Ben Obese-Jecty MP: speeches

Speeches

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  I do—we need to get more pilots through the door, and I have asked numerous questions about our ratio of pilots to aircraft. I appreciate that the Minister does not want to divulge that information, but I would suggest that currently, it is not as good as it could be. The joint programme office that should fix the F-35 is undergoing a global support solution reset that will cost an additional $13.7 billion. I would be interested to hear from the Minister whether any of that figure will be paid for by us in the UK. As a result, there is no timeline for completing technology refresh 3, which 72% of our F-35Bs still require, and no timeline for the completion of the block 4 upgrade. Talk of the 12 F-35As for the NATO nuclear mission—which the hon. Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst) mentioned—has gone suspiciously quiet, with rumours that they will be cut, and that is before we talk about the four-year lead times for low rate initial production material required to build them. Crucially, though, there is currently no more money allocated to the F-35 Lightning programme. The departmental budget laid out in the integrated review defence Command Paper back in 2021 only included the procurement of the 48 we now have; all new funding for the F-35 will need to be outlined in the defence investment plan. That brings us on to drones. We know that the RAF is committed to having the Tempest as a manned platform, but by the time it comes into service, the US will be a decade deep into its collaborative combat aircraft programme. It has just awarded General Atomics and Anduril sizeable contracts for the FQ-42A Dark Merlin and FQ-44A Fury uncrewed fighter jets. The Secretary of the Air Force has stated that the US plans to “procure over 150 combat capable CCA by the end of the decade.” The US has budgeted $1 billion for CCA procurement, $822 million for modifications, and another $1.4 billion for research and development. How much of the £10 billion of additional funds available for our entire defence budget do we think we are planning to spend? When the defence investment plan is published, we will need to look closely at investment in those projects that should deliver drones. How does this all tie together? I have spoken briefly about Project ASGARD before—the Chief of the General Staff, speaking at the RUSI land warfare conference earlier, talked about the need to be able to strike Russia within 30 minutes—but whether or not this is properly resourced in the DIP will be instrumental to our fortunes. We need to move past our current squeamishness and invest properly in both Project ASGARD and its RAF cousin, Project BOYD. I was fortunate enough to visit a demonstration of ASGARD during Exercise Arrcade Strike last month, which gave a glimpse of how the next war might be fought. My takeaway, however, was how desperately it will need to be invested in. We risk being a day late and a dollar short when it comes to an integrated anti-access/area denial and integrated air and missile defence solution. The reluctance of our senior leaders to move from an in-the-loop and on-the-loop approach to the kill chain to an on-the-loop and out-of-the-loop posture concerns me—it is better to have the capability and not need it than need it and not have it. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed to me last week that the MOD is looking at machine vision for lock-on in the terminal phase of one-way effectors, but we must move further and faster. For all the talk of defence investment in exquisite capabilities, nobody is suggesting that we increase the mass of the Army significantly. That is before we consider that every single vehicle platform the Army operates, except for Foxhound, is due to go out of service by 2030. Our ability to field an armoured division is at best optimistic; in reality, it is laughable. My own background is in armoured infantry, as is that of my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp), and were we to try and field an armoured battlegroup—let alone a division—I would be interested to see what form it would take. At the front of any armoured push is formation reconnaissance. That role should by now be delivered by Ajax. My views on Ajax are well documented, as I delivered a debate on the topic in Westminster Hall earlier this year, but what progress has been made since then? In the wake of Exercise Titan Storm, the Government commissioned an independent expert panel review. The results of that review have been submitted via a final report, but the Minister appears hesitant to publish the outcome. I would be grateful if he published those findings for scrutiny in the House now that the review has concluded. In his summing up, could the Minister outline when the House will receive an update on that review’s findings? We know that the first phase of bringing Ajax up to speed will require the restarting of trials with the current version of Ajax, but the Minister has also informed me that the current platform requires a number of upgrades outside the scope of work in upgrading from capability drop 3 to capability drop 4, including improvements to the electrical power generation system, the crew compartment heating and the air filtration system. Although those sound like gremlins that need to be worked through on any new platform, can he tell me which of those modifications, if any, will mitigate the injuries sustained by service personnel on Exercise Titan Storm? Ajax must be a success—we cannot afford to be stuck with a platform that no other country is willing to buy. The reputational damage to the platform is in danger of being baked in if the Government do not get the fix right first time. All 589 hulls have been built, and the factory will have no further work once those vehicles are assembled and rolled out. What work will the General Dynamics facility in Merthyr Tydfil then have to do? When I raised that question with the Government, they stated that it is an issue for General Dynamics. There is a reason the Government did not include that facility within the scope of the defence growth deal for Wales. Put simply, the Government cannot afford for Ajax to fail, neither from a defence exports perspective—and there are currently no pending orders—nor from a capability perspective. The Government know this, having made no assessment of any potential replacement platforms such as the Combat Vehicle 90, so when will we finally see Ajax realise its potential? Sadly, though, that is not the only issue. Behind Ajax should be Challenger 3, but Challenger 3 remains in the demonstration phase and, based on reports in The Telegraph last week, is now beset by problems. The turret power traverse gearbox is potentially proving to be a problem that may push back delivery of the tank by years—to put that in layman’s terms, that is the part that makes the turret rotate. The Government have now said that this is not the case, but it is concerning that they are yet to declare the planning assumption for service entry for the new tank, despite all 148 remaining Challenger 2 tanks being in scope for upgrade and conversion. The Government have also previously told me that they are continuing to explore export opportunities for Challenger 3. What export opportunities? We have 148 main battle tanks; how many are we planning to sell, and who would buy them? We have no plans to replace them. I would be interested to understand the full scope of the Army’s heavy armour automotive improvement programme. In January, the Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry told me: “Manufacturing will begin once the tank’s performance is proven, rather than being tied to a specific deadline.” By when does he anticipate the tank’s performance will be assessed to have made the grade? Meanwhile, our allies look elsewhere to rearm. With both the Franco-German main ground combat system to replace the Leclerc and Leopard 2 respectively and other fledgling initiatives, what is the future of armour? “Behind the tanks” Warrior is due to go out of service next year, currently with no realistic replacement. Warrior is due to be replaced by a mixture of Boxer and the Ajax-derived Ares, but neither looks set to be ready in time. More concerningly, the Government’s position appears to have shifted once again, with the Minister telling me last week: “Under current plans, Boxer is initially being fielded as a supporting capability to Armoured Units within 3rd (UK) Division, before being fielded to Mechanised Infantry Units between 2030-2035.” Warrior goes out of service next year, so what is filling this capability gap? We have not yet seen an order for the Patria 6x6 as part of the common armoured vehicle system. The Government told me recently that they were continuing to monitor the market for potential future platforms, but the defence investment plan is supposedly to be published next week, so why have these decisions not already been made? From a Royal Navy perspective, it is no secret that the hybrid Navy concept is the direction in which they are sailing. The commitment of the Royal Marines to the High North and potential investment in a joint commando craft or littoral strike craft would illustrate a longer-term commitment to that force posture, but the hybrid Navy concept means that the Type 83 is dead in the water. The decision to gift Type 26 build slots to the Royal Norwegian Navy kicks the can down the road when it comes to the sticky issue of when we need to pay for the new ships, with just eight to be built for us and a further five for the Norwegians. Given our significant commitment to global operations in comparison with the commitment of the Norwegians, do we really think that just three more ships will cover our global commitments? This has been a whistlestop tour through just some of the myriad capabilities that will need to be detailed in the defence investment plan within the next week or so. [Laughter.] I left a lot out! Members are chuckling, but I could have gone on for another hour. We need to spend more on defence. We need to resource our military to meet the threats that we face, not the ones that we would like to. If this Prime Minister, this Chancellor and this Defence Secretary will not find the funding required by cutting the welfare budget or changing the fiscal rules, they should make way for someone who will—but perhaps that will happen sooner rather than later.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I do not disagree. I recognise the point that the hon. and gallant Gentleman is making and his passion for delivering what he describes. I am a member of said all-party parliamentary group, and I am happy to push in order to try and get this across the line. I also recognise the politics of this. Although I am not sure his party will welcome him apparently somewhat throwing the Home Office under the bus in this instance, I recognise that there are complexities around the ability to deliver from a Home Office perspective. I know that is something that the Conservatives encountered when we were in government, and I imagine it is very much the same situation for the Government now. I insist that new clause 5 is still a good new clause. It would come in the right place within the Armed Forces Bill. I recognise that the hon. and gallant Gentleman is trying to give the Government some wiggle room to get out of voting for the new clause this evening, but I am convinced that it should be voted on, and that we should push it forward in order to put some pressure on the Home Office.

• 26 Mar 2026 · A14 Environmental Mitigation: Huntingdon · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for his response the other day to my written question, which made clear that the trees would be replanted alongside the A14. I have surveyed that area in recent weeks, and it is real mess. The land has simply not been maintained after the environmental land-management schemes were put in place, so it is reassuring to hear that the trees will be replaced. However, there are other problems with some of the schemes: some of the buildings that were compulsorily purchased have not been maintained and have become dilapidated, National Highways is ransoming access to the land to local developers by charging a 30% shared value increase, just so that developers can gain access to the A14, and we have dangerous at-grade junctions. Will the Minister meet me to discuss some of the problems that we have with access to the A14 in Huntingdonshire, so that my constituents can be reassured that we are working hard to ensure that that road works as it should?

• 23 Feb 2026 · Schools White Paper: Every Child Achieving and Thriving · Hansard source

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  It was not lost on me this morning that the Secretary of State announced the SEND White Paper in Peterborough, just down the road from my constituency of Huntingdon. It comes under Cambridgeshire county council, which has a terrible record of delivering EHCPs. I have spoken to dozens of schools and hundreds of parents in my constituency who are beside themselves at the length of time it is taking Cambridgeshire county council to deliver EHCPs. Not only is it not within the 20-week statutory timeframe; it sometimes takes 20 months-plus. Can the Secretary of State reassure my constituents that these plans will immediately address those concerns about the delivery of EHCPs and make a real difference to the children who are waiting for those much-needed plans?

• 11 Feb 2026 · Police Grant Report · Hansard source

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  The police are required to pick up the slack in so many different aspects of this, and I do not think that that is factored into or reflected in the way we are looking at the force structures. I hope that it will be factored into the review of the forces. Coming back to rural crime, in my constituency of Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire constabulary has an effective and successful rural crime action team, but they are only 14 strong and cover a huge rural area. This must be factored into discussions and not risk being lost in the maelstrom of big-ticket policing items brought under national control and a myopic focus on urban and neighbourhood policing. It is my understanding that the rural crime action team, who specialise in dealing with machinery theft, GPS theft and hare coursing, have been moved from being operational support unit officers to being designated as neighbourhood policing officers. They are specialist officers required to do a specialist role. They are not bobbies on the beat in the villages around my constituency and they are never going to be that, so it is annoying to see that they are being restructured in that way. Redesignating rural crime specialist officers as neighbourhood officers to balance the books and tick an administrative box is not going to cut it. Cambridgeshire constabulary proved itself to be an effective force with the swift manner in which it neutralised the assailant following the Huntingdon train attack last November. Speaking to my local officers, I know that there are huge inconsistencies in the way in which each force is managed, and I ask the Policing Minister for clarity on how those discrepancies will be harmonised intra-force. We know that overtime calculations for police officers lack consistency from force to force, as does the application of the adjustment bank for outstanding hours owed. These issues are affecting officers on the ground. Not every issue in policing is an operational resourcing question. Much of the pressure officers are experiencing is due to administrative inconsistencies, from pay inequality, given the south-east allowance, to officers wearing body armour that is past its expiration date because of failings in the procurement system—a tragic front-page scandal waiting to happen. To conclude, I ask the Policing Minister to consider: ringfenced funding for rural crime action teams in the new force structure so that rural crime can be eradicated once and for all; pay disparities, particularly in regard to eligibility for the south-east allowance, the application of overtime eligibility and the management of the adjustment bank; and consortium contracting, and particularly the risk posed by reliance on one make of vehicle, including the use of Volvos by any force, given that Volvo is now owned by the Chinese Zhejiang Geely Holding Group. I believe I have a meeting scheduled with the Policing Minister, and I would be keen to continue the discussion around these issues with her on behalf of the officers in my county who have received a raw deal for far too long.

• 29 Jan 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  The Ajax armoured vehicle programme is currently under threat, but work is due to be completed at the Merthyr Tydfil factory next summer. Could the Minister confirm whether there are any conversations through the UK Defence and Security Exports office around securing an export package for the Ajax vehicle and guaranteeing work at the factory going forwards?

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend again, and I absolutely concur. With the delays to Ajax, we can no longer afford to fail to upgrade Challenger 2 to Challenger 3. The fact that the timeline of that has slipped to indefinite is a serious concern for our armoured capability. A successful export programme would fuel development of the platform and allow it to improve over multiple iterations. It would enhance our own capability, and allow us to benefit from the first-mover advantage of adopting a common vehicle platform that can be expanded with the addition of an IFV and a mortar variant, putting us in the vanguard of armoured development in the drone age. But that cannot happen without the vehicle proving its capability—first with the soldiers, then with our allies. In a crowded field, that should be a top priority. In “The Iliad”, Ajax loses a competition to Odysseus and, distraught by the result and conquered by his own grief, plunges his sword into his own chest, killing himself out of shame at his own failure. The irony should not be lost on any of us. Fix Ajax, and fix it quickly. There is a war coming.

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

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  I thank everybody who participated in this very detailed debate. The Welsh Members who spoke represented the workers at the factory in Merthyr Tydfil extremely well; it is important that their voices are also heard in this debate. From my perspective, it is very important that we focus on how to deliver Ajax as a capability. I appreciate everything that the Minister said about the changing character of conflict and the changing nature of warfare. Ukraine has certainly moved the dial, particularly on armoured warfare and the survivability and lethality of armour going forward, and I know that the Chief of the General Staff has a very detailed view on how he wants to progress our lethality across the Army, particularly with regard to what that looks like going forward. Ajax is in danger of being superseded by events; indeed, there is a potential that it is almost out of date. It is important that we consider how to make it relevant for the future, given that it has had a significant investment. Yes, it is late, but we can still utilise it, if we can harness its capability. I spoke to soldiers who have used the platform successfully—there are some—and they were positive about the capability of the vehicle. The wider issue is that we do not have an armoured capability that backs that up. It is the tip of the spear, but the handle of the spear is not up to standard. There are some serious concerns around how we maintain the capability of Challenger and what the armoured infantry looks like in the future. I would like to thank everybody for participating in the debate. Question put and agreed to. Resolved, That this House has considered the future of the Ajax Programme.

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

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  I absolutely concur with my right hon. Friend that Boxer is a vital capability—even more so, given the training pause that we are now encountering with Ajax—and we need to get Boxer into service as quickly as possible. I welcome the speeding up of that process overall. Meanwhile in October, the then Minister for the Armed Forces had stated: “Currently ARES will be fielded to Training Regiments, Armoured Cavalry units and Armoured Infantry units.” As I said, we have ordered only 93. For reference, in order to reflect the establishment of an armoured infantry battalion, we would need 45 Ares to replace the capacity of the Warrior FV510, notwithstanding how many Athena variants we would need to cover the 511 command variant. Where is the capacity to have vehicles at training regiments and armoured cavalry units? There is no redundancy built into the current vehicle fleet. The 93 Ares platforms equate to just 23 per battalion with no spare capacity, which is not even enough to replace three rifle companies’ worth of the Warrior FV510 variant. Can the Minister explain what the future establishment of these armoured infantry battalions will be? I appreciate that he will not have that information to hand—I do not think the Army knows yet—but will he write to me and explain how an armoured infantry battalion will be structured using Ares and Boxer? The demise of Warrior leaves a yawning capability gap that will be difficult to adequately replace without a new IFV. The then Minister for the Armed Forces stated that, “there is no direct replacement for Warrior”, and: “There are no plans to extend the out-of-service date for Warrior beyond 2027, and as such an extension is not under consideration.” The then Minister also stated: “As the ARES platform is delivered into service, tactical doctrines will be reviewed accordingly.” I do not expect the Minister to answer the question or to know the ins and outs of armoured infantry doctrine, but he should raise the question with the Land Warfare Centre, and with the infantry battalions that will receive Ares, to ask them how the platform will be used and what capability will then be lost. By removing a main armament from the armoured infantry’s firepower we fundamentally change the way that the vehicle is fought. It changes the way the vehicle can move cross-country, effectively removes the option to move in bounding overwatch, and means it can never engage enemy armour. Doctrinally, it turns the armoured infantry into mechanised infantry. Doctrinally, Ares is more akin to the Mk3 Bulldog. Despite that, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry this week informed me that Ares “is more suitable to be employed in the direct battle, rather than in the close support role”. Given the glaring absence of a main armament on Ares, I would dispute that assessment, which seems convenient rather than well thought through. Bulldog itself is due to be replaced in 2030, so what progress has been made in procurement of the Patria 6x6? Crucially, in December, the same Minister stated: “There are no other platforms within the Army’s armoured fleet which can fulfil the armoured reconnaissance role; Ajax has been specifically designed for this purpose.” With that in mind, and given that the entire Ajax fleet is grounded for an unspecified length of time pending an investigation by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch, with support from the Army Safety Investigation Team and General Dynamics, can the Minister state how the armoured reconnaissance capability of the British Army is currently being provided given that statement, and therefore what is the deployability of 3rd (UK) Division without any formation or armoured reconnaissance capability, or even the deployability of an armoured battle group from within 3 Div? The parlous state of the British Army’s armoured capability is on the cusp of being thrust into stark relief by the Prime Minister’s announcement last week that we had committed troops to the multinational force for Ukraine. While any detail on that force structure is currently pure speculation, it was reported by The Times that those troop numbers would not exceed 7,500. On a three-form cycle, that is circa 22,000 troops—the majority of the field army. If they are to be more than a speed bump for the vanguard of the Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, they will need capability that they simply do not have today. Challenger 3 has no timeline, with manufacturing due to commence only once the tank’s performance has been proven in the demonstration phase. It is not going to appear anytime soon. The Government have no plan for the remaining 140 Challenger 2s that are not due to be upgraded, and not even a promise that the plan will be outlined in the mythical defence investment plan. That is against the backdrop that the defence investment plan is unfunded, with a black hole of somewhere around £20 billion, give or take an Ajax programme budget. There will be cuts, and there will be delays. Out-of-service dates are going to be stretched to their limits. Bulldog is already 63 years old, and I am sure that it is no coincidence that it will be 67 when it reaches its out-of-service retirement date. The Chief of the General Staff wants to implement the 20-40-40 land warfare concept, of which Ajax is a key part, working in tandem with Project Asgard. That is the capability that could and should provide a continuous on-land deterrent along the eastern flank defensive line, reduce our sensor-to-effector time, and achieve the nebulous tenfold increase in lethality by reducing the kill chain to well inside the sub - seven - minute timeframe that defines the current frontline in Ukraine. Ajax cannot be scrapped. The Army needs it. There is no plan B, and given that it is a fixed-price contract, scrapping it will save no money anyway, despite Ministers confirming that the Government have sought legal advice from the Government Legal Department. The Government have not even considered a viable alternative option in CV90, and starting that process from scratch will take the best part of a decade before we even see a vehicle, based on current queues. Put simply, Ajax needs to be delivered, primarily because the Army needs to restore its armoured reconnaissance capability. Additionally, there is a second order effect: confidence. The British Army badly needs to restore faith in Ajax as a platform. For all the negative stories and press, the Army and the Government must work out how to rebuild confidence in their ailing platform. I know what it is to be given kit that I do not have confidence in, and to have to use it on operations and wonder whether it will let me down, or worse. I know that the Minister can sympathise with that view. We must restore faith in the platform, not only for the soldiers expected to operate with it, but for its appeal from an investor and export position. The long-term future of Ajax depends on the ability of General Dynamics to sell it overseas. The most advanced armoured fighting vehicle in its class should be an easy sell to the nations currently in the process of rearming and upgrading. We have a history of exquisite sovereign capability that nobody else really wants: Challenger 2, Warrior, even the SA80. Each of those has suffered from a lack of development over its life cycle, too often a day late and a dollar short.

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That this House has considered the future of the Ajax Programme. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. This debate has been a long time coming. Such is the Kafkaesque procedure for selecting debates that this application was granted only at the eighth time of asking; I had first requested a debate on this subject on 1 September 2025—over four months ago. Since then, the Ajax programme has gone from on track to throwing a track, and the outlook for the programme and our armoured capability, the future of armoured infantry as a concept and the current deployability of 3rd (UK) Division are now all very much under the microscope. In this debate, I am not seeking to apportion blame, point fingers at individuals or orchestrate a witch hunt. It is clear that the Ajax programme has been failing for a number of years, although I will go on to question some of the recent specific decision making regarding the programme. Accountability sits with successive Ministers. The slow progress on delivery appears to be an issue between the Army, the Department and General Dynamics. We can skip over the potted history of the Ajax programme—others will cover that—but, to paraphrase Rodgers and Hammerstein, “How do you solve a problem like Ajax?” Although it was based on an existing General Dynamics platform, the Army made so many additions and revisions to the existing capability that it is now considered to be bespoke technology. We are talking about a staggering 1,200 capability requirements for each of the six vehicle types under the Ajax umbrella. The March 2022 National Audit Office report on the Ajax programme details the fact that neither the Department nor General Dynamics fully understood some component specifications or how they would be integrated on to the Ajax vehicle, leading to consequential changes to the overall design, disputes between the Ministry of Defence and General Dynamics and, inevitably, programme delays. Both the MOD and General Dynamics have been criticised for underestimating the scale of the work, the technical challenge and the sequencing of the work. General Dynamics blamed the MOD for not having fully defined acceptance criteria; the MOD blamed the General Dynamics safety documentation. The contingency within the programme was quickly used up and the programme was suddenly four years behind schedule. Noise and vibration issues were recognised in mid-2020, with a stop notice issued in June 2021. All dynamic movement and transition activity was halted while the programme underwent a significant reset. The Army resumed training on Ajax in 2023, but paused again in November 2025. The programme’s issues from 2020 to 2021 are well documented. Those issues are a failure to establish effective governance, complex assurance arrangements, high turnover of senior staff, an ineffective programme board, weak project controls—the list goes on. The most stark, however, was “an over-emphasis on achieving its IOC”— initial operating capability— “target date, which meant that it prioritised time and cost over capability. As a result, it pressed ahead with the programme without resolving performance issues.” Given what we know now and the issues encountered less than three weeks after IOC was declared, I would like to hear an assessment from the Minister as to whether he believes that that is still an issue today. Initial operating capability for the Ajax programme was declared on 5 November 2025 by the Government; I stress “by the Government”, because several stages to that process were not made public until last month. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed to me: “All criteria for Ajax Initial Operating Capability…were met on 23 July 2025 and following a period of review, IOC was declared by the Army on 15 September 2025.” We know that only because it was written on a cake in a General Dynamics promotional video of the Minister’s visit to Merthyr Tydfil. Additionally, he confirmed: “Before declaring Initial Operating Capability, I received written assurances from the Chief of the General Staff and the acting NAD”— national armaments director— “that the vehicle was safe to operate. Within the letter note AJAX the vehicle was described as ‘demonstrably safe to operate’.” The Minister added that “prior to Ajax Initial Operating Capability being announced, I sought assurances in writing from the Chief of the Defence Staff and the National Armaments Director that the system was safe to operate, which I received.”

• 8 Dec 2025 · Ajax Armoured Vehicle · Hansard source

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  The Minister knows that, as a former armoured infanteer, I have a keen interest in this topic, but I want to touch on the wider issue of Ajax as it relates to 3rd (UK) Division. If Ajax cannot be fixed, then potentially we will not have a formation recce capability. As it stands, we do not have one, because the vehicle is not deployable. If it cannot be fixed later on, that will be a longer-term issue, particularly as Scimitar is now out of service. Warrior goes out of service in 2027, and Bulldog goes out of service in 2030, with no replacement identified. The Ares platform is fundamentally not an infantry fighting vehicle, and although the Minister has assured us before that he is restoring the armoured infantry capability to 3rd (UK) Division, it is not a like-for-like replacement. Will the Minister look at the current ORBAT—order of battle—for an armoured infantry battalion and how the Ares cannot replace Warrior? A non-stabilised .50 calibre machine gun does not replace a 30 mm cannon. This urgently needs to be looked at, because the Army seems to be chopping and changing its mind and not to know what it wants from its armoured capability.

• 27 Nov 2025 · Budget Resolutions · Hansard source

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  The Secretary of State talks about trying to ensure that cars available under the Motability scheme are made in the UK. I looked at the Motability website yesterday and some of the changes have already been implemented, but there are an awful lot of Chinese cars listed. Yesterday, Omoda and Jaecoo, two of the Chinese companies on that list, announced that they would be implementing a 20,000 mile rebate to individuals to pay for the electric vehicle tax introduced in the Budget. That will allow China to get an even greater foothold in the UK economy. Those cars are built with Chinese IP that sends information straight back to the state, allowing it to track where those vehicles are. What will the Government do to address the impact of the growing number of Chinese vehicles and about the fact that the Budget is, perhaps unwittingly, encouraging the use of Chinese cars in this market?

• 13 Nov 2025 · Police Reform · Hansard source

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  The train attack that took place in my Huntingdon constituency on 1 November was mercifully prevented from being far worse by the swift actions of Cambridgeshire constabulary in neutralising the threat and placing the suspect in custody within eight minutes of the 999 call being placed. However, the Government are lucky that that was the outcome. Cambridgeshire is the fourth worst funded police force in England and Wales, and it does not receive the south-east allowance. The current police allocation formula uses data from as far back as 2001. I know that our current PCC, Darryl Preston, and the current mayor, Paul Bristow, share my concern that our police are not adequately resourced, and we went through this last year with the Policing Minister’s predecessor. What commitment can the new Policing Minister offer me that she will completely overhaul the formula as part of the forthcoming police funding settlement, and give Cambridgeshire the fairer funding it needs?

• 11 Nov 2025 · Remembrance Day: Armed Forces · Hansard source

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  This is a short story about war. It is a story about what war looks like from the ground. It is not so much my story, but I was there and I was part of it. It is the story of Operation Herrick 11. More specifically, it is the story of 3 Rifles Battlegroup in Sangin, a small Afghan town of just a few square kilometres. The casualties sustained by 3 Rifles Battlegroup between October and March over the winter 2009-10 remain the heaviest casualties sustained by a British Army battlegroup since the Korean war. Sangin is where a third of all British soldiers who died in Afghanistan lost their lives. Staff Sergeant Olaf “Oz” Schmid, George Cross, 30, was killed defusing multiple improvised explosive devices on 31 October 2009. Serjeant Phillip Scott, 30, was killed by an improvised explosive device during a patrol on 5 November. Rifleman Philip Allen, 20, was killed by an IED during a patrol on 7 November. Rifleman Samuel Bassett, 20, died in hospital from his injuries from an IED on 8 November. Rifleman Andrew Fentiman, 29, was killed by small arms fire during a foot patrol on the morning of 15 November. Rifleman James Brown, 18, died of his injuries from a suicide IED on 15 December. Lance Corporal David Kirkness, 24, was also killed by the suicide IED on 15 December. Lance Corporal Michael Pritchard, 22, was shot and killed by friendly fire from a British sniper on 20 December. Lance Corporal Tommy Brown was killed by an IED on 22 December. Lance Corporal Christopher Roney, 23, died of his wounds from a friendly fire Apache helicopter attack on 22 December. Sapper David Watson, 23, was caught in an IED detonation and died in the operating theatre on new year’s eve. Corporal Lee Brownson, Conspicuous Gallantry Cross, 30, was killed by an IED on 15 January 2010. Rifleman Luke Farmer, 19, was killed by the same IED as Corporal Brownson on 15 January. Rifleman Peter Aldridge, 19, was caught by an IED, and he died en route to Camp Bastion on 22 January. Lance Corporal Daniel Cooper, 21, was killed by an IED on 24 January. Corporal John Moore, 22, and Private Sean McDonald, 26, were both killed by an IED on 7 February. Rifleman Mark Marshall, 29, was killed by an IED during a routine foot patrol on Valentine’s day, 14 February. Rifleman Martin Kinggett, 19, was shot and killed on 25 February. Rifleman Carlo Apolis, 28, was killed by a single gunshot wound on 1 March. Corporal Richard Green, 23, was killed by a single sniper round on 2 March. Rifleman Jonathon Allott, 19, was killed by a command wire IED on 5 March. Corporal Stephen Thompson, 31, was killed by an IED during a patrol on 7 March. Lance Corporal Tom Keogh, 24, died of a single gunshot wound on 7 March. Serjeant Steven “Stevie” Campbell, 30, was killed by a command wire IED hidden underwater on 22 March. Rifleman Daniel Holkham, 19, was killed by a vehicle-borne suicide IED, weeks short of the end of his tour, on 27 March. Thirty soldiers died in Sangin in those six months, and another 80-plus suffered combat injuries, including amputations. I apologise if there are those whom I have missed, but there is no definitive list that we can check to read their stories. I pay tribute to those who made the ultimate sacrifice, some of whom I knew and many of whom I did not. We ask young men and women, some of them still teenagers, to close with and kill the enemy through dismounted close combat to win the fight in those last 100 yards, and that ask comes with a cost. So in this period of remembrance, I ask those in this House to remember their names, and should any of us have to make that fateful decision to commit soldiers to harm’s way, to remember above everything else that that decision will come with more names.

• 3 Nov 2025 · Huntingdon Train Attack · Hansard source

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  This has been a difficult and challenging weekend for Huntingdon. My thoughts are with the victims of this terrible tragedy; with the LNER crew member whose heroic and selfless actions, placing himself in harm’s way, saved lives at the cost of his own safety, and who remains in a critical but stable condition; with the other four victims who remain in hospital with stab wounds; and with the four who were discharged yesterday, as well as those who bore witness to the attacks and will still be processing their own experiences. I would like to place on the record my praise for the emergency services’ response: to Cambridgeshire constabulary, whose unarmed response officers and firearms officers were able to place Anthony Williams in custody within eight minutes of receiving the 999 call; and to Cambridgeshire fire and rescue service, our air ambulance services, and the East of England ambulance trust for their incident response and for getting the casualties to Addenbrooke’s hospital. I also praise the train driver, Andrew Johnson, and the signalling staff, whose speed of thought in moving the train on to the suburban line from the high-speed line meant that the train could make the unscheduled stop at Huntingdon—a decision that curtailed the attack by several crucial minutes, that allowed the police to apprehend the suspect and that undoubtedly saved lives. The swift action of all those involved prevented a horrific attack from being far, far worse. I am sure that the Home Secretary, and indeed the whole House, would wish to share in my sympathies for those impacted by this horrific attack, and in my pride in the conduct, leadership and professionalism of the responders and railway staff.

• 21 Oct 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  My right hon. Friend makes a valid point. I will talk later about whether it is too draconian. The issue here is one of finality. I am sure we have all had close shaves while driving a car, but the fact of the matter is that if a driver has killed somebody—no matter how unlucky that may have been—that is final. The grief of the families I have spoken to and the stories I have heard from other hon. Members show that we cannot overstate how much of an impact that has on not just the lives of the family but on friends and colleagues. There are opportunities that those people will never, ever have. Beyond that unimaginable pain, think how a family might be left feeling if they find that, far from the accident having been unavoidable, the death was caused by the reckless action of somebody who was playing with their phone, speeding, driving like a boy-racer or drunk. Think of the feeling of injustice when the driver is sentenced and receives little more than a slap on the wrist. The driver who killed Mike was given a two-year driving ban. Hazel will never get to see Mike again. They will never have the opportunity to live out the rest of their lives together. Kim said: “The long-term impact on our family is huge. Although my mum has returned to her job at the hospital she is unable to fulfil her role on a rota and shift system and is unable to reduce her working hours. She has therefore been forced into taking early retirement from a job she has been at for nearly 42 years. We never want my dad to be a statistic, and to never be forgotten.” I tabled new clause 6 because of Mike, because of conversations with Hazel and Kim, and because victims like him need justice, which, as things stand, they will not receive. How can we put such an incredibly low tariff on being directly responsible for someone’s death? The option to ban a driver for life is at the court’s disposal, yet it appears not to be the preference of judges. That leniency suggests that life is cheap and that, far from being a tragedy, a death at the hands of someone careless or dangerous elicits little more than a shrug of the shoulders. In the event that somebody with a licensed shotgun killed somebody because they were careless—or, worse still, because they were dangerous—would we allow them to regain their shotgun licence? Why do we so readily return people’s driving licences after they have taken a life? There is an argument that a lifetime ban is too draconian, does not leave room for rehabilitation and will not work as a deterrent. The new clause is not supposed to be a deterrent; it is for the courts to decide whether a conviction should result in a custodial sentence and thus what degree of rehabilitation, and therefore recidivism, should occur thereafter. The new clause is not too draconian; it is robust. It would take drivers who have killed permanently off our roads and mean that those who have already proved themselves to be fatally unsafe behind the wheel would never again be in a position to take another life or destroy any further lives.

• 21 Oct 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  I wish to speak to my new clause 6, which calls for the implementation of a lifetime driving ban for those convicted of causing death by dangerous or careless driving. Last year there were 380 convictions for causing death by dangerous or careless driving. Of those convictions, 202 were for causing death by dangerous driving, 150 were for causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving, 23 were for causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs, two were for causing death by driving unlicensed or uninsured, and three were for causing death by driving while disqualified. Fewer than 1% of those convicted of causing death by dangerous driving were given a lifetime driving ban; the figure was just two. Since 2017, there have been 1,348 convictions for causing death by dangerous driving, 1,314 convictions for causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving, 158 convictions for causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs, 17 convictions for causing death by driving unlicensed or uninsured, and 11 convictions for causing death by driving while disqualified. There have been nearly 3,000 convictions for causing a death through negligence or recklessness of the driver. Those are thousands of lives lost—husbands and wives who have lost their partner, children who have lost a parent, and parents who have lost a child. Thousands more lives are impacted tragically, forever changed, shattered.

• 21 Oct 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for her contribution, and I wholeheartedly agree. There are so many tales just like that from all our constituencies, and they indicate just how lenient we have been towards those convicted of dangerous driving, particularly those who have caused a fatality. That is precisely why I tabled new clause 6. I believe that families like the one she mentions deserve justice and the closure of knowing that those people will not go on to reoffend. Under section 163 of the sentencing code, any court may impose a driving disqualification for any offence committed after 1 January 1998. The minimum period of disqualification for causing death by careless driving is just 12 months. The sentencing guidelines for a driving disqualification following a conviction for causing death by driving illustrate the leniency that our judiciary applies to these cases. There is something badly wrong with our approach to justice when life is considered as cheap as it is in the current guidelines. The minimum period of disqualification for causing death by dangerous driving is five years. Consider that the threshold for dangerous driving is high, as it covers excessive speeding, drink driving, and dangerous and erratic overtaking manoeuvres—the type of driving that leaves us horrified. Now consider a case in which the outcome of that driving is that someone is killed. The minimum disqualification period is five years—an inconvenience. It speaks to a narrative of, “Whoops, I killed somebody.” The sentencing guidelines include the option for a lifetime disqualification, but reluctance to impose it is currently priced into the guidelines, which state: “Lifetime disqualifications will be rare, in particular because of the increased risk of breach and the possibility of hindering rehabilitation prospects. Lifetime disqualifications will generally be inappropriate unless there is psychiatric evidence and/or evidence of many previous convictions indicating that the offender would be a danger to the public indefinitely if allowed to drive.” Why are we so reticent to permanently remove killer drivers from the road? The guidelines refer to an “increased risk of breach”, but if someone is caught driving while disqualified, having been banned from driving for life after killing someone, perhaps we should send them to prison. Those who know me will know that I am far from anti-motorist. I am no fan of low-traffic neighbourhoods, blanket 20 mph speed limits or terribly designed cycle lanes, but while I have been a car enthusiast for many years, I am also a cyclist, and these days very much a MAMIL—a middle-aged man in Lycra. I have been knocked off my bike twice by cars that “didn’t see” me. I have been doored, and close-passed at 60 mph. I ride with cameras on my bike so that there is evidence of me being knocked off, and some of the driving I could show would deter Jeremy Vine from ever riding a bike in London again—but I have been lucky. Mike Gough was not lucky. Mike was known in Huntingdon for his passionate advocacy for road safety. He too was a keen cyclist, and he often cycled on the country roads around the town—the very same roads I was out on this past weekend. In March last year, as he headed back into Huntingdon along the Brampton Road towards George Street, he was struck by a Ford Transit van attempting to pass him. Paramedics attended the scene and attempted to give CPR, but Mike had been crushed and could not be revived. Mike was pronounced dead at the scene. Along the Brampton Road today, a white ghost bike now marks the site, as a tribute to Mike. The driver received a 12-month sentence—suspended for two years—and a two-year driving ban. As it stands, he will be back on the roads before the next election. Mike’s relatives said that the sentence did not reflect “the seriousness of what has happened or the catastrophic impact on our lives. Michael was the pinnacle of our family and a huge part of the local community. As a family we will never be the same again and our grief is immeasurable.” It is with these events in mind that I have tabled new clause 6.

• 21 Oct 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  The hon. Member makes a valid point. My amendment seeks to remove the chance that those people will reoffend further down the track. The custodial element remains unchanged, so there will still be the possibility of rehabilitation through the prison system to reduce the rate of recidivism. The issue here, as the hon. Member for Twickenham (Munira Wilson) also pointed out, is about giving families closure and the knowledge that those who are guilty of committing these crimes will not be able to go on to reoffend. New clause 6 proposes a lifetime driving ban for death by dangerous or careless driving and related offences—those I covered at the beginning of my speech. Having spoken to Mike’s widow Hazel and his daughter Kim, I can say that it is sobering to listen to somebody recount the story of the day that they had to attend the scene where their husband or father had just been killed. Selfishly, it is sobering to think about how easily it could have been me. I ride the same roads as Mike did. It was not an error, or avoidable on his part. The driver alone was at fault; it was his casual negligence that caused Mike’s death. Mike’s daughter Kim recounts: “On 27 June 2025, the driver, Dennis Roberts, aged 74, pleaded guilty to causing death by careless driving. He was banned from driving with immediate effect, given a one-year sentence, suspended for two years, a two-year driving ban, 250 hours unpaid work and has to pay court charges of around £200. The sentence is within the guidelines of the law, but does the law fit the crime? He has lived his life like normal for 18 months, while we have lost our dad, husband, friend, grandad, and lived the last 18 months encompassed in a whirlwind of grief. Even after sentencing he continues to live his life, just with a small inconvenience of not being able to drive and giving up a few hours to work unpaid. How is that justice? In two years’ time he will be able to drive again. Would you give someone who used a gun carelessly and someone was killed their gun licence back after two years? I doubt it. They would most likely have a custodial sentence too.” I would ask all Members in the Chamber to think how they might feel if they were to get a phone call today informing them that their partner, parent or child had been killed in a road traffic accident.

• 16 Sept 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  It has become increasingly clear that we see huge discrepancies across sentencing for offences. Comparatively trivial offences receive stiff penalties, while serious crimes appear to go relatively or actually unpunished. There is an increasing feeling that the punishment rarely fits the crime, that the law is soft, that criminals act with impunity and that justice has become hard to come by. I would like to recount a story about a family from my constituency. Michael Gough was a keen cyclist and had been cycling weekly, on Saturday mornings, with a group of four friends for a number of years. He would head off early, before 8 am, and go out for three to four hours, returning home by lunch time. He rode all over Cambridgeshire, usually covering between 35 km to 50 km on a ride. As a keen cyclist myself, who rides the same roads and the same sort of distances, I know what a joy it is to get out on my bike at the weekend. On 16 March last year, Mike and the group went out as usual. His daughter, Kim, recalls what happened as the family waited for him to return: “I had gone to mum’s around 12.25 and we set off shortly after. Mum did think it was unusual dad wasn’t back yet, but he did like to talk so thought he’d probably had an extra cuppa at their cake and cuppa stop. We only made it round the corner when my phone started to ring. Mum picked it up and answered it as she noticed it was dad’s friend Tim calling. I pulled over as soon as I could. Tim had said there had been an accident and dad had been knocked off his bike”. The family made their way to the scene of the accident on George Street, in Huntingdon town centre. “We were stood in the street outside Elphicks, opposite Wetherspoons, waiting not having a clue what was going on. Lots of the public were walking up the street and being allowed to walk up and past the scene of the accident to get to where they wanted to go but we were told we had to wait. After a while an officer came down from the scene to talk to us. He asked us to sit in the back of the police car where we were told that dad had been knocked off his bike and had died from his injuries.” The post-mortem subsequently outlined that Mike had been crushed across his chest and could not be resuscitated. It was not until December 2024, some nine months later, that the Crown Prosecution Service charged the driver with causing death by careless driving. A further six months later, on 27 June 2025, the driver—Dennis Roberts, aged 74—plead guilty to causing death by careless driving. He was banned from driving with immediate effect. Roberts was given a one-year sentence suspended for two years, a two-year driving ban and 250 hours’ unpaid work, and was ordered to pay court charges of around £200. As Kim says: “The sentence is within the guidelines of the law, but does the law fit the crime? He has lived his life like normal for 18 months, whilst we have lost our dad, husband, friend, grandad, and lived the last 18 months encompassed in a whirlwind of grief. Even after sentencing he continues to live his life, just with a small inconvenience of not being able to drive and giving up a few hours to work unpaid. How is that justice?” Mike’s tragic and untimely death is sadly not an outlier, but the current sentencing guidelines for causing death by careless driving are far too lenient, given the impact that such a tragedy clearly has on family and loved ones. The factors determining culpability as “careless” as opposed to “dangerous” are largely subjective and the difference between them is opaque, but it is the factors reducing seriousness or reflecting personal mitigation that I find difficult to understand. A good driving record is taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. The inexperience of the driver is taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. Efforts made to assist or to seek assistance for the victim are taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. A lack of maturity is taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. A mental disorder or learning disability is taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. A deprived background is taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. The prospects of education are taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. What prospects do the victims have now—or their family or dependants? These mitigating factors beggar belief. This is not a trivial offence or a victimless crime; it is one that devastates lives. Would any one of us here who lost their partner, child or parent to the carelessness of someone’s driving be content to see that person leave court with little more than the inconvenience of having to get a lift home? Furthermore, the minimum level of sentencing starts at a medium-level community order to one year’s custody. The bare minimum must be a custodial sentence, and it must not be suspended. If we are to trivialise a crime with the most serious outcome—that of ultimately taking a life, even through carelessness—then what price stiffer sentences for less serious crimes? I would not wish anyone to suffer the trauma of enduring such a tragedy, but those who sadly do should at least take comfort that justice has been served. We must stiffen the sentence for causing death by careless driving. We must eliminate the ludicrous mitigation factors that offer too much opportunity for offenders to avoid justice. We must ensure that victims and their families get justice. To prevent others from suffering the lack of justice that Mike and his family have endured, I will table an amendment to address this issue and ensure that Mike’s death was not in vain.

• 8 Jul 2025 · Local Government Reform: Cambridgeshire · Hansard source

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  I wholeheartedly agree. We saw that only last week, when the 10-year health plan was rolled out. The Government would have known full well that this contradicted their previous stance. How does the Government’s merging three ICBs together to make one of the largest in the country chime with the need to reorganise those same ICBs to reflect the 10-year health plan? Can the Minister confirm what the future of the new mega-ICB that includes Cambridgeshire and Peterborough ICB will be under local government reorganisation? Currently, this is completely contradictory. Analysis of the proposed Greater Cambridge unitary of Cambridge city and South Cambridgeshire has shown that it would have a high share of total relative needs formula from environmental, protective and cultural services. Greater Cambridge would have the highest total share after the City of London, and it would be ahead of Westminster. The same analysis shows that the balance of service in any unitary containing Cambridge city would be very focused on non-demand-led services, and thus there would be a greater share of service delivery based on resident services and services for visitors and commuters. Huntingdonshire district council states on its website that the new unitary authority should have a population of around 500,000, though that has since been confirmed by the Minister as a “guiding principle”, not a target: “We understand the need for flexibility, especially given our ambition to build out devolution and take account of housing growth”. Given the proposed housing growth across Huntingdonshire, it is vital that the council does not max out the population size. Huntingdonshire’s projected growth shows that it will be one of the fastest-growing regions in the fastest-growing county, but with several parts of Cambridgeshire expected to grow in the near term, with an increasing tax base and business rates, what modelling have the district councils conducted to ensure that the proposals put to the general public are balanced? The Government have suggested that population size is the main measure of sustainability for new unitaries, but to what extent has the projected growth been factored into those current proposals, particularly on the question of whether two or three unitaries would be preferable within Cambridgeshire? Even if the option were taken for three smaller unitaries, each between 275,000 and 300,000 people, what assessment has been conducted to ascertain the population size of each unitary in 2028, when they would actually come into effect? Furthermore, what would their size be once we see some of the projected growth? We could easily see the new smaller unitaries approach the 350,000 minimum size quite quickly. Between 2021 and 2041, the Greater Cambridge unitary is projected to grow from 318,000 to 381,000. We could potentially see comparative growth across other parts of Cambridgeshire, where development continues at pace. In Huntingdon alone, we will see another 4,000 houses built at Alconbury Weald, with no commitment from the Government regarding a new east coast main line station at Alconbury Weald—a request I have made multiple times. I have discussed that with the Transport Secretary and asked for the current status of the plans from Network Rail, sadly to no avail. We will likely see up to 4,500 homes at RAF Wyton, now that the surplus Ministry of Defence land there has been designated as an MOD Trailblazer site. Between the two, we also have potential development at Hungary Hall. In excess of 10,000 homes in the area potentially means 20,000 to 40,000 additional people over the next 10 to 20 years. Coupled with the new defence technology cluster nearby, the travel to work areas will likely change dramatically. Going forward, we will potentially see Huntingdon as a centre of employment rather than a dormitory town for Peterborough, Cambridge or even London. In 2032, we should theoretically be due a constituency boundary review. We will then see further disruption as constituency boundaries straddle new unitary boundaries, meaning yet more burdensome administrative upheaval, potentially leaving residents confused about who is representing them. Can the Minister confirm the smallest size of unitary that the Government will accept? To what extent will the Government include projected growth in their decision-making process, and over what period? In the event that current and/or projected growth figures do not meet the threshold, to what extent will a sound business case outlining the financial viability of the unitary take precedence? There is much to cover on the various pitfalls of LGR—too much to cover today, arguably. There are still significant questions about how new unitaries will affect travel to work from one extreme to another, for those whose work takes them to Cambridge or Peterborough. There are questions about how unitary boundaries will impact school places and catchment areas for pupils close to the boundaries, how the availability of social housing will be impacted by different combinations of districts, with some owning their social housing stock and others not, and how South Cambridgeshire district council’s ridiculous new four-day week for five days’ pay will translate to the new unitary. Will the new unitary be a four-day week, or will those now on four-day week contracts be mandated to work five days? Will the whole thing be ripped up because SCDC will not technically exist any more? Brett Mickleburgh, Liberal Democrat councillor for Godmanchester and Hemingford Abbots ward, has raised concerns that, “a unitary authority will have huge seats/divisions with a single councillor struggling under an unreasonable case workload—compounded if they have a cabinet role. I fear the members allowance will only be sufficient to allow those retired, of independent wealth or aspiring career politicians to take office”. Brett makes an important point. To what extent have the Government considered that? How big will each unitary council seat be? How many councillors will there be? How will the seats be divided and boundaries drawn? Will they be bigger or smaller than the county divisions? Will there be one, two or three councillors per area now that district and county council functions will be merged? Will we have district council elections in 2026? If we do not get an answer until the end of the year, we are doing a disservice to the candidates, who could have had months’ more time in which to campaign. I could go on. To roll out LGR with such little detail and so few answers does not augur well. It gives me and other Cambridgeshire MPs and councillors little confidence that this will be a smooth transition to larger councils that everybody feels is an improvement on the current structure. I will leave the last word to one of our local councillors, and my main opponent in last year’s general election, Labour and Co-operative Councillor Alex Bulat for St Ives South and Needingworth division: “Among all these voices, Huntingdonshire local voices seem sidelined at best, if not ignored at worst.”