Ben Spencer MP: speeches

Speeches

• 16 Jun 2026 · Thames Water · Hansard source

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  Will the Secretary of State guarantee that no taxpayer money will be used to bail out Thames Water or its shareholders?

• 10 Jun 2026 · Railways Bill · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to new clauses 29 to 32 and amendments 65 to 67, tabled in my name. My mission is to keep Runnymede and Weybridge moving. Rail and transport are important to us: we are situated within the London commuter belt, one 10th of the M25 runs through my constituency, along with the M3, and Egham is five miles from Heathrow. The constituency has companies that were established there because of our transport connections, but also those that deliver services linked to transport, such as logistics. I have tabled a series of amendments with a view to improving services and transport, not only in my constituency but across the country, as we have heard from colleagues—I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Broxbourne (Lewis Cocking) and for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox) for referring to my amendments in their speeches. If the amendments are not pushed to a vote, Madam Deputy Speaker, I hope at the very least that the Minister will be minded to support them, not least in the spirit of improving the rail service across the country, and perhaps to stop having to listen to me rattle on about the level crossings in Egham and other problems in my constituency. A key strength of the Bill is that, as several Ministers have said, the buck stops with them. I believe the Secretary of State said that the buck stops with her, and when I met Lord Hendy, he said that the buck stops with him. That is a key improvement on the previous system, in which South Western Railway and Network Rail were separate, because we now have a clear person and organisation to go to in order to raise issues or problems about the rail infrastructure in our constituencies. New clause 29 would give the Secretary of State the power to direct GBR to co-operate with transport authorities to ensure the effective operation of transport networks and to reduce disruption. It does not make sense to have railway engineering works at the same time as local motorways or arterial roads are closed, or to have multiple pockets of utility works around Chertsey, where I live, all taking place at the same time. We need better co-ordination among all bodies to ensure, first, that such works do not all happen at the same time, and secondly, that if a utility company excavates a road to work on the water supply, for example, necessary work to fix the gas or electricity supply or to install broadband takes place at the same time. New clause 30 relates to an accessible rail strategy. Accessibility issues affect many stations across the country and, frankly, it is scandalous that we have such accessibility problems. In my constituency, there is a focus on the Weybridge lifts, which I have been going on about for many years, as they frequently break down, affecting many passengers across Weybridge. I would like to give a shout-out to Tim Blanchard, a wheelchair user who has led a campaign to try to improve the Weybridge lifts. I am promised that they will be replaced this summer, which will finally see an end to the Weybridge lift saga, but we need more, and I hope the accessible rail strategy will prevent colleagues from having the same problems that we have had locally.

• 3 Jun 2026 · South East Water: Disruption of Supply · Hansard source

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  As the Minister is looking into the situation with South East Water, can I also feed back what happened last week, when parts of Weybridge had restrictions on water supply? Although we are supplied by Affinity Water, I think the problem is broader than just our area. Will she urgently review the resilience and availability of water supply, and in particular the impact that new house building will have on supply over the coming years?

• 2 Jun 2026 · Preparedness for National Emergencies · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) on securing this important debate. Given the number of hon. Members here, we could have had a three-hour debate on his wide-ranging speech. I will be brief so colleagues can get in. In Runnymede and Weybridge, we have flooding incidents almost every year. Thankfully, they are often not huge, but sometimes they very much are. The local resilience forum exists to deal with the really big emergencies, but we often have what I call sub-acute flooding events—where there is enough flooding to cause risk to properties and people, but not enough to trigger an LRF major response. The problem for people facing flooding incidents is that Floodline operates as a telephone directory. The roads are dealt with by the county council. The Environment Agency deals with the direct response. The fire service deals with emergency rescue. The local authorities, Runnymede borough council or Elmbridge borough council, deal with different responses. We have Affinity Water, which is for direct freshwater coming to people’s homes, and we have Thames Water, which deals with the drainage. Each is responsible for a different bit. We have the county council, which leads on overall flood preparedness. It is too disjointed. What we need locally, and also nationally, are flood control centres that can bring all these different organisations together to co-ordinate a flood response. A few years ago, during the last big flood that we had while I have been an MP, my team and I ended up dealing with a lot of the flood response and communicating directly with people. I am very happy to do that, but we need a flood control centre to be able to do so. I think that would help our national resilience. MPs, broadly speaking, have a role in being embedded in our communities. We usually know what is happening at all different levels and we have key contacts on the ground. On that basis, for the local resilience response, does the Minister agree that MPs should have direct access to local resilience forum chairs, both before and during an emergency event?

• 1 Jun 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  T5. What is the Minister’s assessment of the extra investment in defence and the extra kit that Ukraine will need as a consequence of our handing money to Putin through the relaxation of oil and gas sanctions?

• 18 Mar 2026 · Flooding: Rural Communities · Hansard source

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  We are still waiting for delivery of the River Thames scheme in my area. While that is happening, we would be very grateful for some dredging, because at the moment there is no River Thames flood alleviation scheme. Will the Minister take this opportunity to reconfirm the Government’s commitment to delivering the River Thames scheme, which affects my constituency but also the neighbouring constituency of Spelthorne?

• 10 Mar 2026 · Extreme Climate and Weather Events: National Resilience · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 10 Mar 2026 · Extreme Climate and Weather Events: National Resilience · Hansard source

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  The hon. Lady is being very generous with her time, and this has been a fascinating debate. Runnymede and Weybridge is frequently hit by flooding, but I have noticed that one problem is that there are so many different responders, sometimes seemingly acting independently. When residents contact the flood line, they find that it operates more like an intercom service, as opposed to taking information and giving them a direct response. I am calling for a flood control centre—a single point of contact that can co-ordinate flood response and preparatory works in my area. I am happy to speak to the hon. Lady after the debate about the work that I am trying to lobby the Government about. By the sounds of it, that could also help with the response in Cornwall.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I very much take the hon. Lady’s point and the constructive spirit in which it was presented. Twelve months is a long time for the operations of Government to function, and I have faith—I will change my words—in the Government and all of their powers if they wanted to put their minds to bringing this forward. If there are concerns about the ability of the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology to take this forward, those concerns would spill over into all of the consultation requirements that have to be met to make sure that this Bill functions in the correct way. The argument on what we are debating today could swing both ways. Industry stakeholders have expressed strong concerns regarding the diverse incident reporting requirements that exist in several pieces of legislation, including UK GDPR, sector-specific regulation and the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021. As we have already discussed, the Home Office may also bring forward guidelines for reporting ransomware incidents in future. Additional reporting requirements and procedures included in the Bill are viewed as adding a further layer of complexity to a legislative environment that is already very challenging to navigate. Stakeholders report that the current approach, with multiple different reporting procedures and platforms, increases regulatory compliance costs on businesses and detracts from the resources available to implement effective improvements in cyber-resilience. In view of that, will the Minister support this urgently needed review clause to assure industries that the Government have heard their serious and vital concerns on the matter?

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend has figured out what I am going to say in a moment, when it comes to the scoping of the regulator and that communication process. Such is the depth of the rabbit hole that the provision creates that, even though my hon. Friend’s intervention did not go where I thought she was going, another problem has just come to mind. What happens in the circumstance where a critical supplier that acts as a proxy for multiple critical suppliers? How does designation operate in that fashion? There are suppliers that essentially operate as a marketplace to a certain provision of services. Is it the marketplace that is regulated, or is it each supplier within the marketplace? A locum agency could hypothetically be an umbrella company for multiple different smaller locum agencies, each of which would share the corporate risk as part of that. Going back to my first point, the idea that access to the IT network or system will somehow be discriminatory, or dichotomise between people who are in scope of this measure and people who are not, seems to me complete nonsense. It is difficult to see what organisations, if they provide a service to a modern OES, will be in scope of it. Secondly, there is systemic or significant disruption. I often say that, if someone wanted to cripple a hospital, the best way to do that would be to stop the cleaners cleaning rooms, and to stop the porters pushing people around the hospital to get them to their appointments and moving beds. There is often a focus on doctors and on the rest of the core medical and nursing staff— I myself often focus perhaps a bit too much on doctors—but it really is a whole-team effort. In fact, the most critical people are often the people who might not be the subject of the most focus, such as the cleaners and porters. If the cleaners stop work or do not turn up to work, the hospital grinds to a halt. If taxis are not taking people to and from hospital out of hours, or if the patient transport is not taking people to hospital, out-patient departments grind to a halt. If the locum companies that fill gaps in staff rotas are not available to do that, and there are substantial rota gaps that make the provision of services unsafe, the hospital also grinds to a halt. If it is not possible to get access to critical medicines, if staff cannot maintain the blood gas machine or the blood pressure machine, or if the boiler breaks down, the hospital grinds to a halt. It is not just something as obvious as the tragic situation with blood and pathology testing that causes a hospital to grind to a halt. Indeed, I cannot think of many private sector provisions that would not have a substantial impact on a hospital if they were to be removed; if any other Member can, I will be very happy to stand corrected. However, just skimming through them, I can see that the removal of most of them would cause the hospital to grind to a halt. The idea that the significant impact definition will be a discriminatory factor regarding suppliers just does not work. Someone might say: “Ben, you’re completely wrong. We found some providers.”, but, if that situation arises, how will the arbitration occur in terms of the threshold?

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The cloud providers I have spoken to talk about several things. They talk about the crippling cost of energy in the UK, something that we need to drive down—

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for pointing out that discrepancy in the costings. It goes back to the key principle that business and business modelling are best left to businesspeople, not to Government. The Government have a facilitatory role, but fundamentally their role is to get out of the way of business so that it can succeed and our economy can thrive. We need to ensure, for the good of our economy as a whole, that the critical elements of it are regulated in that way. Given the interconnected operation of MSPs in our digital sector, any burden that we put on business will limit the growth that we all need and will limit competitiveness. In this footloose market especially, that could result in organisations and companies operating in other sectors, notwithstanding the fact that they will have to comply with UK jurisdictional rules. As a general point, regulations will cause footloose industries to move and operate in different sectors, which will mean less taxation revenue and more costs for clients, making it more difficult to do business. We need to make sure that our economy is as nimble and free as possible, both for those trading as an MSP and more generally. I cannot labour the point enough: the costs that we impose on businesses under the Bill, in particular in the cyber-security and tech sector, will be felt by our economy as a whole. We will have to pay for that through increased inflation in food, energy or anything else that our critical suppliers provide. Even our NHS provision costs will increase as a consequence of the regulatory burden on businesses as disparate and distant from the NHS as those that we see in the Bill.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for that pertinent intervention. The burden she talks about is not just financial; companies could also find themselves in legal jeopardy should they become subject to overlapping and competing duties without realising when the Bill becomes an Act. More than anything else—perhaps even more than a low taxation regime—businesses want certainty about the regulatory environment they operate in. This is made even more complicated by the fact that many organisations operate in different jurisdictions and have to contend with different, competing regulatory frameworks. My understanding is that the majority try to take an approach in one jurisdiction that will also cover them in the other so that they have an overlap, but those are the big companies. They have more capacity and resource to do that. The problem will be for the companies on the margins that are struggling.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The cloud providers tell me that the energy costs are crippling, which is highly problematic, and that is why we need to drive those costs down. They talk about the challenges of getting data centres built and about planning considerations, which are a concern across the country. They talk about the taxation environment and costs on businesses more generally, particularly when they are footloose, and they talk about the regulatory framework. Pretty much all of those things are not specifically in the Bill, with the exception of the regulatory framework, so there is a lot that is suppressing the opportunities for cloud providers and others in the sector and hindering them from doing business and succeeding. There is a broader point to make about the Bill and the philosophy behind it, because there is something that we have to avoid. There is a sense in the UK that we are getting gummed up by regulation and obsessing more and more about limitations and restrictions to businesses. In that environment, people and organisations that do well financially, succeed and grow are seen as either targets or cheats—as something that we can go for, tax and punish. We have lost or diminished our can-do attitude when it comes to supporting the risk takers and the entrepreneurs, who are the people and organisations building the MSPs and data centres on which our economy relies. Over and above that, there is a cultural issue that is impacting our IT and tech sector. As legislators we should ensure that the thing we have direct control over, which is the legislation in front of us, imposes as small a regulatory burden as possible while still ensuring that it is sufficient to meet our aims. We must listen to businesses and hear their concerns. We hear time and again that the lack of clarity, particularly in this part of the Bill, is putting them at financial and legal risk. That is a very substantial concern.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  As I risk getting into trouble with Mr Stringer, I will not respond to the hon. Member for Lichfield. I look forward to the opportunity to debate this issue again, perhaps in the emergency Budget in the next couple of weeks. Clause 6 brings large load controllers, which provide the flow of electricity in and out of smart appliances, within scope of the NIS regulations if the load is above 300 MW. I understand that the threshold has been decided through consultation, given that that pressure could have a substantial impact on the grid. There is a challenge in managing peak demand and supply in the grid and big changes in it, so I entirely understand why the Government are introducing this provision. Smart EV devices—I have a smart charging electric vehicle device myself—used system-wide could cause big grid disruptions, particularly as we integrate infrastructure into our homes such as solar panels, batteries and other energy-related smart devices. In fact, we need the grid to become more smart device-integrated over the next 10, 15 or 20 years. When we look at projections of energy consumption, we see that we will need to enable people to use the grid by expanding technology such as vehicle-to-grid energy supply, so that we can manage peak load. That is part of expanding our energy, reducing energy costs and supporting renewable energy and the transition to net zero. If anything, this issue will become more important and expansive over the years. On that basis, I have some questions for the Minister about the clause. Why are data centres and large load controllers the two sectors that he has decided to put on the face of the Bill? I say that with particular reference to the NIS2 regulations, which are expanded a bit more. How does he envisage this area expanding in the future? Is he confident that the scope of the clause is sufficient to cover future technologies that are coming down the track? I am thinking of EV charging apps. The list is prescriptive, but does it have sufficient flexibility? Is the Minister able to come back with secondary legislation if he needs to expand the list in the future, given that it is in the Bill in that form? Would it not be better to put that on the face of the Bill and to use secondary legislation to lay it out, in order to have flexibility? The Minister has been trying to ensure flexibility elsewhere, and understandably so—let us not go back into those debates. I just want to understand his reasoning behind that a bit better. That is certainly not a criticism, but I want to know why those particular sectors have been pulled out, and why it has not been left for secondary legislation.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. I am reminded of the Committee’s evidence session earlier this week, in which expert after expert lined up to raise concerns around the scope of the definition. Although they acknowledged the importance of and appreciated the reasons for leaving some things to secondary legislation in a climate as fast-moving as the IT and digital sector’s, they raised concerns about the uncertainty that is coming for business and the need for extensive consultation so that businesses can feed into and have some degree of influence over the regulations that they will have to abide by.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q From all three of your perspectives, are you quite clear about where your individual institutional responsibilities lie? Is there clear water between the organisations? When Ian Levy from Amazon gave evidence this morning, I was struck when he said that Amazon is regulated in the cyber-security space by four regulators. Is the separation of duties and responsibilities clear? Is there a risk that the Secretary of State’s ability to designate critical security risks will muddy the water a bit? Stuart Okin: We have a clear understanding of the responsibilities within Ofgem. We are the joint competent authority with the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero. The Department does the designation and instant handling, and we do all the rest of the operations, including monitoring, enforcement and inspections. We understand our remit with NCSC. GCHQ is part of the cyber-security incident response team; it is ultimately responsible there. Going back to your main concern, we are part of an ecosystem. We have to understand where our lines are drawn, where NCSC’s responsibilities are and what the jobs are. To go back to us specifically, we can talk about engineering aspects, electrical engineering, gas engineering and the cyber elements that affect that, including technology resilience—not cyber. As long as we have clear gateways and communication between each other—and I think that the Bill provides those gateways—that will also assist, but there are clear lines of responsibilities. Natalie Black: It is clear that there is work to do to get in the same place for the Bill. Exactly as Stuart said, the information gateways will make a massive difference. It is too hard, at the moment, to share information between us and with the National Cyber Security Centre. The fact that companies will have to report within 24 hours not only to us but to the NCSC is very welcome. To return to my earlier point, we think that there is a bit of work for DSIT to do to help to co-ordinate this quite complicated landscape, and I think that industry would really welcome that. Ian Hulme: I agree with colleagues. From an ICO perspective, we see our responsibilities as a NIS competent authority as complementary to our role as a data protection regulator. If you want secure data, you have to have secure and resilient networks, which are obviously used to process data. We see it as a complementary set of regulations to our function as a data protection regulator.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Natalie, I am going single out Ofcom, which has a lot on its plate at the moment, particularly when it comes to the implementation of the Online Safety Act 2023 and all its other duties. Are you set up to administer your duties under the Bill? Are your resources siloed, given Ofcom’s competing considerations, particularly over the next few years? Natalie Black: That is a great question, and I am not at all surprised that you have asked it, given everything that is going on at the moment. As well as being group director for infrastructure and connectivity, I am also the executive member of the board, sitting alongside our chief executive officer, so from first-hand experience I can say that Ofcom really recognises how fast technology is changing. I do not think there is another sector that is really at the forefront of change in this way, apart from the communications sector. There are a lot of benefits to being able to sit across all that, because many of the stakeholders and issues are the same, and our organisation is learning to evolve and adapt very quickly with the pace of change. That is why the Bill feels very much like a natural evolution of our responsibility in the security and resilience space. We already have substantial responsibilities under NIS and the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021. We are taking on these additional responsibilities, particularly over data centres, but we already know some of the actors and issues. We are using our international team to understand the dynamics that are affecting the Online Safety Act, which will potentially materialise in the security and resilience world. As a collective leadership team, we look across these issues together. The real value comes from joining the dots. In the current environment, that is where you can make a real difference.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q It was about China’s super-embassy in London. What cyber-security risks do you think that poses, given your experience and background? Chung Ching Kwong: There is not a lot of publicly available information on the sensitive cabling that is around the area, so I cannot confidently say what is really going to happen if they start to build the embassy and have such close contact with those cables. The limit of this Bill when it comes to the Chinese embassy is that it cannot mitigate the risks that are posed by this mega-embassy in the centre of London, because it regulates operators and not neighbours or any random building in the City. If the embassy uses passive interception technology to harvest data from local wi-fi or cellular networks, no UK water or energy company is breached. There is no breach if they are only pre-positioning there to collect information, instead of actually cutting off the cables, so when they do cut off the cables, it will be too late. There will be no report filed under the Bill, even if it is under the scope of the Bill when it comes to regulation. The threat in this case is environmental and really bypasses the Bill’s regulatory scope.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Local Government Reorganisation · Hansard source

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  I support unitarisation and the efficiency savings it brings, but may I caution the Secretary of State a little on his language? A lot of the waste he is talking about is people’s jobs. Many hard-working council workers, who have huge uncertainty about what will happen to them over the next couple of years, will be concerned to hear that sort of language used as we discuss this in the Chamber. What support is he giving local authorities to help those council workers find new jobs once the LGR process is complete?

• 22 Oct 2025 · Energy Security: North Sea Gas and Oil · Hansard source

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  2. What assessment he has made of the contribution of North sea gas and oil to energy security.

• 22 Oct 2025 · Energy Security: North Sea Gas and Oil · Hansard source

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  We all know that the Government’s energy policy is unsustainable. It has even been reported that the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero is looking at authorising tiebacks to access new oil and gas wells using existing infrastructure in the North sea. Will the Secretary of State acknowledge that if we want to increase energy security and reduce energy prices for households and businesses, we must expand the use of the energy resources available to us, including North sea oil and gas?

• 21 Jul 2025 · Independent Water Commission · Hansard source

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  The quality of a river is about not just the water that goes into it, but the maintenance of the river itself. My constituents have been failed over and over again by the Environment Agency in the maintenance of our waterways. Given the Secretary of State’s enthusiasm for breaking apart quangos, will he consider bringing powers away from the EA so that we can manage our rivers properly and effectively?