Ben Spencer MP: speeches

Speeches

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister noted, the clause is a provision that was introduced in Committee in the other place, along with clause 28(3) and (4), and clause 45(6), which have now been removed from the Bill pursuant to our decisions in Committee. Clause 140 aims to ensure the accuracy of data underpinning digital forms of verifying identity, and more broadly. To a degree, it is ironic that we live in a world where we have to debate data dictionaries when it comes to the definition of sex, but I think the point about data dictionaries more generally, over and above the focus on sex data in this debate, is nevertheless sound. We are aware of the Government’s argument that the clauses inserted in the other place pertaining to data accuracy—in particular, clause 45(6)—are not compatible with certain provisions of the European convention on human rights and the Gender Recognition Act 2004. I am grateful to the Minister for writing to the Committee on that, among other matters, but I do not think that his explanation gives any rationale for the removal of clause 140. We strongly disagree with the Government’s position for the reasons I set out last week, but I will not rehash those arguments now. Rather, I want to make a simple argument in favour of retaining the clause on data dictionaries that the Government intend to remove. Clause 140 grants the Secretary of State the power to make regulations establishing the definitions and associated metadata for core personal data attributes. The Secretary of State may require that those definitions are used for, among other things, personal data recorded by public authorities, under subsection (1)(d), and the digital verification service, under subsection (1)(a). My noble friend Lord Lucas compellingly stated the case in support of his data dictionary amendment in the other place, saying that “if we are to live in a data-rich world, we really need a set of well-understood, good definitions for the basic information we are collecting.” —[ Official Report, House of Lords, 28 January 2025; Vol. 843, c. 237-238.] It really is that simple: giving the Secretary of State the power to define those core personal data attributes so that a consistent approach can be taken across the board by public authorities and entities engaged in digital verification services. My question for the Minister is, therefore: what is the objection to the Secretary of State having that power to clarify the meanings of those essential terms, which we need to define data attributes? A clear definition of data attributes, and in particular the meaning of sex, is a foundational building block that will help to ensure that the data we collect can be harnessed for good-quality research on which sound public policy decisions can be based. In the other place, the DSIT Minister, the noble Lord Vallance of Balham, acknowledged the need for data to be “based in truth” and “consistent and clear”. However, he opposed this clause on the basis that the Government would prefer to consider the matter of data accuracy and consistency holistically, outside the scope of the Bill. In that regard, he pointed to ongoing research in the field, including the Sullivan review of data, stats and research on sex and gender, which was commissioned by the previous Conservative Government, and the findings of which this Government would like to take into account in developing their policies in the area. I welcome the fact that the Government intend to take a closer look at the importance of data accuracy, especially in relation to the collection of sex data, but there is no need to kick the can down the road. The clause compels the Secretary of State to do nothing—well, not in an active sense— [ Interruption. ] If only. It does not compel the Secretary of State in an active sense, but it does give him the important power to put definitions of core personal data attributes in place once the important Sullivan review and other studies have been published and considered. As we have mentioned a few times, the Bill has gone through many iterations and a long legislative period. We believe that this clause will be useful, if not essential, for resolving some of these issues. Getting those basic definitions right is essential. If we do not, there could be mistakes that could become entrenched in the records of public authorities. That could lead to skewed research findings on important societal matters, such as health disparities and outcomes across the sectors, as well as employment opportunities and equal pay. For those and many other good reasons, let us take this opportunity to get the basics right. In that regard, I encourage the Minister to heed the timeless words of Julie Andrews with which he opened Committee stage. As far as definitions for core data attributes are concerned, “Let’s start at the very beginning, A very good place to start.”

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is not the appropriate place to discuss new clause 30, but I hope that there will be ample opportunity on Report for further discussion of the broader issue, which is of great importance.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This part of the Bill is a concatenation of different provisions relating to data, which is one of the reasons why I think the Bill is so glorious; it covers such a wide scope of things to sort out. I will speak to some of the deeper debates that we will have later, but I am quite glad to start off by speaking to clause 121. As a former doctor—my wife is a doctor too—I particularly welcome these provisions and the opportunity they provide to ensure that health data can be shared properly. I would say to the Minister that the issue is not merely carrying around patient notes; certainly, in my experience the issue is whether patient notes turn up in the first place at all. As somebody who does not work in the health service any more, I see the other side, where the burden is quite often on the patient to provide their notes or to give information repeatedly that different parts of the system already have. That is a wholly inefficient way of doing things. One of the benefits of having the NHS set up as it is must surely be the ability to have coherent approaches to the sharing of data, so that we do not have this situation with notes. It is not merely an inconvenience. Patients can be exposed to repeated tests and repeated imaging, all of which have a degree of iatrogenic harm and risk, plus delays to progressing. My former field of work was psychiatry, and the places where I worked were very quick to adopt electronic patient records, noting not only the importance of data sharing, but the risk of retraumatising people when repeated disclosures of traumatic events are required—in part, I worry, because that data is not shared as effectively as it could be. I raised the point on Second Reading that changes in this area will need to be supported by ensuring that hospitals and healthcare settings have access to IT of sufficient quality to support the new systems. Can the Minister provide an update on his strategy—although I recognise it is not precisely his strategy; it is shared with the Department of Health and Social Care—on renewing NHS IT infrastructure and ensuring that the necessary kit is put in place so that the provisions can be rolled out to maximum advantage? This is about not merely the sharing of data, but the fact that faxing information is no longer required, and we must have the computer infrastructure necessary for data sharing.

• 11 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I start by congratulating my noble Friend Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge for her hard work and tenacity in raising the profile of the harms caused to victims of sexually explicit deepfakes, and ensuring that clauses criminalising that activity were inserted into the Bill in the other place. We very much welcome the Government’s engagement in this important area, and we broadly support their amendments, which substantially deliver the changes to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 that Baroness Owen sought in the other place. In particular, we welcome Government amendment 31, which substantially reflects the offence of solicitation under clause 141, but could the Minister put a bit more flesh on the bones of the reasoning and necessity behind substituting the term “requesting” for “solicitation”? Does he regard those terms as having equivalent meaning in this context? If not, what is the material difference in the approach to terminology? I am thankful for the Minister’s comments on the “reasonable excuse” defence, but I have some questions about what exactly a reasonable excuse looks like in this context. Does he have any examples to aid our understanding of what constitutes a reasonable excuse in these circumstances? Based on that, do the Government intend to publish guidance on the scope of this defence and its explanation? We are pleased to see the inclusion of Government amendment 38, inserting among other things an extended limitation period of three years from the date of creation, or request for creation, of a purported intimate image for bringing criminal charges. This will increase the scope for victims to seek justice where these images come to light some time after creation.

• 7 Mar 2025 · Protection of Children (Digital Safety and Data Protection) Bill · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to speak on behalf of His Majesty’s official Opposition on this important topic. Thank you for calling me now, Madam Deputy Speaker; I will not speak for too long, because there are so many Government Members who are keen to take part in this important debate. I congratulate the hon. Member for Whitehaven and Workington (Josh MacAlister) on bringing this private Member’s Bill to the House and all the different people, companies, charities and organisations that he has worked with as part of the campaign to drive it forwards. I do feel for him, as I know what it is like for a Back Bencher in the party of Government to navigate the challenges of trying to use a private Member’s Bill—I have had two ballot Bills myself—as a campaign vehicle to drive change. I therefore hope that he will forgive me for some of the comments I shall make about the content of this Bill. We can only deal with the text of the Bill before us, which was only published in the past few days, so my comments will necessarily reflect the detail of the hon. Member’s proposals. In a sense, this debates reminds me of Schrödinger’s cat, in that Members have made equally reference to a former Bill and a current Bill in their speeches. It feels like we are having a debate on a Bill that could have been and a debate on the Bill in front of us. Indeed, the hon. Member’s speech spoke to the lack of a need for further research, but equally the Bill calls for further research to take place. We have heard some fantastic contributions from all parts of the House. I would like to note the contributions from my right hon. Friends the Members for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) and for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds), and my hon. Friends the Members for Reigate (Rebecca Paul), for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox) and for Broxbourne (Lewis Cocking), who reiterated the importance of driving forward change. Many stories and personal declarations have been shared about the impact of social media and the difficulty of parenting at this time. I should declare that I am also a parent, although thankfully my children are not at the stage when they have started consuming social media in the way that I have heard others talk about today.

• 7 Mar 2025 · Protection of Children (Digital Safety and Data Protection) Bill · Hansard source

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  I will come on to that a little later in my speech. Perhaps Government Members will have the chance to express their view on this matter on Report of the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill in a couple of weeks’ time. Turning back to the research, a longitudinal study in the US of more than 6,500 children aged between 12 and 15, adjusted for baseline mental health status, found that adolescents who spent more than three hours a day on social media faced double the risk of experiencing poor mental health outcomes, including symptoms of depression and anxiety. These findings have been brought into sharp focus by recent tragic cases of children taking their own lives after being the subject of online bullying or encountering harmful material online. Clearly, that weighs on all of us as legislators. In government and now in opposition, the Conservatives have pursued measures to make the online world a safer place for children and young people. I am proud that the previous Government passed the Online Safety Act, among other measures, to make the online world safer. The Act requires platforms to take measures to prevent children from accessing harmful and age-inappropriate content, particularly relating to pornography, suicide and self-harm, serious violence and bullying. The Act further requires platforms to remove illegal content quickly and prevent it from appearing in the first place, and to use and enforce age-checking measures on platforms where content harmful to children is published through the adoption of highly effective age assurance technologies. In January, Ofcom published industry guidance on how it expects age assurance to be put into effect, including deadlines for platforms to conduct risk assessments and put certain safety measures in place. We can expect to see further developments in this area as the protections envisaged by the OSA are rolled out. However, parents, including many in my constituency, are rightly concerned about the addictive nature of smartphones themselves and the impact on attention span and social development. According to polling by Parentkind in 2024, 83% of parents felt that smartphones are harmful to children and young people, while research carried out by Policy Exchange across more than 200 schools at the end of 2023 found that schools with strict mobile phone bans achieved, on average, better Progress 8 scores and better GCSE grades, despite the fact that the schools with highly effective bans had a higher proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals than the schools with less restrictive policies. In February, the shadow Secretary of State for Education, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Laura Trott), tabled an amendment to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill to require all schools in England to ban the use of mobile telephones during the school day. That, however, was rejected by the Government. I wonder how Labour Members feel about that. Should the Government decide to do so, perhaps further to the chief medical officers’ review, Opposition Members will work constructively with them to seek practical and effective solutions that enable children to continue to benefit from the opportunities offered online, while protecting them from those harmful effects.

• 7 Mar 2025 · Protection of Children (Digital Safety and Data Protection) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am going to resist the temptation to be drawn into a discussion about research methodology in this area, although I have to tell the hon. Gentleman that I am very tempted to talk about the importance of case series data and qualitative data in terms of what people are telling us and what we are seeing ourselves, compared with cross-sectional or longitudinal studies or cluster studies looking at the impact of different schools. What I will say is that the stories of what children are being exposed to that we have heard in this debate and that we have all heard from our constituents are horrific—I do not think anyone would disagree with that. Clearly, we need to protect children from that. At the heart of the Bill is the desire to drive forward our scientific understanding of the effects of smartphone and social media use on children’s mental health, learning and social development. I hope we hear a commitment from the Minister that the Government will conduct a detailed review in this complex area where so much is at stake, but I would also expand it further. Any analysis must take a clear-eyed approach to both the advantages and disadvantages offered by technological developments such as smartphones and internet access, looking at both the benefits to young people of increased connectivity and access to information, and even apps that help to manage health conditions such as diabetes at school and away from home, which will transform the lives of children and young people, and the increasing body of research that demonstrates the damaging effects of excessive smartphone and social media use on children and adolescents.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will build on the Minister’s last point. I am glad that we have these provisions in the current incarnation of the Bill. One of the things that makes the Bill so interesting is that it contains a panoply of different areas of correction and improvement. On the electronic register of births and deaths, what is perhaps most surprising about this change is that our current system is so old but that it has not been done before. Of course, we are supportive of the change and look forward to seeing it in action.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Hobhouse. The national underground asset register is clearly important. The benefits of trusted partners having access to the information held in this critical infrastructure are plain to see, and I am glad that this provision is in the latest iteration of the Bill. The information the NUAR holds is critical infrastructure, and we need to think carefully about data security and access to this information, in terms of how it is held on the register and the security measures for people directly accessing the register and for third parties. I am unclear as to why the Government are against the amendment made in the Lords. If anything, it could be argued that it should go further in ensuring that sufficient security measures are in place for people accessing this information. It is reasonable that there should be a requirement to inform stakeholders about relevant cyber-security measures. I hear what the Minister says about the disclosure of security measures, but I do not think cyber-security advice and provisions are a particular area of national secrecy. There are many cyber-security standards that can be provided as guidance or as a bare minimum for people accessing this information. We support the continued inclusion of these measures. To go further, if anything, the Government should consider more broadly the different ways in which the information can be accessed. I do not know what the Minister can say from the Front Bench in response to the point about the proportionality of disclosures that can be made by the Government and the advice on the operation of the clause.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I have to go back to the previous point again. Will cyber-security measures be covered as part of the consultation?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  No worries. The Minister has tempted me to ask whether, as part of the consultation that is being put forward, cyber-security measures will be considered and consulted on.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  We are dealing with those provisions a bit later on.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not convinced that the clause is ambiguous. In the absence of a counter-amendment or a commitment from the Minister to bring something to the Committee to achieve the enhanced security in this area that we all want, we oppose the Government amendment. Question put, That the amendment be made.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Notwithstanding the question that the Minister has just posed, we are speaking in parallel lines. The purpose of the provision is to ensure that adequate cyber-security measures are taken up and accessed by parties. Security around the NUAR is one thing; there is also the question of security around the relevant stakeholders who are using it, hence the “before” component. Governments provide cyber-security advice all the time. I am sure that there is general cyber-security advice on the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology website. I do not understand why the Minister is resistant. If he is concerned about the drafting, will he not come back with a counter-amendment?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Is that a cyber-security vulnerability the Minister has just disclosed to the Committee?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I think the Minister entirely appreciates where we are going, why the amendment has been put on the boards and why there is a desire for something like it in the Bill. Will he put forward a counter-amendment to satisfy that desire?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Amendments 10 and 11 seek to remove certain provisions that were introduced in Committee in the other place. I thank Sex Matters for its work, but also many people in this policy area who have tried to focus on the importance of data accuracy and validity when it is used. I hope we all agree that it is important that data, when it is collected—in fact it is a principle of data collection and maintenance—is accurate and correct and that there is no point holding or using data if it is incorrect. Biased data is worse than no data at all. Therefore, I do not understand—especially given the extra use of the data that will come as part of digital verification services—why the Minister and the Government are not keen on the provision to stipulate that public bodies that hold sensitive data should be certain of its accuracy, particularly when the data is going to be passed on and used as part of digital verification services. I am confused by the resistance to ensuring that the data is correct, particularly when we anticipate that it will be used as part of a far bigger spectrum. It will be consumed by a digital verification service in which it is not routine to go back and look at the original paper records. The only dataset to be relied on will be some Oracle Excel spreadsheet or whatever database is used by public authorities. This debate has become more acute with regard to the importance of sex data. It is critical that sex data is available to protect public spaces and to be used in scientific research to allocate someone’s sex as part of medicine and healthcare. I speak as a former doctor, and I guess I should declare an interest in that I am married to a doctor. The use of sex data is critical in medical screening programmes, such as cervical screening and prostate screening, to understand and interpret investigations. It is critical that the data is accurate; otherwise, there is a danger that research will not be appropriate or will produce bad results, and there is also a potential degree of medical harm. It is critical that we get sex data correct when it is being used. I do not agree with the argument that requiring the disclosure of sex data is either disproportionate or somehow a breach of the European convention on human rights. The whole point of digital verification services is proportionate disclosure. In fact, we have heard speeches from both sides of the Committee about proportionate disclosure, and limiting the amount of personal data that is passed on as part of a digital verification service. My challenge is, quite simply, that if somebody is collecting sex data as part of a verification system, why are they doing so? If they do not need to know what someone’s sex is, it should not be collected. Digital verification services allow people to choose their proportionate disclosure. There will be times when sex data is required for renting a property—that example has been used before—because people may want to rent properties in single-sex accommodation. I may argue that is a proportionate disclosure. If it is a standard rental property in another situation, it is probably a non-proportionate disclosure. Another argument has been made that it is needed to triangulate data to verify ID. Again, that does not seem to work, because the whole point of a digital verification service is to allow someone to have a digital ID framework and use different points to verify. The perversity of this debate is that these schemes and their proportionate disclosure protect people’s identities. They protect people from non-disproportionate disclosure. We need to make sure that the data we are using is accurate and correct, and that it says what we want it to say when someone is inquiring about somebody’s sex. If somebody is asking for sex data but they do not need it, people should be able to say no, which the existing provisions allow for.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Will the code of practice include information on the proportionate disclosure of data through the DVS scheme?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Digital verification services are important, and will make a big change when rolled out as part of this legislation. The provision is entirely right, particularly on the proportionality of data disclosure. Reading through some of the various reports and briefings we have received, the example used is of someone going into a nightclub: why should a scanned copy of their driving licence be consumed and contained by whoever the data holder is, when all they need to do is prove their age? These services will open the door to allow the proportionate disclosure of data. There is a both a data assurance component and a section on privacy, so we are glad that the Government are taking these measures forward. I sympathise with the intention of new clause 9, in the name of the hon. Member for North Norfolk, which is to make sure that we do everything we can to support people who are digitally excluded. That ensures that people are not locked out and that there is a degree of reciprocity, so that as we digitalise more, the opportunity remains for people to access non-digital base services. I am not sure about the scope of the binding duty in the provision and about how the duties on small providers, as opposed to a duty on public service providers, play out politically. I think those are different things. Nevertheless, I support the sentiment of the new clause.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am not going to rehash the previous debates. Clearly, the Committee has made its decision, no matter how disappointing that is. I just wanted to pick up the Minister’s previous point about the use of common sense in arbitration decisions when it comes to access to protected same-sex spaces. I fully support using common sense, but how does that play out in a situation where somebody has gone through a digital verification service that has used data that is held by a local authority, but that has been changed at a later date—that is, in effect, gender data? How will that be resolved?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for giving way. I appreciate that it is a technical question and I hope he is able to give a response. Equally, I appreciate that he may have to write to me in due course. I see that there are papers coming his way.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner, and I thank all hon. Members taking part in the Committee as well as the officials. As the Minister said, this is the third iteration of this Bill and it has been extensively covered in Committee before. We rely on and thank former Members and those in the other place who worked on the Bill to get it to where it is. I am pleased that the Government are taking the Bill forward and that it is one of the early Bills in the Session. There is much to say about the Bill that is positive, and not just because it is a reformed version of our previous two Bills. Although, ironically, the Bill does not reference the term “smart data”, clause 1 brings forward smart data and smart data schemes. That will help to open up a digital revolution, which will build on the successes of open banking in other sectors. We very much support that.

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I apologise, Mr Turner: I misspoke earlier with regard to our position on the Government amendments. Rather than offering positive support, I meant to say that we will not oppose the technical amendments. What does the FCA think about these amendments? Has the Department consulted the FCA?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  We support technical amendments to the Bill to make sure it works properly, but I am intrigued why these amendments are necessary at such a late stage, bearing in mind the multiple layers of scrutiny that the Bill has gone through. Can he explain where he received the feedback about the necessity of the proposed changes?

• 4 Mar 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  What is the point of politics if we do not have a debate? We strongly disagree with the interpretation that the provisions are somehow incompatible with ECHR rights. They totally support people’s privacy rights under article 8 regarding proportionate disclosures. If somebody needs to have someone’s sex data, they need sex data. They do not need gender data. The provisions allow for it, and if somebody does not need sex data, they should not be collecting it in the first place.