Ben Spencer MP: speeches

Speeches

• 19 May 2025 · Mental Health Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member is of course very knowledgeable given his background as a mental health nurse. I would like to see in the Bill a provision setting out that, in order to detain someone for the purposes of health or safety, they must lack decision-making capacity for the detention to be authorised. For the prevention of harm to others, there are reasons to overcome autonomy in decision-making capacity, but I would like to see an additional component specifying that if the detention for assessment and treatment in hospital is purely based on health and safety and not on risk of harm to others, the patient must also lack capacity. Otherwise, people who have full and intact decision-making capacity can nevertheless come into the scope of the powers. The liberty protection safeguards are a bit of a mess, quite frankly, and the DoLS were clearly a substantial mess. It is interesting that the legislative scrutiny of the Bill points out that it is a missed opportunity not to tidy up some of the interface between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act—a point that I will come to a little later in my speech. In terms of parity of esteem, bringing forward fusion law and gelling the Acts closer together needs to be the direction of travel. I hope that we do not have to waste another 20 years until we get the opportunity something like that. There is something else that we need to reflect on. It comes to my other points about the focus in the Bill, but I will reiterate it. The core focus of the Bill is on reducing detentions of people from black and minority ethnic groups, who are over-represented in detention. One of the key focuses in fixing that must be on socioeconomic deprivation—where we see socioeconomic deprivation, we see severe mental disorder following—but I worry that the Bill is a missed opportunity and will not do what is required to deal with those disparities. There are three problems with the Bill, and two things that I wish to flag. I am sensitive to the concerns that have been raised about people with autistic spectrum disorders and learning disabilities, and the advocacy regarding such people being in hospital. Being in a general adult ward is a challenging environment as it is, and it is particularly challenging for someone with an ASD or a learning disability. People can get stuck in hospital not really going anywhere. That concern applies to most disorders—I do not think it is unique, given the lack of community support services. I disagree, however, with the focus on ASD and LD above all other conditions. If we want to talk about non-progressive conditions, I do not understand why a brain injury, or Korsakoff’s dementia for example, are not within the scope of this measure. I do not understand why, rather than using the Bill to take people out of section 3 of the Mental Health Act, something like a bolstered treatability test is not used, which is what was in the Act before it was modified in 2007.

• 19 May 2025 · Mental Health Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  rose —

• 19 May 2025 · Mental Health Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak in support of the Bill. To begin with, I need to make a couple of declarations. I have a family member who is a consultant psychiatrist. I am now a non-practising general adult psychiatrist with an endorsement and years in psychiatry, and I previously worked as a consultant psychiatrist. I took part in the 2018 Wessely review as a panel member on the tribunal working group, and I was on the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee in the last Parliament. In a declaration of a more personal nature, this is an area that I feel passionately about. It is a great privilege to speak to this important piece of legislation and reforms going forward. The United Kingdom reforms its mental health legislation every 20 years or so. I did not want to correct the Secretary of State, but the first Mental Health Act was in 1959—I hope that was substantially before he was born, with reference to his earlier comments. The legislation has gone through various iterations from the original Lunacy Act and similar legislation in the 19th century. In the UK, we have always been at the forefront of reform to the law and to provisions and powers in this area. It is important in this Second Reading debate to focus on what the Mental Health Act is and what it does. Members have talked more broadly about the challenges of delivering mental health care currently, but it is important to reflect that the Mental Health Act is very specific and precise. It is about the regulation of detention—sometimes for assessment, sometimes for treatment—of people with mental disorder, and has a range of powers on aftercare and guardianship. It is focused on detention and assessment, or treatment, of people with mental disorder. We need that because there are times when people with severe mental illness become so unwell that they are unable to recognise their illness. Their illness puts their health at risk—predominantly through self-neglect or non-treatment. It puts their safety at risk, again through self-neglect, as well as through suicide. And, less commonly but critically, it puts them at risk of causing harm to others. The legal framework allows us to regulate compulsory treatment in that regard. It is absolutely critical that we have those powers so that, when people are so unwell that they do not recognise it and they lose agency, we can, as a compassionate society, take them into hospital and treat them, with a view to getting them back to themselves. I have used the 1983 Act countless times, applying it both to assessments and, as a section 12-approved doctor, to treatments, and I have used it as a responsible clinician. I suspect that I am one of the few Members of this House—certainly in this debate—who has had those roles and responsibilities. In terms of framing, it is important to reflect that one of the key changes in the 1983 Act, which is such an important piece of legislation, was that it was about restricting powers and ensuring that there were strong procedures for reviewing detentions. As a former health professional in this area, I am certain that all professionals working in it are mindful of the scope of powers that the Act provides. When applying restrictions, people do not use these powers in anger or without a great degree of thought and contemplation. The most intrusive intervention available to us in the health service is to detain and treat people in hospital or in secure hospital settings. Those powers are not taken lightly. A lot of concern was expressed at the start of the debate—and I am sure it will continue—about the way in which people have been treated in hospital. There have been some very high-profile scandals in which things have not worked well, to say the least, and care and treatment have been atrocious and abusive. However, people working in health and care in the UK are doing so because they want to see the best outcomes for their patients. Sometimes, they are limited in that because of the resources available. They do not use the Mental Health Act with a view to harming people, but with a view to helping them. Being detained under the Mental Health Act is not a prime facie harm; it is a treatment and a good thing. If someone needs to be detained and treated in hospital, they need to be detained and treated in hospital. If I became so unwell that I needed to be detained under the Act, I would want to be detained. Thankfully, I am not in that position today— [ Interruption. ] At least I believe that I am not, although the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans), might have a different view on that. [ Laughter. ] Should I get to the point where I am so unwell that I cannot consider my own care, I would want the powers of the Mental Health Act to be used quickly, particularly if I were posing a risk to myself, my family and others, so that I can get better and back to living my life. I pay tribute to Baroness May of Maidenhead, who kicked this off, and to Professor Sir Simon Wessely—a good friend—Stephen Gilbert, Sir Mark Hedley and Rabbi Baroness Neuberger for their work in the 2018 review. There is a lot of good work in the Bill, from the greater focus on advance care planning and the more frequent detention reviews, which I recognise may bring a workforce burden, to the provisions on nominated persons. I will not go into the detail in this Second Reading speech, but I will focus on a few general points on which I think a bit more work needs to be undertaken. In some ways—I will have to message Sir Simon after this to ask his forgiveness—the Bill is a missed opportunity in that we have are not moving towards fusion law. For the benefit of those who are not all over the detail, at the moment the UK has two pieces of legislation regulating how to treat people in the absence of consent. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 came about from case law in the ’80s and ’90s and was codified in 2005. That Act broadly regulates physical health treatments for people who lack the capacity to consent—we have focused quite a lot on capacity in the recent debates on the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. The principles of the 2005 Act are autonomy and the functional capacity and best interests tests for people who lack capacity, meaning that we test someone’s capacity, and only if they lack capacity can we intervene in their best interests, sometimes by using deprivations of liberty. The Mental Health Act arose from a very different pathway. In its first days, it was more about the regulation of asylums. The Act is about status and risk. The gatekeeper conditions for the current Mental Health Act are that a patient has a mental disorder of a nature and a degree that requires assessment in hospital because of the risk to their health and to the safety of others. Capacity does not feature whatsoever. We have two pieces of legislation. One applies to the most severe mental disorders and deals with status and risk, and the other deals with autonomy and best interests. I strongly believe that the two need to be merged. We should use capacity and best interest frameworks to regulate treatment of mental disorder in the absence of consent—there are ways of doing that. I like the fact that we are starting to incorporate a bit more in the Bill.

• 16 May 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I rise to speak to amendments 18, 30, 31, 17 and 32, which stand in my name. I will start with amendment 18. Many moral arguments on the need for the Bill have been proposed both inside and outside this place. Some of those arguments have addressed the desire for greater control at the end of life, but the vast majority have focused on the prevention of irreversible suffering. The principle of bodily autonomy—which I strongly support in the context of full decision-making capacity, with certain important caveats—is used to justify the rights that the Bill will grant. However, let us put aside the debate surrounding the Bill and focus on the text of the clauses, which is the task that we face on Report. The provisions are silent on suffering, silent on control and silent on all but a terminal illness with a prognosis of fewer than six months. If the principle is that we must prevent irreversible suffering, all those suffering irreversibly should be able to seek physician-assisted suicide. If the principle is that we should give people control—another level of expression of bodily autonomy—all adults who truly and freely consent with full decision-making capacity should be able to seek physician-assisted suicide. If those principles are circumscribed to an arbitrary definition of “terminal illness”, the inexorable conclusion must be that those patients’ suffering or autonomy are more important than those of others, or that their lives have less value. We have seen that position subtly imported into this debate. When requesting an assisted death is not framed as suicide because some perceive it as understandable, the underlying argument is, “If you’re terminally ill, of course you want to die—that’s understandable.” We must ensure that we do not, by accident or otherwise, enshrine in our statute book value judgments on the worth of the lives of the terminally ill or on the protections that they should enjoy like everyone else. I tabled amendment 18 to expand the scope of the Bill as much as I can to reduce the discrimination inherent within it. The maximum I could do was to remove the six-month restriction, but I wish the amendment could go further. I know that some Members will wince at this provision, but I ask them to ask themselves what the principles and values in the Bill are, how they are being applied and whether they are being applied equally. I believe that the Bill as drafted is incoherent and discriminatory. My amendment would introduce some moral clarity to the Bill. If we do not do so, the courts will. I turn to amendments 30 and 31. If we are to rely on the principle of autonomy to authorise physician-assisted suicide for terminal illness, the expressed choice must be true and free. Autonomy needs help, though. A true and free choice needs to be informed; a true and free choice cannot be made under coercion; a true and free choice requires decision-making capacity. I believe that, if we are to rely on the principle of autonomy for the most grave of decisions, there needs to actually be a choice. In the absence of relevant and available palliative care options, where is the choice? How can we rely on autonomy in the absence of choice? The prospect of people choosing physician-assisted suicide not because it meets their needs, but because their needs are unmet owing to a failure in the provision of palliative care, is a moral outrage. My amendments 30 and 31 would ensure that that does not happen.

• 16 May 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  Will the Minister give way?

• 16 May 2025 · Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am sorry but I really cannot, given the time restrictions. Amendment 17 pertains to the test of decision-making capacity. In English and Welsh law, we use the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to define capacity, and I believe it is right that the functional test of capacity is used in this Bill. We have common law tests of capacity in some circumstances, which arose before we had the Mental Capacity Act. However, the decision to end one’s own life was not permitted in the early case law leading up to that Act. There is no jurisprudence background or guidance. These capacity tests have not been done before. This test needs a bit more of a framework of support. Amendment 17 lays out the minimum information that needs to be understood as part of the functional test of capacity. Critically, that would include information about the current treatment options, about doing nothing and about proceeding under this legislation. It would make clear that physician-assisted suicide is not a medical treatment, but a personal choice about life and death. Without amendment 17, this Bill will fundamentally undermine the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors do not prescribe death, and this Bill must make that clear. I turn finally to my amendment 32. There has been some discussion about the inadequacies of the decision-making capacity test as gatekeeper. In effect, there may be circumstances in which, despite having capacity, the person is otherwise recognised as vulnerable. That is how our courts operate. The impact of depression or personality disorder on decision-making capacity can be subtle and elusive. I know, as I used to be a consultant liaison psychiatrist and did research in the area of decision-making capacity. This is tricky stuff to do, especially in the context of a request for an intervention, rather than a refusal. We should have trained psychiatrists at an early stage assessing capacity. They are expert at picking up these subtle cues and all the other stuff that is going on. A request for physician-assisted suicide should not be taken in isolation, and that needs to be understood and supported. We need someone who knows how to use the Mental Health Act, because if a doctor is doing the assessment, and they have a patient in front of them with a mental disorder, expressing a desire to end their life, they need to make sure that that patient gets the right and appropriate treatment. That may well be using the Mental Health Act. We need to make sure that this happens; I hope it would happen as part of the process as usual, but there is no safeguard in the Bill to make sure that it does. Psychiatrists turning up on the panel at the end is not good enough; they need to be there from the start. Finally, there are broader issues about the interaction with protections to save life, article 2, and a doctor’s duties. I will cover those in the debate on the second grouping, along with the incredible importance of the Bill’s interaction with the suicide prevention strategy.

• 14 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to rise to speak on Lords amendments to the Data (Use and Access) Bill. Over the course of debating the Bill, it has become customary to thank those in the other place for the work they have done, particularly Baroness Owen for her work on deepfakes and others who have campaigned boldly in that area. I will begin by speaking to Lords amendment 49B. We have been clear that supporting the creative and AI sectors is not a zero-sum game; we need to support both sectors. Through their ham-fisted consultation on copyright and AI, the Government have raised great concern throughout the creative sector, and the resulting attempts to amend this Bill have been in response to the mess they have created. In Committee and on Report, we set out a series of amendments that focused on the outcome—not the process—for a solution in this area. Those amendments focused on ensuring that the position in law of copyright in this area was clear, on the need for proportionate and effective transparency, on removing barriers to start-ups, and on facilitating technological solutions via digital watermarking. In one of the many interventions on the Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Steve Barclay) mentioned the importance of implementing digital watermarking. He referred to it as a response to deepfakes, but it also has relevance to technical solutions, and it strikes me as quite odd that the Minister went on to cover broadly the same topics in his opening remarks, despite pointing out to my right hon. Friend that those topics were not relevant to the ongoing debate. That indicates how confused the treatment of this area in the Bill has become, and the need for clarity. I pay tribute to Viscount Camrose, Lord Parkinson, my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage), my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale), Baroness Kidron, and others in this House and in the other place, for their work on amendments to reach a resolution in this area. We had sympathy with earlier versions of those amendments, but also concerns about their workability and prescriptiveness. We have worked with Baroness Kidron to get to a position that we can now support; we believe that solutions need to incorporate the principles of transparency and proportionality. The amendment is not a perfect solution, but it is more reasonable than doing nothing. I find it astounding that the main criticism that the Minister has made of Lords amendment 49B is that it has a run-in period prior to implementation and that people are calling for things to happen now. That is an odd way of approaching legislating. As the Opposition, we are working with other parties, among others, to try to find a solution to get the Minister out of a hole. I hope that Members across the House support the amendment. Moving on to digital verification services, I welcome the Lords’ disagreement with amendments 32 and 52, and support their amendments 32B, 32C, 52B and 52C on sex data accuracy, which received the support of Members in the other place. As my noble Friend Viscount Camrose said in his speech, it was necessary to re-table amended versions of the clauses on data accuracy previously secured in the other place because our new clause 21 was not in scope for debate in the Lords. The Lords amendments are technical and complex, so if you will forgive me, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will speak briefly to new clause 21 to explain for the benefit of Members how things have evolved over time. Our new clause 21 would have compelled public authorities to correct the datasets they hold in relation to sex and to collect data on the protected characteristic of sex in accordance with the legal definition set out in the Supreme Court’s judgment: biological sex. It would also have allowed public authorities to collect data on acquired sex as recorded on a gender recognition certificate where that is relevant and lawful. It would have imposed no new obligations on the correction of data held by public authorities—the obligation already exists under article 5(1)(d) of the UK General Data Protection Regulation—but would simply have put in place a timescale for correcting data on sex. We know from the findings of the Sullivan review that that correction is much needed and long overdue. To address a misconception, new clause 21 was silent on how sex is recorded in physical and digital forms of identity for those holding a gender recognition certificate. That is a sensitive issue for the 8,500 holders of GRCs in the UK, and we hope that much-needed clarity in this area will be given by the Equality and Human Rights Commission in its guidance due to be laid before Parliament next month. It will be up to the Secretary of State to make rules as to how that guidance is implemented in digital verification services. However, that issue, while important, does not affect the clear obligation that already exists in law to record data on sex accurately. Lords amendments 32C and 32B, and disagreement with amendment 32, would compel the Secretary of State to examine whether the public authorities that will act as data sources for the digital verification services system ascertain sex data reliably in accordance with biological sex and, where lawful and relevant, with sex as recorded on a gender recognition certificate. That would prevent inaccurate sex data from being entrenched and proliferated in the digital verification services system. Lords amendments 52B and 52C, and disagreement with amendment 52, would give the Secretary of State the power to define in a data dictionary sex data as biological sex and, where relevant, sex as recorded on a gender recognition certificate. That could then be applied across the digital verification services system, the register of births and deaths, and other circumstances where public authorities record personal data. The amendments are critical for correcting our compromised datasets on sex and would ensure that poor-quality and inaccurate data does not undermine digital verification services. To be clear, if our amendments do not make it into the Bill, self-ID will be brought forward through the back door, risking the protections that single-sex spaces offer to everyone. Self-ID is not and never has been the position in UK law. I do not understand why the Government are resisting these measures. Digital verification systems need to be trustworthy to deliver the benefits intended by the Bill. If they are not trustworthy, the system will fail. I therefore commend these vital and much-needed amendments to the House.

• 14 May 2025 · Public Sector Productivity: Technology · Hansard source

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  Accurate data is important, particularly in the public sector—we will be voting on this later today. How will the Secretary of State measure his planned productivity improvements? How will he define success, and over what time period?

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  It is a privilege to respond to this debate on behalf of His Majesty’s official Opposition, and to speak to the new clauses and amendments. This is an ambitious piece of legislation, which will enable us to harness data—the currency of our digital age—and use it in a way that drives the economy and enhances the delivery of public services. Since its original inception under the Conservatives in the last Parliament, the Bill has also become the platform for tackling some of the most pressing social and technological issues of our time. Many of these are reflected in the amendments to the Bill, which are the subject of debate today. I start with new clause 20. How do we regulate the interaction of AI models with creative works? I pay tribute to the work of many Members on both sides of this House, and Members of the other place, who have passionately raised creatives’ concerns and the risks posed to their livelihoods by AI models. Conservative Members are clear that this is not a zero-sum game. Our fantastic creative and tech industries have the potential to turbocharge economic growth, and the last Government rightly supported them. The creative and technology sectors need and deserve certainty, which provides the foundation for investment and growth. New clause 20 would achieve certainty by requiring the Government to publish a series of plans on the transparency of AI models’ use of copyrighted works, removing market barriers for smaller AI market entrants and digital watermarking and, most important of all, a clear restatement of the application of copyright law to AI-modelling activities. I cannot help but have a sense of déjà vu in relation to Government new clause 17: we are glad that the Government have acted on several of the actions we called for in Committee, but once again they have chosen PR over effective policy. Amid all the spin, the Government have in effect announced a plan to respond to their own consultation—how innovative! What is starkly missing from the Government new clauses is a commitment to make it clear that copyright law applies to the use of creative content by AI models, which is the primary concern raised with me by industry representatives. The Government have created uncertainty about the application of copyright law to AI modelling through their ham-fisted consultation. So I offer the Minister another opportunity: will he formally confirm the application of copyright law to protect the use of creative works by AI, and will he provide legal certainty and send a strong signal to our creative industries that they will not be asked to pay the price for AI growth?

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for his clarification and reiteration of that point, and again for his work with colleagues to take forward the issue, on which I think we are in unison across the House. New clause 21 is on directions to public authorities on recording of sex data. One does not need to be a doctor to know that data accuracy is critical, particularly when it comes to health, research or the provision of tailored services based on protected characteristics such as sex or age. The accuracy of data must be at the heart of this Bill, and nowhere has this been more high-profile or important than in the debate over the collection and use of sex and gender data. I thank the charity Sex Matters and the noble Lords Arbuthnot and Lucas for the work they have done to highlight the need for accurate data and its relevance for the digital verification system proposed in the Bill.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I have been very clear on this, and it is important in such a complex area to look at the detail and nuance of the challenges around— (Interruption.) Well, it is very easy to create a new clause where we click our fingers and say, “Let’s make this more illegal; let’s bring in x, y or z restriction.” As a responsible Opposition, we are looking at the detail and complexities around implementing something like this. [Interruption.] I have been asked a few questions and the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson) might want to listen to the rationale of our approach. One question is how to define social media. Direct messaging services such as WhatsApp and platforms such as YouTube fall in the scope of social media. There are obviously social media platforms that I think all of us are particularly concerned about, including Snapchat and TikTok, but by changing the age of digital consent we do not want to end up capturing lower-risk social media platforms that we recognise are clearly necessary or beneficial, such as education technology or health technology platforms. And that is before we start looking at whether age verification can work, particularly in the 13-to-16 age group.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for making that statement at the Dispatch Box. As he knows, we need to have that formally, in writing, as a statement from the Government to make it absolutely clear, given that the consultation has muddied the waters.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I think that was wishful thinking by the Minister in this debate. Our new clause says that we need to look at the desirability of raising the digital age of consent for data processing from 13 to 16 in terms of its impact particularly on issues such as the social and educational development of children, but also the viability of doing so in terms of the fallout and the shaking out of the Online Safety Act and with regard to age verification services. Should there then be no evidence to demonstrate that it is unnecessary, we would then raise the digital age of consent to 13 to 16. It might be the case that, over the next six months, the shaking out of the Online Safety Act demonstrates that this intervention is not necessary. Perhaps concerns around particular high-risk social media platforms will change as technology evolves. We are saying that the Government should do the work with a view to raising the age in 18 months unless there is evidence to prove the contrary. [Interruption.] I have made this crystal clear, and if the Minister would choose to look at the new clause, rather than chuckling away in the corner, he might see the strategy we are proposing.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  rose—

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I would therefore be grateful if the Minister said why there remains uncertainty among creatives about the application of copyright in this area. Is that not why we need to move this forward? I now turn to Government amendment 34 and others. I congratulate my noble Friend Baroness Owen on the tremendous work she has done in ensuring that clauses criminalising the creation of and request for sexually explicit deepfake images have made it into the Bill. I also thank the Government for the constructive approach they are now taking in this area.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I say again that the position is that, following a careful look at the evidence regarding the desirability and validity of doing so—taking into account findings regarding the impact and implementation of the Online Safety Act and age verification and how one defines social media, particularly high-risk platforms—unless there is direct evidence to show that raising the age from 13 to 16 is unnecessary, which there may be, then we should raise it from 13 to 16. If that has not provided clarity, the hon. Gentleman is very welcome to intervene on me again and I will try and explain it a third time, but I think Members have got a grasp now. This new clause will also tackle some of the concerns at the heart of the campaign for Jools’ law, and I pay tribute to Ellen Roome for her work in this area. I am very sympathetic to the tragic circumstances leading to this campaign and welcome the additional powers granted to coroners in the Bill, but I know that they do not fully address Ellen Roome’s concerns. The Government need to explain how they can be sure that data will be retained in the context of these tragedies, so that a coroner will be able to make sure, even if there are delays, that it can be accessed. If the Minister could provide an answer to that in his winding-up speech, and detail any further work in the area, that would be welcome. On parental access to children’s data more broadly, there are difficult challenges in terms of article 8 rights on privacy and transparency, especially for children aged 16 to 17 as they approach adulthood. Our new clause addresses some of these concerns and would also put in place the groundwork to, de facto, raise the digital age of consent for inappropriate social media to 16 within 18 months, rendering the request for parental access to young teenage accounts obsolete. I urge colleagues across the House to support all our amendments today as a balanced, proportionate and effective response to a generational challenge. The Bill and the votes today are an opportunity for our Parliament, often referred to as the conscience of our country, to make clear our position on some of the most pressing social and technological issues of our time.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for her intervention, and I will shortly come on to the impact on all people of the decision of the Supreme Court. Our new clause’s focus and scope are simple. The Supreme Court ruling made it clear that public bodies must collect data on biological sex to comply with their duties under the Equality Act. The new clause ensures that this data is recorded and used correctly in accordance with the law. This is about data accuracy, not ideology. New clause 21 is based in part on the work of Professor Alice Sullivan, who conducted a very important review, with deeply concerning findings on inaccurate data collection and the conflation of gender identity with biological sex data. She found people missed off health screening, risks to research integrity, inaccurate policing records and management through the criminal justice system, and many other concerns. These concerns present risks to everyone, irrespective of biological sex, gender identity or acquired gender. Trans people, like everyone else, need health screening based on their biological sex. Trans people need protecting from sexual predators, too, and they have the right to dignity and respect. The Sullivan report shows beyond doubt that the concerns of the last Government and the current Leader of the Opposition were entirely justified. The Government have had Professor Sullivan’s report since September last year, but the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology has still not made a formal statement about it or addressed the concerns raised, which is even more surprising given its relevance to this Bill. The correction of public authority data on sex is necessary and urgent, but it is made even more critical by the implementation of the digital verification services in the Bill.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  That is good to hear.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for her intervention, and for all the work that she and colleagues on both sides of the House are doing in this area. I hope that the findings of the Sullivan report are implemented as soon as possible, and part of that implementation would be made possible if Members across the House supported our new clause. For the digital verification services to be brought in, it is important that the data used to inform them is accurate and correct. Digital verification could be used to access single-sex services, so it needs to be correct, and if sex and gender data are conflated, as we know they are in many datasets, a failure to act will bring in self-ID by the back door. To be clear, that has never been the legal position in the UK, and it would conflict with the ruling of the Supreme Court. Our new clause 21 is simple and straightforward. It is about the accurate collection and use of sex data, and rules to ensure that data is of the right standard when used in digital verification services so that single-sex services are not undermined. New clause 19 is on the Secretary of State’s duty to review the age of consent for data processing under the UK GDPR. What can or should children be permitted to consent to when using or signing up to online platforms and social media? How do we ensure children are protected, and how do we prevent harms from the use of inappropriate social media itself, separate from the content provided? How do we help our children in a world where social media can import the school, the playground, the changing room, the influencer, the stranger, the groomer, the radical and the hostile state actor all into the family home? Our children are the first generation growing up in the digital world, and they are exposed to information and weaponised algorithms on a scale that simply did not exist for their parents. In government, we took measures to improve protections and regulate harmful content online, and I am delighted to see those measures now coming into force. However, there is increasing evidence that exposure to inappropriate social media platforms is causing harm, and children as young as 13 may not be able to regulate and process this exposure to such sites in a safe and proportionate way. I am sure every Member across the House will have been contacted by parents concerned about the impact of social media on their children, and we recognise that this is a challenging area to regulate. How do we define and target risky and inappropriate social media platforms, and ensure that education and health tech—or, indeed, closed direct messaging services—do not fall within scope? How effective are our provisions already, and can age verification be made to work for under-16s? What ids are available to use? What will the impact of the Online Safety Act 2023 be now that it is coming into force? What are the lessons from its implementation, and where does it need strengthening? Finally, how do we support parents and teachers in educating and guiding children so they are prepared to enter the digital world at whatever age they choose and are able to do so? The Government must take action to ensure appropriate safeguards are in place for our children, not through outright bans or blanket restrictions but with an evidence-based approach that takes into account the recent legal changes and need for effective enforcement, including age verification for under-16s. Too often in this place we focus on making more things illegal rather than on the reasons for lack of enforcement in the first place. There is no point in immediate restrictions if they cannot be implemented.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  For the fourth time, and as I have said, new clause 19 would effectively create a de facto position whereby there are restrictions on the use of inappropriate social media services by children. It seeks to tackle the challenges of implementation, age verification and the scope of social media. It says that there needs to be work to make sure that we can actually do so and that, when we can, we should move in that direction, unless there is overwhelming evidence that it is not needed, such as with the shaking out of the Online Safety Act. Finally, I return to new clause 21. Sadly, it has been widely misrepresented. The laws in this area are clear: the Equality Act puts in place obligations in relation to protected characteristics. The Supreme Court says that “sex” means biological sex, and that public authorities must collect data on protected characteristics to meet their duties under the Equality Act. The new clause would put that clear legal obligation into effect, and build in data minimisation principles to preserve privacy. There would be no outing of trans people through the new clause, but where public authorities collect and use sex data, it would need to be biological sex data.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  There are a few issues with new clause 1. One is the scope in terms of the definition of networking services and ensuring platforms such as WhatsApp are not captured within it. Looking at new clause 19, there are challenges to implementing in this area. There is no point in clicking our fingers and saying, “Let’s change the age of digital consent,” without understanding the barriers to implementation, and without understanding whether age verification can work in this context. We do not want to create a system and have people just get around it quite simply. We need the Government to do the work in terms of setting it up so that we can move towards a position of raising the age from 13 to 16.

• 7 May 2025 · Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords] · Hansard source

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  It has been a pleasure to hear the speeches of Members from across the House. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale), who spoke with passion about the protection of copyright in AI. I suspect that my right hon. Friend is looking forward to seeing the back of the Bill, and hoping that it does not return in a future iteration. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) spoke of the importance of ensuring that data does not fall victim to hostile states and hostile state actors. My right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds) spoke with knowledge and authority about this important issue, and the challenges and practicalities involved in ensuring that we get it right for our children. I will return to the three themes that we have put forward. The Minister has repeatedly given assurances on the application of copyright with regard to AI training, but the Secretary of State created uncertainty by saying in the AI copyright consultation: “At present, the application of UK copyright law to the training of AI models is disputed.” When we create that level of uncertainty, we need at least an equal level of clarity to make amends, and that is partly what our new clause 20 calls for: among other things, a formal statement from the Intellectual Property Office or otherwise. I do not see why it is a challenge for the Government to put that forward and deliver.

• 29 Apr 2025 · River Thames: Unauthorised Mooring · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Lady for giving way in such an important debate. I entirely share her frustrations about progress with these boats. This issue affects many of my constituents not just in Weybridge, but across my constituency. I am sure that she will come on to this point. Given the nature of rivers, does she agree that a positive step forward would be working with me, my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp), the hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mr Reynolds) and the Minister to try to get a group together so that rather than pushing the boats on, we can tackle the issue once and for all?

• 29 Apr 2025 · River Thames: Unauthorised Mooring · Hansard source

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  I have had countless meetings with the EA linked with Elmbridge and in trying to deal with this problem, particularly in Desborough cut and Weybridge. Does the Minister think that the EA has sufficient powers in statute to be able to tackle this issue? She just mentioned discretionary powers. Do we need to change the law so that this can be dealt with once and for all?

• 23 Apr 2025 · Intellectual Property: Artificial Intelligence · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey, and to respond on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition in this very well-attended, knowledgeable and thoughtful debate. Given that so many Members have taken part, I can only make some brief remarks. I want to focus on principles, which came up quite a few times throughout this debate. In a complex area, it is principles that help us get through. It seems to be tradition in this debate to say happy birthday to the hon. Member for Bury North (Mr Frith)—he will be clipping this so that it can go out on his social media. He spoke with knowledge and passion, and there is not much to disagree with in what he said. He also mentioned what I see as the core principles—transparency; the ability to enforce copyright; the ability to demonstrate where data comes from, so that we can see who owns it and what the root trace is; and a technological solution linked to that, in terms of demonstrating data ownership. I also mention my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage), the Chair of the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, who reiterated this week, importantly, that all companies need property rights to be enforced, and that these two are not mutually exclusive. I thank her for her extensive work in this area to push forward this debate. The previous Government were committed to the UK being at the cutting edge of tech and creative industries, and we remain committed to that in Opposition. We have heard the concerns of the creative industries loud and clear, but we do not believe that there is anything to be gained by treating the emergence of AI as some sort of zero-sum game, where one industry wins and another fails. It should not be an either/or. This needs to be mutually inclusive, not mutually exclusive, and we believe that it is possible to achieve that. This is a challenging and complex area to get right. Solving this problem is not simple, particularly if we look at what is happening internationally and at extra-jurisdictional issues. Quite simply, other areas have not fixed this either. If there was a straightforward solution for this problem, it would be in process right now. It is important to recognise that from the outset, and to recognise the challenge facing the Minister in fixing the problem, but I have ambition for him. I believe that he can fix it, and I look forward to him doing so over the course of the next year. It is in this direction that we as Opposition want to take things forward. We believe that getting this area of policy right will mean focusing on some key principles. Most importantly, there should be proportionate transparency in our AI industries about how they use creative content to train their models and generate content. That should be combined with recognition and enforceability of creative rights. The development of technology in the form of a readily accessible digital watermark will be instrumental in helping creatives protect their work online. Start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises in our growing AI industries need to be supported to develop their models in a way that respects the rights of creatives. In that regard, the AI opportunities action plan identified the need to unlock public and private datasets to enable innovation and attract international talent and capital. We tabled a series of pragmatic amendments to the Data (Use and Access) Bill in Committee that would have committed the Secretary of State to putting in place a plan to achieve those important aims within a reasonable period after the conclusion of the Government’s consultation on copyright and AI. We understand that the Government have received in excess of 11,500 consultation responses from stakeholders, which they are in the process of analysing. Given the concern that their original plans caused in our creative industries, we welcome the Minister’s announcement, following the closure of the consultation, that the Government have taken a second look at their preferred approach to regulating the sector. In particular, we welcome the renewed emphasis on the need for increased transparency about how models are trained, so that creatives can enforce their rights. This is a key area that has come up throughout the debate, and we called on the Government to set out an informed plan in Committee on the data Bill. We appreciate that the impact of AI on intellectual property requires proper and careful consideration. We will work constructively to support the creation of policy and plans in this fundamentally important area. If we get it right, there will be tremendous economic and societal benefits to growing our AI sector and supporting our creative sector to continue to thrive. It is time for the Government to be clear about their plans, in order to create certainty for the AI and creative industries about the way forward and help promote an environment of confidence, paving the way for investment and growth.