Blair McDougall MP: speeches

4 Jul 2024–3 Jul 2025

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Our reporting years run from 4 July to 3 July, starting with the 2024 general election. They are not official parliamentary sessions. Office costs keep IPSA’s April–March financial years. Records may cover only part of a year; a missing record does not mean no work was done.

Read what this MP said, asked and contributed in Parliament.

28 published records · newest first.

Speeches

  • 24 Jun 2025 · China Audit · Hansard source
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    As chair of the all-party parliamentary groups on Uyghurs and on Hong Kong, I have lost count of the number of responses I have had from Ministers that have referred to today’s audit. I hope the Foreign Secretary will forgive me if I take today as the start of a conversation, rather than the last word on these matters. He has again used his three Cs mantra: competing and co-operating with China, and challenging it when needed. I wonder if he understands that many Hongkongers, Uyghurs and others who are fighting for freedom from or within the People’s Republic of China worry that the order of that is deliberate, and that the “challenging” part is a lower priority. What reassurance can he give to those groups that commercial interests will not trump the responsibility to protect freedoms and security, particularly of British Hongkongers? Can he confirm that the threats identified in the audit, and the national security challenge, will be fed into the decision making on whether to allow the embassy?

  • 24 Jun 2025 · Chagos Archipelago: Sovereignty · Hansard source
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    When the Foreign Affairs Committee was in Washington recently, we raised the Diego Garcia deal with the Administration. They could not have been more enthusiastic for this deal, because they recognise that it secures our strategic interests in the area. Does the Minister agree that it is perhaps time for Conservative Members to stop playing politics with national defence?

  • 23 Jun 2025 · Middle East · Hansard source
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    I associate myself with the Foreign Secretary’s condemnation of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, but we need to match that condemnation with accountability. Here in the UK, Jewish communities in particular are deeply concerned about what lies ahead. Last week, the Iranian ambassador acknowledged before the Foreign Affairs Committee that MI5 had identified 22 threats on British soil that had been organised by the Iranian regime. What is the Foreign Secretary’s message to Jewish communities, who are in a state of high alert at the moment, wondering what will happen?

  • 9 Jun 2025 · Chinese Embassy Development · Hansard source
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    Earlier this year I spoke at a huge demonstration outside the proposed embassy site, which was attended by thousands of British Hongkongers who fear that the hands that throttled their freedoms in Hong Kong are reaching into our society, too. I understand the Minister’s point and the limitations on what he can say on the issue at this time, but this is not just a matter of national security; does he understand that it is also a matter of personal security for many of our constituents, given the increase in transnational repression emanating from Beijing?

  • 22 Apr 2025 · Ukraine Update · Hansard source
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    Over recess, I delivered a message of solidarity from St Andrew’s church in Barrhead to St Andrew church in Bucha, the site of a horrific massacre. It was clear when I was in Kyiv that that brutality has meant the Ukrainians are still determined to fight, but again and again, they raised their concerns about their exposure and their overreliance on American air defence. What can we do to mitigate that, and what consideration has the Secretary of State given to creating an integrated air defence zone in the west of Ukraine?

  • 2 Apr 2025 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source
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    I share the Minister’s bafflement at the Opposition’s utter obsession with this issue. Can he confirm that under the agreement, the vital US-UK military base and its operations will be completely unaltered?

  • 2 Apr 2025 · Gaza: Israeli Military Operations · Hansard source
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    The poor people of Gaza are trapped between Hamas, who refuse to release the 59 hostages, and Defence Minister Katz, who is now threatening the “total destruction” of Gaza. Does the Minister share my despair at the lack of leadership committed to peace? Will he also talk about what diplomatic efforts we are making, as well as through aid spending, to try to create moderate leadership in the region that can establish the long-term circumstances for peace and reconciliation?

  • 26 Mar 2025 · Engagements · Hansard source
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    Q10. I join the Prime Minister in welcoming the delegation from Bring Kids Back, which is trying to return the tens of thousands of children abducted by Vladimir Putin in an act of pure evil. The Prime Minister will be aware that that initiative has been working with Yale University’s humanitarian lab, which was tracking thousands of those children inside Russia until recently—I say “until recently” because it has had its long-term funding removed. Will he consider using our existing contributions to the partnership fund for a resilient Ukraine to resume that important work, and in doing so, restore the hope that those children can be returned to their anguished families?

  • 5 Mar 2025 · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office · Hansard source
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    I am very happy to do so. The hon. Gentleman and I have worked closely together on Georgia—a country in the backyard of Vladimir Putin that is on day 96, I think, of huge street protests, all for lack of the cost of a single storm shadow missile in recent years. We cannot fill all the gaps, but I hope that we can triage, and can look at places such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Belarus, where a small amount of money makes an enormous amount of strategic difference. If investing in arms allows us to fight, we must remember to invest in the reasons why we want to fight in the first place. The fundamental weakness of the authoritarians with whom we are in this unspoken war is the same. Every act of brutality is a confession of their weakness. They know that if their people were free to choose, they would not choose the form of Government that is there. All that those authoritarians offer is corruption, violence and brutality against their own people, who will choose to be on our side in the global fight, but we need to put in the resources to make that case every single day around the world with confidence.

  • 5 Mar 2025 · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office · Hansard source
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    Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is appropriate that we have such a distinguished internationalist in the Chair for this debate. [Interruption.] That did not get me any extra time for my speech. I recognise the impossible decisions that the Government have to take, but I hope that we do not set up a false dichotomy in which we believe that our moral preferences have to be at odds with our strategic interests. I recognise, though, that the Government are making budgetary decisions in response to very painful real-world events that are taking place every day. I represent many of the FCDO workers from East Kilbride, and I myself worked for 10 years delivering aid. I do not want to repeat what others said in pleading for the international development budget, but I want to ask the Government about one thing, and perhaps challenge them on it. If, as the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) said, we are not still the development superpower, what is our offer to the global south? We know what Russia’s offer is: blood for gold. It will kill your enemies for you, through mercenaries, and take precious minerals out of your country. We know what China’s offer is: infrastructure in return for debt that keeps you in its power. We cannot offer violence, and we cannot demand subservience. It seems to me that our offer is values, but values need to be projected through vehicles. In the time I have, I want to mention two of those vehicles. I add my voice to those of right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken in defence of the BBC. Others have spoken about how development helps to save money on defence. That also works the other way around: when defence fails, development picks up the pieces. If we need one example of that, we can look to Afghanistan. When we left Afghanistan, we left behind the BBC World Service. It is now the only broadcast journalism in the country—the only thing that is still there, saying to those people, “We have not abandoned you.” The cuts that we are discussing imply very deep cuts to the World Service, which I hope we will not see. The second thing I wanted to plead for is the democratic infrastructure that supports dissidents and democrats around the world—the people I worked with. As we stand here, that infrastructure is being dismantled because of Elon Musk’s vandalism. The most extraordinarily brave people I have ever met are being utterly abandoned.

  • 22 Jan 2025 · Russian Maritime Activity and UK Response · Hansard source
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    Putin and his autocratic friends mistake our freedom and openness for weakness, so may I enthusiastically welcome the strength of the response to the Russian activity? The Secretary of State will be aware of the reports in Newsweek in recent days about patents that have been filed in China for specific cable-cutting technology, presumably for military use by the Chinese. Can he reassure the House that, as well as being active in deterring Putin, the Government are taking a similarly robust stance on any attempts by China to cut the cables?

  • 6 Jan 2025 · Frozen Russian Assets: Ukraine · Hansard source
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    I congratulate the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) on securing the debate. There is a bit of a disease in British politics of reaching back to the second world war to make a point, but when we walk into this Chamber, we walk through an archway of bomb damage, and when we hear the echoes of history, we should listen to them—the hon. Member made that point eloquently. In a sense, it is frustrating that we are even debating whether to do what is in the motion, but it is good that we are having the debate because the fact that we care about the rule of law and the international order is what separates us from Putin and his allies. We have to prove to Putin and his allies that our belief in those things is not a weakness, and we have to prove that we have the determination to defend our values. In this year, which marks the 80th anniversary of the defeat of fascist aggression in Europe, we have to constantly remember that the freedoms we enjoy were won through strength and sacrifice, and that freedom comes at a cost. The hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells listed the enormous price that Ukraine is paying in lost citizens, lost children and lost infrastructure for defending that freedom. The world has said clearly that Putin has to pay the price for that. The UN General Assembly has said that Russia must make “reparation for the injury, including any damage, caused by such acts”. This is a debate about balance sheets and bank accounts, but putting a monetary value on the cost of this war is, at best, partial accounting.

  • 6 Jan 2025 · Frozen Russian Assets: Ukraine · Hansard source
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    Absolutely. As well as listening to the echoes of deeper history, we have to learn lessons from our more recent failures. I met a soldier called Dimitri in a ward for wounded soldiers in Kyiv. He was strengthening his stumps for the day when he could have prosthetics fitted to both his now-missing legs. I asked what his hope for the future was, thinking he would say a holiday, getting a job or spending time with his family. He said that it was living life without shame. Listening to him, I felt ashamed because, as proud as we all are of the support we have given Ukraine, it has not been enough. We know one thing in this debate: the money that Putin owes is many times greater than the money that has been seized. The legal objection to transferring the funds in whole to Ukraine seems to be that under the principles of the use of countermeasures by states the measures must, first, induce a change in policy from the target and, secondly, be reversible. On the first, seizing the assets does not just induce the change in policy; it delivers the change in policy. It pays the reparations in part. On it being reversible, we can give the Kremlin a credit note for the money paid and say it has been taken off the total. With the time I have left to speak, I want to ask the Minister two direct questions, but these are really questions for all Western nations that hold Russian state assets but are hesitant about sending them in full to Ukraine. First, is there any conceivable situation in which we and our international partners would unfreeze the assets we hold and return them to Russia if Putin has not delivered the reparations he is bound to pay? Secondly, is there any conceivable situation in which Putin would voluntarily give up those reparations? If we are honest, the answer to both those questions has to be no. Rather than making policy on an imaginary future that will not come and holding the funds in perpetuity, we should use them now in full—in whole—when Ukraine needs them most. If we are hung up on the legal arguments, as I say, we should call in a loan and give the Kremlin a credit note. The irony of the debate is that we are at risk of our commitment to the international order preventing us from enforcing it. The irony is that Putin, having stepped outside that international order, is demanding its protection. We need to listen to the echoes of history as we enter this Chamber and ensure that Ukraine has everything it needs to fight and win this war.

  • 5 Dec 2024 · Detained British Nationals Abroad · Hansard source
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    I congratulate the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on securing this debate, and on continuing to be a discomfort in the derrière for successive Governments on these issues. The right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) talked about the brightest and the best going into the Foreign Office, so I will begin by recognising the unfairness of this debate. We will all stand up and talk about the worst failings of the Foreign Office, and I recognise that the debate will be responded to by a Minister who represents some of the best efforts of civil servants, who go into incredibly dangerous and difficult circumstances to try to serve our constituents. I want to put that on the record. There is a lot of talk in this Chamber about the legacies that this Government have inherited, and it is good that we are talking about one of the worst ones: our country’s record of securing the release of those who have been arbitrarily detained overseas. I will come to some of the policy issues that other Members have touched on, but I will deal first with the principle behind such cases. Ella Wheeler Wilcox wrote: “To sin by silence, when we should protest, Makes cowards out of men.” What is true of individuals is also true of nations. The Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), spoke about the example of the US, which is relevant here. When other countries’ citizens are held unjustly, it is treated as an affront, an injury to all and a national slap in the face. Yes, quiet negotiation takes place politely behind the scenes on behalf of those countries’ prisoners, but alongside that polite and patient diplomacy is their citizens’ full-throated outrage. I know that the staff working on this issue in the Foreign Office care deeply about it, but the right hon. Members for Chingford and Woodford Green and for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale) both raised the case of Jimmy Lai. We have to ask why Canada was successful in securing the release of the two Michaels, and how Australia secured the release of journalist Cheng Lai. Just last week, the Americans secured the release of three more of their citizens, yet Jimmy Lai, who is a British citizen and one of us, and who has been arbitrarily detained in solitary confinement for nearly four years, has not been freed. We could talk about Jagtar Singh Johal, Alaa Abd el-Fattah and so many others. Our first responsibility as a Parliament, a Government and a country is to be publicly, vocally and unanimously furious about this issue. Everything else follows from the righteous anger that we should all feel on behalf of our citizens who are rotting in foreign jails. That anger should drive us to ask what is behind the failure of British diplomacy in the past. A lack of strategy is certainly part of the answer. Like the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I was encouraged by the noises that the Foreign Secretary made last week about making good on his promises, both on the issue of a special envoy and on the right to consular access. I welcome the Government’s commitment to step up the engagement on these cases, but that needs to be part of an entirely new approach. I am not naive: I know that it is only because we are having conversations with foreign Governments about trade that we are able to get in the room and discuss our citizens who have been unjustly detained. Indeed, when I was an adviser in the Foreign Office, the role of Minister for trade and human rights was a stand-alone Cabinet position. Because I believe we must make deals around the world—our constituents’ standard of living depends on it—I question whether our current policymaking framework on arbitrary detention can ever deliver the kind of response that we would all expect if we found ourselves in a prison cell in one of the darker corners of the world. For me, this is about the balance we strike between charming and chastising those we are negotiating with. I wonder whether our current approach to those who are arbitrarily detained makes it inevitable that attempts to secure the release of our people become either a prologue or an epilogue to the main story, which is one of securing our economic self-interest. Are we sending our representatives into these negotiations with red lines that those on the other side of the table know are written in pencil rather than in pen? After 16 years in a Dubai jail, Ryan Cornelius has had more time than anyone to contemplate that tension. He shared with me a letter he has written to the Prime Minister ahead of the Prime Minister’s trip to the Gulf on behalf of the UK, in which he identifies the inherent challenge in diplomacy I describe: “Making it clear to your interlocutors that there can be no normal relationship with a friendly country which treats our citizens in this way may be an uncomfortable thing for you to do on this visit…if you look the other way in the interest of sealing a few deals you will have diminished this country’s standing in the eyes of the rest of the world.” For me, Mr Cornelius’s letter gets to the heart of the matter. In asking our delegations and diplomats to balance arbitrary detention against trade outcomes, the risk is that they will leave those rooms having failed to achieve either objective. If the arbitrary imprisonment and mistreatment of our citizens is not a red line, what is? If it is a red line, it cannot be something that the people we send into these rooms might have to give up in order to secure other Government priorities. The release of our people must be understood by those on the other side of the table as non-negotiable. That is why it is essential that any special envoy we appoint has the power, the status and the degree of independence from Ministers to make it an immutable principle not just that the policy on the release of hostages will not be sacrificed for other priorities, but that it cannot be sacrificed for other priorities. My right hon. Friend the Member for Islington South and Finsbury, the Chair of the Select Committee, was far too delicate, perhaps not wanting to appear engaged in a power grab, when she said that this is a debate for another time, but we have to debate the fact that other jurisdictions place the power for designating state hostages, or for applying sanctions in response to such cases, in the hands of the legislature. The value of such an approach is that it allows the Executive and their diplomats to honestly say in those negotiating rooms that they cannot separate their wider relationship with a country from the mistreatment of citizens by its Government. I know that the suggestion of losing such power would be greeted with horror in the corridors of King Charles Street, but we cannot simply continue with the current model, which has left British citizens in jail. As well as greater independence in policymaking, there should also be a degree of automaticity in our policy response. As has been suggested by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green, when an individual is designated as being arbitrarily detained, there has to be a consistent application of Magnitsky sanctions. This would not only provide an incentive to release the British citizens already held, as it would hold perpetrators to account, but it would also act as a disincentive to those who might target our people in the future. Inconsistent action in these cases simply emboldens those regimes and makes our citizens less safe. Finally, we have to act in concert with like-minded countries that are similarly committed to the rule of law. Recent years have seen the erosion of norms around arbitrary detention by autocracies that are increasingly working in concert with each other. Only co-ordinated action by democracies, and by those committed to the rule of law, can help recreate a global order in which such actions are deemed universally unacceptable. There is no cause more urgent than ensuring the liberty and freedom of our own citizens. I commend the right hon. Gentleman for securing this debate.

  • 2 Dec 2024 · North-West Syria · Hansard source
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    My mind also turned to the former Member for Batley and Spen, my friend Jo, and the cry she made in this Chamber to do something to help the people of Syria. Back then, we saw the widespread use of chemical weapons in the last moment when Assad’s regime was under pressure. What steps are the Government taking to monitor any war crimes taking place in this moment? By way of deterrence now, will the Minister reaffirm that the British Government still believe there should be accountability for the use of chemical weapons a decade ago in Syria?

  • 28 Nov 2024 · Taiwan: International Status · Hansard source
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    I beg to move, That this House, recalling that United Nations Resolution 2758 of 25 October 1971, which established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations (UN), does not mention Taiwan, notes that UN Resolution 2758 does not address the political status of Taiwan or establish PRC sovereignty over Taiwan and is silent both on the status of Taiwan in the UN and on Taiwanese participation in UN agencies; and calls on the Government to clarify its position that UN Resolution 2758 does not establish the One China Principle as a matter of international law, to state clearly that nothing in law prevents the participation of Taiwan in international organisations and to condemn efforts made by representatives of the PRC to distort the meaning of UN Resolution 2758 in support of Beijing’s One China Principle and the alteration of historic documents by representatives of the PRC, changing the name of the country from Taiwan to Taiwan, province of China. I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate. This is the first time I have stood in the Chamber to back the democratic rights of the people of Taiwan, and I want to acknowledge those who have worked on this issue over many years, in particular the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and my former neighbouring MP Stewart McDonald. I also recognise the Minister’s long-standing commitment to the human rights of people in the region, and indeed your commitment, Madam Deputy Speaker. I welcome to Parliament the deputy representative, director and assistant director of the political division from the Taiwanese Representative Office. They are in the Gallery to observe this debate, which carries an important bearing on our strong and vibrant relationship with Taiwan. The detail in the motion may seem esoteric, but diplomatic technicalities on an issue as fraught as the status of Taiwan could have far-reaching consequences for the entire world, and we must have this debate now rather than later. I think back to the frenetic last-minute activity ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with emergency flights full of anti-tank weapons, hastily drafted sanctions regimes and fruitless shuttle diplomacy. Ukraine stands as a reminder that it is best to form policy on a crisis before the crisis emerges. Incremental changes to the status quo made by authoritarian regimes are likely a prelude to more overt measures, and the best time to deter an aggressor is before their confidence grows. It is not possible to overstate the risks of a conflict over Taiwan. Leaving aside the humanitarian costs and geopolitical consequences of another democracy being attacked by a larger authoritarian neighbour, the economic pain would be felt in every household in this country. Around 90% of the world’s large container ships pass through the Taiwan strait once a year. Taiwan produces two thirds of all semiconductors, and well over 90% of all advanced microchips. It is estimated that a conflict would cost the global economy not less than $2.5 trillion, but that estimate is calculated by the Rhodium Group using only shipping data. Bloomberg puts the figure at a massive $10 trillion—about 10% of global GDP—and it regards that to be a conservative estimate. The scale of the risk is why this debate is taking place not only in this Chamber but in Parliaments around the world, and I put on record my thanks to the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China for its assistance. Through its work, Parliaments in Australia, the Netherlands and Canada and the European Parliament have all expressed their opposition to the distortion of UN resolution 2758.

  • 28 Nov 2024 · Taiwan: International Status · Hansard source
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    Absolutely. Although first and foremost in our minds should be the impact on people in Taiwan of any crisis, it would also be felt by our constituents in their cost of living and everything that happens in this country. It is right that this is a worldwide debate, given the military incursions into Taiwanese territory, cyber-attacks, disinformation, interference with shipping and aircraft—all the things that make the headlines—and I welcome the new Government’s expressions of concern about aggressive moves in the strait. However, this needs to be a global conversation, because the People’s Republic of China is involved in an aggressive worldwide diplomatic strategy, especially across the global south. The strategy aims to secure international acceptance for its expansionist One China principle, which is to say that Taiwan is part of a single China and the PRC is the only legitimate Government of Taiwan, denying Taiwan’s democracy any distinctive international status. Of course, resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan at all, and it does not address in any way the political status of Taiwan. It does not establish the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan, and it is silent on the participation of Taiwan in the United Nations and its agencies. Importantly, it has no force of impact on us as sovereign nations and the relationships we choose to have with Taiwan. The current strategy by Beijing is a distortion of international law, but it is also at odds with the long-standing policy of the United Kingdom. It is essential that that is contested, and this debate offers the Minister and the new Government the opportunity to make it clear that the UK opposes that effort by the communist Government to rewrite history, or to unilaterally decide the future of Taiwan. Debates about Taiwan are famously full of symbolism: which flag is flown, what nomenclature is used, and which seemingly synonymic words cause offence. It would be easy to write off discussions about the interpretation of resolution 2758 as yet another finer detail that distracts from a bigger picture, but that would be a mistake. This is not pedantry from Beijing; this is predation. Chairman Xi watched the near-unanimous diplomatic disapproval of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, and he is seeking to reduce the chances of a similar chorus of condemnation towards any move against Taiwan. If the PRC’s position that the UN resolution endorses its sovereignty over Taiwan were accepted, it would later use that consensus to argue that any future coercion of Taiwan through arms or other means—whether blockade or annexation—would be legal. Similarly, any acceptance of Beijing’s interpretation would be used to argue that moves to prevent such coercion by Taiwan’s democratic supporters were unlawful. This is not a technical issue but another source of increased risk for conflict across the Taiwan strait. Will the Minister confirm today whether, as has been reported, any assurances have been given to the PRC that the UK will not seek to counter internationally its efforts on the One China principle, and whether promises have been made privately that we will not make the case with third-party nations for UK policy, namely our position that Taiwan’s status is undetermined? Does she recognise that any UK Government acquiescence with the idea that the status of Taiwan is an internal matter for the PRC alone risks giving legal cover to any future aggressive acts? Does she recognise that distorting resolution 2758 to pursue the exclusion from international organisations of Taiwan—a democratic, self-governing people—undermines the legitimacy of the international rules-based order, not least as it appears to be inconsistent with the treatment of other disputed territories? Will the UK advocate for meaningful Taiwanese participation in all international organisations for which statehood is not a prerequisite? Past moments of crisis in the strait of Taiwan have flared up and subsided—in particular in 1996 and 2000 after presidential elections—but three things that have changed since then should make us more concerned. First, China is far more heavily armed. Already possessed of the largest naval fleet in the world, Beijing has been adding to it the equivalent of the entire Royal Navy every two years. It will soon have the largest air force in the world. Secondly, people on both sides of the strait have grown apart. The Taiwanese now have more of a sense of their own identity, and their democracy is deeply embedded, while China’s populist nationalism has grown, and the PRC, which was hardly ever a free and open society, has moved even further in an authoritarian direction, from Xinjiang to Tibet and Hong Kong. Chairman Xi previously proposed to apply the “one country, two systems” approach to Taiwan. However, the systematic removal of Hongkongers’ civil liberties means that any promise from the mainland to maintain the freedoms that Taiwan enjoys could not be trusted. We know that Beijing does not keep its promises. Thirdly, if we are honest, the west has been found wanting. We have been less than united and less than determined in our defence of democratic allies and democracy around the world. Xi has learned from Putin’s years of slowly boiling the frog, dividing western opponents from each other, manipulating our populations and operating in the grey zone where a gradual increase in aggressive acts avoids a strong strategic response from the west. That mixture of Chinese armament, growing nationalism, increasing authoritarianism and western weakness is a potentially deadly combination. Indeed, the military exercises and provocations around Taiwan are a recipe for unintentional disaster. Last year, there were more than 1,700 occasions when PRC military aircraft deliberately entered the air defence identification zone of Taiwan. PRC jets turn away when they are just minutes from Taipei. During exercises, we see Taiwanese and PRC vessels in stand-offs on the edge of Taiwan’s nautical buffer zone. Meanwhile, we do not have agreed red lines around Taiwan with other like-minded countries, and worrying ambiguities remain. For example, a maritime and air blockade is normally classed as an act of war, but that is not clear in this case because of Taiwan’s ambiguous state. Will the Minister assure the House that the legal status of a blockade around Taiwan is being looked at? I worry that we could have a situation where Governments use that ambiguity as an excuse for inertia in the event of a crisis. Will she take the opportunity to say that a maritime and air blockade around Taiwan would be a red line for the Government? On so many occasions during the cold war, catastrophe was avoided due to essential de-escalation protocols that prevented the misinterpretation of either side’s intentions. I would be interested in the Minister’s assessment of whether there are sufficient procedures of the kind between the military commands of Taipei and Beijing, as in such a febrile and nationalistic atmosphere, a mistake could easily be misunderstood as deliberate escalation, and control of volatile public opinion could easily be lost. As was said earlier, let us not forget who paid the price for the collective failure of the international community to deter Putin’s aggression. It was first and foremost the Ukrainian people, but ordinary working people around the world also found themselves with unaffordable bills. If Bloomberg is correct, escalation across the strait would be, as the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green said, five times worse than the economic contraction post Ukraine. We simply cannot allow that to happen. When we discuss Taiwan, we talk a lot about protecting the status quo, but we must recognise that the PRC is already actively working to change that status quo. Beijing has not paid any price for that. Xi’s diplomatic offensive has not been met with a commensurate effort from western democracies. As the PRC isolates Taiwan within international institutions, we have not increased our engagement in response. Above all, there has been no sanction for the constant military intimidation or grey zone attacks. I recognise, of course, that careful diplomatic language is needed on this issue, but we live in a world where free and open societies are retreating in the face of authoritarian regimes who no longer recognise the old order or even international boundaries, and who are seeking to recreate the world in their image. I do not expect the Minister to depart from the delicate, long-established language that has defined the UK’s position towards Taiwan since diplomatic relations were established with the PRC, and the motion does not ask for such a departure. I ask the Minister to put on record the Government’s concern about Beijing’s distortion of the international law around Taiwan, and about the editing of historic UN documents by Chinese officials. I hope that is seen not as an outlandish or hawkish request, but merely as the least we can do when confronted with such troubling behaviour. Finally, putting all diplomatic language aside, the debate is an opportunity to acknowledge the truth: Taiwan is not China in one important way that no amount of economic, military or diplomatic bullying by Beijing can obscure. It is this: the people of Taiwan are free and the people of China are not. Now more than ever, we must stand with democracies and against dictatorships. We must stand up for freedoms that we claim are universal, regardless of where people live in the world, and we should stand with the democracy of Taiwan.

  • 26 Nov 2024 · Georgia Elections · Hansard source
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    I thank the Minister for his actions. I draw the attention of the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and to the work I have done in the past with democratic activists in Georgia. Those activists are terrified that Georgia is now at a turning point. Will the Minister join me in calling for new elections under international oversight and an end to the attacks on civil society groups, especially the heroic LGBT groups who are under attack there? If those things do not take place, will the Government keep open the option of sanctions on the individuals who are responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia?

  • 19 Nov 2024 · Jailing of Hong Kong Pro-democracy Activists · Hansard source
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    As chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Hong Kong, I thank Ministers for their efforts and recognise the efforts of the Prime Minister. However, after nearly four years in solitary confinement for Jimmy Lai and with a trial beginning in a court that we know will only ever find him guilty, at what point does the delicate diplomacy have to give way to something more like a demand for his freedom?

  • 18 Nov 2024 · Topical Questions · Hansard source
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    T6. As we meet today, EU Foreign Ministers are reportedly discussing that Chinese manufacturing is now providing drones to the Russian war machine, specifically drones made in Xinjiang. Does that not further the need for Europe to deepen its own defence industrial base, and specifically, should we be securing an administrative arrangement with the European Defence Agency to that end?

  • 6 Nov 2024 · Uyghur and Turkic Muslims: Forced Labour in China · Hansard source
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    I beg to move, That this House has considered UK supply chains and Uyghur and Turkic Muslim forced labour in China. Thank you for chairing this debate, Mr Dowd, and for the opportunity to highlight the issue. I thank the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Lothian East (Mr Alexander), for being here to respond to the debate: in his last period in office and during his sabbatical from this place he was a consistent advocate for the dignity of people all over the world. That human rights have never been respected by the People’s Republic of China is a given, but the persecution of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims since 2017 has been unprecedented even for the Chinese Communist party. More than 1 million Muslims have been imprisoned in an enormous network of camps; possibly as many as 3 million out of a population of 11 million Muslims have made their way through the camps at some time. This is the largest mass arbitrary detention since the second world war. Uyghur women face forced sterilisation, forced abortion, sexual violence in the camps, and forced marriage to Han Chinese men. Thousands of mosques have been demolished. Hundreds of Muslim graveyards have been bulldozed. Countless sacred Islamic shrines have been destroyed. Uyghurs are forced to consume pork, drink alcohol and eat during the Ramadan fast. These crimes are part of a deliberate effort to destroy the Uyghurs as an ethnic group with a distinct culture and religious identity. International organisations and human rights groups too numerous to list assess that crimes against humanity are taking place in Xinjiang, and this House of Commons has voted to recognise that what is going on is a genocide—an intentional policy that seeks to destroy a people. All of that provides context to the issue of forced labour in Xinjiang, but it is important to understand that Uyghur Muslim slavery is not a by-product of the attempt to destroy a people; it is an integral part of China’s project. Indeed, as the camps were built, factories for forced labourers were constructed alongside them. For those Uyghurs who are not inside the camps, the threat of incarceration is used to coerce them into the PRC’s wider labour transfer programme. There is a dark contradiction at the heart of all this. The atrocities are happening in a region that is increasingly closed to those who would testify to the crimes, the journalists and human rights groups who would document them and of course those who would flee to freedom if they could. However, at the same time that the region is closing down, it is increasingly open to and integrated into the global economy. Xinjiang mines, refines and manufactures for the world. Some of the best-known global brands are profiting from the destruction of a people. The scale of slavery in the region is enormous and is barely disputed: four years ago, official Chinese Government documents acknowledged that 2.6 million Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities had gone through labour transfer programmes. The scope of the industries affected is too large to cover in the time afforded to us today, so I will focus on three areas that especially expose the UK’s economy and that risk consumers being unwittingly complicit in Muslim slave labour: clothing, cars and climate change. Xinjiang produces a quarter of the world’s cotton. The idea of hundreds of thousands of slaves working in cotton fields evokes an image of slavery and forced labour from another era, but this is not historical practice. It is a well-documented economic reality in the Uyghur region today.

  • 28 Oct 2024 · China: Human Rights and Sanctions · Hansard source
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    I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I thank the Foreign Secretary for making it clear that Jimmy Lai’s release is a priority, and I join hon. Members in saying that the issue is urgent, not just because of his failing health, but because once the trial restarts on 20 November, it will be more difficult to bring the situation to a positive conclusion. The Foreign Secretary mentioned the need for a consistent strategy towards China—consistent not just from him, but from the whole of Government. China reacts to naked economic self-interest, so can he make sure that the matter is raised across Government—by the Business Secretary on issues of trade, by the Net Zero Secretary on issues of green energy, as my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Tony Vaughan) mentioned, and by the Education Secretary when it comes to education, so that we appeal to that self-interest?

  • 22 Oct 2024 · Ukraine · Hansard source
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    Given the potential of North Korean boots on the ground joining Iranian drones in the air above Ukraine, it seems clear that the calculus that Russia is operating to is very different from that of the western alliance. Does the Secretary of State agree that there is a risk that, when the fear of escalation is one-sided, that itself becomes escalatory? Therefore, while welcoming the additional support that he has announced today, I wonder whether he will join me in saying that it is time for other countries to follow the lead that the UK has shown today.

  • 16 Oct 2024 · Engagements · Hansard source
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    As the Prime Minister works for a ceasefire and the return of the hostages, he will have the support of Members across the House. He will have noted the comments from the White House calling for urgent action to deal with the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and for the Netanyahu Government to increase access to aid and the amount of aid getting through. Does the Prime Minister agree with those comments from the White House, and what representations is he making on that matter?

  • 10 Oct 2024 · Gaza and Humanitarian Aid · Hansard source
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    I began this week by speaking to commemorate the hostages who were taken on 7 October. I see no contradiction in ending it by recognising the horror of the humanitarian situation within Gaza. It is important to put it on the record that people in Gaza do not choose to be ruled by Hamas. A poll published last month showed that two thirds of people in Gaza support a two-state solution, not the destruction of Israel, and only 6% support Hamas. In the short time I have, I want to ask the Minister to reflect on three particular things. First, in a deeply uncertain environment, we know one thing: winter is coming. It is about to get colder and wetter, and the lower immunity that people have due to malnutrition—particularly children—means an increased risk of respiratory diseases, diarrhoea and other common diseases. Along with others, I ask the Minister what more he can do to ensure that more shelter and more hygiene kits are allowed through to reach those who need it. Secondly, looking beyond the ceasefire that we all want, I want to talk about the long tail of insecurity within Gaza. Dozens of bakeries have been destroyed and about two thirds of agricultural land has been damaged in some way. Fields, greenhouses, polytunnels and irritation systems have been damaged. The plan for the day after has to start now. What plans do the Government have to ensure that horticulture, livestock farming and fishing are restored and the bakeries and markets rebuilt? Otherwise, this will be not a short-term emergency but a long-term problem. Finally, after the 2014 Gaza war generous pledges were made by international donors for reconstruction. In some cases, the funds pledged simply did not come through. In many cases, attempts to reconstruct were blocked by the Israeli Government. There were other cases. For example, Fatah accused Hamas of stealing hundreds of millions of dollars of reconstruction aid. In 2014, about 150,000 properties were damaged in some way. This war has far outstripped that. What can the Minister do, working with international partners, to ensure that the failures after the last 2014 war in Gaza are not repeated?

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