Ben Spencer MP: speeches 2025

Speeches

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

  More

  Will the hon. Lady give way?

• 13 Jun 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Member for her intervention. Of course there are situations in which a decision to end one’s life is perfectly understandable—indeed, rational. I spent my career looking after people, many of whom presented to me and to medical services with thoughts about wanting to end their life. Many of them had mental illness. Some had terminal illness. The fundamental problem with the Bill is that it has a complete blind spot for those people who are highly vulnerable. It is scandalous that we have got to this point and are still having a debate about the core concepts. The Bill should have been dealt with properly from the start with a royal commission or a review so that we did not get to the point where we are still debating core principles on Report.

• 11 Jun 2025 · Spending Review 2025 · Hansard source

  More

  What is most interesting about the spending review is what is not mentioned: there is no mention of the River Thames scheme, no mention of our rivers, no mention of the Animal and Plant Health Agency in New Haw, and no mention of improvements to rail, despite the nationalisation of South Western Railway. In fact, there is almost no mention at all of the south-east, despite the Chancellor saying that this a spending review for the whole UK. However, she has effectively confirmed the third runway at Heathrow, despite there being no local engagement. May I invite the Chancellor to come to Runnymede and Weybridge to meet people and see if their priorities are indeed hers, as she claims?

• 10 Jun 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. As I said, this is clearly a tricky area to legislate—I have said that at the Dispatch Box and in Committee many times—but what is not helping is the uncertainty that has been created throughout the debate, whether it is the position of copyright law, preferred third options or the status of opt-out, which is how we got into this pickle in the first place.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  It feels like we are going from “Groundhog Day” to “Lost in Translation” because the Government clearly are not getting the message. Today I will try something different and tell the House a story—the story of this debate: A story was read in the deep dark wood, AI saw the book, and the book looked good. “Where are you heading to, original tome? Come here with me, and I’ll give you a home.” “That’s awfully sweet of you, but no, I’m meeting my author, and they say where I go. Now I like you, and I don’t want to cause strife But they made me with love and words shaped by life. So if we’re to partner, please do ask them first, To not would be naughty,” he said with lips pursed. Perhaps I owe Julia Donaldson an apology, while also thanking her for the national treasure that is “The Gruffalo”—I look forward to the third book in the series. We did not use AI, which was useless, to draft it, just the skills of one of my team members Jacqui Gracey—human skill, talent and transparency over sources and work. Transparency is fundamental to protect creative endeavours. No one can doubt that the Minister has done his best to demonstrate the enduring nature of the creative spirit in the face of adversity and to avoid committing to a timescale and to legislating on transparency. This week, it is a new parliamentary working group. Last week, it was reviews. Next week, it may even be a citizens’ assembly, but the creative industries are not buying it. Our noble colleagues in the other place are not buying it. Members of Opposition parties, and indeed some Members on his own Benches, are not buying it. They are not buying it because the Government have lost the confidence of their stakeholders that they would bring forward legislation to enact effective and proportionate transparency requirements for AI models in the use of their creative content—AI companies need to buy it. It is this loss of confidence in the Government’s will to take decisive action that means that nothing short of a commitment to bring forward legislation will be enough to allay the fears of the creative industries.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the Chair of the Select Committee, who is also trying to break us out of the groundhog day that we seem to have found ourselves in. The Lords amendment does not fetter the Government’s policy options, nor does it prescribe how proportionate transparency should be achieved. It simply puts a line in the sand for the Government to act on this hugely important issue. To return to the AI and the Gruffalo, So on went the story through the deep dark wood To be loved by its readers, as a good book should. Yet the AI pondered, as it wanted it now. “I’ll simply just scrape it”, the AI did avow. When he was musing, he stumbled across The author reclining on a patch of green moss. They had glasses and notebooks and ideas galore. They had printed five books, but were working on more. Their eyes came to meet—they were in for a fight. Both wanted the story, but who was right? The answer is both, if reasonably sought For content, not stolen, but licensed or bought. Be clear what you’re taking, be transparent and true, And recognise the content and its real value. Then there’s no monster nor bad guy, just an allegorical rhyme And a plea to listen and take action in time.

• 10 Jun 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  What the last Government did not do is release a consultation that had a ministerial foreword to say that the position of copyright was uncertain. What they did not do was say their preferred option was opt-out, which spooked the creative industry and caused all these problems in the first place. It is this Government’s ham-fisted approach that caused so many of the problems that they are now trying and failing to fix. The Government have played a large part in creating this problem.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  Back again, and it feels a bit like groundhog day. I must confess that I am a Bill Murray fan, and I think “Groundhog Day” is a great movie. However, I realise that some Members on both sides of the House may not have been born when it was released, which makes me feel a little old, so I will explain a little of the plot. A weatherman set in his ways is sent to a town in Pennsylvania to report on groundhog day, and finds himself in a time loop in which he lives the same day over and over again. In due course, that leads to despair, but eventually he learns that this gives him the opportunity to learn from his mistakes—the time loops can be seen as a blessing or an opportunity, not a curse—and through this he grows, develops and changes. He then breaks out of the time loop to live happily ever after. We will be stuck in groundhog day on this Bill until the Government realise that the Lords amendments are not a nuisance, but an opportunity, and that they need to listen to the concerns and change course. The noble Lords in the House in which this Bill started have made clear the risk to creatives from AI companies taking their data, and the importance of fairness and transparency. We on the Opposition Benches and Members on both sides of the House have raised similar concerns, but we do not have the numbers yet. In Parliament, it is not sufficient to win the vote; it is also necessary to win the argument, and the Government have lost this argument. Copyright law is a toothless instrument if the lack of transparency about the use of creative content in AI models continues. The lack of transparency renders the enforcement of rights elusive, and the Government are apparently happy for this to persist on an open-ended basis. While the Government’s direction of travel remains uncertain, everyone loses out. Creatives continue to lose out when their work is exploited without payment. Firms in the AI industry, especially smaller ones, cannot get out of the starting blocks, let alone play their part in turbocharging our tech economy. The Government continue to risk the confidence of both these key industries, with the chilling effect on investment that this entails. Of course, we are sensitive to the constitutional principles, and noble Lords were very mindful of that topic in their speeches in the other place. The Minister is right that it is almost unprecedented for the other place to return to a Bill so many times. However, rather than use this as a reason to try to push through the Bill, the Government need to listen to that evidence of the strength of feeling. We all know that the Government will have to respond to these concerns, and their position will have to change. I would love to end this speech with a literary quote suited to the substance of the debate, and I envy the Minister’s ability always to bring flair to our discussions across the Dispatch Box. Instead, I will fall back on a political one from the 38th American President, Gerald Ford: “Compromise is the oil that makes governments go.” The Government should meet the Lords on the compromise they have offered, put oil in the engines of our creative and AI industries, and bring an end to this groundhog day.

• 3 Jun 2025 · Thames Water · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the Secretary of State for his comments on continuity of service, which will provide some reassurance to my constituents. Thames Water has failed my constituents time and again; clearly, it needs investment. What is he doing to ensure that there is the confidence to invest in our water sector?

• 22 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  As hon. Members know, the substance of this Bill began with the previous Government, in recognition of the need to streamline and harness the use of data to grow the economy and drive improvement in the delivery of public services. As I have said before, when the Bill started its life, most of us had no idea that it would become the vehicle for addressing some of the most important social and technological issues of our time. Although I welcome the huge benefits that the Bill will bring to the economy and public services when it comes into force, I fear that it will go down on the Government’s record as the Bill of missed opportunities. It is a missed opportunity to fix our flawed public data sets, which present a barrier to tracking and tackling inequalities in areas such as women’s health; a missed opportunity to commit to a review of protections for children in their use of social media platforms, and to taking action to increase those protections where the evidence shows there is good reason to do so; and a missed opportunity to provide much-needed certainty to two of our key growth industries, the creative and AI sectors, on how they can interact to promote their mutual growth and flourishing. It could be seen as somewhat dispiriting to be back at the Dispatch Box again, having the debate on copyright and AI with the Department’s ministerial team, but I see that there has been an upgrade since our last outing at the Dispatch Box. I pay tribute to the Secretary of State for his tone and his approach to this debate, particularly his recognition of previous mistakes made. As politicians, we do not say sorry often enough, or recognise mistakes or where we would have wanted things to go better. I appreciate the statements he has made from the Dispatch Box, but the fact that we are here is testament to the determination and sincere concern of Members of both Houses. Whatever Benches they sit on, they are deeply concerned that we must not miss this opportunity to find a solution to such a significant challenge. Our colleagues in the other place have spoken about their commitment to the primacy of this House, and their reticence to delay the passage of this Bill any further than is absolutely necessary. Their resolve demonstrates the importance of this issue to Members of both Houses and the stakeholders they represent. The Government have spoken repeatedly of their commitment to protecting the creative industries, but their actions are still yet to match their rhetoric. It appears that “reviews” have today been upgraded to “working groups.” Many excuses have been made for why the Government feel unable to act now. Baroness Kidron and other noble Lords have acted in good faith on the Government’s stated concerns, and have sought to address them in the latest iteration of their transparency amendment on copyright and AI. Lords amendment 49D would provide the Government with flexibility to put in place proportionate regulations on the transparency of AI enterprises by reference to their size. Importantly, it would allow a reasonable timeframe for the Government to complete their review of responses to their consultation, which concluded in February, before the Secretary of State is compelled to lay draft transparency regulations before Parliament. For the third time, an amendment on this topic received the overwhelming support of Members in the other place, and the debate at the last round showed that the strength of feeling is mirrored in this House. Amendment 49D is a balanced clause that would put in place a much-needed long-stop date to provide the certainty that creatives and the technology industries alike have been calling for. As the hon. Member for East Thanet (Ms Billington) suggested, it is a backstop. The Government have run out of excuses for failing to act. Today we have an opportunity to achieve something relatively rare in our political climate: creating effective, balanced legislation based on cross-party compromise. It is important to public confidence in Government to show that we can put sound principles above politics when the overwhelming need arises. The Government have another opportunity today; let us make sure that it is not another missed one.

• 19 May 2025 · Mental Health Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. Sensory over-stimulation can be a particular issue for those with autistic spectrum disorders. I have been concerned when I have looked after patients, and I have thought carefully about the challenges, particularly in general adult wards, of catering to the needs of people with autistic spectrum disorders or a learning disability. I would argue that that would apply broadly to anyone in a general adult hospital, irrespective of diagnosis—everyone has particular needs and sensitivities and we need to be mindful of that. I suspect this is something that the hon. Lady and I will disagree on, but I would consider an autistic spectrum disorder and a learning disability to be a mental disorder. It certainly is under the ICD-10 classification of mental and behavioural disorders. One problem with how this issue is framed in the Bill is, for example, where Rett disorder, which is also a pervasive developmental disorder, would come into it. Does it come under the term “autistic”? Where does a not otherwise specified pervasive developmental disorder come into it? I am not sure whether how the terms in the Bill will operate in real life has been thought through. I do not understand why we are not pushing for such a provision for every disorder and condition that people have when they come into hospital. That is why we are not focused on something like a treatability test, or otherwise. This has a specific real-life fall-out. If people need to be in hospital after 28 days and there is a deprivation of liberty, that is going to happen. It will not stop happening; with the best will in the world, and even with this Bill, it will keep on happening. People will either be detained under liberty protection safeguards, or they will end up being detained with anxiety related to their ASD or learning disability, which would place them within scope of the Mental Health Act. A further challenge and disparity in the Bill is that it does not affect forensic provisions. People could be keener to pursue a criminal prosecution of people with ASD or an LD because that would enable a longer stay in detention than 28 days. That is why in the pre-legislative scrutiny we suggested that there should be an option to get a pre-authorisation for detention beyond 28 days by going to a tribunal, which we thought might deal with some of the concerns raised. Personally, I like the idea of pre-authorisation in general beyond 28 days, and it is something that Professor Richardson spoke about in her review back in the late ’90s. The Government recognise that there are challenges with this area, which is why these changes are in the schedules. There is a recognition that, frankly, this is not workable, and we will see as the Bill progresses that there are broader concerns about how it operates. Another area of concern is nominated persons and parental responsibility. The Bill changes “nearest relative” to a “nominated person”, which means that people can choose who performs that important role under the 1983 Act. The nearest relative or nominated person can discharge someone from the powers of the Act, which would inevitably mean that they would be discharged from hospital—there are powers to bar people, but it is quite a high threshold. This measure is important because it will allow someone under the age of 18 to choose someone who is not their parent to have that important statutory power. We raised this issue in the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee. We could have a situation in which a 16-year-old with competence who is detained under the 1983 Act in hospital chooses their mate, or somebody else—not their parent or someone with parental responsibility—to have the power to discharge them from measures under the Act, which would inevitably mean them leaving hospital. The parent, who in such situations is often responsible in some way for the after care, would lose that power. I am concerned, as were the Lords, about the impact of that measure on the Children Act 1989. I think there is a serious problem in changing this area of law—we do not have this in physical health—and introducing the ability to give a statutory power to a non-parent. I know the Minister will look into that in the Bill Committee, but I think the Government will have to row back on that. They could easily amend the Bill to say that if someone is under the age of 16, the nominated person must have parental responsibility unless there is a good reason for them not to have it. Sixteen and 17-year-olds are a bit different, especially when people start getting close to 18 and there are other children’s rights, but I cannot see why we should legislate to let someone under 16 choose someone who does not have parental responsibility to have that important power. The third problem is that the Bill is silent on deprivations of liberty in A&E, which are ongoing. It has been a while since I worked in A&E, but there has always been the challenge of what to do with someone who turns up to A&E if the doctor thinks that they will probably need detaining under the Mental Health Act because they are suicidal or very unwell, and wants to keep them there while the assessment takes place. We can get through it using the Mental Capacity Act 2005, but it is messy. It would be a lot clearer for everybody if we said, for example, that section 5(2) of the 1983 Act, which allows for temporary detention, could apply to an A&E setting. There is a bunch of technical stuff about the interaction between deprivation of liberty and the Mental Capacity Act, but I suspect you will start giving me the evil eye, Madam Deputy Speaker, and telling me to move on if I start— [ Interruption. ] Madam Deputy Speaker says no, but I suspect that Members across the House might start doing that, so I will move on. Let me flag two things in the Bill. It allows for a discharge from hospital under supervised conditional discharge to a deprivation of liberty. That is in response to the case of Secretary of State for Justice v. MM, which involves a problem with how the law currently operates. As far as I know, in mental health law we have never had a situation where deprivations of liberty in the community were authorised under the Mental Health Act—someone had to be in a registered hospital. That is a big Rubicon to cross. I see why the Government need to tidy up this area of law, but I am not convinced that we have realised what a big Rubicon this is to cross. The operation of the Mental Health Act has always meant that someone was detained in hospital, but when they are in the community they are in the community. Someone might have certain restrictions placed on them by a community treatment order, or otherwise, but they are not deprived of their liberty in their home or in some other community setting that is not a registered medical hospital. I think that measure needs a bit more reflection. I believe that the majority of those who will undergo compulsory treatment under detention, certainly for a long period of time, under this legislation will be people with psychosis, such as schizophrenic forms of psychosis, schizophrenia and bipolar affective disorder, but lot of the debate and focus has been on non-psychotic illnesses. That is not to say that those illnesses are less important—they are certainly not less important, especially for those who experience them—but I am concerned that people with schizophrenia always get a raw deal. They are often marginalised by society and in terms of the amount of advocacy they have. In fact, a lot of the evidence that we reviewed in the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee focused on non-psychotic disorders, perhaps because sadly people often turn their backs on people with psychotic illnesses. Sometimes those people find themselves in a situation where their illness is so debilitating that they cannot advocate for themselves, so there tends to be a bias towards disorders such as dementia, ASD and LD, where there is someone to advocate, such as CAMHS or families who might push a little bit more. I am not saying that any condition is more important—I really want to stress that—but as parliamentarians, we do not necessarily understand that the bulk of the conditions that the Bill focuses on concern psychosis. Finally, I have spoken a lot about how psychosis can lead to people being detained in hospital and about the impact of that. Psychosis is a pretty terrible disease but it does not need to be: lots of people get better and it is one of the most treatable diseases. The Bill will help people to get better and we cannot lose sight of that.

• 19 May 2025 · Mental Health Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  I appreciate the hon. Member giving way. There is a logical inconsistency, which is that people with autism and learning disability are looked after under mental health services for autism and learning disability. If the argument is, “Well, those conditions should not be within the scope of Mental Health Act”, one could make an argument that they should not be within scope of mental health services full stop.

• 19 May 2025 · Mental Health Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  The hon. Member is of course very knowledgeable given his background as a mental health nurse. I would like to see in the Bill a provision setting out that, in order to detain someone for the purposes of health or safety, they must lack decision-making capacity for the detention to be authorised. For the prevention of harm to others, there are reasons to overcome autonomy in decision-making capacity, but I would like to see an additional component specifying that if the detention for assessment and treatment in hospital is purely based on health and safety and not on risk of harm to others, the patient must also lack capacity. Otherwise, people who have full and intact decision-making capacity can nevertheless come into the scope of the powers. The liberty protection safeguards are a bit of a mess, quite frankly, and the DoLS were clearly a substantial mess. It is interesting that the legislative scrutiny of the Bill points out that it is a missed opportunity not to tidy up some of the interface between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act—a point that I will come to a little later in my speech. In terms of parity of esteem, bringing forward fusion law and gelling the Acts closer together needs to be the direction of travel. I hope that we do not have to waste another 20 years until we get the opportunity something like that. There is something else that we need to reflect on. It comes to my other points about the focus in the Bill, but I will reiterate it. The core focus of the Bill is on reducing detentions of people from black and minority ethnic groups, who are over-represented in detention. One of the key focuses in fixing that must be on socioeconomic deprivation—where we see socioeconomic deprivation, we see severe mental disorder following—but I worry that the Bill is a missed opportunity and will not do what is required to deal with those disparities. There are three problems with the Bill, and two things that I wish to flag. I am sensitive to the concerns that have been raised about people with autistic spectrum disorders and learning disabilities, and the advocacy regarding such people being in hospital. Being in a general adult ward is a challenging environment as it is, and it is particularly challenging for someone with an ASD or a learning disability. People can get stuck in hospital not really going anywhere. That concern applies to most disorders—I do not think it is unique, given the lack of community support services. I disagree, however, with the focus on ASD and LD above all other conditions. If we want to talk about non-progressive conditions, I do not understand why a brain injury, or Korsakoff’s dementia for example, are not within the scope of this measure. I do not understand why, rather than using the Bill to take people out of section 3 of the Mental Health Act, something like a bolstered treatability test is not used, which is what was in the Act before it was modified in 2007.

• 19 May 2025 · Mental Health Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  rose —

• 19 May 2025 · Mental Health Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  I rise to speak in support of the Bill. To begin with, I need to make a couple of declarations. I have a family member who is a consultant psychiatrist. I am now a non-practising general adult psychiatrist with an endorsement and years in psychiatry, and I previously worked as a consultant psychiatrist. I took part in the 2018 Wessely review as a panel member on the tribunal working group, and I was on the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee in the last Parliament. In a declaration of a more personal nature, this is an area that I feel passionately about. It is a great privilege to speak to this important piece of legislation and reforms going forward. The United Kingdom reforms its mental health legislation every 20 years or so. I did not want to correct the Secretary of State, but the first Mental Health Act was in 1959—I hope that was substantially before he was born, with reference to his earlier comments. The legislation has gone through various iterations from the original Lunacy Act and similar legislation in the 19th century. In the UK, we have always been at the forefront of reform to the law and to provisions and powers in this area. It is important in this Second Reading debate to focus on what the Mental Health Act is and what it does. Members have talked more broadly about the challenges of delivering mental health care currently, but it is important to reflect that the Mental Health Act is very specific and precise. It is about the regulation of detention—sometimes for assessment, sometimes for treatment—of people with mental disorder, and has a range of powers on aftercare and guardianship. It is focused on detention and assessment, or treatment, of people with mental disorder. We need that because there are times when people with severe mental illness become so unwell that they are unable to recognise their illness. Their illness puts their health at risk—predominantly through self-neglect or non-treatment. It puts their safety at risk, again through self-neglect, as well as through suicide. And, less commonly but critically, it puts them at risk of causing harm to others. The legal framework allows us to regulate compulsory treatment in that regard. It is absolutely critical that we have those powers so that, when people are so unwell that they do not recognise it and they lose agency, we can, as a compassionate society, take them into hospital and treat them, with a view to getting them back to themselves. I have used the 1983 Act countless times, applying it both to assessments and, as a section 12-approved doctor, to treatments, and I have used it as a responsible clinician. I suspect that I am one of the few Members of this House—certainly in this debate—who has had those roles and responsibilities. In terms of framing, it is important to reflect that one of the key changes in the 1983 Act, which is such an important piece of legislation, was that it was about restricting powers and ensuring that there were strong procedures for reviewing detentions. As a former health professional in this area, I am certain that all professionals working in it are mindful of the scope of powers that the Act provides. When applying restrictions, people do not use these powers in anger or without a great degree of thought and contemplation. The most intrusive intervention available to us in the health service is to detain and treat people in hospital or in secure hospital settings. Those powers are not taken lightly. A lot of concern was expressed at the start of the debate—and I am sure it will continue—about the way in which people have been treated in hospital. There have been some very high-profile scandals in which things have not worked well, to say the least, and care and treatment have been atrocious and abusive. However, people working in health and care in the UK are doing so because they want to see the best outcomes for their patients. Sometimes, they are limited in that because of the resources available. They do not use the Mental Health Act with a view to harming people, but with a view to helping them. Being detained under the Mental Health Act is not a prime facie harm; it is a treatment and a good thing. If someone needs to be detained and treated in hospital, they need to be detained and treated in hospital. If I became so unwell that I needed to be detained under the Act, I would want to be detained. Thankfully, I am not in that position today— [ Interruption. ] At least I believe that I am not, although the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans), might have a different view on that. [ Laughter. ] Should I get to the point where I am so unwell that I cannot consider my own care, I would want the powers of the Mental Health Act to be used quickly, particularly if I were posing a risk to myself, my family and others, so that I can get better and back to living my life. I pay tribute to Baroness May of Maidenhead, who kicked this off, and to Professor Sir Simon Wessely—a good friend—Stephen Gilbert, Sir Mark Hedley and Rabbi Baroness Neuberger for their work in the 2018 review. There is a lot of good work in the Bill, from the greater focus on advance care planning and the more frequent detention reviews, which I recognise may bring a workforce burden, to the provisions on nominated persons. I will not go into the detail in this Second Reading speech, but I will focus on a few general points on which I think a bit more work needs to be undertaken. In some ways—I will have to message Sir Simon after this to ask his forgiveness—the Bill is a missed opportunity in that we have are not moving towards fusion law. For the benefit of those who are not all over the detail, at the moment the UK has two pieces of legislation regulating how to treat people in the absence of consent. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 came about from case law in the ’80s and ’90s and was codified in 2005. That Act broadly regulates physical health treatments for people who lack the capacity to consent—we have focused quite a lot on capacity in the recent debates on the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. The principles of the 2005 Act are autonomy and the functional capacity and best interests tests for people who lack capacity, meaning that we test someone’s capacity, and only if they lack capacity can we intervene in their best interests, sometimes by using deprivations of liberty. The Mental Health Act arose from a very different pathway. In its first days, it was more about the regulation of asylums. The Act is about status and risk. The gatekeeper conditions for the current Mental Health Act are that a patient has a mental disorder of a nature and a degree that requires assessment in hospital because of the risk to their health and to the safety of others. Capacity does not feature whatsoever. We have two pieces of legislation. One applies to the most severe mental disorders and deals with status and risk, and the other deals with autonomy and best interests. I strongly believe that the two need to be merged. We should use capacity and best interest frameworks to regulate treatment of mental disorder in the absence of consent—there are ways of doing that. I like the fact that we are starting to incorporate a bit more in the Bill.

• 16 May 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

  More

  I rise to speak to amendments 18, 30, 31, 17 and 32, which stand in my name. I will start with amendment 18. Many moral arguments on the need for the Bill have been proposed both inside and outside this place. Some of those arguments have addressed the desire for greater control at the end of life, but the vast majority have focused on the prevention of irreversible suffering. The principle of bodily autonomy—which I strongly support in the context of full decision-making capacity, with certain important caveats—is used to justify the rights that the Bill will grant. However, let us put aside the debate surrounding the Bill and focus on the text of the clauses, which is the task that we face on Report. The provisions are silent on suffering, silent on control and silent on all but a terminal illness with a prognosis of fewer than six months. If the principle is that we must prevent irreversible suffering, all those suffering irreversibly should be able to seek physician-assisted suicide. If the principle is that we should give people control—another level of expression of bodily autonomy—all adults who truly and freely consent with full decision-making capacity should be able to seek physician-assisted suicide. If those principles are circumscribed to an arbitrary definition of “terminal illness”, the inexorable conclusion must be that those patients’ suffering or autonomy are more important than those of others, or that their lives have less value. We have seen that position subtly imported into this debate. When requesting an assisted death is not framed as suicide because some perceive it as understandable, the underlying argument is, “If you’re terminally ill, of course you want to die—that’s understandable.” We must ensure that we do not, by accident or otherwise, enshrine in our statute book value judgments on the worth of the lives of the terminally ill or on the protections that they should enjoy like everyone else. I tabled amendment 18 to expand the scope of the Bill as much as I can to reduce the discrimination inherent within it. The maximum I could do was to remove the six-month restriction, but I wish the amendment could go further. I know that some Members will wince at this provision, but I ask them to ask themselves what the principles and values in the Bill are, how they are being applied and whether they are being applied equally. I believe that the Bill as drafted is incoherent and discriminatory. My amendment would introduce some moral clarity to the Bill. If we do not do so, the courts will. I turn to amendments 30 and 31. If we are to rely on the principle of autonomy to authorise physician-assisted suicide for terminal illness, the expressed choice must be true and free. Autonomy needs help, though. A true and free choice needs to be informed; a true and free choice cannot be made under coercion; a true and free choice requires decision-making capacity. I believe that, if we are to rely on the principle of autonomy for the most grave of decisions, there needs to actually be a choice. In the absence of relevant and available palliative care options, where is the choice? How can we rely on autonomy in the absence of choice? The prospect of people choosing physician-assisted suicide not because it meets their needs, but because their needs are unmet owing to a failure in the provision of palliative care, is a moral outrage. My amendments 30 and 31 would ensure that that does not happen.

• 16 May 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

  More

  Will the Minister give way?

• 16 May 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

  More

  I am sorry but I really cannot, given the time restrictions. Amendment 17 pertains to the test of decision-making capacity. In English and Welsh law, we use the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to define capacity, and I believe it is right that the functional test of capacity is used in this Bill. We have common law tests of capacity in some circumstances, which arose before we had the Mental Capacity Act. However, the decision to end one’s own life was not permitted in the early case law leading up to that Act. There is no jurisprudence background or guidance. These capacity tests have not been done before. This test needs a bit more of a framework of support. Amendment 17 lays out the minimum information that needs to be understood as part of the functional test of capacity. Critically, that would include information about the current treatment options, about doing nothing and about proceeding under this legislation. It would make clear that physician-assisted suicide is not a medical treatment, but a personal choice about life and death. Without amendment 17, this Bill will fundamentally undermine the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors do not prescribe death, and this Bill must make that clear. I turn finally to my amendment 32. There has been some discussion about the inadequacies of the decision-making capacity test as gatekeeper. In effect, there may be circumstances in which, despite having capacity, the person is otherwise recognised as vulnerable. That is how our courts operate. The impact of depression or personality disorder on decision-making capacity can be subtle and elusive. I know, as I used to be a consultant liaison psychiatrist and did research in the area of decision-making capacity. This is tricky stuff to do, especially in the context of a request for an intervention, rather than a refusal. We should have trained psychiatrists at an early stage assessing capacity. They are expert at picking up these subtle cues and all the other stuff that is going on. A request for physician-assisted suicide should not be taken in isolation, and that needs to be understood and supported. We need someone who knows how to use the Mental Health Act, because if a doctor is doing the assessment, and they have a patient in front of them with a mental disorder, expressing a desire to end their life, they need to make sure that that patient gets the right and appropriate treatment. That may well be using the Mental Health Act. We need to make sure that this happens; I hope it would happen as part of the process as usual, but there is no safeguard in the Bill to make sure that it does. Psychiatrists turning up on the panel at the end is not good enough; they need to be there from the start. Finally, there are broader issues about the interaction with protections to save life, article 2, and a doctor’s duties. I will cover those in the debate on the second grouping, along with the incredible importance of the Bill’s interaction with the suicide prevention strategy.

• 14 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  It is a pleasure to rise to speak on Lords amendments to the Data (Use and Access) Bill. Over the course of debating the Bill, it has become customary to thank those in the other place for the work they have done, particularly Baroness Owen for her work on deepfakes and others who have campaigned boldly in that area. I will begin by speaking to Lords amendment 49B. We have been clear that supporting the creative and AI sectors is not a zero-sum game; we need to support both sectors. Through their ham-fisted consultation on copyright and AI, the Government have raised great concern throughout the creative sector, and the resulting attempts to amend this Bill have been in response to the mess they have created. In Committee and on Report, we set out a series of amendments that focused on the outcome—not the process—for a solution in this area. Those amendments focused on ensuring that the position in law of copyright in this area was clear, on the need for proportionate and effective transparency, on removing barriers to start-ups, and on facilitating technological solutions via digital watermarking. In one of the many interventions on the Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Steve Barclay) mentioned the importance of implementing digital watermarking. He referred to it as a response to deepfakes, but it also has relevance to technical solutions, and it strikes me as quite odd that the Minister went on to cover broadly the same topics in his opening remarks, despite pointing out to my right hon. Friend that those topics were not relevant to the ongoing debate. That indicates how confused the treatment of this area in the Bill has become, and the need for clarity. I pay tribute to Viscount Camrose, Lord Parkinson, my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage), my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale), Baroness Kidron, and others in this House and in the other place, for their work on amendments to reach a resolution in this area. We had sympathy with earlier versions of those amendments, but also concerns about their workability and prescriptiveness. We have worked with Baroness Kidron to get to a position that we can now support; we believe that solutions need to incorporate the principles of transparency and proportionality. The amendment is not a perfect solution, but it is more reasonable than doing nothing. I find it astounding that the main criticism that the Minister has made of Lords amendment 49B is that it has a run-in period prior to implementation and that people are calling for things to happen now. That is an odd way of approaching legislating. As the Opposition, we are working with other parties, among others, to try to find a solution to get the Minister out of a hole. I hope that Members across the House support the amendment. Moving on to digital verification services, I welcome the Lords’ disagreement with amendments 32 and 52, and support their amendments 32B, 32C, 52B and 52C on sex data accuracy, which received the support of Members in the other place. As my noble Friend Viscount Camrose said in his speech, it was necessary to re-table amended versions of the clauses on data accuracy previously secured in the other place because our new clause 21 was not in scope for debate in the Lords. The Lords amendments are technical and complex, so if you will forgive me, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will speak briefly to new clause 21 to explain for the benefit of Members how things have evolved over time. Our new clause 21 would have compelled public authorities to correct the datasets they hold in relation to sex and to collect data on the protected characteristic of sex in accordance with the legal definition set out in the Supreme Court’s judgment: biological sex. It would also have allowed public authorities to collect data on acquired sex as recorded on a gender recognition certificate where that is relevant and lawful. It would have imposed no new obligations on the correction of data held by public authorities—the obligation already exists under article 5(1)(d) of the UK General Data Protection Regulation—but would simply have put in place a timescale for correcting data on sex. We know from the findings of the Sullivan review that that correction is much needed and long overdue. To address a misconception, new clause 21 was silent on how sex is recorded in physical and digital forms of identity for those holding a gender recognition certificate. That is a sensitive issue for the 8,500 holders of GRCs in the UK, and we hope that much-needed clarity in this area will be given by the Equality and Human Rights Commission in its guidance due to be laid before Parliament next month. It will be up to the Secretary of State to make rules as to how that guidance is implemented in digital verification services. However, that issue, while important, does not affect the clear obligation that already exists in law to record data on sex accurately. Lords amendments 32C and 32B, and disagreement with amendment 32, would compel the Secretary of State to examine whether the public authorities that will act as data sources for the digital verification services system ascertain sex data reliably in accordance with biological sex and, where lawful and relevant, with sex as recorded on a gender recognition certificate. That would prevent inaccurate sex data from being entrenched and proliferated in the digital verification services system. Lords amendments 52B and 52C, and disagreement with amendment 52, would give the Secretary of State the power to define in a data dictionary sex data as biological sex and, where relevant, sex as recorded on a gender recognition certificate. That could then be applied across the digital verification services system, the register of births and deaths, and other circumstances where public authorities record personal data. The amendments are critical for correcting our compromised datasets on sex and would ensure that poor-quality and inaccurate data does not undermine digital verification services. To be clear, if our amendments do not make it into the Bill, self-ID will be brought forward through the back door, risking the protections that single-sex spaces offer to everyone. Self-ID is not and never has been the position in UK law. I do not understand why the Government are resisting these measures. Digital verification systems need to be trustworthy to deliver the benefits intended by the Bill. If they are not trustworthy, the system will fail. I therefore commend these vital and much-needed amendments to the House.

• 14 May 2025 · Public Sector Productivity: Technology · Hansard source

  More

  Accurate data is important, particularly in the public sector—we will be voting on this later today. How will the Secretary of State measure his planned productivity improvements? How will he define success, and over what time period?

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  It is a privilege to respond to this debate on behalf of His Majesty’s official Opposition, and to speak to the new clauses and amendments. This is an ambitious piece of legislation, which will enable us to harness data—the currency of our digital age—and use it in a way that drives the economy and enhances the delivery of public services. Since its original inception under the Conservatives in the last Parliament, the Bill has also become the platform for tackling some of the most pressing social and technological issues of our time. Many of these are reflected in the amendments to the Bill, which are the subject of debate today. I start with new clause 20. How do we regulate the interaction of AI models with creative works? I pay tribute to the work of many Members on both sides of this House, and Members of the other place, who have passionately raised creatives’ concerns and the risks posed to their livelihoods by AI models. Conservative Members are clear that this is not a zero-sum game. Our fantastic creative and tech industries have the potential to turbocharge economic growth, and the last Government rightly supported them. The creative and technology sectors need and deserve certainty, which provides the foundation for investment and growth. New clause 20 would achieve certainty by requiring the Government to publish a series of plans on the transparency of AI models’ use of copyrighted works, removing market barriers for smaller AI market entrants and digital watermarking and, most important of all, a clear restatement of the application of copyright law to AI-modelling activities. I cannot help but have a sense of déjà vu in relation to Government new clause 17: we are glad that the Government have acted on several of the actions we called for in Committee, but once again they have chosen PR over effective policy. Amid all the spin, the Government have in effect announced a plan to respond to their own consultation—how innovative! What is starkly missing from the Government new clauses is a commitment to make it clear that copyright law applies to the use of creative content by AI models, which is the primary concern raised with me by industry representatives. The Government have created uncertainty about the application of copyright law to AI modelling through their ham-fisted consultation. So I offer the Minister another opportunity: will he formally confirm the application of copyright law to protect the use of creative works by AI, and will he provide legal certainty and send a strong signal to our creative industries that they will not be asked to pay the price for AI growth?

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the Minister for his clarification and reiteration of that point, and again for his work with colleagues to take forward the issue, on which I think we are in unison across the House. New clause 21 is on directions to public authorities on recording of sex data. One does not need to be a doctor to know that data accuracy is critical, particularly when it comes to health, research or the provision of tailored services based on protected characteristics such as sex or age. The accuracy of data must be at the heart of this Bill, and nowhere has this been more high-profile or important than in the debate over the collection and use of sex and gender data. I thank the charity Sex Matters and the noble Lords Arbuthnot and Lucas for the work they have done to highlight the need for accurate data and its relevance for the digital verification system proposed in the Bill.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  I have been very clear on this, and it is important in such a complex area to look at the detail and nuance of the challenges around— (Interruption.) Well, it is very easy to create a new clause where we click our fingers and say, “Let’s make this more illegal; let’s bring in x, y or z restriction.” As a responsible Opposition, we are looking at the detail and complexities around implementing something like this. [Interruption.] I have been asked a few questions and the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson) might want to listen to the rationale of our approach. One question is how to define social media. Direct messaging services such as WhatsApp and platforms such as YouTube fall in the scope of social media. There are obviously social media platforms that I think all of us are particularly concerned about, including Snapchat and TikTok, but by changing the age of digital consent we do not want to end up capturing lower-risk social media platforms that we recognise are clearly necessary or beneficial, such as education technology or health technology platforms. And that is before we start looking at whether age verification can work, particularly in the 13-to-16 age group.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  I thank the Minister for making that statement at the Dispatch Box. As he knows, we need to have that formally, in writing, as a statement from the Government to make it absolutely clear, given that the consultation has muddied the waters.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

  More

  I think that was wishful thinking by the Minister in this debate. Our new clause says that we need to look at the desirability of raising the digital age of consent for data processing from 13 to 16 in terms of its impact particularly on issues such as the social and educational development of children, but also the viability of doing so in terms of the fallout and the shaking out of the Online Safety Act and with regard to age verification services. Should there then be no evidence to demonstrate that it is unnecessary, we would then raise the digital age of consent to 13 to 16. It might be the case that, over the next six months, the shaking out of the Online Safety Act demonstrates that this intervention is not necessary. Perhaps concerns around particular high-risk social media platforms will change as technology evolves. We are saying that the Government should do the work with a view to raising the age in 18 months unless there is evidence to prove the contrary. [Interruption.] I have made this crystal clear, and if the Minister would choose to look at the new clause, rather than chuckling away in the corner, he might see the strategy we are proposing.