Ben Spencer MP: speeches

Speeches

• 1 Jul 2026 · Online Safety: Children · Hansard source

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  This might be the last time this Department for Science, Innovation and Technology ministerial team get the chance to face us at the Dispatch Box, so on behalf of our team I wish them well over the next few weeks as the Government go through their hard reset. Has the Secretary of State spoken to the virtual Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham), and told him of the work under way to deliver the essential safeguards to restrict social media for under-16s following the successful campaign by parents, families and the Conservative Opposition, led by the Leader of the Opposition? Or is it that, as when we pull the plug on a computer, any unsaved progress will be lost?

• 16 Jun 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  Before I begin, I would also like to make some remarks in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the murder of Jo Cox. I never met Jo Cox. I never knew Jo Cox, and I am very sad that I did not, because having seen the impact she has had on our politics, on this place and on the people who knew her, she was clearly an incredible person. I do not think anyone can disagree with what she stood for, and in particular, that we have more in common in our politics. Our politics is worse off without her. Yet again, we return to this Government’s vacant vacillation regarding our national security. I urge the Minister again to take this opportunity to strengthen UK cyber-security from the threat posed by foreign state actors. Protecting the UK and its citizens is the primary responsibility of Government, but still, in the face of clear evidence of increasing threats, this Government fail to act. The risk of physical threats and the need to invest in defence are clear to all, yet the Government prioritise increasing welfare spending over the safety and security of armed forces personnel and our country. The situation is so serious that the Defence Secretary had to resign, as he could not defend the inaction of this Government or the risks they are taking. While the dangers presented to our cyber-security may be less visible, they are no less real. Hostile state actors are working every single hour of every single day to undermine our democracy and our security. These are risks that every Member across this House will be aware of. It is chilling to know that when Iran shut down its internet access, social media accounts purporting to be pro-independence Scottish people stopped tweeting. Expert analysis has estimated that thousands of similar accounts could originate in Iran and that as much as 26% of such accounts could be fake. Social media is now a weapon. We know that hostile state actors have sought to attack and undermine Parliament. Just last week we were told that spyware had been discovered in Government buildings linked to recent high-profile decisions regarding China’s controversial mega-embassy project in London.

• 21 May 2026 · Women’s Health and Wellbeing: Online Censorship · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. As we are discussing health, I should declare that I am a former NHS doctor and my wife is an NHS doctor. I thank the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington) for her detailed and highly researched speech, as well as all other Members who have spoken. This has been a most concerning debate in relation to the systemic impact of health promotion, and it has thrown up bigger, more fundamental challenges that we, as a society, must start to grapple with. I will come to that later in my remarks. My first job in the psychiatric training scheme—and my first consultant job—was on a women’s ward in south-east London. That was one of the most amazing jobs I have ever done: looking after very poorly women and doing my bit to deal with complex physical health issues and to promote women’s health. I totally appreciate and agree about the importance of reducing what is—let us face it—ridiculous stigma and social taboo around women’s health issues, but I come at this as a doctor, so I have a particular perspective. Equally, I am mindful that my perspective—how I look at society—has changed during my 44 years. If someone had asked the Ben of 20 years ago, “Do you think we live in a society that is equal for men and women?” he would have said, “Yes, of course we do.” In the past 15 years, I have come to know that that is completely wrong, things are nowhere near where they should be and we still have a huge amount of work to do. Sadly, what we have heard in this debate, and the list of de-promoted words that the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central handed to me, are further evidence of the challenges that we must tackle. She is 100% right to raise this topic, among others, and to call out what has been happening. But—and there is a “but”—this issue is not simply about access to information. This is not just a question of whether the information should or should not be accessible—in my view, it absolutely should be—or of how to determine the threshold between adult content and factual material. The debate also relates to decisions made by private companies to impose limits on what they permit or promote on their sites. That is the nub of the issue: should companies be allowed to make those decisions, or should it be the role of Government to regulate those choices or actions? To be clear, I do not believe that this debate is about the scope of the Online Safety Act, which does not restrict companies in the publication of factual health information. At no point does that Act says that information on breasts, vaginas, fertility, menstruation or menopause, or on any other body part, condition or medical term, should be restricted or classified as adult material. The way that that information or imagery is presented may indeed come within the scope of the Act, but its existence does not. Inappropriate adult content should not be accessible to children—that is right—but factual and educational material should not meet that criterion. It is also worth bearing in mind that, in some ways, this is not a new issue. I am sure that, just as people looked at information in anatomy textbooks for educational purposes before the internet, plenty of people looked at it for other purposes—but, again, that is not a matter for Parliament or the Online Safety Act. Under our current legal framework, private companies have the right to choose what information they permit on their websites. That is a commercial decision, and if we are not happy with such a decision—my very strong view is that we should not support the restriction of information relating to women’s health—we should call them out and persuade them to change their position. Algorithmic transparency is important, but it is also critical, given the evidence that we have heard in this debate, that companies are not able to hide behind the Online Safety Act. A bigger problem that we will have to tackle or process at some point is the status of social media in our society. Is it private or is it something bigger? Should it be regulated, like news outlets? That would be a huge change in our position, creating such regulatory burdens as to make the UK wholly uncompetitive in the market and having an extreme impact on people’s access to information. It would also be counterproductive, because it is nigh-on impossible to do. I look forward to hearing from the Minister, whom I welcome to his place. This is the first time I have had the pleasure of being opposite him at the Dispatch Box. I reiterate the Opposition’s strong support for what Members from both sides of the House have said about the importance of destigmatising these matters. I hate even using the word “destigmatise” because I worry that that is stigmatising in itself—it is ridiculous, in some ways, that we have to have this debate in the modern age, but we are where we are. We must ensure that everyone has access to sensible and appropriate information, without the biases that have been mentioned in the debate. Finally, as a former NHS mental health doctor, I point out that social media is not the only online source of health information. I signpost people who have questions to the NHS website, where there is plenty of stuff on all health areas—I looked it up on my phone during the debate. We do not have to rely on big-tech social media; we have plenty of services in which other information is available.

• 20 May 2026 · Child Protection Online · Hansard source

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  Does the Secretary of State regret having been forced into a ban on social media for under-16s during proceedings on the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026, rather than having committed to a ban the first place, or introducing a Bill in the King’s Speech?

• 19 Mar 2026 · Online Harms · Hansard source

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  I congratulate the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire (Ian Sollom) on securing this debate. As with so many debates over recent months, it has shown that online harms are a matter of paramount importance to Members on both sides of the House and in the other place. As was to be expected, every Member who spoke focused on online harms. I think only one Member, the hon. Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward), spoke about some of the positives of the internet age. I would usually say that it has been a pleasure to listen to and take part in the debate, but it really has not been in this case, because it has been a pretty grim debate. We have had a tour de force discussion of all the horrors that young people and adults are exposed to on the internet, and we have heard about the importance for our society and country of tackling them. I am very proud of the steps that His Majesty’s official Opposition took in government to make the online environment a safer place, from bringing the Online Safety Act into force to the commendable and tenacious work of my noble Friends in the other place, especially Baroness Owen and Baroness Bertin, who are the staunchest of advocates for protections from digital forms of abuse for women and girls. Members will know that Baroness Owen secured important amendments to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to criminalise the solicitation of sexually explicit deepfake images. Baroness Bertin’s report and campaigning has resulted in amendments being tabled to the Crime and Policing Bill concerning nudification apps. That is by no means the extent of their important work. The aim of the Conservatives’ Online Safety Act was to build an environment where adults could access legal content freely and where children enjoy greater protections. I welcome in particular the entry into force last year of Ofcom’s protection of children codes. I also welcome the enforcement action that Ofcom has already taken under the Act to tackle file-sharing sites disseminating child sexual abuse material and pornography sites that have failed to put in place highly effective age-assurance measures to prevent children from accessing content. However, we know that concerns regarding children’s social media use go well beyond content that is explicitly harmful and subject to restrictions under the Online Safety Act. As a result of addictive algorithms that drive excessive use and unhealthy patterns of behaviour, parents across the country are rightly concerned about their children’s social and emotional development. That is why we called for a social media ban for children under the age of 16. This month, the Government regrettably voted down amendments to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which were secured in the other place by my noble Friend Lord Nash, to bring such a ban into effect. In response to pressure from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition and other Members across the House, the Government have now launched their own consultation on measures to restrict access to social media for under 16s, alongside several other online safety matters. If the Government had accepted our amendment to the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, such a review would be well under way by now, and we would be closer to a solution on this generationally important issue, but we are where we are. Consultation is no substitute for action, and I sincerely hope that the Government will deliver on the timescales set out for responding and bringing in measures after their consultation concludes in May. As with any rapidly evolving technology, social media and other online tools develop new apps and sites that pose novel threats and demand a response from Government and regulators. We have seen most recently in AI chatbots, some of which may fall outside the scope of the regulatory framework in promoting self-harm content to young people. A particular harm that I have raised with Ministers and Ofcom, of which there has been a disturbing increase, is the use of AI chatbots to obtain medical or other advice that should be sought from regulated professionals. The hon. Member for Winchester (Dr Chambers) mentioned that in his speech. Last year, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency established a national commission, which ran a call for evidence on the suitability of the UK’s framework for regulating AI in healthcare. The call for evidence closed last month, and I look forward to seeing the commission’s conclusions and the Government’s proposals for dealing with the risks that will no doubt be highlighted. A fundamentally important aspect of online harm that has attracted comparably less media attention and debating time in Parliament is the threat to democracy of online disinformation campaigns perpetrated by hostile state actors and their affiliates. The Science, Innovation and Technology Committee reported last year that online foreign interference and disinformation campaigns are putting UK citizens at risk. We also had credible reports last year of Iranian state-backed digital interference in the Scottish independence referendum. The risk posed by that type of activity is intensifying, as artificial intelligence tools provide the capability to generate deepfake content purporting to represent politicians or campaigns, amplified by foreign, hostile, state-controlled bot accounts. As people—particularly young people—increasingly obtain their news online, it is more important than ever that we consider the potential of digital watermarking tools that can be used to demonstrate the provenance and authenticity of content published on the internet. This danger is likely to increase as a result of geopolitical tensions. In their report on artificial intelligence and copyright, which was published yesterday, the Government recognised the risks posed by digital replicas and deepfakes in spreading convincing disinformation online, and committed to exploring options to address the growing problem. The Government also discussed the need to label AI-generated content to make disinformation easier for users to spot. Will the Minister provide timescales for that further work, and an update on the Government’s broader strategy on countering AI-generated democratic interference material? What role does Minister think digital watermarking tools will play in countering the proliferation and impact of deepfake videos and content?

• 4 Mar 2026 · Draft Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provision) Regulations 2026 · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. The statutory instrument makes consequential amendments to references in primary and secondary legislation to reflect the abolition of the Information Commissioner’s Office and the transfer of its functions to a new body corporate, the Information Commission. The Information Commission was granted additional powers and duties under the Data (Use and Access) Act, reflecting the increasing breadth of issues that impact data protection regulation, including the power to commission a new strategic framework and implementation plan. Obligations under the new framework set out a requirement for the Information Commission to take into account specified considerations when undertaking its duties, including the promotion of innovation and competition and the fact that children merit specific protection. On the important question of protections for children, the Minister will be aware that His Majesty’s official Opposition, in my name, tabled a new clause to the Data (Use and Access) Bill on this very issue. It sought to compel the Secretary of State to undertake a review within 12 months of Royal Assent, which was received in June 2025, of the case for raising the age of consent for social media to 16 under GDPR. The new clause received broad cross-party support but was voted down by the Government. Having finally responded, albeit too little and too late, to His Majesty’s Opposition and widespread public pressure to act, the Government launched their consultation on social media access for under-16s earlier this week. Does the Minister agree that had the Government accepted our amendment, their review would now be well under way, and we would be several steps closer to a solution for this generationally important challenge. I hope that in future they will consider a bit further the question of accepting Opposition amendments. In an increasingly digitised world, our industry regulators, including the Information Commission, face an ever-growing workload in circumstances where resources are under pressure. What discussion is the Minister’s Department having with the Information Commission about its ongoing strategy to ensure that it can meet its expanded role effectively?

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I do not want to repeat the discussion that we had a moment ago. I think it is complete lunacy to permit the building of a super-embassy—one of the biggest in the region—next to highly critical data transmission. I am also concerned by media reports that the Prime Minister’s recent visit to China was greenlighted only following the final approval of the embassy. I am deeply depressed that, following the visit, Jimmy Lai has been effectively sentenced for life. I respect the tone and constructive way in which the hon. Member for Harlow approaches this debate, but it is fair to say that the Government are sadly weak on standing up to hostile state actors such as the Chinese Communist party. As I said at the start, there is simply no point in granting the Secretary of State powers to issue directions on the basis of national security if the Government are not willing to be clear-eyed about the most critical cyber-security risks to the nation. I therefore submit that the new clauses are a vital addition to the Bill to focus the attentions of the Secretary of State to ensure that her functions under part 4 are carried out in the best interests of our national security. No responsible Government would or should vote against such provisions. Parliament should make it crystal clear that the Chinese Communist party is a threat to the United Kingdom. We must support new clauses 2 and 3. Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned. — (Taiwo Owatemi.)

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will speak to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Dewsbury and Batley (Iqbal Mohamed), but wait for the next group to speak to clauses 15 and 16 and the amendments to them in the name of the official Opposition. From the outset, it is important for me to say that while I have spoken to the hon. Member more generally and responded to a debate he secured on AI, I have not spoken to him specifically regarding these amendments and their precise purpose. However, given his concerns about the AI sector and his background, we can see where he is going with them. Broadly speaking, the amendments would ensure that as part of the reporting requirements under these clauses, there is an ability to measure whether adaptive AI or large language models have been responsible for a cyber-security breach or an incident within the systems themselves. That derives from what we see happening more generally in the cyber-security sector. We heard evidence that, online, people can essentially purchase a cyber-security hack suite of software. It is possible to pay for people to do hacking and one can get training in it. A lot of hacking and cyber-security breaches are now expanding because of large language models and the use of AI to probe systems. I do not know if we have a sense of scope regarding how much this is a problem specifically in the UK, whether for the individual businesses or organisations that will be regulated under the Bill. I understand, as I interpret them, that the point of the amendments is to get a dataset on where AI or automated decision making has been used to pose a particular cyber-security risk. The amendments also speak to a more general point. There has been a lot of debate in this place over the years about what we as a country, and equivalent democracies, are doing on the regulation of AI and large language models, building on the Bletchley conferences, innovative work and what guardrails we need to think about in terms of imposing LLMs and AI in the UK, and how we approach AI being used by hostile state actors, such as through bot accounts. I understand that the use of deepfakes, bots and so on is an emerging risk as a method of cyber-attack. There are broader issues with regard to transparency when bots on the internet and social media networks can get into various IT systems and accounts, and effectively pretend to be somebody else to get around the cyber-security system. As with all things, we do not know what we do not know. I understand that the amendments were tabled to increase reporting requirements and give us more evidence of the scope of the problem and the threat posed. I will be grateful if the Minister gives his sense of how much of a problem this is, particularly with regard to whether reporting requirements are necessary. I believe that the Government’s original plan was to introduce an AI Bill. That would have pros and cons, and I remain agnostic on that, but, speaking for His Majesty’s Opposition, I would like to know the Minister’s plans for the AI landscape and whether, in the upcoming King’s Speech, there is an idea of revisiting an AI Bill, which might make such amendments obsolete.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  I broadly agree. This is one of those difficult areas where there can be overlap. I have sympathy with the argument that it is important to use any opportunity, and in particular this Bill, to raise fraud. We focus on financial fraud, but this area is not limited to that, especially when we think about other malicious operators, and about ransomware and hacktivism, where the boundaries are particularly blurred. In a situation where a fraudulent operator, service, provider or organisation has material, whether on social media or subject to search engines, and the police or other competent authorities have flagged it to the provider as fraudulent—as illegal criminal activity—what duties does that provider have to remove it or take it down? Is that something that the Minister is aware of? Has he looked into it, and what is the Government’s plan to crack down on that activity?

• 4 Feb 2026 · Teenagers’ Use of Social Media · Hansard source

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  The public support a ban on social media for the under-16s, Conservative Members support a ban on social media for the under-16s, and Labour Members support a ban on social media for the under-16s. The Secretary of State has said many fine words about her concerns for children’s safety online, but what we now need is action. Will she take the opportunity to make clear her position: does she, or does she not, support a ban on social media for the under-16s?

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you very much for coming in to give us evidence this afternoon, and thank you for your service. I have two questions. Who are the main threat actors in cyber-attacks on UK networks and information systems—what do they break down into, in terms of state actors, affiliates and criminal gangs? Secondly, on ransomware attacks, you will know that the Government review states that ransomware is “the greatest of all serious and organised cybercrime threats”. In your view, what is the scale of that threat and what sectors and businesses are the primary targets? DCS Andrew Gould: To take the actors first, they are probably quite well known, in terms of the general groupings. Yes, we have our state actors—the traditional adversaries that we regularly talk about—and they generally offer very much a higher-end capability, as you will all be aware. The next biggest threat group is organised crime groups. You see a real diversity of capability within that. You will see some that are highly capable, often from foreign jurisdictions—Russian jurisdictions or Russian-speaking. The malware developers are often the more sophisticated as service-type offerings. We see more and more ransomware and other crime types almost operating as franchises—“Here is the capability, off you go, give us a cut.” Then they have less control over how those capabilities are used, so we are seeing a real diversification of the threat, particularly when it comes to ransomware. Then, where you have that proximity to state-directed, if not quite state-controlled—that crossover between some of those high-end crime groups and the state; I am thinking primarily of Russia—it is a lot harder to attribute the intent behind an attack. There is a blurring of who was it and for what purpose was it done, and there is that element of deniability because it is that one further step away. Moving back down the levels of the organised crime groups, you have a real profusion of less capable actors within that space, from all around the world, driving huge volumes, often using quite sophisticated tools but not really understanding how they work. What we have seen is almost like a fragmentation in the criminal marketplace. The barrier to criminal entry is probably lower than it has ever been. You can download these capabilities quite readily—you can watch a tutorial on YouTube or anywhere else on how to use them, and off you go, even if you do not necessarily understand the impact. We certainly saw a real shift post pandemic from traditional criminals and crime groups into more online crime, because it was easier and less risky. You look more broadly at hacktivists, terrorists—who are probably a lot less capable; they might have the intent but not so much the capability—and then the group that are sometimes slightly patronisingly described as script kiddies. These are young individuals with a real interest in developing their skills. They have an understanding that what they are doing is wrong, but they are probably not financially or criminally motivated. If they were not engaging in that kind of cyber-crime, they probably would not be engaging in other forms of criminality, but they can still do a lot of damage with the tools they can get their hands on, given that so many organisations seem to struggle to deliver even a basic level of cyber-resilience and cyber-security. One of the things that we really noticed changing over the last 18 months is the diversification of UK threats. Your traditional UK cyber-criminal, if there is such a thing, is primarily focused on hacking for personal benefit, ransomware and other activity. Now we are seeing a diversification, and more of a hybrid, cross-organised crime threat. There are often two factors to that. We often hear it described in the media or by us within law enforcement publicly as the common threat—this emerging community online—otherwise known as Scattered Spider. There, we are seeing two elements to those sorts of groups. You see an element of maybe more traditional cyber-skills engaged in hacking or using those skills for fraud, but we also see those skills being used for Computer Misuse Act offences, in order to enable other offences. One of the big areas for that at the moment that we see is around intimate image abuse. We see more and more UK-based criminals hacking individuals’ devices to access, they hope, intimate images. They then identify the subject of those intimate images, most predominantly women, and then engage in acts of extortion, bullying or harassment. We have seen some instances of real-world contact away from that online contact. Think of the scale of that and the challenge that presents to policing. I can think of cases in cyber-crime unit investigations across the country where you have got a handful of individuals who have victimised thousands of women in the UK and abroad. You have got these small cyber-crime units of a handful of people trying to manage 4,000 or 10,000 victims. It is very difficult and very challenging, but the flipside of that is that, if they are UK-based, we have a much better chance of getting hold of them, so we are seeing a lot more arrests for those cross-hybrid threats, which is a positive. There is definitely an emerging cohort that then starts to blend in with threats like Southport and violence-fixated individuals. There seems to be a real mishmash of online threat coming together and then separating apart in a way that we have never seen historically. That is a real change in the UK threat that is driving a lot of policing activity. Turning to your ransomware question, what is interesting, in terms of the kinds of organisations that are impacted by ransomware, a lot of the ransomware actors do not want to come to notice for hitting critical national infrastructure. They do not want to do the cloning of pipelines. They do not want to be taking out hospitals and the NHS. They know they will not get paid if they hit UK critical national infrastructure, for starters, so there is a disincentive, but they also do not want that level of Government or law enforcement attention. Think of the disruptive effect that the UK NCA and policing had on LockBit the year before last. LockBit went from being the No. 1 ransomware strain globally to being out of the top 10 and struggling to come back. We saw a real fragmentation of the ransomware market post that. There is no dominant strain or group within that that has emerged to cover that. A lot of those groups that are coming into that space may be a bit less skilled, sophisticated and successful. The overall threat to organisations is pretty much the same. The volume is the volume, but it is probably less CNI and more smaller organisations because they are more vulnerable and it is less likely to play out very publicly than if there is a big impact on the economy or critical national infrastructure. As such, there is probably not the level of impact in the areas that people would expect, notwithstanding some of the really high-profile incidents we had last year.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Natalie, I am going single out Ofcom, which has a lot on its plate at the moment, particularly when it comes to the implementation of the Online Safety Act 2023 and all its other duties. Are you set up to administer your duties under the Bill? Are your resources siloed, given Ofcom’s competing considerations, particularly over the next few years? Natalie Black: That is a great question, and I am not at all surprised that you have asked it, given everything that is going on at the moment. As well as being group director for infrastructure and connectivity, I am also the executive member of the board, sitting alongside our chief executive officer, so from first-hand experience I can say that Ofcom really recognises how fast technology is changing. I do not think there is another sector that is really at the forefront of change in this way, apart from the communications sector. There are a lot of benefits to being able to sit across all that, because many of the stakeholders and issues are the same, and our organisation is learning to evolve and adapt very quickly with the pace of change. That is why the Bill feels very much like a natural evolution of our responsibility in the security and resilience space. We already have substantial responsibilities under NIS and the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021. We are taking on these additional responsibilities, particularly over data centres, but we already know some of the actors and issues. We are using our international team to understand the dynamics that are affecting the Online Safety Act, which will potentially materialise in the security and resilience world. As a collective leadership team, we look across these issues together. The real value comes from joining the dots. In the current environment, that is where you can make a real difference.

• 18 Nov 2025 · Draft Online Safety Act 2023 (Priority Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. This statutory instrument represents an important development in the obligations on platforms regulated under the Online Safety Act to protect people from encountering illegal content online. The OSA was enacted by the last Government with the primary aim of safeguarding children and removing serious illegal material from the internet. Tackling the most harmful content, such as that which is the subject of today’s discussion, goes to the heart of the Online Safety Act’s aims. His Majesty’s Opposition therefore welcome and support the draft regulations. The experiences and opportunities offered by the online world change rapidly. It is right that legislators are responsive when new risks emerge or when certain types of unlawful content proliferate on the internet. Under the last Government, the OSA amended the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to criminalise several forms of sexual misconduct and abusive behaviour online. The new offences included cyber-flashing and the sharing of or threatening to share intimate images without consent. The amendments were made to keep pace with novel threats and forms of abuse, the victims of which are too often women and girls. Baroness Bertin’s independent review of pornography, which was published in February this year, highlighted the damaging impact on victims of intimate image abuse, ranging from physical illness to mental health effects such as anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and suicidal thoughts. The effects of cyber-flashing and intimate image abuse on victims is severe. It is therefore right that this statutory instrument brings cyber-flashing within the scope of the priority offences in schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act, while retaining as a priority offence the sharing of or threatening to share intimate images. We also strongly support the addition as a priority offence of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm, which is the other important component of this statutory instrument. Desperate people who contemplate self-harm need early intervention and support, not encouragement to self-harm. Under this SI, regulated services will be obliged to proactively remove the material when they become aware of it on their platforms and take measures to prevent it from appearing in the first place. One can only wonder why it has taken so long to get to this position. I am sure we will have a unanimous view not only in the House but in society of the importance of removing such material. The regulations will work only if they are adopted by the industry and subject to rigorous oversight, coupled with enforcement when platforms fail in their obligations. That is a necessity, and why we had to introduce the Online Safety Act in the first place. It is right that Government regulators should look to identify obstacles to the implementation of the OSA and take action where necessary. Since the introduction of Ofcom’s protection of children codes in the summer, important questions have arisen around the use of virtual private networks to circumvent age verification, as well as data security and privacy in the age-verification process.

• 18 Nov 2025 · Draft Online Safety Act 2023 (Priority Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for his question on a very important point, which was raised just last week in Department for Science, Innovation and Technology questions by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) and others. The Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted, also raised questions about the importance of the scope of regulations for chatbots. The Government seem all over the place as to whether the large language models, as we understand them, regulate the content that comes into scope. Given the response we received last week, it would be helpful to have some clarity from the Minister. Does he believe that LLMs are covered by the OSA when it comes to encouraging self-harm material? If there is a gap, what is he going to do about it? I recognise that he is commissioning Ofcom to look at the issue, but in his view, right now, is there a gap that will need someone to fix it? What are his reflections on that? This is increasingly becoming a priority area that we need to resolve. If there is a gap in legislation, we need to get on and sort it.

• 18 Nov 2025 · Draft Online Safety Act 2023 (Priority Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  I hope the Minister takes this in a constructive spirit. Concerns have been raised across the House as to the scope of the OSA when it comes to LLMs and the different types and variations of chatbots, which are being used by many people right now. Is he not concerned that he as the Minister, and his Department, are not able to say at the Dispatch Box whether they believe LLMs are completely covered in the scope of the OSA? Has he received legal advice or other advice? How quickly will he be able to give a definitive response? Clearly, if there is a gap, we need to know about it and we need to take action. It surely puts the regulator and the people who are generating this technology in an invidious position if even Her Majesty’s Government think there is a lack of clarity, as he put it, on the scope of the applicability of the OSA to new technologies.

• 12 Nov 2025 · Taxes · Hansard source

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  Tax collection and working for HMRC are important jobs. Obviously the tax collector gets a bad rap in popular culture, but I wish to thank the hon. Gentleman’s parents and family for what they do.

• 12 Nov 2025 · Taxes · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. That was pretty much what I was going on to say. We are seeing this constant kite-flying about various different potential taxes or cooked up schemes that could affect different walks of life, as the Government are trying to keep meeting their burgeoning and ever-growing spending commitments. That is making people lose confidence, and it has a real impact on the decisions they are making here and now, even without the policies having been enacted. Like it or not, the Budget on the 26th is already here and operating. It is operating through the media, and people are making decisions now that are having a real impact, particularly in my patch.

• 3 Nov 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  T5. According to media reports, the Secretary of State recently revealed in a speech that the UK had deployed troops to Israel to monitor the ceasefire in Gaza. Could he take this opportunity to update the House on the number and activities of any troops deployed there?

• 10 Sept 2025 · Online Safety Act 2023: Effectiveness · Hansard source

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  I welcome the Secretary of State and the new ministerial team to their places, and thank the former team, who I have very much enjoyed sparring with over the past few months. In light of the report of the Department’s plans to review the implementation of the Online Safety Act, can the Secretary of State confirm the scope of that review, including whether it will address the apparent confusion in the media between the powers of the Online Safety Act and the Public Order Act 1986? Will the review look at age verification to ensure that people’s data is safe and secure, and that the pass schemes they use are trusted? Will it tackle the use of VPNs, particularly by children, to get around age verification?

• 2 Sept 2025 · Draft Online Safety Act 2023 (Qualifying Worldwide Revenue) Regulations 2025 · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. Thank you for your guidance at the start of the debate. Given the narrow scope of this SI, I will make some very brief introductory remarks about the Online Safety Act before going into the detail of the SI. Nearly two years ago, under the last Government, the groundbreaking Online Safety Act was enacted with the purpose of protecting people online. Rightly, the strongest protections in the Act were designed for children. Every day, children are subjected to harmful content affecting their views of society, relationships and themselves. The Online Safety Act is an essential tool to address that. It has faced much opposition and still faces challenges today, but it provides the template for the most robust online safety framework in the world. It is a measure that I am very proud of, but we must now work to ensure that the provisions are implemented and enforced effectively. Realising the essential protections built into the Online Safety Act is dependent on high levels of industry compliance. I hope that we will have future opportunities to debate the wider provisions of the Act, including the effectiveness of age verification and the definition of “harmful content”, but today we rightly focus on fees and enforcement. The draft regulations set the parameters for how we define and calculate companies’ turnover in order then to then calculate both fees and maximum penalties, should they be incurred. The SI is therefore very technical in scope, but important. The Act requires that Ofcom’s operating costs for the online safety regime are covered by providers of regulated services through a fees regime, and it is vital that that is apportioned fairly. Fines are powerful sanctions available to Ofcom, but they must be proportionate to the company and the scale and breadth of the infringement, so that companies in breach of their duties under the Act can be held to account in a way that will not only penalise non-compliance but encourage a material change in operation.

• 21 Jul 2025 · Magna Carta School · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for his answer. Can he clarify whether the Magna Carta school will have a full rebuild, due to the presence of reinforced autoclaved aerated concrete, or is it just the science and arts block that will be rebuilt? Will he meet me to discuss this issue and the work that will take place on such a fantastic local school?

• 17 Jul 2025 · Social Media: Misinformation and Algorithms · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady and the Select Committee that she chairs for delivering this important review. I also thank her for her statement to the House, which has highlighted the scale of the challenge we face in relation to the proliferation of misleading and harmful content online. I join her in putting out my prayers and sympathies to all those affected by the horrors in Southport last year. Given the report’s findings that young people are particularly susceptible to misleading and harmful content and online radicalisation, due to the stage of their cognitive development, does the hon. Lady consider that the Government should commit to conducting a review of the evidential case for raising the digital age of consent for social media platforms from 13 to 16?