Caroline Johnson MP: speeches

Speeches

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It does raise questions about the point of new section 12E. That provision was not there before; there must be a reason for adding it. Either the Government want ideologically to reduce the amount of private provision in the NHS, or they want to increase it. The clause gives them the power to do both. Labour politicians very often tell the public that the NHS is being privatised. Data has shown that that is not happening, but that did not matter; they found the myth politically advantageous and repeated it ad nauseam. Now, the Minister and her colleagues are in office—they have the levers of power—and are proposing to change the law to make it easier to change the provider mix. That is not only ironic but deeply misguided. I tabled amendment 53 to require any changes to the provider mix to be in the interests of patients. If the Minister is unwilling to support that, will she offer a compelling explanation why? Clause 10 has alarmed stakeholders across the health sector and the political spectrum. That really ought to tell us something. I look forward to her response.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is right. When all the new doctors that the Government have promised have been trained, they will need jobs and postgraduate medical training, and there are issues with that. Nevertheless, the Government asked the public to vote for them on the basis that they would double the number of medical school places. Many of the hon. Gentleman’s colleagues produced little videos to that effect, which can be viewed on Twitter. They toured the newsrooms saying, “Please vote for us, we’re going to double the number of medical school places.” They suggested that there would be a revolution in Government to make sure that there were enough doctors. This is important—more doctors would help. All new clause 44 does is ask the Government to commit to doing what they have said that they will do—or to say that they will not. Either way, we have had the Secretary of State saying one thing and a Minister saying the opposite and then correcting it, so we need clarity. The public deserve that. The Minister herself said that they would double the number of medical school places so that we have the doctors that our NHS needs. If they do not double the number of medical school places, it follows that they will not have the number of doctors that the NHS needs. Presumably that is in their workforce plan, but it needs to be cleared up. Amendment 50 would put a duty on the Secretary of State to publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS workforce every five years. The logic is straightforward: if the Government believe that their plans are sufficient, they can be compared to an impartial assessment of the workforce. The previous Government published a workforce plan in 2023, setting out how to tackle existing and future workforce challenges over several years. That included doubling the number of medical school places. Yet three years later, this Government are on course for a new plan that is reportedly far less ambitious—we will find out in a minute. The workforce affects whether patients can be seen on time, maternity wards are safely staffed and elderly patients get the dignity they deserve. It is the difference between the NHS meeting the challenge of an ageing population or slipping into decline. If Labour Members are confident that the Minister’s workforce planning is robust, I expect that they will support my amendment, which requires an independently audited forecast. If they are not willing to support it, that suggests that they know this Government cannot be trusted to deliver the workforce that patients need. Amendment 54 and new clause 45 were also tabled in my name. Amendment 54 would require the Secretary of State to look at the amount of clinical work that NHS managers undertake. As a clinician, I have increasingly noticed that highly qualified clinical practitioners come in, become the person on the ward who can be relied on, and then go off because they get promoted to a nine-to-five job that is easier and pays more, but does not deliver clinical care. The chief medical officer, for example, still delivers clinical care, and the amendment probes the Government to consider how many nurses and clinicians in hospitals are delivering clinical care. I asked that in written questions, and the Government did not know the answer. It is materially important information, particularly when looking at the Dash report, which talks about an explosion in the number of people who are clinically trained but not providing clinical work—instead, they are creating guidelines and monitoring whether other clinicians are doing the work. If more of those people were engaged in clinical activity, that might improve the quality of both the guidelines and care, because more junior staff would have senior staff around to help them.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 11, page 8, leave out lines 15 to 30. This amendment prevents the Secretary of State from removing the Chief Executive of an integrated care board.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way on that point?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 10, page 6, line 21, leave out from “interests” to end of line and insert “of patients”. This amendment would only allow the Secretary of State to vary the balance between the public and private sectors in the NHS where it is in the interests of patients to do so.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Before the lunch break I was saying that, in essence, clause 7 states what the Secretary of State’s job is. It moves the function of planning the workforce from NHS England to the Secretary of State, which is a reasonable thing to do. I talked about the previous Government’s record on opening new medical schools and how that has helped with the number of clinical staff. We also talked about workforce planning. The Government are due to produce a workforce plan, but it is not clear when it is due to come out. It was due to come out at the end of last year, but it did not; it was then due to come out in the spring, but now it is the summer. Given the Prime Minister’s resignation, it is not at all clear when it will come out. Will the Minister let us know whether it will come out before the summer recess, this week or whenever? I quoted some of the concerns of the Royal College of Nursing, the British Medical Association, of which I am a member, and others. Those concerns include the workforce plan. Those organisations have seen what we have not seen, so they have been asked to comment on something that we have yet to see. That brings me to new clause 44, which is in my name. Before the general election, Labour promised that it would double the number of medical school places. The now Chancellor of the Exchequer promised to double the number of medical school training places, as did the now Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology. Once the general election had passed and Labour was in government, the promise was reiterated. At oral questions in October 2024, the now former Health Secretary said: “This Government are committed, as we were in opposition, to doubling the number of medical school places”. —[ Official Report , 15 October 2024; Vol. 754, c. 683.] — but there has not really been any progress. During a debate this year on the junior doctors’ foundation programme, I asked the Minister for Care whether the Government’s intention was still to honour that pledge. He said: “Yes, that is the Government’s intention.” —[ Official Report, 22 April 2026; Vol. 784, c. 133WH.] — only to later submit a written correction stating that the Government had never committed to doing so. Are they going to, or not? It is not clear. Labour promised to double the number of medical school places, but now that pledge appears to have been airbrushed out of history. Can the Minister please explain why she and her colleagues deemed the workforce pledge essential before the election but not after it? Can she tell us whether it is Government policy? In essence, my new clause 44 asks Members on the Government Benches to vote for what they promised before the election and have promised since. New clause 44 is very simple: it stipulates that the Secretary of State must double the number of medical school training places by 2031-32. That is what Labour promised, so it should be fairly easy for Labour Members to vote for it. I hope that the Committee will support the new clause, which only requires Ministers to do what their party promised before it came into government. If the Government are not keen on committing to clear targets, they can at least commit to full scrutiny of their workforce plans. Of course, there is a risk that the House has been misled. Either the promise was made or it was not. The Minister for Care said that it was promised and then submitted a written correction to say that that was inaccurate and that it was never Government policy, but if it has been stated by the Secretary of State at the Dispatch Box, representing the Government, then it is Government policy. Can the Minister help to clarify that point? If the House has been misled by either her former boss or the Minister for Care, perhaps she can clear that up for us. Perhaps the vote will help.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way on that point?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 8 is essentially about the control that the Secretary of State has over ICBs. When we discussed the clause abolishing NHS England, we talked a lot about the balance between democratic accountability on the one hand and independence from political interference on the other. The Government suggest that the Bill is a decentralising Bill. What this clause does is essentially to recentralise by default. As the Minister has just said, the Secretary of State can change what the ICB is doing if they think that it is inappropriate. What does “inappropriate” mean exactly, and how will that power be used? It may be used very infrequently—perhaps the current and previous Secretaries of State think that the power would be used infrequently—but equally it could be used in response to considerable pressure from MPs, lobbyists and campaign groups. Instead of issuing directions sparingly, we may end up in a position where the Secretary of State is issuing day-to-day instructions. The Government want ICBs to take greater responsibility for commissioning decisions, but then they want to be able to undermine them by direction from the Health Secretary. The Health Secretary will never have as good a grasp of the situation in the local geographic area as local leaders, but he has the power to tell them what to do and issue blanket instructions with different characteristics. That will be inherently inefficient. ICB leaders will be under pressure, knowing that if they make a particular decision they can be removed or be told to do something different. They have the job and they have the power, but they haven’t really—all at the same time. There is also the plan, as the Minister outlined, to make directions something that the Government publish. The clause says that directions must be published by the Secretary of State, but only “as soon as reasonably practicable”. The intention behind requiring the prompt publication of directions is to reduce the surface area for back-room pressures, but the lack of a clear timeframe makes it rather a weak measure. We currently have a Government who seem open to greater use of the private sector, whether in financing projects or in delivering out-patient care. Well, our Prime Minister resigned yesterday, and there is no guarantee that the Government of the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) will take the same approach. Will the Minister confirm whether the powers in clause 8 could be used by a Health Secretary to instruct ICBs to stop using a specific type of provider? I would not dispute the idea that the Secretary of State needs to be able to exercise some control over the health service now that NHS England is being abolished, but the clause seems contrary to the Government’s stated vision for health management. I am not sure whether it is in the best interests of patients.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 11 is particularly interesting. In August 2025, Alan Milburn was asked about the abolition of NHS England on the Health Foundation podcast. He said that the Government wanted to see a model that was “more delegated…more devolved” and “more diverse”, which necessitated the centre being smaller. Considering that he is a former Labour Health Secretary and a non-executive director at the Department of Health and Social Care, I do not doubt his understanding of what the Government wanted to achieve. When the former Health Secretary, the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting), announced the 10-year plan to the House, he also talked about dissolving power. He spoke of a “brave new world of devolution of power, resources and control”. —[ Official Report , 3 July 2025; Vol. 770, c. 469.] That was repeated in the Government publications that accompanied the Bill: “Empowering ICBs as strategic commissioners will support putting patients at the centre of care by devolving decisions to a local level where different services can better integrate… Reforms to the NHS FT model will give providers more flexibility to design and deliver healthcare around local needs.” Between the announcement of the abolition of NHS England and the publication of the Bill, Ministers articulated a vision for a more decentralised system. There is expert consensus that decentralisation boosts performance, reduces health disparities and fosters innovation. After listening to remarks this morning, I have no doubt that Members are clued up on the importance of innovation to the health service, but a problem—a philosophical contradiction—at the heart of the Government’s reform programme and the Bill is that Ministers talk about decentralisation while these provisions constitute a recentralisation of power.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  In a system as large as the NHS, covering an area as diverse as England, it is necessary that the Government be able to deal with unexpected situations. The pandemic may be half a decade behind us already, but the Committee will remember that the previous Government had to act quickly and part with a lot of money in a short time. In such instances, it is essential that Ministers have the power to provide financial assistance. It is not only about crises, however; ordinarily, there are occasions when a Government will want to roll out a new prevention programme or address deficiencies in care in particular areas. I know that health policy is always evolving, and the case for flexibility is clear. The Health Secretary may need to be able to provide financial assistance in pursuit of supporting the health service. I am sure that hon. Members are familiar with the existing legislation. Section 12D of the National Health Service Act 2006 gives the Secretary of State, NHS England, an ICB or the local authority the ability to make direct financial payments as an assistance to persons or bodies. Clause 9 would new section 12DA of the Act, under which the Secretary of State would be empowered to provide assistance to any person or body carrying out, or proposing to carry out, activities that they deem beneficial to the service. This is where semantics are important. The existing legislation allows the Secretary of State to make payments, but clause 9 is different: it would allow the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance and to make available persons employed by the civil service or any other resources that the Secretary of State has. This is a remarkably open-ended power that would allow the Secretary of State to spend taxpayers’ money while bypassing standard scrutiny. When NHS England spends money, there is transparency: the public can see how much has been spent on different types of care, ranging from hospitals to public health programmes. The public can see how much money has gone into trusts, into the independent sector and into procurement. Transparency builds trust in the system and disincentivises wasteful spending. Where will parliamentarians or the public be able to see the financial expense of civil servants, or literally any other resource that the Secretary of State may offer in support? For the first time, the Health Secretary will have the power to insert politically directed civil servants into elements of the health service that are not under public ownership. As clause 9 is drafted, the Secretary of State could provide civil service labour to private or mutual health providers that work within the NHS. Will the Minister elaborate on how that would be used, and how it would be beneficial to the taxpayer and the health service? The number of civil servants taking home more than six figures has increased under this Government. Their time should be focused on delivering public services, not propping up providers, especially ones that are private businesses. It is also unclear where the legal liability lies under such arrangements. If something goes wrong and the human resources provided by the Secretary of State are responsible, is the Secretary of State responsible or the entity into which those staff have been inserted? Can the Minister clarify that? It may be politically beneficial in the short term to provide state support, but it can be costly to the public purse and damaging to markets in the long term. By allowing the Health Secretary to issue assistance in the form of free civil servant labour, clause 9 effectively creates a new type of off-the-books subsidy. How can Members of the House or NHS providers tell whether assistance is operational support or a de facto subsidy? It could undermine the idea of a level playing field for firms contracted to deliver NHS services. There is also the question of when assistance crosses from operational support into running a provider or firm. We do not necessarily want to be in a position where the Bill is used to bail out failing private firms with NHS contracts. I return to the phrase “any other resources of the Secretary of State”. It is difficult to understand why the legislation was written in this way, allowing financial assistance, the provision of labour, and then the use of absolutely any other resource at the Health Secretary’s disposal. As with several other provisions in the Bill, it seems another sign that the legislation was rushed. Instead of circumscribing power tightly where it is needed, the Bill gives huge sweeping powers while claiming that it decentralises. The Minister has described clause 9 as a discretionary power intended to support the effective functioning of the health service and its workforce. Although that may be what she sought to achieve, that is not the reality. The clause paves the way for arbitrary and unaccountable deployments of state resources, and that should concern all hon. Members.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Puberty Blockers · Hansard source

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  I am sorry, but I just do not support that. We would not give children cocaine on the basis that they wanted it and would get it illegally otherwise. These are not sweeties; they are powerful drugs and need to be treated with respect. Even if we accept the premise that a very small number of people might benefit from treatment, how could clinicians decide which children to treat? On what ethical or moral code would we want to inject powerful drugs into children who are likely to have a self-limiting illness and therefore do not need it? That is what the Government have chosen to do, and it is not necessary. Following on from the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon, they have this data already. The Tavistock was a travesty, but it means that the Government could analyse the data from the outcomes of those children. They could establish the outcomes as children went into adulthood, and Baroness Cass tried to do this using the data linkage study. Shockingly, six out of seven adult gender clinics refused to provide the Government with the data. Even when a specific piece of legislation was passed by the previous Government to clarify that it was legal to provide the information to this trial, the gender clinics still did not provide it. I understand that NHS England is working on the data linkage study, but I ask the Secretary of State why it is taking so long. Is the abolition of NHS England causing delay? Why is he letting this trial, which he has expressed reservations about, go ahead in the knowledge that it is unnecessarily broad and in advance of the data linkage study?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Puberty Blockers · Hansard source

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  This is not a form of gene therapy. It is a medication that is a GnRH analogue, and what it essentially does is delay puberty. It was designed as a drug to treat children who go into puberty much earlier than they would be expected to, and to delay it until, as it were, the right time. The effects of the use of puberty blockers in older children and for a much longer period, at an age when they ought to have started puberty, are not fully understood.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Puberty Blockers · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman is exactly right, and he expresses my point succinctly. Why is the Secretary of State going ahead with a trial—experimenting on more children unnecessarily—when he has the data to analyse already? Why has he chosen to fund this trial? Is he worried about the children who will be put on a medical pathway that may lead to cross-sex hormones and a lifetime of medicalisation when they would have got better by themselves anyway? I want to talk about the age of these young people. The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency warned in February that the youngest patients are at the greatest risk, and may end up on puberty blockers for a much longer period. They have a higher risk to fertility because sperm and eggs have not yet fully developed at Tanner stage 2, but this Government have chosen to include children of 11 or 12. Some will wonder why it is 11 for girls and 12 for boys—indeed, I was asked that question yesterday—but as a paediatrician I am aware that puberty starts earlier in girls than in boys. It is somewhat ironic that a trial based on the premise that girls could be boys recognises this biology, but I am glad that in this respect it does. However, that means some of the participants will be primary school-aged children with the merest form of puberty. How can they possibly meet the eligibility criteria, which includes “sufficient understanding of the treatment advantages and disadvantages, including discussion of fertility preservation”? How can a child of 11 understand what it means to lose sexual function, to be unable to have children when they are older, to have difficulties in thinking and to have weak bones? Remember that this Government think that 14-year-olds are not old enough to watch social media, but they think 11-year-olds are capable of understanding this.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Puberty Blockers · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention on devolution, and I am sure the Secretary of State was listening and considering what he has said. To go back to the age of the young people, I am reminded of the judgment in Bell v . Tavistock, which says: “We do not think that the answer to this case is simply to give the child more, and more detailed, information. The issue in our view is that in many cases, however much information the child is given as to long-term consequences, s/he will not be able to weigh up the implications of the treatment to a sufficient degree.” I draw right hon. and hon. Members’ attention to the next part of the quote: “There is no age appropriate way to explain to many of these children what losing their fertility or full sexual function may mean to them in later years.” Yet, as Secretary of State confirmed yesterday, the children must consent or assent to being in this trial. Another question that he did not answer yesterday is why the Government did not heed the MHRA recommendation for a minimum of 14 years. Having established that the Government are going to put a group of physically healthy children with a self-resolving condition at a risk they may not fully understand, the remaining question is why they would they want to do this. The trial itself has an interesting design. We are told that it is a randomised controlled trial—as a doctor, I am familiar with that term—but in this case it is a bit of a fudge. Yes, this Government-sponsored trial will randomise which children get the drugs now and which get them in a year’s time, but the comparison group that does not receive puberty blockers—300 children from the Horizon Intensive trial, with whom the trial will seek to compare—may not be considered a reliable comparison, because the group is a different group with different eligibility criteria. When the results of this trial are published, this fact is bound to be used by people who dispute or disagree with the findings. The Secretary of State said this trial will resolve the dispute over the issue, but that is one of the reasons why I think it will not. I want to discuss sexual function, because yesterday the Secretary of State said that the trial would involve the completion of a number of questionnaires, and one of my hon. Friends raised the question about what happens to children’s sexual function in the long term. What is sexual function? It is desire, arousal and orgasm. The trial organisers are clearly concerned about this, because they put into the trial the ALSPAC—Avon longitudinal study of parents and children—romantic relationships questionnaire. I read the questionnaire on the Health Research Authority website, and children from the age of 12 and over will be asked these questions, one of which is: “In the last year have you had oral sex with another person? (This is when they put their mouth or tongue on your penis/vagina or you put your mouth or tongue on their penis/vagina)”. Let us be clear: if that is happening to a 12-year-old, that is sexual abuse and the police should be called. Is the Secretary of State content for the Government to be asking these questions of such young children? Can he believe that they will be paid £20 for completing their questionnaires, alongside £30 for completing the assessment of cognitive ability and £15 for completing physical and height assessments, in addition to travel expenses? There will be lots of talk this week about the Prime Minister’s legacy. Putting children as young as 11 on puberty blockers, with irreversible life-changing consequences, would be the most disturbing final chapter in what has been a troubled book of leadership. Today, right hon. and hon. Members will be asked to vote to consider their approval or disapproval of the trial. I urge them to look at their conscience, read the trial protocol—it is online—and remember that these are vulnerable children who deserve the best care. One day, the children caught in the middle of this debate will be adults. It is our responsibility to ensure that when they look back on their one childhood, their one adolescence and their one chance to enjoy growing up, they must know that every decision was made with the utmost care, caution and respect for their future. The power to make that happen is in our hands today. I urge hon. Members to protect children’s futures.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Puberty Blockers · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend raises a very good point, and I will come to the data linkage study shortly. What we do know from the Cass review is that the vast majority of children who went on to puberty blockers in adolescence went on to receive cross-sex hormones, which are known to have permanent effects. One fact that is crucially important is that it is not possible for clinicians to confidently determine which children with gender incongruence will persist with the trans identity into adulthood, and which will not. How can the clinicians possibly know that they are not injecting potentially dangerous drugs into children whose incongruence will resolve itself? The answer is that they cannot. Will the Secretary of State tell us whether he is aware of new evidence allowing clinicians to work out confidently which children will persist with the trans identity at 11 and which will not? We need to think about the risk involved in the treatment, and whether it is worth the benefits that they will purportedly receive. The trial researchers suggest that they will take a wide approach to looking at potential benefits, that they will look at quality of life and body satisfaction, and that there must be a reasonable prospect of benefit; but how can they know whether there is a reasonable prospect of benefit when they do not know whether or not the condition will persist? Some have suggested that giving puberty blockers will help the few adults who retain their trans identity into adulthood to pass as the opposite sex. Does the Secretary of State think that the long-term damage to many is worth it for the cosmetic benefit of a few? The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 specify that “anticipated benefits” must justify the risk. This is an ethical rather than a medical question. Does the Secretary of State think that the benefits justify the risk? I regret that we have ended up discussing the details of a clinical trial in the Chamber—the reality is that things should be done impartially by scientists in most cases—but with this topic we have seen the quashing of open debate, which is why we have ended up where we are. I will move on to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon (Gregory Stafford). Even if the Secretary of State thinks the principle of the trial is right, he must surely agree that it is unnecessary and unethically broad. For example, if someone was designing a trial to treat children with a specific form of cancer, the children who would be entered into the trial would have that specific form of cancer. We would not include children with any disease, because that would make the results unreliable in terms of benefit to the target group and children would be unnecessarily put at risk of receiving experimental drugs that they did not need. The same applies to this trial. The Cass report tells us that many of the children in the proposed trial will get better on their own. The Secretary of State said yesterday that “we are talking about a very small subset of a very small group.” —[ Official Report , 22 June 2026; Vol. 788, c. 56.]

• 23 Jun 2026 · Puberty Blockers · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That this House calls on the Government to take steps to prevent the PATHWAYS clinical trial into the effect of puberty suppressing hormones on children with gender incongruence. Before I start, I declare an interest as an NHS consultant paediatrician, a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, and a member of the British Medical Association. It is also important for us to recognise at the beginning of this debate that we are talking about the protection of children—vulnerable children who are troubled, and who need our care and compassion and the very best quality of healthcare. The healthcare of children distressed about their gender is an area in which attempts have been made to shut down debate with threats and accusations of transphobia; we saw the way that the hon. Member for Canterbury (Rosie Duffield) was treated when she raised concerns. As adults and as elected Members of this House, we have a duty to safeguard children in our country. That means protecting them from adults who—with whatever motivation, good or bad—could do them harm. As a children’s doctor, I have recruited patients for trials, and I have cared for children and babies participating in clinical trials. I recognise the value of a well-designed clinical trial in improving clinical care, but today the House is not being asked to consider the principle of performing clinical trials in general, or on children in particular—I hope we can all agree that a well-designed trial can improve care. Rather, we are being asked to consider the Pathways trial: whether it meets ethical tests, what it does, the cohort, the protocol and the consent. I will go through each of those points in turn. The Pathways trial is part of a group of studies run by King’s College London and funded by the Government. So what does it do and why are we so concerned? The trial will take 226 children who are physically healthy—who are developing normally—and inject them with powerful drugs to delay that normal development in a way that may weaken their bones, affect their ability to think, damage their sexual function, and leave them unable to have children of their own. We are told that the purpose of this is to treat a diagnosis of gender incongruence. So what is gender incongruence? The International Classification of Diseases states that it is “characterised by a marked and persistent incongruence between an individual’s experienced gender and the assigned sex, which often leads to a desire to ‘transition’”. We know that gender incongruence is a condition that is subjective. It is based on how someone tells us they feel. There are no blood tests and no lab markers that can be used to diagnose it. As a paediatrician myself, I understand that how patients feel, particularly in relation to their mental health, is very important. We know from the Cass review that the vast majority of children with gender incongruence will get better on their own. Again, as a paediatrician, I am used to providing supportive treatment for conditions such as respiratory viruses and gastroenteritis, which generally get better on their own, but I am not used to giving powerful drugs to children that can cause permanent long-term damage for subjective, self-resolving difficulties during adolescence.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Puberty Blockers · Hansard source

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  Well, one of the things with doctors is that if you ask two doctors, you might get two different opinions. I completely respect Baroness Cass. She has been president of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, of which I am a member, and she has done great work on the report that we commissioned in the last Parliament. I know she is concerned that people may obtain these drugs illegally if they are not provided, but I do not share that concern. Personally, I think the important thing is whether the people obtaining such drugs legally are using them in a way that is safe, and I am not convinced that that is the case.

• 22 Jun 2026 · Pathways Study: Puberty Suppression · Hansard source

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  I declare an interest as an NHS consultant paediatrician and a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. What does this trial do? Put simply, it takes physically healthy children with normal pubertal development and subjects them to powerful drugs that may weaken their bones, affect their ability to think, damage sexual function and make them unable to have children of their own. Serious stuff—and for what? To treat a diagnosis of gender incongruence that will probably resolve without treatment. Let us look at this carefully. Gender incongruence is a subjective condition; it is how someone says they feel. There are no lab markers and no scans. That, of course, is not necessarily unusual. In fact, it is common in mental health conditions. Gender incongruence is often self-resolving; it gets better on its own. Again, this is not unusual in paediatrics. It is really common for children to be admitted to hospital for supported care for things like gastroenteritis and respiratory viruses. Puberty blockers are powerful drugs. This is a powerful treatment with significant long-term consequences. Again, this is not new to paediatrics. Some chemotherapy, for example, has substantial short and long-term consequences. But what is unusual and, I think, toxic is the combination of all three. Medicine is about balancing risk. Where else would we give powerful drugs with potentially serious long-term consequences for a subjective condition that is likely to get better on its own? I understand that this trial has been approved, but time and again we have seen and heard how fear and hostility can distort priorities. We have seen tragedy occur when fears of accusations of racism limited mental health treatment. We have seen profound suffering when fear of accusations of Islamophobia limited inquiries into the grooming gangs. The healthcare of children distressed about their gender is another topic where there have been attempts to shut down debate with threats and accusations of transphobia. Such attempts were reported in relation to the Tavistock. When considering treatments for life, with lifelong implications, we have a duty to be careful and sensible, so I ask the Secretary of State: why are this Government funding a trial that will cause harm to physically healthy children? These children may be 11 years old, at Tanner stage 2. Some of them are primary school children with only minimal signs of puberty. This is far too young. The MHRA warned in February that the youngest patients are at greatest risk; they may end up on puberty blockers for a much longer period, and face a higher risk to fertility, because sperm and eggs have not yet fully developed at Tanner stage 2. I am reminded of this point in the judgment in Bell v. Tavistock: “There is no age appropriate way to explain to many of these children what losing their fertility or full sexual function may mean to them in later years.” Yet as the Secretary of State confirmed, the children must consent or assent to being in the trial. Why did the Government not heed the MHRA’s recommendation of a minimum age of 14 years? This Labour Government think that 14 is too young to watch social media. Why do they think 11 is old enough for this trial? What is the goal of the treatment? In the trial, the outcome is a short to medium-term effect on quality of life and body satisfaction. Does the Secretary of State believe this is proportionate to the risks of these medications? Is there any evidence suggesting that puberty blockers are safer than they were thought to be in 2024, when the Government banned them, following the expert advice from the Commission on Human Medicines? Some have suggested that the drugs help adults to pass as the opposite sex. Is the long-term damage really worth it for the cosmetic benefit of a few? And it is just a few, because we know that the vast majority will be better without any treatment. The Secretary of State said that “when it comes to eligibility, we are talking about a very small subset of a very small group.” Even if we were to accept the premise that a very small number might benefit from treatment, how could the clinicians identify which those children might be? A study of clinical outcomes from kids treated at the Tavistock is due to be completed next year. That could help, so why is the Secretary of State not waiting until that report is completed before conducting an experiment on an unnecessarily broad group of children? Has evidence come to light since the Cass review that helps clinicians confidently work out which 11-year-olds will become adults with gender dysphoria and which will not? The Secretary of State has said that the criteria will stop short-term harm, and that should mean that long-term harm will not occur or go unnoticed, but history is littered with examples of things that do not cause short-term harm but do cause long-term damage. He also suggested that the trial will resolve the dispute, but sadly, I do not think that will be the case, because, first, a single trial rarely resolves a dispute; and, secondly, the comparison group, who are not getting the puberty blockers, are not randomised and are an intrinsically different population. This is bound to be highlighted once the result is published. In medicine, we have a founding principle: primum non nocere—first, do no harm. I ask the Health Secretary to please cancel this trial before vulnerable children suffer unnecessary, irreversible harm on his watch.

• 18 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend talked about how the ICBs have merged. There are lots of different types of reorganisation going on at once: the abolition of NHS England, the changes to local authorities, the introduction of mayors in some areas, and the changes and cuts to ICBs. What effect is that having in his part of the country?

• 18 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. First, I declare a number of interests. I am a consultant paediatrician working in the NHS, a member of the British Medical Association and a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. Like the Minister for Secondary Care, I got into politics after working in the health service. I am sure she agrees that what you see when working in the health service stays with you when working in the House, and that it benefits the House to have people who have done all different jobs working here. The NHS constitution says that health services should “improve, prevent, diagnose and treat both physical and mental health problems with equal regard”, yet in my work as a doctor—and I worked across several hospitals during my training—the gap between the vision of what should be delivered and the reality of what is being delivered has become apparent to me. The answer frequently given seems to be top-down reorganisation. As I will talk about in a minute, such top-down reorganisation has been done so many times but does not seem necessarily to have delivered in practice what it promised. Indeed, to an extent, we seem to be changing things from how they were to how they are to how they were, backwards and forwards. This Government have decided, in pursuit of better outcomes and cost savings, once again to reorganise the health service, and they seek to do so with this Bill and particularly clause 1. Clause 1 formally abolishes NHS England. The clause may have very few words, but they represent one of the biggest changes to our health service in decades. Abolishing NHS England is not just a decision about organisational structure or trimming bureaucracy, but a break with the direction of travel the health service has been on since its inception. Prior to the creation of the NHS in 1948, health services were fragmented: some people used contributory workplace schemes, people who could afford it paid out of pocket, and everyone else relied on very limited state and voluntary provision or went without. In the aftermath of the second world war, the national health service created a state monopoly provider. The Minister of Health had a duty to provide a comprehensive health service free for all at the point of use and a bureaucracy was created to manage it. There was a tripartite split between hospital services, local authority services and independent practitioner services. The hospitals provided secondary care for those with serious disease and those requiring emergency response. The NHS also took over many cottage hospitals in rural areas that had previously been run by GPs, and larger hospitals that used to be run by local authorities and the voluntary sector. At that time, hospital staff were managed by hospital management committees appointed by regional hospital boards. Those boards implemented Government policies and oversaw the budget. Meanwhile, teaching hospitals kept more independence, directed by their own boards of governors. Councils, operating as local health authorities, had a duty to provide several personal health services including health centres, maternity care, home nursing, immunisation and ambulance services—some of those are now provided by NHS England. They also had substantial powers to prevent illness and to care for the disabled. Independent practitioners—GPs, dentists, pharmacists and opticians— delivered services to local communities under contract from the health service. Now they deliver under contract from NHS England and the ICBs. The health service underwent significant reorganisation in 1974, not long before I was born. The main objective at that time was to create a unified, integrated system. Community health services previously operated by councils moved into NHS control. These functions were put under the control of new area health authorities, which took control of most NHS hospitals. Some larger area health authorities had their own distinct management teams, which managed services on the ground—we can look at the current process and ask how it is similar and how it is different. The majority of teaching hospitals lost independent governance, in the way that we, too, are seeing that go back and forth. Above the new area health authorities sat regional health authorities, which were responsible for planning and allocating financial resources. Their members were appointed by the Secretary of State. In the 1980s, Ministers recognised that the system had become very bureaucratic—perhaps similarly to today—and in 1982, area health authorities and district management committees were scrapped in favour of new district health authorities, with the aim of reducing what was in effect a three-layer structure to two layers. The thinking was that the new district health authorities would be closer to local populations, but primary care was left mostly unchanged. Once again, there are parallels with what is happening now. From its inception to the end of the 1980s, the NHS had gone through several waves of rationalisation, but the model remained that of a centrally planned public service. However, during that time, there was an intellectual change—the concept of choice. Previously, people had been happy just to get a health service, which they had not had access to before, but that changed and people wanted choice. We now see the benefits of giving patients choice, and we will hear about how the Government’s changes through the Bill will apparently improve patient choice. Of course, individuals have different values and preferences and live their lives in different ways, which makes it impossible for there to be a single public interest for the Government to pursue. Against that backdrop, the new public management approach to Government administration emerged, advocating for the introduction of market mechanisms and performance metrics—we have heard about the targets that NHS England follows—in public institutions. In theory, if elements of the state could operate more like the private sector, perhaps Ministers could achieve both cost savings and better outcomes. In 1991 the Government introduced market logic into the health service. They created an internal market by splitting the purchasers—mainly, at that time, the district health authorities—from the providers, which were the hospitals. The Secretary of State gained the power to create NHS trusts—hospitals with the freedom to acquire, hold and dispose of assets; make bids for capital directly to the NHS management executive, in the way they might for NHS England; borrow money within limits; develop their own management structure; and employ their own staff with their own terms of employment. Within three years, almost all providers had become trusts. GP fundholding was established, enabling larger practices to receive budgets to buy secondary care on behalf of their patients, but that was short lived and was shelved in 1999. When new Labour came to power in the late ’90s, one might have thought that things might swing back the other way, but in some respects the trajectory was similar. Initially, the Labour Government talked critically about the internal market. In 1998 the then Health Secretary told Members that the Government were “sweeping away the internal market” —[ Official Report , 1 July 1998; Vol. 315, c. 314.] and the NHS plan published in 2000 claimed that “the internal market introduced competition but failed to bring improvements.” However, the policy choices of that Government furthered, rather than dismantled, the marketised aspects of the health service. They were saying one thing but, to some extent, doing another. There are similarities with this Bill: we have talked about decentralising power but, as we heard in evidence on Tuesday, many people feel it is more of a centralising Bill than a decentralising Bill. It was clear that the new public management approach had been adopted across the political divide. The NHS plan promised patients more choice about how to access the NHS—a good thing. It promised a system of inspection, accountability and far greater local autonomy. It said: “For the first time the NHS and the private sector will work more closely together not just to build new hospitals but to provide NHS patients with the operations they need.” When GP fundholding went, the Government introduced primary care groups, which meant that GPs, nurses and other staff came together to commission for local populations. Those groups then evolved into primary care trusts, which by 2002 were responsible for spending 80% of the annual NHS budget—a budget that is now distributed by NHS England.

• 18 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  Thank you, Sir Jeremy. I will be grateful if the Minister clarifies at the end, because she seems to be suggesting that Lord Darzi’s report was wrong in some way. He was assessing the NHS at the same time that she was, with the experience of having been a Minister, and made the counter-suggestion. It is not just about what one does; it is about how one goes about it. As we heard on Tuesday, there is in general a plan of what is going to happen, but so many decisions have not been made yet in relation to this. In particular, one of the witnesses from the union talked about how unsettling that was for staff and how difficult it is for staff to be asked to go from the current location to a destination unknown. It is very difficult to make transformation in a direction when it is not clear where one wants to be. In March 2025, the Government announced that NHSE would be abolished. The largest healthcare union described the handling of the announcement as “shambolic”, coming only days after the announcement of a 50% cut to staffing levels at the centre. In the days and months since, Ministers have provided only some clarity about what they are trying to achieve. According to the Government, the restructure will cut red tape, save money, devolve power and improve accountability, all with a view to improving patient outcomes. Those are not new objectives; they are the same objectives that underpinned the creation of NHS England. How is it that the same objectives require dismantling the institution created to deliver them? Again, I just do not understand what has changed the Government’s mind. Let us look at cutting red tape. As a Conservative, I welcome the ambition to make the health service more efficient. My constituents do not want to pay for staff in the Minister’s Department duplicating the work of those in NHS England, particularly when thousands every day are subjected to care that could certainly be improved. On Tuesday, we heard from the former Health Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), that “the bureaucracy has got completely out of hand.” –– [ Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 33, Q58.] However, that bureaucracy is not confined to NHS England and any medical practitioner will explain that bureaucracy exists across the entire health system. Can the Minister explain how the changes will improve that? Lord Darzi’s independent investigation said that, taken together, there are nearly 80 people employed in regulatory and headquarters functions for each NHS provider trust. Can the Minister say how many people will be in such roles once the abolition of NHS England is complete? Can she talk about how abolishing NHS England will review the volume of paperwork on patient safety, some of which is helpful for patient safety and some of which is not. That was identified by Dr Dash in her report. I remind Members that abolishing NHS England is not a prerequisite of undertaking a robust cost-benefit analysis before introducing changes. We have had difficulty in getting answers on numbers. We have been told that this will save money—£1 billion a year, I believe—but no sums have been produced for us to scrutinise to explain where that will come from. Indeed, when asking questions about where it might come from, it has been quite difficult to establish that. We have heard that the redundancy package will be worth £1.1 billion to £1.3 billion. It does not seem clear exactly where that will come from or how it will benefit patients. It is also not clear how many of those staff will end up re-employed by the new organisation, having received redundancy from the first, and what effect that will have on the country’s finances. More than a year on from the Government’s announcement that they will abolish NHS England, how much progress have Ministers made? In March 2025, Lord Scriven tabled a question about the legislation required to abolish NHS England. In her response, the Health Minister in the other place, Baroness Merron, wrote: “Ministers and senior Department officials will work with the new transformation team at the top of NHS England, led by Sir Jim Mackey, to determine the structure and requirements needed to support the creation of a new centre for health and care.” One year later, in March 2026, the Liberal Democrat health spokeswoman, the hon. Member for North Shropshire, tabled a question asking what functions had been transferred over since the announcement was made. In response, the Minister for Secondary Care wrote: “Work is progressing at pace to develop the design and operating model for the new integrated organisation, and to plan for the smooth transfer of people, functions, and responsibilities.” One does not need to enlist the services of Hercule Poirot to see that, one year later, that work has not been done. The Government have no comprehensive plan for how they will abolish NHS England. They can write a line in the Bill to abolish it, but how that will happen, to which clauses 2 and 3 relate, is, as yet, really uncertain.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Good morning, Dr Benneyworth. There seems to have been a bit of a muddle in how some of this has been expressed this morning. For clarity, could you explain how a regulator is different from an investigatory body, please? Dr Benneyworth: We are a safety investigator. We have been modelled on other industries that have very successful safety records, and we have learned from those other industries. We investigate patient safety concerns of national significance, and we make recommendations into national bodies about what needs to be improved. We make very few recommendations—only small numbers—into those national bodies, but they are about what needs to change from a systemic point of view to make patient care better. That is underpinned by learning from other industries—the safety science, the human factors and the real knowledge about how you improve safety—and we are trying to embed that in the NHS. Regulation is very different. That looks at individual providers. I used to the work for the CQC and regulate primary care. It looks at how individual providers are functioning. It makes recommendations to individual providers about what needs to change, and it judges an individual’s performance against a set of regulations. The two functions are completely different. The other important thing for us is that we do not attribute any blame or liability in our investigations. That is vital, because we learn from what we see. We learn from those investigations, and we are trying to embed a continuous learning environment and culture within the system.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Earlier on it was asked what would happen if the HSSIB was rolled into the CQC, yet the problem with the healthcare was a failure of the CQC to properly regulate or investigate. I was a little bit lost for words at that point. How would that work in practice? Or would it not? Dr Benneyworth: I think it will be very difficult. At the moment, we have the ability, being an independent organisation, to investigate any part of the system where there is a concern. That includes the national system. In several of our investigations we have looked at how the national system, the regulatory system and NHS England are working, and how other parts of the system are working. We are unique in that, because a lot of those bodies do not get the scrutiny from any other part of the system, and they do not get that oversight and ability to look and understand how the national system works together. If we were a directorate in the CQC, as outlined in the legislation, it would be very difficult for us to comment on how the CQC was looking at different areas and how it was managing certain aspects of safety. I think there is also concern about our ability to make effective recommendations to the CQC if we are a directorate within it.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Another question that has been raised about independence is the choice of what to investigate. The Secretary of State can direct, but the impact assessment suggests that the Government intend to direct the vast majority of investigations. Is it currently the case, or has it been the case in the past, that the vast majority has been directed by the Secretary of State, or has that been unusual? Dr Benneyworth: That would be unusual. We have undertaken one very detailed set of investigations into mental health in-patients, which was directed by a previous Secretary of State. We would very much want to hear the patient safety concerns of the Secretary of State to understand what we investigate. We work extensively with stakeholders across the system. We want to be a constructive part of the system. We want to investigate the areas that people are concerned about. We work extensively with all stakeholders to hear their patient safety concerns and make sure that our investigations are informed by that knowledge and by what we are hearing from patients and families, as well as staff working in the system. However, we need to make sure that we have the independence to investigate what we are hearing about. It is very important that we are not stopped investigating something, and it would be concerning if someone told us not to investigate something. We need to maintain that independence.

• 16 Jun 2026 · Health Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Yes, although yesterday we received an answer to a written parliamentary question saying that the abolition of NHS England is causing no disruption to the development of new services. That is the Government’s view. Sarah Woolnough: It is inevitable that, in any large-scale change in an organisation, there will be opportunity cost. These arguments were very well rehearsed by the previous Secretary of State. He undertook personally that he would not follow this course of action, exactly because these things take longer and cost more, and because the benefit realisation case is not always clear. It is also quite hard to tell—we have grappled with this as a think-tank—whether there is good evidence of what you are delivering at the end, and whether the benefits will be realised as you stated they would be up front. It is harder to get the granular evidence and costings to prove the case, but our ongoing concern has been whether you need to wholescale reorganise to drive the sorts of benefits that the Government have said they want to deliver. We absolutely understand and agree with those who say, “Let’s reduce duplication. Let’s streamline. Let’s make sure that we’re getting value for money and spending taxpayers’ money wisely.” Do you need to launch a large reorganisation—a mass rearranging of the deck chairs of this nature? Our view has been, “You shouldn’t and you don’t.”