Ben Obese-Jecty MP: speeches

Speeches

• 30 Jun 2026 · Defence Investment Plan · Hansard source

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  RAF Wyton is in my constituency and I have a huge amount of service housing, both in the RAF Wyton and the former RAF Brampton patches, so service housing is extremely important to me. Will the Secretary of State confirm whether he is cutting £300 million from the service family accommodation budget in this Parliament and moving it into the next Parliament?

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  Corona muralis—I wager that few people in this Chamber, if any, have heard that term. Perhaps the odd classicist will have heard it. It was one of ancient Rome’s most coveted military decorations. According to Aulus Gellius, it was a golden crown, shaped like a city wall, awarded for bravery, much like the Victoria Cross. It was awarded to Roman soldiers for being the first up the ladder and on to the enemy castle walls during a siege. Whoever received it found fame, and the accolade could be leveraged as a political stepping stone. Survival might be unlikely, but the prospect of personal and political glory could motivate men to embark on a suicide mission, convinced that they would fare better against impossible odds than those who had tried and failed before them. In “The History of Rome”, Livy wrote: “The men dashed on in the face of wounds and missiles, and neither walls nor armed men standing on them can restrain them from vying with one another in the attempt to climb”. With that, I welcome the Defence Ministers to their new roles, and wish them luck in the forthcoming reshuffle. The new Defence Secretary tells us that he is working around the clock. That is another idiom to add to a lexicon that includes “flat out”, “at pace” and “laser-focused”—the perennial favourite. This Government’s failure to invest in defence, particularly given the high horse that they rode in on, while waxing lyrical about “hollowing out”, is farcical, given that we have already seen two experienced Defence Ministers quit. We now see two more take up the colours—both decorated former officers with an MBE, and each with an MBE for their service. Coronae murales all round. The defence investment plan has entered the zeitgeist, but our duty in this House is to hold the Government to account. We can talk about top-level budgets and use exciting buzzwords, but unless we are actually talking about what is in the plan, that capability is largely irrelevant. The defence investment plan is not funded properly; it is not even close to being funded properly. An additional £10 billion, plus £3.5 billion of loose change that the Government found down the back of the sofa, will not touch the sides. The new Defence Secretary will need to make damaging and difficult cuts. Much of that will not be truly realised until the publication of the ’26-27 Ministry of Defence accounts at the end of next year—by which point he may be long gone. There are projects that sit under the major projects portfolio, specifically Dreadnoughts and GCAP. The defence nuclear enterprise takes up 18% of the entire defence budget. To put that in context, it means that we are last in NATO for our spending on conventional forces. We spend less, proportionally, than North Macedonia and Luxembourg. We need to be mindful of the spiralling cost of Dreadnought. If we couple that with the cost of upgrading the Astraea warhead, and of the AUKUS commitment, we see that we are locked into a huge proportion of the available budget being spent on submarines alone. Last week, the Royal United Services Institute wrote that it anticipates the DNE may hit 25% of the budget within the period covered by this defence investment plan. Meanwhile, its aerial contemporary, GCAP, continues to be a costly endeavour—so costly, in fact, that despite the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry informing me last week that a new funding deal for Edgewing had been agreed, my sources at the MOD tell me that the deal is not the multi-year settlement that is needed. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed the duration of the new funding deal. With the demise of the future combat air system, GCAP and F-47 are the only NATO sixth-generation programmes left in town, yet the RAF is struggling to find the money for the platform, has apparently rowed back on committing to pillar 2, and is in danger of being superseded by events. The new uncrewed fighters currently in development are a fraction of the cost, and will be many iterations developed by the time we see the first Tempest. It will take something special to ensure GCAP is not a relic before it even leaves the drawing board. Last year, the previous Chief of the Air Staff—now Chief of the Defence Staff—made clear that there were “no major equipment programmes planned for the next 15 years. We have what we have for the near and medium term”, despite the combat air strategy being about to undergo a refresh. What the RAF has planned now is what we will have through to 2040. We have taken delivery of 48 F-35B jets thus far, and the programme of record states that we are committed to 138. Does anyone genuinely believe that the defence investment plan will lay out the pathway to buying another 90, if we have only bought half that number since 2012 in order to fulfil a purpose—being carrier deployable—that now makes little strategic sense? For reference, the US has budgeted for 85 this year alone, at a cost of $21.4 billion. Analysis by the US Government Accountability Office has shown that the full mission-capable rate of the F-35 is a lamentable 25%. Our own Public Accounts Committee reported in March that “The UK F-35 fleet achieved approximately one third of the MoD’s target” for the time it was able to fly all its required missions in 2024, and achieved only two fifths of the level of availability of the global F-35B fleet.

• 23 Jun 2026 · Defence Spending and Readiness · Hansard source

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  I do—we need to get more pilots through the door, and I have asked numerous questions about our ratio of pilots to aircraft. I appreciate that the Minister does not want to divulge that information, but I would suggest that currently, it is not as good as it could be. The joint programme office that should fix the F-35 is undergoing a global support solution reset that will cost an additional $13.7 billion. I would be interested to hear from the Minister whether any of that figure will be paid for by us in the UK. As a result, there is no timeline for completing technology refresh 3, which 72% of our F-35Bs still require, and no timeline for the completion of the block 4 upgrade. Talk of the 12 F-35As for the NATO nuclear mission—which the hon. Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst) mentioned—has gone suspiciously quiet, with rumours that they will be cut, and that is before we talk about the four-year lead times for low rate initial production material required to build them. Crucially, though, there is currently no more money allocated to the F-35 Lightning programme. The departmental budget laid out in the integrated review defence Command Paper back in 2021 only included the procurement of the 48 we now have; all new funding for the F-35 will need to be outlined in the defence investment plan. That brings us on to drones. We know that the RAF is committed to having the Tempest as a manned platform, but by the time it comes into service, the US will be a decade deep into its collaborative combat aircraft programme. It has just awarded General Atomics and Anduril sizeable contracts for the FQ-42A Dark Merlin and FQ-44A Fury uncrewed fighter jets. The Secretary of the Air Force has stated that the US plans to “procure over 150 combat capable CCA by the end of the decade.” The US has budgeted $1 billion for CCA procurement, $822 million for modifications, and another $1.4 billion for research and development. How much of the £10 billion of additional funds available for our entire defence budget do we think we are planning to spend? When the defence investment plan is published, we will need to look closely at investment in those projects that should deliver drones. How does this all tie together? I have spoken briefly about Project ASGARD before—the Chief of the General Staff, speaking at the RUSI land warfare conference earlier, talked about the need to be able to strike Russia within 30 minutes—but whether or not this is properly resourced in the DIP will be instrumental to our fortunes. We need to move past our current squeamishness and invest properly in both Project ASGARD and its RAF cousin, Project BOYD. I was fortunate enough to visit a demonstration of ASGARD during Exercise Arrcade Strike last month, which gave a glimpse of how the next war might be fought. My takeaway, however, was how desperately it will need to be invested in. We risk being a day late and a dollar short when it comes to an integrated anti-access/area denial and integrated air and missile defence solution. The reluctance of our senior leaders to move from an in-the-loop and on-the-loop approach to the kill chain to an on-the-loop and out-of-the-loop posture concerns me—it is better to have the capability and not need it than need it and not have it. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed to me last week that the MOD is looking at machine vision for lock-on in the terminal phase of one-way effectors, but we must move further and faster. For all the talk of defence investment in exquisite capabilities, nobody is suggesting that we increase the mass of the Army significantly. That is before we consider that every single vehicle platform the Army operates, except for Foxhound, is due to go out of service by 2030. Our ability to field an armoured division is at best optimistic; in reality, it is laughable. My own background is in armoured infantry, as is that of my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp), and were we to try and field an armoured battlegroup—let alone a division—I would be interested to see what form it would take. At the front of any armoured push is formation reconnaissance. That role should by now be delivered by Ajax. My views on Ajax are well documented, as I delivered a debate on the topic in Westminster Hall earlier this year, but what progress has been made since then? In the wake of Exercise Titan Storm, the Government commissioned an independent expert panel review. The results of that review have been submitted via a final report, but the Minister appears hesitant to publish the outcome. I would be grateful if he published those findings for scrutiny in the House now that the review has concluded. In his summing up, could the Minister outline when the House will receive an update on that review’s findings? We know that the first phase of bringing Ajax up to speed will require the restarting of trials with the current version of Ajax, but the Minister has also informed me that the current platform requires a number of upgrades outside the scope of work in upgrading from capability drop 3 to capability drop 4, including improvements to the electrical power generation system, the crew compartment heating and the air filtration system. Although those sound like gremlins that need to be worked through on any new platform, can he tell me which of those modifications, if any, will mitigate the injuries sustained by service personnel on Exercise Titan Storm? Ajax must be a success—we cannot afford to be stuck with a platform that no other country is willing to buy. The reputational damage to the platform is in danger of being baked in if the Government do not get the fix right first time. All 589 hulls have been built, and the factory will have no further work once those vehicles are assembled and rolled out. What work will the General Dynamics facility in Merthyr Tydfil then have to do? When I raised that question with the Government, they stated that it is an issue for General Dynamics. There is a reason the Government did not include that facility within the scope of the defence growth deal for Wales. Put simply, the Government cannot afford for Ajax to fail, neither from a defence exports perspective—and there are currently no pending orders—nor from a capability perspective. The Government know this, having made no assessment of any potential replacement platforms such as the Combat Vehicle 90, so when will we finally see Ajax realise its potential? Sadly, though, that is not the only issue. Behind Ajax should be Challenger 3, but Challenger 3 remains in the demonstration phase and, based on reports in The Telegraph last week, is now beset by problems. The turret power traverse gearbox is potentially proving to be a problem that may push back delivery of the tank by years—to put that in layman’s terms, that is the part that makes the turret rotate. The Government have now said that this is not the case, but it is concerning that they are yet to declare the planning assumption for service entry for the new tank, despite all 148 remaining Challenger 2 tanks being in scope for upgrade and conversion. The Government have also previously told me that they are continuing to explore export opportunities for Challenger 3. What export opportunities? We have 148 main battle tanks; how many are we planning to sell, and who would buy them? We have no plans to replace them. I would be interested to understand the full scope of the Army’s heavy armour automotive improvement programme. In January, the Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry told me: “Manufacturing will begin once the tank’s performance is proven, rather than being tied to a specific deadline.” By when does he anticipate the tank’s performance will be assessed to have made the grade? Meanwhile, our allies look elsewhere to rearm. With both the Franco-German main ground combat system to replace the Leclerc and Leopard 2 respectively and other fledgling initiatives, what is the future of armour? “Behind the tanks” Warrior is due to go out of service next year, currently with no realistic replacement. Warrior is due to be replaced by a mixture of Boxer and the Ajax-derived Ares, but neither looks set to be ready in time. More concerningly, the Government’s position appears to have shifted once again, with the Minister telling me last week: “Under current plans, Boxer is initially being fielded as a supporting capability to Armoured Units within 3rd (UK) Division, before being fielded to Mechanised Infantry Units between 2030-2035.” Warrior goes out of service next year, so what is filling this capability gap? We have not yet seen an order for the Patria 6x6 as part of the common armoured vehicle system. The Government told me recently that they were continuing to monitor the market for potential future platforms, but the defence investment plan is supposedly to be published next week, so why have these decisions not already been made? From a Royal Navy perspective, it is no secret that the hybrid Navy concept is the direction in which they are sailing. The commitment of the Royal Marines to the High North and potential investment in a joint commando craft or littoral strike craft would illustrate a longer-term commitment to that force posture, but the hybrid Navy concept means that the Type 83 is dead in the water. The decision to gift Type 26 build slots to the Royal Norwegian Navy kicks the can down the road when it comes to the sticky issue of when we need to pay for the new ships, with just eight to be built for us and a further five for the Norwegians. Given our significant commitment to global operations in comparison with the commitment of the Norwegians, do we really think that just three more ships will cover our global commitments? This has been a whistlestop tour through just some of the myriad capabilities that will need to be detailed in the defence investment plan within the next week or so. [Laughter.] I left a lot out! Members are chuckling, but I could have gone on for another hour. We need to spend more on defence. We need to resource our military to meet the threats that we face, not the ones that we would like to. If this Prime Minister, this Chancellor and this Defence Secretary will not find the funding required by cutting the welfare budget or changing the fiscal rules, they should make way for someone who will—but perhaps that will happen sooner rather than later.

• 22 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I appreciate what the hon. Member is saying. I am not putting the Minister under scrutiny here; I am merely highlighting the invidious position that he finds himself in and the situation as we find it. I spoke to the hon. and gallant Member, the Minister, earlier today, so he knows full well that I am going to say this. I very much want to put this front and centre as an issue that needs to be resolved, and to put some heat and light on it to encourage the progress that we are yet to see. The only reason to oppose this new clause is purely political, as the Government choose to play games with people’s lives rather than support our armed forces community and uphold the armed forces covenant. Earlier this year, that same armed forces community was surveyed by the Army Families Federation on the armed forces pathway to settlement in the UK, in response to the 2025 “Restoring Control over the Immigration System” White Paper. It had 1,424 qualifying responses and more comments on reducing the cost of indefinite leave to remain than any other topic. One of those responses stated: “the current level of fees for ILR—and the subsequent cost of citizenship—places a significant financial burden on Armed Forces families. Given the service and sacrifices made by Armed Forces personnel, and the vital role their families play in supporting them, these costs are prohibitively high for many. As a result, families who are committed to remaining in the UK long-term face unnecessary financial hardship simply to secure their lawful status and future.” Another said: “Speaking from experience it’s a struggle to get us and our kids to join our husbands here in the UK. We have to work 2 jobs in order to pay for the visa and travelling expenses. We have to bring our 3 kids over to the UK. Due to the expensive costs we have to apply for loans to cater for the expenses. With the high living standards and tight financial constraints, we have to save up for our ILR fee once our 5 years contract is done. It’s so hard to save, especially for us. Me and my 3 kids have to apply for ILR together as our visa expired the same date, so that’s a total of £12K we have to fork out to pay the fee. Can the home office look into this urgently? Thank you.” Another said: “I have supported my partner’s service to the UK while facing many of the same sacrifices required of military families. This includes frequent relocations, prolonged periods of separation, disrupted employment opportunities, and the emotional and practical challenges that come with military life. For Commonwealth families in particular, these sacrifices are made alongside the added uncertainty of immigration status. Charging ILR and citizenship fees places an unfair financial burden on spouses who have already contributed significantly to the stability and wellbeing of service personnel. Military spouses play a vital role in enabling service members to serve effectively, yet are required to pay substantial fees simply to remain in the country their families serve with loyalty and dedication”. This last one said: “the financial burden of applying for ILR and subsequently citizenship is not proportionate to Armed Forces pay, particularly in the context of the current cost-of-living crisis. Many serving personnel simply do not earn enough to comfortably meet these fees, even though they have complied fully with all rules and requirements. It is difficult to understand why those who have shown long-term commitment, loyalty and service to the United Kingdom must go through one of the longest and most expensive settlement routes, while others are supported through different schemes that include accommodation, financial assistance and fee exemptions. This creates a strong perception of unfairness among service members, who feel they are being penalised for following the rules.” That last one really sticks in the craw. We price our service personnel out of being able to afford to live here as veterans while dishing out ILR to others like confetti, who have done nothing to earn it. There is perhaps no better example of a genuine two-tier system. Before Labour Members go into the voting Lobby and swipe their pass on autopilot, I ask them to think about why they became MPs—specifically Labour MPs—because if the answer was to clamp down on immigration so hard, with the bar so high that we do not even let the children of people who have risked their lives in the service of this nation live here without fleecing them for thousands of pounds, they will get a slow handclap for achieving their political dreams. If, on the other hand, they have the moral courage to do the right thing, they should not go into the No Lobby. What is the worst that is going to happen? How whip-able do we think the parliamentary Labour party actually is right now, just a few hours after the Prime Minister has resigned? I ask Labour Members to have the moral courage to do the right thing, to vote in favour of new clause 4 and to deliver on the promise they made to service families when they stood for election. In a matter of days, they will find themselves jockeying for position in the leadership contest. People who are Whips today might not be Whips tomorrow. Nobody is going to lose the Whip as the Government collapse because they did not vote against this new clause. There may never be a more perfect set of circumstances in which to rebel: a Government with no authority trying to whip Labour MPs to vote against their own manifesto pledge and against the wishes of the Royal British Legion. I dare say there has never been safer, more fertile ground upon which to rebel. If Labour Members cannot vote in favour of the new clause, I beg them not to vote against it. When this issue was voted on three weeks ago, there were 102 abstentions. The Prime Minister has laid out the timetable for his departure. This Administration is in its death throes. How much do those on the Labour Benches feel they really owe the outgoing Administration? They should be asking what the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) would do, because I am not really asking the current Government any more. What is the point? Today, at the start of Armed Forces Week, I ask Labour Members to consider how they will vote tonight. Do they want to vote against service families, against the Royal British Legion campaign and against doing the right thing in order to prop up a Government who have a lifespan we can now measure in hours? This is now about whether the next Government back this change. I ask them to support new clause 4, not to vote against it. Ministers should think very carefully about what they want their legacy to be. They should have the moral courage to do the right thing tonight.

• 2 Jun 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  By now, the Secretary of State will be well aware of my opposition to the 1,900 acre East Park Energy solar farm in my constituency. We are now at the business end of the planning process; the application is before the Planning Inspectorate, ahead of a decision by the Secretary of State later this year. Will he outline roughly when he expects to have to take a decision on the application? Ahead of that, will he meet me and my hon. Friend the Member for North Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller) to discuss our concern that it is not the right solution for our area and our constituents?

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I welcome the introduction of the strategic reserve in the Bill, but I would like clarity on how it will be paid for. Will it be via separate funding or will it come from the money already allocated to pay for the active reserve in the MOD budget?

• 2 Jun 2026 · Armed Forces Bill · Hansard source

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  I wish to speak to new clause 5, which I tabled. I start by thanking all Opposition Members—both in my party and across four other parties—who have supported this amendment. Let the record show that not one person on the Labour Benches supported it. We often speak in this House about veterans, our shared respect for those who have served and how best to support veterans in their post-military life, be it with careers, housing, mental health or simply the frailty of growing old. With that shared sense of society repaying our collective debt to those who have served must come the moral courage to do the right thing that we expect those who have served to show. During my Army career, I had the privilege to serve alongside and command soldiers from all over the Commonwealth—Australians and Canadians, South Africans and Jamaicans. As a support weapons platoon commander, a quarter of my anti-tank platoon was Fijian. As hon. Members may expect from a fine rugby playing regiment such as the Duke of Wellington’s, it was unbelievably competitive to get a spot on the wing. I therefore know well the courage and the sacrifice shown by our Commonwealth personnel not only today, but alongside me on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and during operations across the globe long preceding that. We owe those men and women the right to make a life in the country they have risked theirs to defend. Over four years ago, in April 2022, the previous Government implemented a visa fee waiver for those who have served in the UK armed forces. That waiver also applied to eligible veterans who were yet to regularise their immigration status. Having campaigned for that long before I became an MP, it was hugely welcome to see the playing field levelled somewhat for Commonwealth veterans. While that was a welcome first step, I personally felt that it was not enough. We in this Chamber often recognise the sacrifice and the challenges of those families left behind when service personnel deploy. Being a military spouse or child is not easy. This situation is made even harder for the family of a Commonwealth service member, because while we waived the fees for serving personnel in 2022, we did not extend the right to the immediate family and dependants of that service member. That means many Commonwealth veterans are saddled with significant visa fees if they wish to stay in the UK as a family after leaving the armed forces. From 8 April this year, when the cost increased once again, the base fee for applying for indefinite leave to remain is £3,226 per person. To put into context the speed of that increase, when we waived fees for service members just four years ago, it was £2,389 per person—a near £1,000 increase. That is just for indefinite leave to remain, not citizenship. In the US armed forces, a non-US citizen can achieve full US citizenship upon discharge for the price of the admin fee—just a few dollars. A service member, their spouse and two children now potentially face a cost of just shy of £10,000 for the right to live in the country they have risked their life to defend. I defy anybody to tell me that that is fair. It is not until the 12-year point that personnel become entitled to a resettlement grant of £15,047. The purpose of the resettlement grant is to do precisely what it says: to give people a head start, be it through a trade course, a deposit for a house or the funds to set up an entrepreneurial new business. None of those options is available to those who need to spend the majority of the grant on just obtaining the right to live in the country. What on earth are we doing? Why are we fleecing those who have served this country, saddling them with a five-figure burden? The Royal British Legion and Poppyscotland lead the charge on this campaign. They have pushed for these changes consistently. They highlight that in delivering this manifesto pledge, the Government would fulfil their obligations under the armed forces covenant by removing those disadvantages and barriers to family life. Going into the 2024 general election, the Conservative manifesto looked to correct this issue. As part of our pledge to veterans, we announced that a Conservative Government would: “extend the visa fees waiver introduced to cover Commonwealth personnel, to include their direct dependants.” The Labour manifesto, too, made that pledge, stating: “We will also scrap visa fees for non-UK veterans who have served for four or more years, and their dependents.” So where are we with that? I have raised the question on a number of occasions. In November 2024, I asked the then Veterans Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), what the timetable was for delivering that manifesto pledge. I was told: “We are working on that. It is in the manifesto, and it will come out in due course.” —[ Official Report , 18 November 2024; Vol. 757, c. 22.] In June 2025, during the Armed Forces Day debate, I asked the then Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), if he could provide an update “on the work being done to waive visa fees for families and dependants of our Commonwealth personnel”. He told me: “We have a manifesto commitment to deliver that. The Defence Secretary has spoken to the Home Secretory about this, and our officials are in dialogue about it. I hope that the Minister for Veterans and People, who looks after this area, will be able to announce progress in due course. The hon. Member and I share a strong sense that there is a wrong to be righted here, and those people who serve our country for a good period of time should be able to settle here. I think progress will be made, but I recognise his interest in that happening.” —[ Official Report , 26 June 2025; Vol. 769, c. 1290-1291.] That was a year ago. On 5 January 2026, the new Veterans Minister told me in a written answer that the Government are “working closely with the Home Office to deliver this commitment”. She went on to state: “it is not possible at this stage to provide an implementation date”. In April, she informed me: “This Government is committed to waiving visa fees for non-UK veterans”. In total, I have asked the Government for an update on the progress of the implementation of their manifesto pledge seven times and we are no closer to an implementation date after nearly two years than we were when the Government came to power. I am not seeking to apportion individual blame here. Having spoken to Ministers individually, including the two on the Front Bench today, I do not doubt that the Defence Front Bench wishes to implement this policy, but there is clearly something that is causing it to stall, be that the Home Office or the machinery of government. There is an opportunity here to drive this policy forward. We should bear in mind that the Ministry of Defence does not even collate the information regarding the number of ILR applications submitted by family members of service personnel. It has literally no idea of the impact the failure to deliver this policy is having. After two years with no timetable for implementation on the horizon, I have little confidence this is a priority on the MOD’s to-do list. I appreciate that the Government measure working flat-out in months, but this could be measured in continental drift. It simply does not appear to be a priority for the Government. However, my greater fear is that rather than do the right thing today, the Government will churlishly and spitefully vote against new clause 5, “because politics”. Not one Labour MP signed the new clause, despite every single one being asked twice. The Government have whipped their MPs not to support it, just as they will whip their MPs to vote against it. A vote against new clause 5 is not just a vote against the Labour manifesto that each Labour MP stood on. It is a vote against our veterans. It is a vote against those who have risked their lives to defend this great nation. It is a vote that tells Commonwealth personnel that this Government do not have their back, that joining our armed forces will still see them treated as second-class citizens, with limited options post service. Those Labour MPs with a military presence in their constituencies should ask themselves how they will spin it to the service member who has to pay £10,000 to live here with their family, instead of putting down a deposit on a house or launching a business. They should ask themselves whether, for the sake of playing politics this evening, it is worth holding somebody else back.

• 21 May 2026 · Middle East: Economic Response · Hansard source

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  Back in March, the Chancellor announced the £50 million crisis and resilience fund to help families with the price of heating oil, which is a big issue in rural constituencies such as mine. Does she have any plans to extend or repeat that scheme come the autumn, given that we are likely to have a similar crisis with the strait of Hormuz still shut? To what extent will the Russian oil that will come via a third country under commodity code 2710 form part of the fuel mix?

• 18 May 2026 · Backing Business to Create Economic Growth · Hansard source

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  The Secretary of State mentions crocodile tears; what would he say to the hospitality businesses in my constituency that have been impacted by the rise in national insurance contributions, the minimum wage rise and the business rates that he just talked so effusively about? What message would he give to them as they struggle to deal with the outcome of the Budget?

• 28 Apr 2026 · Referral of Prime Minister to Committee of Privileges · Hansard source

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  Trade envoy to Harlow, right there.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Knife Crime · Hansard source

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  It was around this time last year that I led the Backbench Business debate in the Chamber on preventing knife crime among children and young people, so I welcome the measures announced by the Minister and hope that they have a huge impact, reducing the use of knives by young people. I want to touch on two points in her announcement. When it comes to banning zombie knives, we know that they and ninja swords account for less than 4% of all fatal stabbings. Screwdrivers account for more fatal stabbings, and household kitchen knives account for over half of all those stabbings. Given how easily accessible they are, do the Government have any steps in place? I appreciate that stopping access to kitchen knives is an impossible task, given that everybody in this Chamber has them at home, but are the Government considering any measures to dissuade people from using kitchen knives in this way? Furthermore, we know that social media has a huge influence on children, creating the fear that leads to them carrying a knife. Does the Minister have any steps to address that?

• 24 Mar 2026 · Defence · Hansard source

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  I will start with a quote: “Your path leads to war. You know that. So war is coming. What will you do when you feel its breath upon your neck?” The answer is: not enough. The defence investment plan was due last autumn, then by Christmas, and then it was to be delivered as soon as the MOD finishes working flat-out. If the MOD spent as much time on the DIP as it has done telling everyone that it is working at pace, maybe it would have been delivered by now. Let us look at the impact of the delay. In the air, we are yet to see investment in the capability that has been committed to. The Chief of the Defence Staff, in his prior role as Chief of the Air Staff, last year confirmed that the RAF has “no major equipment programmes planned for the next 15 years. We have what we have for the near and medium term”. Given the evolution development cycle of current capability, is that really a tenable position? The F-35B is due to graduate as a Government major projects portfolio programme by the end of this month, but will it? Will we see the delivery of the remaining seven F-35Bs by the end of next month, as scheduled? The Royal Air Force is yet to even place an order for the 12 F-35As that are due to qualify us to join NATO’s dual capable aircraft nuclear mission. That was announced nine months ago, with no orders placed and no progress made. It might as well just be a poster on the Defence Secretary’s bedroom wall. Likewise, the next tranche of F-35Bs has also not yet been ordered from Lockheed Martin. This goes back to my point regarding overstretch. Operation Firecrest will see the carrier strike group deploy with 24 F-35Bs. There are six deployed forward in Akrotiri, seven are awaiting delivery, and one fell in the sea. That leaves us with just 10 planes for training and to cover any other tasks. We are maxed out. Later this year we may be in a position where we have no realistic spare capacity of our only fifth-generation platform, with no current plans to purchase any more—and if/when we do purchase more, they are years away from delivery. But are we actually going to buy any more? Given our limited resources, putting all our chips on the global combat air programme and inevitably short-cutting our way to never truly fleshing out the accompanying system-of-systems does not augur well. We are already struggling to find the funding for the next phase of that project, delaying the signing of the trilateral contract for the next phase from last September because of the delay to the DIP, creating tensions with Japan and Italy and threatening the 2035 timeline that is crucial for Japan. When I challenged the Prime Minister on the delay, he would not commit to when the contract would be signed. On the high seas, Britannia most certainly does not rule the waves. HMS Dragon has finally arrived in the eastern Mediterranean, but it was one of only three Type 45s available. I use the term “available” loosely, as it had to be withdrawn from its NATO Maritime Group One commitment—a commitment that starts in a few weeks and for which we currently have no replacement ship available. The Government have no plan to facilitate that commitment and are presumably hoping that HMS Dragon can be recalled. The Royal Navy has to deliver Type 26 and Type 31, with all ships coming into service, optimistically, within the next nine years. Type 83 will see its outline business case submitted by June, but my understanding is that that programme may not make the cut, which raises serious questions about the future air dominance system. I would be surprised if Type 91 made the cut either, given that it is currently being assessed for feasibility and affordability. Decisions are pending on: the future cruise anti-ship weapons system; batch 1 offshore patrol vessels; the global decision support system, the maritime aviation transformation programme; Project Beehive; and Project Vantage. Charting a course to a much vaunted hybrid Navy looks perilous at best—I hope the Minister has his sextant to hand. On land, despite all that, the Army arguably has the most work to do. The Army has a huge transformation programme that will make it almost unrecognisable by the next Parliament. If there is one capability that we should be throwing the kitchen sink at, it is Project Asgard, which the Chief of the General Staff spoke effusively about last year in his Royal United Services Institute land warfare conference speech. He said: “It’s a project that, through AI-fuelled, software-defined and network enabled capabilities we are confident has made 4 Light Brigade capable of acting 10 times faster and 10 times further than it could last year.”

• 17 Mar 2026 · Youth Unemployment · Hansard source

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  I was lucky enough to get my first job when I was 16—washing up in a kitchen as well as working in a warehouse—which taught me some really good life skills about what it is like to be employed and the responsibilities that come with that. From speaking to businesses in my constituency, I know that those opportunities simply do not exist for young people at the moment. Being paid a bung to hire young people will not help, because the problem is the huge impact of business rates, national insurance contributions and the minimum wage on their ability to retain the staff they have. They are having to lay off those staff because they simply cannot afford to keep them on. Knowing full well that I will clip this and put it on social media, what will the Secretary of State say to businesses in my constituency to show them that he is listening to those concerns and will address them, rather than putting on a sticking plaster, as this package surely does?

• 16 Mar 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  On a point of order, Mr Speaker. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry mentioned Exercise Titan Storm in the context of Ajax. On 1 January, I asked the Ministry of Defence a named-day question—which was due an answer by 7 January—about how many noise and vibration injuries had been sustained up to Exercise Titan Storm. Before Defence Ministers leave the Chamber, may I ask for your advice on how best to elicit an answer, which is now over two months late?

• 4 Mar 2026 · Ministry of Defence · Hansard source

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  The world has rarely been as delicately balanced as it is now. We have entered the era where hard power is the only currency, and we are well into our overdraft. Moving to defence spending of 3% of GDP still remains only an ambition for the next Parliament, not a guarantee or even a firm commitment, and there was nothing in the spring forecast yesterday about the achievability of that target. This morning, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury was on the media round, and in a bravura performance of sticking to the party line, when Kate McCann asked the Minister on Times Radio whether the Treasury was holding up the defence investment plan, he did not deny it. In January, it was widely reported that there is a £28 billion funding gap between the scope of the defence investment plan and the available budget over the next four years. That was discussed in a meeting between the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff before Christmas. It is now March. The defence investment plan was due in the autumn, but we still have not seen it, despite repeated assurances that the Ministry of Defence is working “at pace” to deliver it. When the delivery window has been missed by over six months, talking of working “at pace” rings somewhat hollow. Last week, Bloomberg reported that the Treasury is exploring a multinational defence mechanism, allowing it to borrow off-books for both procurement and stockpiling. In his winding up, will the Minister clarify whether that is something that the Government have explored? Yesterday, the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister said that he hoped that the defence investment plan would be published “no later than the next couple of months”, so it may not be published this financial year. There are local elections in May and purdah will start in around a fortnight. The defence investment plan will contain a huge number of geographically sensitive announcements around the awarding of contracts and the construction of factories and new facilities, so it simply cannot be announced after purdah has started. Will the Government confirm whether the DIP will be published before or after the period of purdah? My contacts in the Ministry of Defence believed that the defence investment plan would be published in March, although it remains unclear whether that will be the DIP in its entirety or just part one of a double DIP that will announce only the headline items, burying the bad news in a later second instalment. Back in September, the Government’s defence industrial strategy laid out a number of elements, including the pledge to deliver a defence finance and investment strategy by early 2026. How is the Minister doing with that? The defence investors advisory group is supposed to be providing the expertise to formulate the strategy. Will we see it before the defence investment plan or simultaneously? Will it at least be published this financial year? Recommendation 59 of the strategic defence review states: “The MOD must deliver an overarching infrastructure Recapitalisation Plan to the Secretary of State by February 2026.” It is now March, and we would like to see that as well, Only last week, I spoke in the Chamber to explain that we are potentially facing a crisis of overstretch in our armed forces. I said that “our armed forces are on the cusp of looking overstretched, and doubly so in the event that anything else comes into scope or goes hot.” —[ Official Report , 25 February 2026; Vol. 781, c. 414.] Now we are committing resources to the middle east that there appears to be no coherent plan for. If the last few days in Iran have taught us anything, it is that we are barely justifying our seat at the top table when it comes to defence. Overtaken by our European rivals, now less experienced than our Ukrainian allies, and smaller and more reticent than our American allies, there are questions about our place in this new era. The Government run the risk of somehow making us a militarily irrelevant nuclear power.

• 3 Mar 2026 · Spring Forecast · Hansard source

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  We have heard several different discussions about defence today, but may I remind the Chancellor that yesterday morning an Iranian Shahed drone struck the runway at RAF Akrotiri? It was not taken out by any counter-drone technology—technology that was due to be included in the defence investment plan that the Minister for the Armed Forces informed me would be announced in autumn 2025. It is now spring 2026 and, despite the fact that we have had a Budget and now a spring forecast since the autumn, we have still not seen the defence investment plan. Will the Chancellor assure us that all the recommendations from the strategic defence review that the Government have pledged to deliver will be delivered in the defence investment plan when it is announced?

• 25 Feb 2026 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Member for his contribution. I hope he has not stolen a look at my speech, as I am about to come on to just that point, but I agree with him. There is potentially a trade-off to be made between putting troops on the ground in Ukraine and in the High North. There is a possibility that doing both those things to the sufficient level that we require may prove too much of a challenge. We are committed in Estonia, just as we are to be committed in Ukraine. It has been reported that our commitment to a post-ceasefire force would be around 7,500 troops. That is smaller than our peak commitment in Afghanistan, but that reflects the difference in posture. While 7,500 does not sound like a lot—only circa 10% of the current Army—it does not reflect the fact that three times that number is needed to sustain the deployment. By the time of a second six-month rotation through Ukraine, we would have 7,500 who have just returned from the first tour, the second 7,500 currently doing the job and the next 7,500 training to go. That is 22,000-odd from a field army of, say, 40,000, meaning that over half the Army will be committed to manning the eastern flank deterrence line. It was reported in The Telegraph yesterday that multiple members of the coalition of the willing have privately conceded that their contributions to the post-ceasefire peacekeeping mission depend on permission from Vladimir Putin. Could the Minister in his summing-up confirm whether every country in the coalition of the willing has committed to deploying troops to the peacekeeping mission in Ukraine alongside us? If we include the aforementioned battlegroup in Estonia, that is another 3,000 troops operating on the same cycle. If we factor in ongoing commitments, such as NATO’s Allied Reaction Force special operations component, which we lead for the next year, the Falkland Islands Roulement Infantry Company and the Resident Infantry Battalion in Dhekelia, as well as the process of retraining and rearming for the plethora of planned new capabilities, the number of personnel quickly adds up under the stacked readiness of multiple commitments. With the Prime Minister announcing our commitment to Operation Firecrest this year with the carrier strike group, as well as the expanded Royal Marines commitment in Norway, suddenly our armed forces are on the cusp of looking overstretched, and doubly so in the event that anything else comes into scope or goes hot. I highlight these challenges to draw out the complexity of the broader strategic issue. The only way this level of operational commitment will be feasible is if, like our European allies, we properly fund defence. That is why we have called on the Government to go faster and spend 3% of GDP on defence by the end of this Parliament to ensure that they can deliver the 62 recommendations in the strategic defence review that they have already pledged to deliver. But the defence investment plan itself is six months late, strongly suggesting that the plan as it stands is unaffordable. Can the Minister confirm that the plan will finally be published before the Easter recess? It is imperative that the plan addresses the growing capability gaps as the warfare spiral develops in eastern Europe. In conclusion, “I believe we are on a collision course with a Russia that is on a war footing, that is replenishing its lost equipment and that is re-arming fast… Putin will only take us seriously when he sees our factories producing at wartime rates. And that’s why I believe so strongly in the need to rebuild our own national arsenal and reconnect society with its Armed Forces… The urgency could not be clearer. Just ask yourself: If you knew now that our soldiers would be involved in large-scale combat operations in 2027, what would you be doing differently—and why are you not doing it?” Those are not my words, but the words of the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Roly Walker. He said them yesterday. As we mark the fourth anniversary of Vladimir Putin’s needless and tragic war, I am sure everyone in this House would agree with me when I say that I hope we are not here to mark a fifth. Slava Ukraini.

• 25 Feb 2026 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  I wholeheartedly concur. The Iranians, in particular, are global leaders in exporting terror, backing, as they do, the Houthis, Hezbollah and Hamas. Their provision of the Shahed drone to Russia and the bombardment that the Ukrainians face lead to a terrible toll and are a terrible result. Anyone who has seen any of the innumerable videos of first-person-view drone footage of soldiers being stalked and killed by drones cannot fail to appreciate the new reality of modern warfare. On the point made by the hon. Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward), the last year alone has seen Russia increase its use of drones by 200%. Such a capability sea change cannot be overstated. Four years into Putin’s three-day special military operation, Russia has sustained a staggering 1.2 million casualties, 325,000 of them fatalities. That is fast approaching the number of soldiers that we lost in the entirety of the second world war. The majority of casualties—reportedly 70% to 80%—are now caused by drones. It is reported that Russia can no longer recruit new soldiers at the rate that they are being lost, and in the past fortnight, Ukraine has liberated 300 square kilometres in its southern counter-offensive. We are four years into this conflict, and the remarkable bravery of the Ukrainian armed forces remains undiminished. Yes, we have supported them with matériel, intelligence, rapid procurement and funding, but the human sacrifice required to win, or crucially not lose, a war of sovereignty and survival is something that we perhaps do not address enough. Fifty-five thousand Ukrainian soldiers have been killed since 2022—the equivalent of more than two thirds of our regular Army. From the contributions this afternoon, it is clear that Members on both sides of this House want an end to this conflict, and an end on Ukraine’s terms—one that does not see them acquiesce to the Russian threat that it has given so much to keep at bay. In the broader context of European security, what comes next? There are significant lessons to be learned from the conflict in Ukraine. No war has been as visually documented at such close quarters as this. The Lessons Exploitation Centre at the Land Warfare Centre will have been busy shaping our future tactics. An example of that is the recently released outcome of NATO’s Exercise Hedgehog 2025 in Estonia, in which a team of just 10, training against experienced Ukrainian drone operators, were able to render two battalions combat-ineffective in just half a day. We are through the looking glass. Last Saturday, the Defence Secretary wrote a piece for The Telegraph in which he explicitly stated: “I want to be the Defence Secretary who deploys British troops to Ukraine–because this will mean that the war is finally over.” But to quote Winston Churchill, that will simply be “the end of the beginning.” The Minister does not need me to tell him that the ceasefire will simply facilitate a reconstitution of Russian forces. To use an old adage, Russia will trade space for time. When it returns to its barracks in the Leningrad military district, it will be based only a few minutes from the Estonian border. Pskov, home of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division and the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade, is just 35 km away. The NATO Forward Land Forces already man the line in Estonia via Operation Cabrit—one of our ongoing commitments. The battlegroup deployed there serves as a deterrent to further Russian expansionism and belligerence. No longer just a strategic tripwire, it is now a force equipped with a capability in Project Asgard that presents a lethal recce-strike system—a force whose very presence provides Estonia with the security of the NATO umbrella; a force so vital that its ongoing presence is apparently written into Estonia’s defence strategy.

• 23 Feb 2026 · Oxford-Cambridge Growth Corridor · Hansard source

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  Defence will be a key pillar of the Oxford-Cambridge growth corridor. In my Huntingdon constituency, we are lucky to have RAF Wyton. It is in the middle of a very ambitious project, Project Fairfax, which will use surplus Ministry of Defence land. The MOD signed a memorandum of understanding with Huntingdonshire district council last year, and Homes England is a key part of that. Will the Minister meet me and the chief executive of Huntingdonshire district council to discuss how we can best supercharge these growth plans and make good progress on them?

• 12 Feb 2026 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  The town of Huntingdon in my constituency has a rich cultural and historical heritage and is the birthplace of Oliver Cromwell—one of my predecessors in this House. It is the former home of the diarist Samuel Pepys, it is the first place in the UK where chocolate ice cream appeared on these shores, and it is also the birthplace of the sandwich—something very close to my heart. Because of this cultural heritage, we are putting the town forward to be the town of culture in 2028. I thank Paul Sweeney and the business improvement district team in Huntingdon for their hard work in putting forward a bid, not only to celebrate our cultural heritage but to build a legacy going forward. Will the Leader of the House join me in championing Huntingdon as the very best opportunity for Huntingdonshire to cement a town of culture for 2028?

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  Could the hon. Member clarify precisely how much of the cost of the Chagos islands deal will come from the Ministry of Defence budget?

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  So wrote the President of the United States only a week ago: “The UK giving away extremely important land is an act of GREAT STUPIDITY.” For once, he is not wrong. I have lost track of the number of times I have spoken about the Chagos deal in this House, but each time brings a new stick with which to beat the Government. It is genuinely difficult to see how the Government have got to this point, but their kamikaze negotiating tactics have led them to a situation where they can no longer even muster the collective energy of their Back Benchers to defend it. The dogged determination of the Government to capitulate to a 2019 advisory ruling by the International Court of Justice would be commendable, were it not so timid. The UN General Assembly adopted resolutions urging the UK to comply with the ICJ’s advisory opinion, but crucially, the US voted in support of the UK, clearly not fearing the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, of which it is not a member. As I am sure everybody here already knows, the United States’s support is significant because of the presence of the naval support facility, Diego Garcia. It is a strategically important location that is effectively a persistent aircraft carrier in the Indian ocean, critical for force projection in the southern hemisphere and across INDOPACOM—the United States Indo-Pacific Command. On Monday, the Minister of State responsible for the overseas territories, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth responsible (Stephen Doughty) was quick to imply that discussions regarding the deal with the United States were an almost daily occurrence. With that in mind, perhaps the Minister in his summing up could outline to the House what discussions the Government have had with their US counterparts regarding the limitations placed on operations by compliance with the Pelindaba treaty. This was the answer I received to a recent written question: “Both the UK and Mauritius are satisfied that our existing international obligations are fully compatible with the Agreement”, but what precisely does that exclude going forward? The African nuclear weapon-free zone treaty was signed by Mauritius in 1996 and prohibits myriad functions relating to nuclear weapons, including possession or control of nuclear weapons. There are obviously no intercontinental ballistic missiles based at Diego Garcia, but the US nuclear triad is designed to provide a second-strike capability that includes air-launched warheads. Naval support facility Diego Garcia is a strategic waypoint for the US air force bomber fleet, the B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers. Following 9/11, the US used Diego Garcia for operations in Afghanistan, and subsequently during the start of the Iraq war. As recently as last May, the US air force had B-2 bombers stationed on the island. This is critical because the B-2 Spirit is the delivery method for the Mod 11 B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb, the primary weapon for the ground-penetrating mission. This capability matters, and while it will likely never be used, we cannot afford to let enemies in the region know that that will never be on the table. We should bear in mind that the Prime Minister is in China this week. Strategic posture across the Pacific, particularly in Taiwan and the second island chain, will surely come up in conversation. Ceding the Chagos islands to a country within China’s orbit is yet another strategic mis-step in the Prime Minister’s inability to deal with China robustly. On the ongoing issue of sovereignty, in note No. 25 between the ambassador of the United States of America and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, written on 30 December 1966, point (1) states very clearly: “The Territory shall remain under United Kingdom sovereignty.” This time last year, I asked the Government whether the 1966 exchange of notes would require amendment as a result of the change in sovereignty, and they answered: “The 1966 Exchange of Notes between the UK and US regarding the joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia has been subject to routine amendments and supplementation since signature. Any amendments resulting from the proposed agreement with Mauritius will be factored into this existing process.” Can the Minister outline what progress the Government have made? I asked that question on 5 February last year, and here we are, a year letter, with the treaty on the brink and no update from the Government, other than through a slightly churlish appearance from the Minister at the Dispatch Box in Monday’s urgent question. Crucially, the legislation was pulled from the other place that afternoon. Throughout the passage of the Bill, the Government have deflected, obfuscated, been dragged to the Chamber, given us the run-around on detail, gaslit us, and generally tried to force this deal through. The lack of speakers on the Government Benches is testament to the fact that Labour MPs simply do not want to put their name to this legislation. All it achieves is a weakening of our military options in the southern hemisphere, and the exemption of 80% of Mauritian workers from income tax. Kudos to Mauritian Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam, clearly a savvier negotiator than our dear Prime Minister. “There is no doubt that China and Russia have noticed this act of total weakness”, said President Trump. Perhaps the Prime Minister could ask Xi Jinping about it before he offers him a state visit.

• 26 Jan 2026 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  Last week we had a discussion about the cost of this deal, and I asked the Minister whether he would confirm the figure of £34.7 billion from the Government Actuary’s Department. He did not give me a direct answer, but later in the debate he confirmed that it was a nominal amount, not adjusted for inflation or the social time preference rate. With that in mind, will the Minister give the House the most accurate assessment he can of the true figure for the total cost of the deal, adjusted for inflation and the social time preference rate?

• 20 Jan 2026 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for giving way and for his detailed explanation of how the calculations have been made. The Government Actuary’s Department clearly stated that this deal would cost £34.7 billion. That figure was then confirmed by his colleague, the Minister for the Middle East, who said that all the figures had been ratified by the Government Actuary’s Department, but his colleague sitting next to him, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, told me that that figure was inaccurate. Will the Minister therefore clarify how much this deal costs?

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

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  I absolutely concur with my right hon. Friend that Boxer is a vital capability—even more so, given the training pause that we are now encountering with Ajax—and we need to get Boxer into service as quickly as possible. I welcome the speeding up of that process overall. Meanwhile in October, the then Minister for the Armed Forces had stated: “Currently ARES will be fielded to Training Regiments, Armoured Cavalry units and Armoured Infantry units.” As I said, we have ordered only 93. For reference, in order to reflect the establishment of an armoured infantry battalion, we would need 45 Ares to replace the capacity of the Warrior FV510, notwithstanding how many Athena variants we would need to cover the 511 command variant. Where is the capacity to have vehicles at training regiments and armoured cavalry units? There is no redundancy built into the current vehicle fleet. The 93 Ares platforms equate to just 23 per battalion with no spare capacity, which is not even enough to replace three rifle companies’ worth of the Warrior FV510 variant. Can the Minister explain what the future establishment of these armoured infantry battalions will be? I appreciate that he will not have that information to hand—I do not think the Army knows yet—but will he write to me and explain how an armoured infantry battalion will be structured using Ares and Boxer? The demise of Warrior leaves a yawning capability gap that will be difficult to adequately replace without a new IFV. The then Minister for the Armed Forces stated that, “there is no direct replacement for Warrior”, and: “There are no plans to extend the out-of-service date for Warrior beyond 2027, and as such an extension is not under consideration.” The then Minister also stated: “As the ARES platform is delivered into service, tactical doctrines will be reviewed accordingly.” I do not expect the Minister to answer the question or to know the ins and outs of armoured infantry doctrine, but he should raise the question with the Land Warfare Centre, and with the infantry battalions that will receive Ares, to ask them how the platform will be used and what capability will then be lost. By removing a main armament from the armoured infantry’s firepower we fundamentally change the way that the vehicle is fought. It changes the way the vehicle can move cross-country, effectively removes the option to move in bounding overwatch, and means it can never engage enemy armour. Doctrinally, it turns the armoured infantry into mechanised infantry. Doctrinally, Ares is more akin to the Mk3 Bulldog. Despite that, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry this week informed me that Ares “is more suitable to be employed in the direct battle, rather than in the close support role”. Given the glaring absence of a main armament on Ares, I would dispute that assessment, which seems convenient rather than well thought through. Bulldog itself is due to be replaced in 2030, so what progress has been made in procurement of the Patria 6x6? Crucially, in December, the same Minister stated: “There are no other platforms within the Army’s armoured fleet which can fulfil the armoured reconnaissance role; Ajax has been specifically designed for this purpose.” With that in mind, and given that the entire Ajax fleet is grounded for an unspecified length of time pending an investigation by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch, with support from the Army Safety Investigation Team and General Dynamics, can the Minister state how the armoured reconnaissance capability of the British Army is currently being provided given that statement, and therefore what is the deployability of 3rd (UK) Division without any formation or armoured reconnaissance capability, or even the deployability of an armoured battle group from within 3 Div? The parlous state of the British Army’s armoured capability is on the cusp of being thrust into stark relief by the Prime Minister’s announcement last week that we had committed troops to the multinational force for Ukraine. While any detail on that force structure is currently pure speculation, it was reported by The Times that those troop numbers would not exceed 7,500. On a three-form cycle, that is circa 22,000 troops—the majority of the field army. If they are to be more than a speed bump for the vanguard of the Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, they will need capability that they simply do not have today. Challenger 3 has no timeline, with manufacturing due to commence only once the tank’s performance has been proven in the demonstration phase. It is not going to appear anytime soon. The Government have no plan for the remaining 140 Challenger 2s that are not due to be upgraded, and not even a promise that the plan will be outlined in the mythical defence investment plan. That is against the backdrop that the defence investment plan is unfunded, with a black hole of somewhere around £20 billion, give or take an Ajax programme budget. There will be cuts, and there will be delays. Out-of-service dates are going to be stretched to their limits. Bulldog is already 63 years old, and I am sure that it is no coincidence that it will be 67 when it reaches its out-of-service retirement date. The Chief of the General Staff wants to implement the 20-40-40 land warfare concept, of which Ajax is a key part, working in tandem with Project Asgard. That is the capability that could and should provide a continuous on-land deterrent along the eastern flank defensive line, reduce our sensor-to-effector time, and achieve the nebulous tenfold increase in lethality by reducing the kill chain to well inside the sub - seven - minute timeframe that defines the current frontline in Ukraine. Ajax cannot be scrapped. The Army needs it. There is no plan B, and given that it is a fixed-price contract, scrapping it will save no money anyway, despite Ministers confirming that the Government have sought legal advice from the Government Legal Department. The Government have not even considered a viable alternative option in CV90, and starting that process from scratch will take the best part of a decade before we even see a vehicle, based on current queues. Put simply, Ajax needs to be delivered, primarily because the Army needs to restore its armoured reconnaissance capability. Additionally, there is a second order effect: confidence. The British Army badly needs to restore faith in Ajax as a platform. For all the negative stories and press, the Army and the Government must work out how to rebuild confidence in their ailing platform. I know what it is to be given kit that I do not have confidence in, and to have to use it on operations and wonder whether it will let me down, or worse. I know that the Minister can sympathise with that view. We must restore faith in the platform, not only for the soldiers expected to operate with it, but for its appeal from an investor and export position. The long-term future of Ajax depends on the ability of General Dynamics to sell it overseas. The most advanced armoured fighting vehicle in its class should be an easy sell to the nations currently in the process of rearming and upgrading. We have a history of exquisite sovereign capability that nobody else really wants: Challenger 2, Warrior, even the SA80. Each of those has suffered from a lack of development over its life cycle, too often a day late and a dollar short.