Ben Spencer MP: speeches

Speeches

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Okay.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  New clause 2 contains an obligation for the Secretary of State to establish and maintain by regulation a list of foreign powers presenting a significant cyber-security risk to the UK. The list must include states that have been confirmed by GCHQ as having perpetrated a cyber-attack, whether by a state department, agency or affiliate, on the UK in the preceding seven years. It must also include foreign powers that GCHQ has warned pose a risk to the security or resilience of the network or information systems of one or more operators of an essential service or critical suppliers. New clause 3 would compel the Secretary of State to review and report to Parliament on the risk to networks and information systems posed by foreign powers appearing on the register under new clause 2, with specific regard to activities undertaken from abroad and the risk posed by locations or premises controlled by those states in the United Kingdom. New clauses 13 and 15, in the name of the hon. Member for Henley and Thame, look as if they have been tabled in the same spirit of genuine concern about the risk of foreign hostile state interference and control in critical systems and supply chains. There is an established precedent in UK legislation for maintaining registers or lists of hostile state actors and other entities presenting a threat to our national security for use by Government. That includes the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act 2023, which came into effect last year. Russia and Iran were placed on an enhanced tier of the scheme, which applies to foreign powers considered to pose a risk to the UK’s safety or interests. The Government said that that was in response to those countries being identified as presenting an elevated national security risk. China was conspicuous by its absence, despite the director of GCHQ having confirmed in 2024 that her organisation devotes more resource to China than to any other single mission.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clauses 48 to 52 deal with notifications and financial penalties where a regulated entity is deemed not to be compliant with directions issued by the Secretary of State under part 4. In particular, clause 48 would grant enforcement authorities powers to issue a contravention notice if they believe a person has failed to comply with a requirement under part 4. The notice must set out details of remedial steps to address the failure, as well as the financial penalty that the enforcement authority intends to impose. Clause 49 would require penalties to be set at a level that is appropriate and proportionate, with the maximum penalty being £17 million or 10% of turnover. A maximum daily penalty of £100,000 applies to ongoing breaches. The maximum fines for failing to comply with an information notice or an inspection would be set at £10 million.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Okay.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 45 gives the Secretary of State powers to require regulatory authorities to monitor and report on regulated entities’ compliance with directions given under clause 43 for reasons of national security. Clause 46 provides the Secretary of State with extensive information-gathering powers through the use of information notices to facilitate the giving of directions and monitoring of compliance with directions under clause 45(4). Clause 47 empowers the Secretary of State to conduct inspections to assess whether a regulated entity is complying with directions issued under clause 45(4). The Secretary of State may appoint a third party to conduct the inspection, and require the regulated entity to meet the costs associated with this. I reiterate the point that these powers are necessary; however, given the potential for significant cost and administrative burden for businesses, they should be subject to contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous oversight by parliamentary authorities, observing the necessary confidentiality protocols. I also make the point that these information-gathering powers apply extraterritorially and may lead to conflict with regulated entities’ data privacy obligations in other jurisdictions. What discussions has the Secretary of State conducted with industry and law enforcement counterparts in other countries about the approach to information sharing for this purpose, and the implications for companies operating services on a cross-border basis?

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I have two questions for the Minister. Given the impact on devolved legislation, can he confirm that the consultation will extend to devolved authorities should it impact on them? My second question is more generally on the theme of devolved authorities. Can he confirm that, as part of the publicised “reset” negotiations with the European Union, bringing Northern Ireland into scope of NIS2 regulations is totally off the table?

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I think the Minister is saying that there will be a parliamentary scrutiny mechanism under these powers. Is that what he is saying?

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I do not want to repeat the discussion that we had a moment ago. I think it is complete lunacy to permit the building of a super-embassy—one of the biggest in the region—next to highly critical data transmission. I am also concerned by media reports that the Prime Minister’s recent visit to China was greenlighted only following the final approval of the embassy. I am deeply depressed that, following the visit, Jimmy Lai has been effectively sentenced for life. I respect the tone and constructive way in which the hon. Member for Harlow approaches this debate, but it is fair to say that the Government are sadly weak on standing up to hostile state actors such as the Chinese Communist party. As I said at the start, there is simply no point in granting the Secretary of State powers to issue directions on the basis of national security if the Government are not willing to be clear-eyed about the most critical cyber-security risks to the nation. I therefore submit that the new clauses are a vital addition to the Bill to focus the attentions of the Secretary of State to ensure that her functions under part 4 are carried out in the best interests of our national security. No responsible Government would or should vote against such provisions. Parliament should make it crystal clear that the Chinese Communist party is a threat to the United Kingdom. We must support new clauses 2 and 3. Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned. — (Taiwo Owatemi.)

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 40 requires the Secretary of State to publish a report every five years on the operation of the NIS regulations and parts 3 and 4 of the Bill. Reports should include a review of any exercise of powers under parts 3 and 4 by the Secretary of State. Given the wide-ranging powers granted to the Secretary of State under those parts, I have some sympathy for amendment 26, tabled by the hon. Member for Henley and Thame, which seeks to reduce reporting intervals from five years to three. The shadow Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch and Upminster (Julia Lopez), raised this issue on Second Reading. She suggested that annual or biannual reviews might allow for effective parliamentary scrutiny of the NIS regulations and of the Secretary of State’s exercise of powers to respond to emerging threats. In view of the concerns voiced by the hon. Members for Henley and Thame and for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe, and by the shadow ministerial team, will the Minister explain why five-year intervals have been selected and whether the Government will look at this important issue again?

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I really think we should be very critical about this. What we are doing now is parliamentary scrutiny. There will be directions in future, which we expect to be laid, and they will also be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Even where they are redacted because of national security concerns, somebody, or some mechanism of Parliament, will be able to scrutinise them. Can the Minister confirm that?

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  For the sake of clarity on the legal status of the codes, I entirely agree with the Minister that it is important to get this right, and my understanding of codes of practice in a different area—statutory codes of practice relating to the Mental Health Act—is that case law says that deviation from the code of practice should be done only for cogent reasons. That is a pretty high bar to pass in terms of deviations. I should declare an interest as a former consultant psychiatrist and someone who operated subject to that particular code of practice. For absolute certainty, will the Minister write to the Committee and make the status very clear, along with reference to relevant case law in terms of other codes of practice? Does the clause override that jurisprudence or not? That would settle the question as the Bill goes through Parliament.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I really do not understand the Minister’s answer. If it has not been published on national security grounds, how will we know that it has been laid? The whole thing could be entirely secret. Surely it has to go to the ISC as an accountability mechanism.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The Minister is being generous with his time during this important debate. I was just thinking through his earlier response to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton about using the cost reclaims to employ cyber-security professionals. That goes to the heart of the concerns about the Bill and its approach to regulation. We have heard that the industry, including regulators, is struggling to recruit cyber-security professionals. What gives the Minister confidence that, just because some money will be sloshing around in the regulators, there will be the ability to recruit cyber-security professionals, who are going to be essential to the implementation of the Bill?

• 9 Feb 2026 · Leagrave Station: Step-free Access · Hansard source

  More

  The Minister knows this is coming. He has just mentioned the Railways Bill, so would he care to comment on my new clause 69, which would require the setting out of an accessible rail strategy, not only on step-free access but on lift downtime? I feel a bit guilty in a sense, because we have lifts in Weybridge in my constituency, but one of the biggest problems is that they are not functional a lot of the time, so people who are travelling play a sort of Russian roulette as to whether the lifts are going to be available, with all the disruption that follows. Could the Minister please comment on the strategy that I am proposing?

• 9 Feb 2026 · Leagrave Station: Step-free Access · Hansard source

  More

  I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving way in this very important debate. This issue affects constituencies across the country, including mine—we have problems at Weybridge station. May I draw to her attention my new clause 69 to the Railways Bill, which sets out a requirement for an accessibility strategy that the Government have to report on? I have intervened on her now, but I hope to intervene on the Minister later for his comment on that.

• 9 Feb 2026 · Leagrave Station: Step-free Access · Hansard source

  More

  Specifically on third-party funding, does the Minister agree that when it comes to infrastructure projects such as airport expansion, noting Heathrow’s proximity to my constituency, airports really should be a key target in terms of further funding, in order to improve accessibility on our railways?

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. Legal clarity is important. I have absolutely no issue with lawyers, but we do not want to make a load of money for lawyers as a consequence of the definitional challenges around the Bill’s implementation. That is not good for businesses, which need certainty as to how to apply the regulatory framework under which they operate. Regulatory uncertainty will not help a business to make decisions. My assumption is that the default position will be for businesses to assume that they are not regulated entities, which means that they will not take actions that we would like them to take as a result of the Bill. Again, we will be making laws under which everybody loses out. My final point is about the carve-out in respect of public authority oversight. It is all well and good for the Government to say, “We have an action plan and we’re going to sort out Government IT and the cyber-security risk for Government services,” but it is not playing out that way. Our biggest risks, and the most vulnerable components of our digital IT infrastructure, are those that are linked to Government services. Change is needed. My sense is that when a company interacts and shares data with Government and public sector services, the biggest-cyber security risk is likely to be in the aspects that are provided by Government services. We are making legislation that puts a host of burdens on the private sector, yet we are largely silent about what is happening in the public sector. Putting people at risk in that way is really not good enough. We need to support our overall cyber-security.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Irrespective of their size, whatever definition or metric we use, businesses operate on fine margins for the majority of the time. Regulatory burdens not only impact their ability to operate; they are yet another cost, which means that the cost of services increases. That has a deleterious effect on our economy more generally. Burdens on businesses are passed on to consumers. That makes it more expensive to do business unless there are customers to receive it. Global business competitiveness, which we have not spoken about yet, is critical. I am very concerned about UK competitiveness in the digital and tech sector. It saddens me to say that we are dwarfed by US big tech in many areas. I want our digital and IT sector to be bigger and better than that of our competitors, but we need a framework to support it. Even for bigger businesses, the regulatory burden is critical, especially as they can choose, to a certain extent, where they incorporate and focus on doing business. We want to ensure that the UK has the best regulations, but the best regulations are often the ones that are least burdensome but that still provide certainty to allow businesses to operate. This is a highly competitive market.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  This clause is one of the provisions that has given rise to widespread industry concern regarding its scope and implications. Business supply chains, particularly for large operators of essential services and multinational companies, are becoming ever more complex. The increased digitisation of service provision across the board means that the delivery of essential services can be vulnerable to severe disruption when the systems of critical supply chain entities are interrupted by cyber-attacks. The Government have pointed to the 2024 cyber-attack on Synnovis, a pathology lab provider serving several London hospitals, as an example of the severe consequences that can flow from a cyber-attack on a key supply chain provider. In that case, the suspension of Synnovis services caused disruption to more than 11,000 appointments and operations. The attack caused at least two cases of serious harm to patients and, tragically, one patient’s death was attributed to the long wait for blood test results. Estimated financial losses from the attack exceeded £30 million. The previous Government were conscious of intensifying supply chain risk, and consulted on measures to enable regulators to designate individual suppliers as critical if they provided an IT service on which an OES or RDSP was dependent for the provision of its essential service. The response to that consultation showed overwhelming support for the proposal, but stakeholders argued that the designation process would need to be transparent and based on engagement with industry. It is those vital elements of transparency and engagement, or rather the current lack of them, that are causing high levels of concern among supply chain entities that stand to be brought within scope of regulation when these provisions come into effect. To break that down, preserving agility for the Secretary of State and regulators to respond to emerging risks has been recognised as both a strength and a weakness of the Bill. However, lack of certainty is a particular concern in a context of critical supplier designation, especially as this part of the Bill has the potential to bring in large numbers of small and even microbusinesses within the scope of regulation, potentially by multiple regulators. That is a daunting prospect for smaller companies, even taking into account the caveated duty on competent authorities to co-ordinate in the approach to regulation of critical suppliers in the proposed new paragraph 14L of the NIS regulations. Several witnesses in oral evidence, including techUK and ISC2, made strong arguments that SMEs often lack the financial and human resources to develop cyber-security expertise and comply with regulation. Those organisations will need additional time to prepare, and a better indication of the criteria that might be used by regulators to determine which supply chain providers are critical. Industry bodies have called on the Government to ensure meaningful consultation on secondary legislation and guidance, to ensure that the measures are fit for purpose and capable of practical implementation. As part of the planned consultation, will the Minister commit to considering whether there are alternative approaches to regulation for increasing cyber-resilience in companies below a certain size?

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  My hon. Friend has figured out what I am going to say in a moment, when it comes to the scoping of the regulator and that communication process. Such is the depth of the rabbit hole that the provision creates that, even though my hon. Friend’s intervention did not go where I thought she was going, another problem has just come to mind. What happens in the circumstance where a critical supplier that acts as a proxy for multiple critical suppliers? How does designation operate in that fashion? There are suppliers that essentially operate as a marketplace to a certain provision of services. Is it the marketplace that is regulated, or is it each supplier within the marketplace? A locum agency could hypothetically be an umbrella company for multiple different smaller locum agencies, each of which would share the corporate risk as part of that. Going back to my first point, the idea that access to the IT network or system will somehow be discriminatory, or dichotomise between people who are in scope of this measure and people who are not, seems to me complete nonsense. It is difficult to see what organisations, if they provide a service to a modern OES, will be in scope of it. Secondly, there is systemic or significant disruption. I often say that, if someone wanted to cripple a hospital, the best way to do that would be to stop the cleaners cleaning rooms, and to stop the porters pushing people around the hospital to get them to their appointments and moving beds. There is often a focus on doctors and on the rest of the core medical and nursing staff— I myself often focus perhaps a bit too much on doctors—but it really is a whole-team effort. In fact, the most critical people are often the people who might not be the subject of the most focus, such as the cleaners and porters. If the cleaners stop work or do not turn up to work, the hospital grinds to a halt. If taxis are not taking people to and from hospital out of hours, or if the patient transport is not taking people to hospital, out-patient departments grind to a halt. If the locum companies that fill gaps in staff rotas are not available to do that, and there are substantial rota gaps that make the provision of services unsafe, the hospital also grinds to a halt. If it is not possible to get access to critical medicines, if staff cannot maintain the blood gas machine or the blood pressure machine, or if the boiler breaks down, the hospital grinds to a halt. It is not just something as obvious as the tragic situation with blood and pathology testing that causes a hospital to grind to a halt. Indeed, I cannot think of many private sector provisions that would not have a substantial impact on a hospital if they were to be removed; if any other Member can, I will be very happy to stand corrected. However, just skimming through them, I can see that the removal of most of them would cause the hospital to grind to a halt. The idea that the significant impact definition will be a discriminatory factor regarding suppliers just does not work. Someone might say: “Ben, you’re completely wrong. We found some providers.”, but, if that situation arises, how will the arbitration occur in terms of the threshold?

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  The cloud providers I have spoken to talk about several things. They talk about the crippling cost of energy in the UK, something that we need to drive down—

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  Clause 13 requires in-scope data centre operators to provide certain information to their designated competent authorities, which—subject to Government amendment 11, which we passed earlier—will now be solely Ofcom, and to keep that information up to date. The information includes the data centre operator’s address and the names of directors. It must be provided within three months of the data centre operator’s designation. For data centres that meet the threshold criteria, that would be three months after clause 4 comes into force. Other OESs are not subject to an equivalent requirement to provide information to their sector regulator. That reflects the fact that the Government currently have limited information about the data centre sector. RDSPs are already required, under regulation 14 of the NIS regulations 2018, to provide their contact details to the information commission, as their sector regulator. Clause 14(2) amends regulation 14 to require RDSPs to provide more information, including about their directors and the digital services they provide. It would also require the information commission to share a copy of its register of RDSPs with GCHQ. Clause 14(9) requires RMSPs to register with the information commission and to submit the same contact details as RDSPs. RMSPs must nominate a UK representative if they are based outside the UK. The information commission will be required to maintain a register of RMSPs and to share it with GCHQ. Clauses 13 and 14 give Ofcom and the information commission access to more detailed information about regulated entities and facilitate regulatory oversight of the data centre RDSP and RMSP industries in the UK. Question put and agreed to. Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 15 Reporting of Incidents by Regulated Persons

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Member so much for that intervention about the time it would take to find an alternative supplier, because it will bring me on nicely to my point about alternative suppliers. However, before I move on to that point, the hon. Gentleman made a very good point in his intervention, which I will address. To be subject to these provisions will create a regulatory burden, and therefore a cost burden, for an organisation that is designated to be a national critical supplier. If I was a supplier of services, I would want to have the best provision possible. I would want to be cyber-secure; I would want to have a gold-standard service. However, I might also be nervous of being designated as a critical supplier because of the regulatory burden that would impose on me, which would make me potentially less competitive in getting contracts because of the costs that would ensue. There would need to be an arbitration system where a company that is under threat of being designated a critical supplier could have a discussion or debate about whether that designation was relevant or not. I will now move on to the point that the hon. Gentleman made about alternative services. I really have no idea at all how we can expect a regulator to delve into the complexities and the minutiae of what is available in a local economy to provide these services that the OES is receiving. Do we expect the relevant regulator to check what taxi services are available—actually available, rather than some sort of fantasy availability where they are available on paper, but not in reality—in the local ecosystem that could supply to that hospital, which is the operator of essential services? What is the scope of research that the regulator would have to do? What considerations would they need to take regarding how much the taxis cost and how effective they are? What about the procurement decisions and processes that have already been gone through? Most public sector organisations have complex procurement rules when setting up their contracts—and that is before we even begin to consider health and safety concerns that are subject to regulatory provisions. For example, if the regulator decided that taxi services are under threat of becoming a critical supplier, then does the taxi service have the ability to deal with someone who has a cardiac arrest, needs oxygen or has a behavioural disturbance? Can it manage people with physical or mental disabilities? What is the scope of that particular service provision? The experts will be the people who commissioned it in the first place; yet on the face of the Bill there is no objective requirement for the regulator to speak to the OES in the first place about how this provision and service was procured. In terms of the service being available—as per the point made by the hon. Member for Harlow about the time to shift through—how will that be evidenced and investigated? What resource is going into this? That is just for a taxi company. What about when we expand it—and this is just for the NHS—to cleaners, porters, locum agencies or medicines provision? Is the provision of services geographically circumscribed or will this be across the country? I am sure that one can find alternative services to provide taxis to St Thomas’ in Birkenhead, but that does not necessarily mean that it is available in a reasonable timeframe or sense, in terms of the designation of supplier.

• 5 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. Clause 9 brings within scope of the NIS regulations a new category of technology service providers, known as relevant managed service providers. MSPs play a critical role in the UK economy. Research conducted by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology under the last Government suggests that 11,000 MSPs were active in the UK in 2023, of which 1,500 to 1,700 were medium or large organisations that would be in scope of the Bill. Micro and small enterprises that offer managed services are excluded from the scope of regulation but have the potential to be designated as critical suppliers under other provisions, which we will come to shortly. MSPs are critical to the functioning of the multiple businesses that they serve, offering contracted IT services such as helpdesk and technical support, server and network maintenance, and data back-up. In many cases, they also provide managed cyber-security solutions to their customer bases. Consequently, these businesses often have significant access to their clients’ IT networks, infrastructure and data, which makes them attractive and valuable targets.