Ben Spencer MP: speeches

Speeches

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Does that also exist for local government? Does adult social care and so on have that integration too? Stewart Whyte: Yes, there is integration between ourselves and the local authorities.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q It was about China’s super-embassy in London. What cyber-security risks do you think that poses, given your experience and background? Chung Ching Kwong: There is not a lot of publicly available information on the sensitive cabling that is around the area, so I cannot confidently say what is really going to happen if they start to build the embassy and have such close contact with those cables. The limit of this Bill when it comes to the Chinese embassy is that it cannot mitigate the risks that are posed by this mega-embassy in the centre of London, because it regulates operators and not neighbours or any random building in the City. If the embassy uses passive interception technology to harvest data from local wi-fi or cellular networks, no UK water or energy company is breached. There is no breach if they are only pre-positioning there to collect information, instead of actually cutting off the cables, so when they do cut off the cables, it will be too late. There will be no report filed under the Bill, even if it is under the scope of the Bill when it comes to regulation. The threat in this case is environmental and really bypasses the Bill’s regulatory scope.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Do you not think that, as the Minister taking this through the Commons, you should have also had some of those meetings and consultations? Kanishka Narayan: I have had some meetings but, as the Minister in charge of this Bill, she has been very engaged with businesses, so I think that is fitting. We have obviously worked very closely together, as we normally do, in the course of co-ordinating across the two Chambers.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you, Minister, for giving evidence this afternoon. I have a couple of questions. The first is about the definitions in the Bill, whether of MSPs or otherwise. All day long we have heard from representatives of different sectors of the industry, and pretty much everyone has talked about the importance of consultation on the definitions and when they are applied in secondary legislation. A certain amount of that stuff will be in primary legislation, so what consultation have you had with industry in setting up the definitions in the Bill in the first place? Kanishka Narayan: Thank you for the question on definitions. I have two things to say on that. First, observing the evidence today, it is interesting that there are views in both directions on pretty much every definitional question. For example, on the definition of “incident thresholds”, I heard an expert witness at the outset of the day say that it is in exactly the right place, precisely because it adds incidents that have the capability to have an impact, even if not a directness of impact, to cover pre-positioning threats. A subsequent witness said that they felt that that precise definitional point made it not a fitting definition. The starting point is that there is a particular intent behind the definitions used in the Bill, and I am looking forward to going through it clause by clause, but I am glad that some of those tensions have been surfaced. Secondly, in answer to your question on consultation, a number of the particular priority measures in the Bill were also consulted on under the previous Government. We have been engaging with industry and, in the course of implementation, the team has started setting up engagement with regulators and a whole programme of engagement with industry as well.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Your evidence is really helpful. To help with my understanding, if you look across all the suppliers in your service, are there any that you would not consider to be critical, such that if you clicked your fingers now and one of them disappeared, it would not have a material impact on your ability to maintain patient safety and deliver healthcare? Irrespective of the debate about size, what suppliers do you not determine to be critical? Stewart Whyte: For me, it would be a slightly different assessment from Brian’s. We would be looking at anything where there is no processing of personal data. For me, that would not be a critical supplier from a data protection perspective. But there might be some other integration with NHS board systems that Brian might have concerns about. There is a crossover in terms of what we do, but my role is to look at how we manage data within the NHS. If there are suppliers where there is no involvement with identifiable data of either staff or patients, I would not see them as a critical supplier under this piece of legislation.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I assume that you are referring to the previous Minister, who you took over from? Kanishka Narayan: I am referring to the Minister for Digital Economy, who is in the other place.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you for giving evidence this morning. The Bill would not have prevented recent attacks on high-profile parts of UK industry such as Co-op, Marks and Sparks, and Jaguar Land Rover. What more do you think can be done to mitigate the risk to jobs, supply chains and the UK economy from further large-scale cyber-attacks against out-of-scope companies? My second question is a bit more technical. Do you consider that the definition in the Bill of a managed service provider is sufficiently clear and certain for businesses to understand whether they are in scope or out of scope of the Bill? Dr Sanjana Mehta: I appear before the Committee today on behalf of ISC2, which is the world’s largest not-for-profit membership association for cyber-security professionals. We have 265,000 members around the world and 10,000-plus members in the UK. On your question about sectoral scope, our central message is that we welcome the introduction of the Bill and we believe that it will go a long way towards improving the cyber-resilience of UK plc. Yes, there are certain sectors that are outside the scope of the Bill, and we believe that there are a number of non-legislative measures that could be used to enhance the cyber-security of other industries and parts of the sector. In particular, the forthcoming national cyber action plan should be used as a delivery vehicle for improving the resilience of UK plc as a whole. On the previous panel, I think Jen mentioned that there are voluntary codes of practice. As an organisation, we have piloted the code of practice for cyber governance, and we have signed up to the ambassadors scheme for the code of practice for secure software development. We think that the upcoming national cyber action plan can further encourage the uptake of such schemes and frameworks. Most importantly, we call upon Government to focus on skills development as a non-legislative measure, because ultimately that will be the key enabler of success, whether it is for organisations that are within or outside the scope of the Bill.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you for coming to speak to us this morning. I have a different question for each of you, so I will rattle them off and ask you to go through them. Starting with Ben from Darktrace, how are developing and emerging technologies such as AI and post-quantum crypto changing the nature of cyber-security threats? Do you think the Bill responds adequately to that changing threat landscape? Moving on to Matt from Cisco, what further guidance and consultation from the Government and the Information Commissioner is needed for MSPs to comply effectively with their obligations under the Bill? Chris from NCC Group, the National Audit Office report last year highlighted lots of serious deficiencies in Government cyber-resilience. Do you think the cyber action plan goes far enough? How can Government Departments be overseen and held to account in a way that will deliver meaningful improvements in cyber-resilience? Finally, Ian from Amazon, a core feature of your business model is extensive exposure to supply chain partners. Do you think that the designation of critical suppliers by regulators under the Bill is the correct approach? What further consultation is needed to make sure that that is proportionate, prioritises the most critical suppliers and, crucially, gives a degree of certainty, whether legal or financial? Ben Lyons: AI is significantly changing cyber-security. You can think about it at three levels: first, the way in which attackers are using AI to mount cyber-attacks; secondly, the need to secure AI systems and AI within companies and organisations; and thirdly, the question of how AI is changing cyber-security on the defensive side. In brief, we see significant use of AI by attackers. Today, we are releasing the results of a survey in which 73% of surveyed security professionals say that AI-powered threats are having a significant impact on their organisation. These are things like phishing, reconnaissance, and lowering the barriers to being able to launch attacks and review more targets more effectively. Last month, the chief executive officer of Anthropic, which is one of the main frontier AI labs, warned that he sees AI-led cyber-attacks as potentially being the main way in which cyber-attacks are conducted in the future. At the level of the enterprise, you have a challenge of how you secure the enterprise, in terms of not only developing and deploying AI, but visibility of AI used in an organisation. We are certainly seeing AI transform how cyber-security vendors and organisations manage the threat: they have greater visibility, can detect threats more quickly and the like. On how the Bill responds to that, one positive in its approach is that it is setting out an agile, outcomes-based approach that means that the regulatory regime can be capable of evolving as the threat evolves. It is sensible not to talk about AI in depth on the face of the Bill, but through mechanisms such as the code of practice, it will be possible for expectations to evolve over time as the threat and the technology mature.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q The issues about complexity and how loosely the Bill is drafted have come up quite a few times, and you have given good evidence regarding your concerns. What cost to business do you anticipate if the Bill stays so loose, with so much left to secondary legislation? Jill Broom: There is probably a broader point around legal certainty, which is not given on the face of the Bill. Some of our members have highlighted language that could create some pretty significant legal jeopardy for regulated entities. The Bill needs to go a bit further. It could and should do more to provide some legal certainty, because the cost to companies could be quite significant. To the point on consistency across regulators and things like that, we need more frameworks around how that is going to work. Leaving all the detail to secondary legislation is what makes it slightly difficult to examine what is on the face of the Bill, so making sure that everything is consulted on in a mandatory and meaningful way will be important.

• 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you, Jen and David, for coming to give evidence to us morning. Two questions. First, one to you, Jen. Lots of UK corporations have been the subject of recent major cyber-attacks, such as Jaguar Land Rover and M&S. Under the Bill as drafted, these remain outside the scope of the regulation. In your view, what is the best way to mitigate the risk to the economy, jobs and supply chains of further cyber-attacks of that scale to these important out-of-scope businesses? Secondly, and linked to that: Mr Cook, what lessons have you learnt from assisting clients with the implementation of NIS2—the second network and information systems directive—on the need for certainty in legislation? What do you think will be the most challenging areas of business to implement this Bill? Jen Ellis: There is a thing that you always hear people say in the cyber-security industry which is, “There are no silver bullets”. There is no quick fix or one easy thing, and that definitely applies when looking at policy as well. I cannot give you a nice, easy, pat answer to how we solve the problem of attacks like the ones we saw last year. What I can say is that, looking at the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill specifically, I think it could include companies above a certain size or impact to the UK economy. The Bill currently goes sector by sector— which makes lots of sense, to focus on essential services—but I think we could say there is another bucket where organisations beyond a certain level of impact on the economy would also be covered. That could be something like the FTSE350. Including those might be one way to go about it, but it is worth noting that it would not simply solve the problem because the problem is complex and multi-faceted, and this is just one piece of legislation. David Cook: With respect to NIS2, that is an example of a whole suite of laws that have come in across the European Union—the Digital Decade law; I think there is something like 10 or 15 of these new laws. They do all sorts of different things, and NIS2 sits within that. NIS2 is the reform of the NIS directive, which is the current state of play in UK law. NIS2 gives certainty and definition, by way of the legislation itself and then the implementing legislation, which means that organisations have had a run-up at the issue and a wholesale governance programme, which takes a number of years, but they know where they are headed, because it is a fixed point in the distance, on the horizon. The Bill we are talking about today has the same framework as a base. The plan then is that secondary legislation can be used in a much more agile way to introduce changes quickly, in the light of the moving parts within the geopolitical ecosystem outside the walls. For global organisations with governance that spans jurisdictions, a lack of certainty is unhelpful. Understanding where they need to get to often requires a multi-year programme of reform. I can see the benefits of having an agile, flexible system, but organisations—especially global ones, which are the sort within the scope of this Bill—need time to prepare, recruit people, get the skillset in place, and understand where they need to get to. That fixed future point needs to be defined.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Medical Training (Prioritisation) Bill · Hansard source

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  As always, Mrs Cummins, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I rise to speak to new clause 2, which stands in my name and is supported by many other Conservative Members. I declare again that I am now a non-practising doctor and my wife is a doctor. I believe that ambition should be encouraged, and success should be dependent on the talent and hard work of the individual. However, in a vocation where we really want to encourage and support the brightest and the best, the signal being beamed out by the NHS and its various arms and quangos is unfortunately quite different. We have already seen this over the years in how the NHS treats competence and excellence among doctors—someone could be the best doctor in the world and be treated exactly the same as someone who is just about competent. No other operation would approach employment, and celebrating and supporting success, in that way. I do not think, though, that I have ever seen as egregious and extreme an example of completely ignoring talent and merit as the preference informed allocation system. The shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), has laid out some of the details behind that system, but I encourage Members across the Committee to read about how preference informed allocation works—about the soulless, computerised, algorithmic method by which it allocates human beings a random number. That random number is then the sum total of those people’s dreams, hopes and ambitions when it comes to placements as they take their first steps into their medical career. To me, PIA looks better suited to the dystopian sci-fi programmes that I enjoy watching—better suited to “Logan’s Run” or “The Prisoner”, in which people are allocated numbers. It is not the way that we should be treating people in this country, and it is outrageous that such a system has been brought into force. We in this House should stand up for merit, and I really hope the Minister will affirm from the Dispatch Box today that the Government will dismantle this awful scheme.

• 27 Jan 2026 · Medical Training (Prioritisation) Bill · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 27 Jan 2026 · Medical Training (Prioritisation) Bill · Hansard source

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  I will start with what is now a traditional declaration: I am a non-practising doctor and my wife is a doctor. I thank the Secretary of State for his comments, and for thinking through the content and merits of my new clause 2, on allocation based on merit. I hope that, as the Bill proceeds through this place and the other place, he continues to focus on that, because it is a very important point. For my Second Reading speech, I am not going to focus on the details of new clause 2—I will hold that back for Committee. Instead, I want to make some general comments. In a sense, the Bill treats the symptoms of what has been happening in the medical workforce. I do not think it is a cure for the fundamental disease or the problems we have had over the years, which are in part down to a creeping de-professionalisation of the medical profession. I also think they are down to the way we have approached doctors’ appointments to placements, and how we assess their skills and CVs, and how that then leads to different appointments and places. Doctors are thrown from pillar to post, subject to the whims of a computer or a training programme. It has been shown time and again that one of the most important things in people’s eyes, or at least what gives most work satisfaction, is autonomy. Unfortunately, we have sleepwalked into a situation, in pursuit of a weird type of fairness in the allocation of jobs, that works towards equality of outcome as opposed to equality of opportunity. Doctors have found themselves unable to compete or have control over their lives. Where they are allocated to their foundation school or their specialty training has a real, material impact. Crucially, within allocations, the geographical regions are huge. That means uprooting: moving your family and your social network. In the training scheme there really is no power that a doctor can exert in terms of choice or preference. My understanding—I am a creature of the Nursing and Midwifery Council and the Medical Training Application Service, when I was coming through and applying for posts—is that we just used to let doctors competitively apply for different posts and put together a sort of portfolio CV. That has all changed. There is now the allocation to training programme schemes and national contracts, which is something I have been campaigning about for quite some time. Do not get me wrong: I think the way the BMA has behaved is absolutely appalling. I categorically and unreservedly condemn the approach that it has taken, and not just under this Government but under previous Governments over various disputes concerning junior doctors. But the fact that doctors have found themselves in a situation where they need to have a militant trade union is a consequence of the training schemes, programmes and national contracts not treating doctors as professionals when it comes to applying for jobs. It also means that the training providers, the trusts and the integrated care systems, cannot provide options that doctors might want to compete for. They cannot say, “Well, we’re a really good research unit, so we’re going to have an offering that pursues a certain type of doctor who wants to go down the academic pathway.” We do not have trusts or regions that can say, “Actually, this is an area where there is quite a lot of social and economic deprivation, so we want doctors who are interested in certain specialties.” For all sorts of different reasons, there are parts of the country that are oversubscribed and parts that are undersubscribed. We cannot use what we use in every other walk of life, which is changing remuneration to encourage people to go to other places. We cannot say, “You know what? Let’s look at flexible working arrangements.” As part of my medical school rotations, I was in Barnstaple. I can only imagine that if the trust for Barnstaple had recruitment challenges—I do not know if it does or does not—then it could look at whether people are into surfing or ensuring they could get involved in other activities outside of medicine. Dare I say, as a former doctor, that medicine is important but there are more important things than people’s careers, in particular their work-life balance. We have a system that does not enable that to happen. The behaviour of the BMA is, in a sense, a consequence of dismantling the normal human experience in the approach to the selection and allocation of jobs. That has real consequences locally. Ashford and St Peter’s, my local trust, struggles to recruit because of the proximity to London, which has London weighting. Since we are on the border of London, to look at it purely financially—if that is the main priority—it makes more sense to pop into London and work than it does being employed in my area. Runnymede and Weybridge, by the way, has house prices and a cost of living that are equal to a big chunk of London, but there is no approach to regionalisation. I am really glad that the Secretary of State is in his place to hear my contribution. I will say to him something that I have said to many previous Secretaries of State. When he is in those difficult negotiations with the BMA and hears from doctors about the workforce experience challenges that they have, would it not be better if we trusted doctors—and, for that matter, anyone who is subject to a national contract—to make decisions for their own lives, and that we devolve decision around pay and terms and conditions to some form of regional unit? For medicine, the obvious solution would be the integrated care systems, but there could be different solutions and ways of approaching it. I think ICS devolution would make the most sense, but there are other opportunities to do it. That way, it moves from the Government essentially getting stuck in the middle of doctors, who are making difficult decisions about their careers and having to balance and judge different T&Cs of work, and the employers, which are different NHS trusts, being unable to use the normal mechanism that any other employer would use to recruit and incentivise people. If we do not do that, unfortunately the consequence is a Bill like the one we are debating: ever-increasing state intervention to try, in the absence of a market system, to impose a command economy. The Secretary will have seen the issues dealing with local doctor prices. The fact that we have struggled with high locum payments for so long is because we do not allow the doctor employment market to resolve itself for adjustments in contracts. The system would save a huge amount of money overall if, rather than having a huge amount of money going to locums and a national contract system for doctors, we let the market sort it out. I will support the Bill, but I see it more as palliation than the definitive treatment that we need to solve the workforce problems for the NHS going forward.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Local Government Reorganisation · Hansard source

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  I support unitarisation and the efficiency savings it brings, but may I caution the Secretary of State a little on his language? A lot of the waste he is talking about is people’s jobs. Many hard-working council workers, who have huge uncertainty about what will happen to them over the next couple of years, will be concerned to hear that sort of language used as we discuss this in the Chamber. What support is he giving local authorities to help those council workers find new jobs once the LGR process is complete?

• 22 Jan 2026 · Local Government Finances: Surrey · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for raising housing targets and planning in local authorities. The majority of my constituency is covered by Runnymede local authority and, I think, roughly a third by Elmbridge local authority. In the Runnymede authority, there is a local plan, so there is no risk of the opportunistic development that he mentions. In the Elmbridge local authority, there is no local plan, so there is opportunistic development. Applications are under way that are causing huge concern to local residents in the Cobham, Downside, Stoke D’Abernon and Oxshott area in particular. In fact, at the end of last year, I wrote to the Secretary of State along with councillors from Elmbridge to raise our concerns about the fact that, because of local government reorganisation, again Surrey has found itself stuck in stasis. There is a local plan in Elmbridge. Can that be put together by the time we hit the election of the shadow authorities? When you think about it, the term itself is an awful one—try knocking on doors and asking for support for the shadow authorities! What is Elmbridge to do? Do people living in the Elmbridge part of my constituency effectively have to wait a year and a half, until we have the full authority going when the shadow authority transfers over, before we can have some sensible progress when it comes to getting plans in place to protect people from opportunistic development? That is before we even talk about the scale of the housing targets, whose spread is disproportionate in Elmbridge; and I will ask the Minister later about the absence of a commitment for a Surrey mayor, who would in part be responsible for planning decisions. I hope Members can see that it is all a bit of a mess, and my constituents and local businesses are stuck in the middle. No topic is more sensitive or concerning than where we find ourselves with special educational needs provision. We all know what happens when that is not fully funded. I welcome the work that the county council and Councillor Jonathan Hulley have been doing to improve transparency and engagement locally, really turning up the dial on what is happening for families and children with special educational needs, but ultimately we need national changes to services and support, and the funding to bring forward delivery. Without the local funding, the opportunities for children to reach their full potential are limited. It leads to failure demand, which is when services do not provide what is needed early on, thereby creating more demand in the system later, and that harms and limits children. That is notwithstanding all the pressures on families and siblings and on schools, which are going above and beyond to try to support those children. The Government know these risks—I know the Minister knows and appreciates them. I hope the Government also know that it is a false economy to cut costs right now. The resulting economic and social impact of not funding these essential services will be calamitous locally. Of course, as night follows day, I fully expect Government Members and others to see this as an opportunity to blame the Conservative Government, and of course I acknowledge that local government has struggled as a result of difficult financial decisions over the years, but there really is no more capacity for cuts. That is why we need to address the issue now. I want to use this debate as a plea to move beyond any sort of blame game or political posturing and work together to address the real risks that we face and establish a sound financial basis for effective local authority finances. Given the clear risks, more than anything else we now need certainty. Residents and businesses need to know that they will not be shackled with high costs resulting from other local authorities’ poor financial management. Businesses and charities that have contracts and partnerships need certainty about their future. We all need to know that there will be adequate funding so that we all retain access to the essential services that local authorities provide. That cannot wait until after the May elections. Our voters need to know what authorities they are voting councillors into. They need clarity over the scope of the authorities’ powers. This debate is the Minister’s opportunity to answer the questions of 1.5 million Surrey residents. How will local authority debt be dealt with? Will central Government ensure effective funding, or do Ministers intend to rely on constant tax rises despite the cost of living pressures? These are council tax rises—taxes on working people, as she and the Government, I assume, would define them. Will we have a mayor in Surrey? If so, can we have the details? How can we prevent the long-term risks if the Government continue to prioritise short-term funding cuts? For once—just for once—will this Government put Surrey first?

• 22 Jan 2026 · Local Government Finances: Surrey · Hansard source

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  The amount of money that local government authorities have, such as Surrey county council and the new east Surrey and west Surrey unitary councils, has a huge day-to-day impact on residents. It determines the provision of services and the protection of our communities, and it is essential to the many businesses and voluntary organisations in the area through both policy and the many direct contacts held with local service providers. We heard again this week claims that the Government are boosting funding for councils, but the reality does not live up to the rhetoric. Surrey county council’s budget is being reduced by over £50 million for the next financial year. Surrey is negatively impacted more than any other area despite increased demand and escalating costs just to maintain existing service levels. The Government’s calculations simply do not provide enough money for statutory services such as adult social care provision—and we all know about the urgent action that is needed to improve the special educational needs system and support available for children, schools and families. Instead of investing in services, the Government are slashing central grant funding for Surrey. Despite that, Surrey county council has managed to put forward a balanced budget, thanks to hard work led by Councillor David Lewis, but the situation as it stands is unsustainable, and the risks are mounting. The Government need to act. In addition to the counterproductive funding decisions being made by the Government, we have the added complication of local government reform. Changing the structures of local authorities is a complicated matter. It requires changes in contracts, staffing, location and every other aspect of running a large and complicated organisation, yet we have no information on how the transition will be funded. It cannot possibly come from existing budgets if services are to be maintained, given the situation I have outlined. There is no clarity on what will happen to staff during the transition. Many jobs are at risk, and some have already sought new, more stable opportunities elsewhere. All face additional pressures as a result of reorganisation, and the risk is that important decisions will be delayed, leaving Surrey stuck in stasis. Beyond transition, we must look at the foundation of the new unitaries. We all know the concerns about local authority debt. Some councils, such as Runnymede borough council, which covers a big chunk of my constituency, were able to operate a commercial strategy with sound financial management, meaning that the risk of high debt was mitigated by clear controls and revenue provisions. However, they are the exception. Too many local authorities borrowed heavily without the knowledge or systems to manage the risk, and none did so more disastrously than Woking borough council. Given the size of the authority, the failures at Woking are unparalleled, both in terms of the scale of the debt and the failure of financial management and scrutiny, yet, despite announcements that the Government are proceeding with local government reform, there is still no clear plan about what to do with the Woking debt. In October last year, the Government announced debt relief totalling half a billion pounds for Woking borough council in 2026-27, but that still leaves more than £1.5 billion of debt, and under the Government’s plans, that may shortly become the liability of residents across west Surrey.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Local Government Finances: Surrey · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, although it sounds like it was more for the Minister than for me. He has given the Minister time to prepare for his inevitable question, which I hope she addresses in her speech.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Local Government Finances: Surrey · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He is exactly right: through local government reform, all areas could be affected by the debt and other commitments of neighbouring authorities. That brings me to the point I was about to make, which is that it really is not fair that my constituents in Runnymede could have to pay for the failed decisions of Woking politicians—both those in power and those who failed in their duty to scrutinise decisions—because those constituents never got to vote for them. The scale of the remaining debt, when combined with the debt of other local authorities, means that the new west Surrey unitary will be bankrupt from day one. New local authorities should be established on a sound and equal footing, so that the provision of services can be determined by local need. The Government need urgently to introduce a sound long-term financial plan for both unitaries in Surrey.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Local Government Finances: Surrey · Hansard source

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  I think the Minister said a moment ago that she would work with the west Surrey authority to resolve the issue. At what stage in the process does she anticipate a decision and resolution? The west Surrey authority will not be an operational statutory unit until spring next year. We have elections to the shadow authorities this year. As I understand it, those shadow authorities will not have any powers until vesting day, when they are transferred to the full-fat authority, so the current county council and the district and borough councils will still have statutory powers. Is the Minister saying that there will be no debt resolution until the west Surrey unitary authority is set up? Is she saying that there will be a resolution when the shadow authority is in place, or will we have a resolution before the elections this May? That is really important for our residents, who need to know what set-up the councillors they are voting for will have to deal with. Can she guarantee, or even say that it is her ambition, that she will get this resolved before we get to those elections?

• 22 Jan 2026 · Local Government Finances: Surrey · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend is a lot harder in his language on this issue and I very much respect him for that. At the very least, we need to have a well thought-out plan and strategy for what is going to happen with the block of debt. There is a variety of different options for how it can be managed and dealt with. Here is the fundamental problem that my constituents—service providers, charities and businesses—raise with me and are really worried about: that decisions made in a neighbouring local authority, which they have had no involvement in or dealings with, will have a material impact on them when the west Surrey unitary authority is set up. I realise that the scale of the debt is a huge and complicated problem. I do not envy the Minister in trying to find a way through. I am glad that we have this forum for debate this afternoon, but we need to have these debates and discussions so that the west Surrey unitary authority—and, frankly, others that are being set up that face similar problems—can be dealt with fairly and so we know what is coming down the tracks. My residents are not going to be punished for decisions made in other authorities that they never had the chance to vote for. That is fundamentally unfair. By the way, in some ways this is not something that we are unused to in my part of Surrey. We sit on the penumbra—just on the outskirts—outside London, and there are plenty of policies that come from this awful Mayor of London that affect us in a whole range of negative ways and which we do not have the ability to vote for. Unfortunately, this situation is far and away the most substantial we have faced, and there is so much fear, concern and uncertainty about what may be coming down the track. Of course there is a huge irony in all this, because Surrey is one of the largest contributors to the Exchequer in our country. Cutting local authority funding, and impacting services and the many contracts that local authorities maintain, risks serious harm, not only locally in Surrey but to the national economy. Let us consider some examples. If the Government do not effectively fund local highways, that will lead to deteriorating road conditions, resulting in more temporary emergency repair works. We all know the nightmare that that causes, with delays, costs of millions in lost work hours and missed appointments, and longer transit times for goods. That damages the Surrey economy and, by virtue, the national economy. If the Government do not effectively fund adult social care, that will cause bed blocking in hospitals and pressure on health services, impeding effective recovery and care. If the Government do not effectively fund planning services, that leads to lengthy delays in assessing applications for homes and businesses and, crucially, risks enabling rogue development, which blights Surrey and other areas. Although planning enforcement remains a discretionary service, there is a real risk that it is increasingly seen as a “nice to have” and not an essential tool to protect communities. Evidence shows that enforcement rates continue to fall in the face of funding pressures. Inappropriate and illegal development—people essentially cocking a snoot at the planning system, and building anyway—is a serious problem in my constituency and in places across the country, and my residents are rightly incensed. Critical to stopping this activity and turning the situation around are not only stronger enforcement powers—for which I have been campaigning for years—but, at the very least, the resources to do proper planning enforcement.

• 22 Jan 2026 · Agricultural Sector: Import Standards · Hansard source

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  I have the Animal and Plant Health Agency in my constituency—it is confusingly named the Weybridge centre, but it is actually in New Haw—I thank the shadow Minister for his advocacy on this issue, and the Government for putting in the funding for the redevelopment.

• 19 Jan 2026 · Arctic Security · Hansard source

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  All relationships, particularly special relationships, must have a foundation of respect and mutual consent. What is the view in NATO on economic measures being used to force the annexation of a sovereign NATO territory?

• 7 Jan 2026 · Ukraine and Wider Operational Update · Hansard source

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  The Secretary of State has explained that he does not want to be drawn on the questions from the shadow Secretary of State for Defence and others on troop numbers or the exact nature of the force that is being conceptualised and put together, but it is more than reasonable for Members of this House to want to ensure that the correct amounts of financial resources are being put in, so has the decision made yesterday changed his assumptions and plans regarding investment, procurement and spending over the next year?

• 6 Jan 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill · Hansard source

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  The cyber Bill should be one of the most fundamentally important pieces of legislation the House will consider in this Parliament, because the UK’s cyber-resilience is a cornerstone of the foremost duty of Government: the protection of the people. The shadow Secretary of State has already made clear that His Majesty’s official Opposition appreciate the urgent need to act to protect our society, our economy and our security in the face of growing and evolving cyber-security risks. The cyber Bill, however, is a Bill of missed opportunities. It would not have stopped the JLR or Marks & Spencer cyber-attacks. It is silent on the threats from hostile state actors, and it does not answer the fundamental question of: if NIS1 was not enforced, what difference will further regulations make? Cyber-security is key to our national security. It is too important an issue to play partisan politics with. As a responsible Opposition, we will work with the Government to get the approach to this legislation correct. Many Members have made insightful contributions today. My right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden), who has great experience in this regard, raised the issue of hostile state actors and gave the Ministers some practical advice on which I hope they will reflect. My hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East (David Reed) spoke about his professional experience and about the need for proportionate regulations and modification of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which was mentioned by several other Members. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove (Bradley Thomas) made an important point about physical technology and the risk of threats from cellular modules. My hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton (Alison Griffiths) also spoke about her own experience and, in particular, about the importance of the Government’s ensuring that the Bill has an impact. The hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) mentioned digital sovereignty, another important issue which we have discussed on many occasions in this place. We also heard from the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), the Chair of the Select Committee; from the hon. Members for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah) and for South East Cornwall (Anna Gelderd); from the right hon. Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds); and from the hon. Members for Congleton (Sarah Russell), for Northampton South (Mike Reader), for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin), for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington), and for Mid Cheshire (Andrew Cooper). The gravest and the most pernicious risks to UK cyber-security go completely unaddressed by this Bill. Cyber is the emerging battlefield of state security, with hostile state actors ramping up their efforts to disrupt our society, our economy and our democracy apace. Time and again in this Parliament, the Government have baulked at acknowledging the elephant—or, in this case, the dragon—in the room when it comes to matters of national security. Last year the director of GCHQ, the UK’s intelligence and cyber-security agency, confirmed that it devotes more resource to China than any other single mission. The evidence is clear: the Chinese Communist party is one of the greatest national security threats that our country faces. In November last year, Mr Speaker took the exceptional step of circulating a briefing from MI5 warning of the widespread efforts of individuals and organisations working on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security to target Parliament for intelligence gathering. In the intervening weeks we have learned that Home Office systems were accessed, apparently by a Chinese state-affiliate group. Reports have circulated that the attack is linked to the Chinese gang Storm 1849, previously connected with cyber-attacks on MPs and the Electoral Commission. Furthermore, in December 2025 the Government confirmed that they had sanctioned two Chinese companies for perpetrating what they described as indiscriminate cyber-attacks on the UK public and private sector IT systems. These are not isolated incidents. They are evidence of a concerted and intensifying campaign on the part of the Chinese Communist party and its affiliates to undermine vital public services and UK businesses. How our country, and how our democratic allies and partners, face the threat of hostile state actors, working in concert, is an epoch-defining challenge. It is a challenge that we must meet, or we will live to regret it. It is no coincidence that several recent cyber-incidents have targeted organs of Government, with malicious actors rightly perceiving that many of our Departments are the weakest links in the cyber-security ecosystem. The National Audit Office’s 2025 report on Government cyber-resilience laid bare the inconsistent, and in some cases glacial, progress of the Government in making effective improvements in cyber-resilience. Last month’s attack on Home Office IT systems is a stark reminder of the urgency of improving Government cyber-security. His Majesty’s official Opposition have received a clear message from cyber-industry stakeholders: the Government should be leading from the front and setting the standard for effective cyber-resilience. I am pleased that the Government managed, at the last moment, to push out the cyber action plan today. It acknowledges the challenge, but how it will ensure that change is delivered is unclear. Attacks on household names such as Jaguar Land Rover, Marks & Spencer and the Co-op have raised public awareness of the risks we face, with consumer supply chains interrupted and jobs put in peril. However, the Bill would not have prevented those attacks had it been in force when they took place. Given the constraints on public finances as a result of the Chancellor’s reckless Budget decisions, the Government need to ask themselves how many cyber-attacks of the magnitude of that on JLR we can afford to bankroll. The Government must undertake an urgent review to identify companies whose failure as the result of a cyber-attack would present a comparable risk to the UK economy to that on JLR. Failing to address all the urgent problems will leave an open goal for malicious cyber-actors to undermine the UK’s security and prosperity. The House is unlikely to revisit cyber-security legislation for some time. The threat to our economy and national security from malicious cyber-actors is one of the most serious we face as a country. In the parliamentary debate after MI5’s China espionage briefing, the Minister for Security pledged to strengthen the legislative tools available to disrupt the threat. Why not use the opportunity presented by the Bill to address that head-on? We stand ready to work with the Government to stand up for and protect our country, and to prevent the Bill from becoming yet another missed opportunity.

• 5 Jan 2026 · Venezuela · Hansard source

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  As the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Nordic countries, I am very grateful for the comments of the Foreign Secretary and the Leader of the Opposition on Denmark and Greenland. I am also grateful that the Foreign Secretary confirmed just a few moments ago that she and the Prime Minister have been raising directly the issue of respect for the sovereignty of that key NATO ally. Why, then, did it take so long for the Prime Minister to publicly espouse his support, which was so delayed after Sweden, Finland and other countries did so?