidance about conversion”, which requires the Secretary of State to publish guidance about matters to be considered when deciding to make an order and requires them to consult persons considered appropriate before publishing or revising guidance. The clause removes “NHS trust order” from section 276 of the 2006 Act, “Index of defined expressions”, and updates schedule 4, so that an NHS trust may be established by an ordinary order under section 25 or a conversion order under proposed new section 57B. Schedule 5 to the Bill inserts proposed new schedule 9A to the 2006 Act, “Conversion of failing NHS foundation trusts”, which provides that, on conversion, the foundation trust’s chair and directors become the initial chair and directors of the new NHS trust, unless they are removed by the Secretary of State under the procedures we have just talked about. The proposed new schedule initially keeps the board the same size, until new arrangements are made. It provides that the foundation trust’s public dividend capital carries over to the NHS trust and that the conversion does not affect continuity of the body —it will remain the same organisation, just with NHS trust status. The proposed new schedule provides that the trust’s property and liabilities, including criminal liabilities, continue unaffected. It also provides that existing contracts continue and that the trust remains party to them. It clarifies that those contracts do not automatically become NHS contracts under section 9(1) of the 2006 Act, provides that the trust keeps any corporate memberships that it held before the conversion, and clarifies that the continuity provisions do not affect the Secretary of State’s wider powers to make directions. The Secretary of State will have a direct power to act where the foundation trust has failed—for instance, where there have been patient safety lapses—and there are clear benefits to that. There are also transparency requirements built in: the Secretary of State must publish guidance and consult before issuing guidance or undertaking conversion, and the power to change the management is limited to a year. However, the last Labour Government said that independence was central to the success of foundation trusts. In 2005, the then Secretary of State, Patricia Hewitt, said: “We know that independence from central Government control and greater freedoms are giving NHS foundation trusts the opportunity to innovate new approaches to healthcare and healthcare services, for the benefit of NHS patients.” —[ Official Report , 7 November 2005; Vol. 439, c. 5WS.] The challenge with innovations is that, even with the very best intentions and the very best advice, some will work and some will not. If any failure at all is a reason for trusts to be taken over, will that cause them to be shy about innovating, for fear of their independence being undermined as a result? There is a balance to strike, so I wonder whether the Minister will comment on that. The change also makes it easy for the Secretary of State to convert a foundation trust for political reasons—for instance, because of pressure from local Members of Parliament. That is a positive in some ways and a negative in others. Again, it could have a chilling effect on the very autonomy and innovation that Ministers want to see, so the question is how they think they will balance that.

• 30 Jun 2026 · Prisoner Releases in Error · Hansard source

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  I understand that the total is 441, which over a two-year period is the worst on record and means that, in less than 24 months, Labour has released more prisoners in error than were released in the previous six years combined. That is a disgrace. How many of those released in error early were convicted of rape?

• 30 Jun 2026 · Prisoner Releases in Error · Hansard source

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  5. What estimate he has made of the number of prisoners released in error since July 2024.

• 29 Jun 2026 · NHS Breast Screening · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I congratulate Gemma Reeves on bringing forward the petition and the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Irene Campbell) on introducing this important debate. It has been very moving to hear so many stories from hon. Members on both sides of the House reminding us of the human cost of this disease. Breast cancer is very common, as other Members have said, affecting one in seven women during their lifetime. The Minister and I have had a number of debates in this Chamber about various diseases and forms of cancer. One of the core principles we often discuss is that early diagnosis saves lives. Cancer Research UK says that 85% of women who live more than 10 years after a diagnosis of breast cancer were diagnosed at stage 1 or 2 —the earlier stages to be diagnosed at. It was for that reason, and on that principle, that the UK introduced the world’s first national screening programme for breast cancer in 1988. Since then, much has changed. In particular, survival rates have improved dramatically. Now, 76.6% live more than 10 years; the figure was very much lower in the 1980s. There are still some issues with screening, however, as hon. Members have said. One is that women with denser breasts find it more difficult to locate lumps, and when doing mammograms, it can be more difficult to locate cancerous tumours. Will the Minister update the House on what work has been done on using ultrasounds and MRIs to identify tumours in women with denser breasts? I understand that the National Screening Council is looking at this subject in detail. When is it due to report its findings to the Minister, and when does she intends to bring them to the House? The effectiveness of treatment has improved, but the risk of overtreatment is higher in younger women. The incidence of the disease is increasing in younger and older women: the Cancer Research UK website says that the rate has increased by 12% in women aged between 25 and 49, and by 72% in women aged between 65 and 69. Should younger women therefore now receive screening, and should older women receive more frequent screening? The cancer plan, which the Government published earlier this year, said that they will engage with manufacturers to look at mammograms that are more accessible to those with a physical disability, who at the moment struggle to receive their screening. Will the Minister update the House on the engagement she has had with manufacturers and on the progress that has been made? The age trial in Oxford is looking at women aged between 47 and 49, and between 71 and 73—the ages just outside the current range of screening. I understand that early results are due in December 2026. Has the Minister had any indication of the results yet, and is she preparing for any results that come forward? Has she engaged with the people running that important trial? Community diagnostic centres, which were initiated by the previous Government and rolled out across the country, provide screening close to people’s homes, which makes it much easier for them to attend. Will the Minister update us on how she is improving the number of CDCs available across the country? The Government have talked about the shifts that they want to produce in healthcare, one of which is about prevention. According to the Cancer Research UK website, 23% of breast cancer cases are preventable. Will the Minister update us on what she is doing to reduce the number of preventable cases of breast cancer? Many hon. Members have talked about attendance at screening tests. The hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire) spoke about some of the reasons why women do not attend screening. It is important that we understand why about a third of women do not attend. It is only by understanding what puts women off and makes them not attend that we can improve the services so that more women do attend. It was sobering to hear how many lives could be saved if more women attended screening. How are we making screening more accessible for women? Are we ensuring that women know that it is happening and that they need it? Do they understand the benefits of it? I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts. Another shift relates to the digital NHS. AI provides us with a number of ways to improve breast cancer screening and treatment. It could help us to understand who should be invited to screening and how often, and it can help when looking at mammogram scans. A few years ago, the Health and Social Care Committee visited Stanford in California and looked at the AI there. We saw a study comparing two radiology consultants looking at a scan, two AI computers using two different programmes, and a person and an AI computer. It discovered that the person and the AI computer were the most accurate. That can help to reduce the number of people we need in the workforce and, importantly, can improve the accuracy of screening results. That brings me on to the workforce. We know that the Government have a workforce plan, although its publication has been much delayed. We have been told repeatedly over the past few weeks that it has moved to “imminent” status—imminent being quicker than soon—but we do not know when imminent is. Does that mean it will be published before the summer, or do we need to wait for the new Prime Minister to make a decision? It would be helpful to know that from the Minister. As we heard about radiology and radiotherapy, the workforce is incredibly important. We need a thorough plan, otherwise we will have recommendations from the NSC for screening and no people to provide that care. I also wanted to raise with the Minister the Lobular Moon Shot Project. We have discussed before the importance of research into lobular breast cancer, which is more difficult to diagnose and treat. The last time we spoke about this, the Minister was looking at research projects that the Government could fund to identify new treatments and ways of screening for this disease, hopefully saving lives. Will she update us on how she is getting along with that? Much of my time at the moment is spent with another Health Minister—the Minister for Secondary Care, the hon. Member for Bristol South (Karin Smyth)—in Committee Room 9, debating the Health Bill. That is where I will be tomorrow. The Bill relates to one of the important organisational factors in screening. At the moment, screening programmes are generally organised by NHS England, which is being abolished. NHS England and the Department of Health and Social Care wrote a letter in March saying that commissioning responsibility will be directly delegated to ICBs, in the same way that they are currently delegated to NHSE, by the Secretary of State. Does the Minister expect that to cause any disruption to the breast screening programme? Integrated care boards have had their budgets cut by 50% just as they are asked to take on this work. We know that they are merging and reorganising in cells. The Government’s plans are that they should follow the mayoral authority boundaries, but the mergers that have taken place so far do not follow those boundaries. There is therefore a risk that we will need reorganisation all over again. Does the Minister think that that will have an effect on the screening programme? If so, what is she doing to mitigate that effect to ensure that as many people as possible get the very best screening and we can reduce the number of people suffering from the disease? The screening programme offers a real opportunity to diagnose, treat early and save lives, but it needs to be delivered well. We need to ensure that the right people get the right type of screening at the right age, and at the right frequency. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response.