Ben Obese-Jecty MP: speeches

Speeches

• 21 May 2026 · Costs for Motorists · Hansard source

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  I want to come back to what the Minister said earlier about the war in Iran. She knows full well that the Leader of the Opposition did not say that she would take us into the conflict, and she knows full well that it was a NOFORN—no foreign nationals—operation and that there was never an opportunity for the UK to be involved. If she does not know that, she should go and speak to the Defence team and get up to date with the details. She has some cheek, considering that the Government have just decided that they are going to row back on the pressure they put on Russia. Given that the Minister did not explain it in her media round this morning, will she now explain exactly why the Government decided to exempt oil and oil products that originate from Russia under commodity codes 2709 and 2710?

• 14 Apr 2026 · Knife Crime · Hansard source

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  It was around this time last year that I led the Backbench Business debate in the Chamber on preventing knife crime among children and young people, so I welcome the measures announced by the Minister and hope that they have a huge impact, reducing the use of knives by young people. I want to touch on two points in her announcement. When it comes to banning zombie knives, we know that they and ninja swords account for less than 4% of all fatal stabbings. Screwdrivers account for more fatal stabbings, and household kitchen knives account for over half of all those stabbings. Given how easily accessible they are, do the Government have any steps in place? I appreciate that stopping access to kitchen knives is an impossible task, given that everybody in this Chamber has them at home, but are the Government considering any measures to dissuade people from using kitchen knives in this way? Furthermore, we know that social media has a huge influence on children, creating the fear that leads to them carrying a knife. Does the Minister have any steps to address that?

• 17 Mar 2026 · Middle East · Hansard source

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  The morning after the drone attack on RAF Akrotiri, the Foreign Secretary said in the media round that the drone had struck the runway at RAF Akrotiri. I clarified that with the Ministry of Defence, which went on to confirm that it in fact struck the hangar. The hangar in question was widely reported in the media as containing the U-2 spy planes of detachment one of the US air force’s 9th operations group, which is tasked with flying intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions over the middle east. To that extent, given that the Foreign Secretary stated that Cyprus is not being used in those US operations, could she clarify unequivocally whether Operation Olive Harvest is being used by the US to fly reconnaissance over the middle east in defensive support of these US operations? If she is sure that it is not, could she confirm what conversations she has had with the US that made her come to that assessment?

• 17 Mar 2026 · Youth Unemployment · Hansard source

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  I was lucky enough to get my first job when I was 16—washing up in a kitchen as well as working in a warehouse—which taught me some really good life skills about what it is like to be employed and the responsibilities that come with that. From speaking to businesses in my constituency, I know that those opportunities simply do not exist for young people at the moment. Being paid a bung to hire young people will not help, because the problem is the huge impact of business rates, national insurance contributions and the minimum wage on their ability to retain the staff they have. They are having to lay off those staff because they simply cannot afford to keep them on. Knowing full well that I will clip this and put it on social media, what will the Secretary of State say to businesses in my constituency to show them that he is listening to those concerns and will address them, rather than putting on a sticking plaster, as this package surely does?

• 4 Mar 2026 · Ministry of Defence · Hansard source

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  The world has rarely been as delicately balanced as it is now. We have entered the era where hard power is the only currency, and we are well into our overdraft. Moving to defence spending of 3% of GDP still remains only an ambition for the next Parliament, not a guarantee or even a firm commitment, and there was nothing in the spring forecast yesterday about the achievability of that target. This morning, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury was on the media round, and in a bravura performance of sticking to the party line, when Kate McCann asked the Minister on Times Radio whether the Treasury was holding up the defence investment plan, he did not deny it. In January, it was widely reported that there is a £28 billion funding gap between the scope of the defence investment plan and the available budget over the next four years. That was discussed in a meeting between the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff before Christmas. It is now March. The defence investment plan was due in the autumn, but we still have not seen it, despite repeated assurances that the Ministry of Defence is working “at pace” to deliver it. When the delivery window has been missed by over six months, talking of working “at pace” rings somewhat hollow. Last week, Bloomberg reported that the Treasury is exploring a multinational defence mechanism, allowing it to borrow off-books for both procurement and stockpiling. In his winding up, will the Minister clarify whether that is something that the Government have explored? Yesterday, the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister said that he hoped that the defence investment plan would be published “no later than the next couple of months”, so it may not be published this financial year. There are local elections in May and purdah will start in around a fortnight. The defence investment plan will contain a huge number of geographically sensitive announcements around the awarding of contracts and the construction of factories and new facilities, so it simply cannot be announced after purdah has started. Will the Government confirm whether the DIP will be published before or after the period of purdah? My contacts in the Ministry of Defence believed that the defence investment plan would be published in March, although it remains unclear whether that will be the DIP in its entirety or just part one of a double DIP that will announce only the headline items, burying the bad news in a later second instalment. Back in September, the Government’s defence industrial strategy laid out a number of elements, including the pledge to deliver a defence finance and investment strategy by early 2026. How is the Minister doing with that? The defence investors advisory group is supposed to be providing the expertise to formulate the strategy. Will we see it before the defence investment plan or simultaneously? Will it at least be published this financial year? Recommendation 59 of the strategic defence review states: “The MOD must deliver an overarching infrastructure Recapitalisation Plan to the Secretary of State by February 2026.” It is now March, and we would like to see that as well, Only last week, I spoke in the Chamber to explain that we are potentially facing a crisis of overstretch in our armed forces. I said that “our armed forces are on the cusp of looking overstretched, and doubly so in the event that anything else comes into scope or goes hot.” —[ Official Report , 25 February 2026; Vol. 781, c. 414.] Now we are committing resources to the middle east that there appears to be no coherent plan for. If the last few days in Iran have taught us anything, it is that we are barely justifying our seat at the top table when it comes to defence. Overtaken by our European rivals, now less experienced than our Ukrainian allies, and smaller and more reticent than our American allies, there are questions about our place in this new era. The Government run the risk of somehow making us a militarily irrelevant nuclear power.

• 12 Feb 2026 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  The town of Huntingdon in my constituency has a rich cultural and historical heritage and is the birthplace of Oliver Cromwell—one of my predecessors in this House. It is the former home of the diarist Samuel Pepys, it is the first place in the UK where chocolate ice cream appeared on these shores, and it is also the birthplace of the sandwich—something very close to my heart. Because of this cultural heritage, we are putting the town forward to be the town of culture in 2028. I thank Paul Sweeney and the business improvement district team in Huntingdon for their hard work in putting forward a bid, not only to celebrate our cultural heritage but to build a legacy going forward. Will the Leader of the House join me in championing Huntingdon as the very best opportunity for Huntingdonshire to cement a town of culture for 2028?

• 14 Jan 2026 · Ajax Programme · Hansard source

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  I thank my hon. Friend for that excellent point. I was not going to cover it in my speech, so it is definitely worth adding to the record for the Minister to address in his response. The interim National Armaments Director, the new National Armaments Director, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Defence Staff represent our most senior leaders within defence. It is hard to believe that they all would have signed off a vehicle platform that was inherently unsafe or where it was a sketchy 50:50 decision. How did we reach a point where four-star senior officers and equivalents had the confidence to sign off the vehicle’s initial operating capability, which then received ministerial approval, only for it to blow up in everybody’s face weeks later like a Wile E. Coyote Road Runner trap? The March 2022 National Audit Office report states: “The Department believes that the contract also incentivised GDLS-UK to prioritise production milestones over the quality and performance of the capability.” It goes on: “The contract incentivised GDLS-UK to achieve production milestones resulting in it continuing to manufacture vehicles while technical issues remained unresolved.” Can the Minister give any clarity on whether that is still the case today, given that General Dynamics signed off achieving all the criteria required to meet initial operating capability, only for the entire programme to collapse less than four months later? Initial operating capability was also signed off by the Army on 15 September, before ministerial sign-off was granted on 5 November. Last year, the then Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry stated that “The Armoured Cavalry Programme (Ajax) is projecting the delivery of over 180 operationally deployable platforms by the end of 2025.” Despite the various travails of the Ajax programme, production has continued throughout the training pause. As a result, we know that the Army has received just under a third of all Ajax platforms across all variants. It should be noted that the 2022 National Audit Office report highlighted that the compressed programme schedule flagged that there would no longer be time to validate the design of capability drops 3 and 4 before manufacture. Given that we are now in capability drop 3, can the Minister confirm whether the designs were validated before these vehicles were assembled and delivered last year? The Minister also confirmed that “It is anticipated that a further 110 platforms will be delivered in 2026, with the remaining 297 platforms delivered by 2028.” With 180 Ajax platforms delivered, a similar number still to be accepted by the Army and all 589 hulls having now been completed in Spain, on current timelines the complete production run will have been completed by mid-2027. I believe that includes bringing all vehicles up to capability drop 4 standard. Assuming that any resolution to the current training pause does not involve the mother of all factory recalls, there could potentially be an idle factory in Wales. What plans are there for the Merthyr Tydfil factory beyond the middle of next year? With only 18 months’ work left to complete, can the Minister assure General Dynamics employees in Wales that they will have a job once Ajax production is complete? Can he assure those employees that there will be no redundancies, given that we have no plans to purchase any more vehicles and that export plans are yet to materialise? While I appreciate that UK Defence and Security Exports sit within the Department for Business and Trade, can the Minister confirm what progress UKDSE has made regarding any potential export sales? One of the main reasons why we are debating this topic today, and the reason for such media interest, is the social media content that has emerged from the factory and from Army personnel regarding the workmanship on the vehicles. To that end, I would like to recognise the efforts of Alfie Usher, aka Fill Your Boots, who has been instrumental in putting heat and light on this issue on behalf of service personnel. For obvious reasons, I am no trade unionist, but he has been the unofficial secretary-general of the unofficial armed forces union for some time. I know that the Armed Forces Minister has previously liaised with Alfie on issues, and—I say this only partially in jest—perhaps the Government should reconsider his application to be the Armed Forces Commissioner. The Government are struggling to fill the role. Alfie’s application got binned back in August, but he has been doing the job unpaid since then anyway. For those who do not follow Alfie’s account—any politician with an interest in defence really should—I should say that between the exposés and topical memes, Alfie has been the bête noire of General Dynamics and the Army, operating as chief whistleblower and ensuring that the voice of those on the ground can be heard. There have been multiple examples of concerns shared by him via social media on behalf of service personnel tasked with prepping newly delivered vehicles. A variety of issues have been highlighted and I ask the Minister, if he has not done so already, to include Alfie within the scope of the ministerial-led review to ensure full transparency and the inclusion of service personnel. They are the end users of this vehicle, and too often we ask our personnel to put up and shut up. An organisation that dines out on moral courage and pretends that it values 360° feedback should make sure that it listens to our soldiers, irrespective of how refreshingly blunt their views might be. The evidence shown by Fill Your Boots has put heat and light on the production and assembly issues upon which blame has been placed. During the first pause in 2021, the MOD and General Dynamics did not agree on whether the levels of noise and vibration of Ajax vehicles breached contractual requirements. Given that the same noise and vibration issues potentially remain unresolved six years later, can the Minister clarify what does constitute a contractual breach? Through 2020-21, General Dynamics undertook a supposedly in-depth review of the Ajax programme to confirm the root cause of noise and vibration issues, identify solutions and then validate them through extensive testing. They identified that noise and vibration issues were caused by the track, suspension and running gear; the engine and its mounting in the vehicle; quality issues including bolting, cable routing and welding; and performance and integration of crew headsets. The vehicles were thoroughly assessed using a noise and vibration calculator, whatever that is, to determine “the safe operating envelopes for the platform across different speeds and terrains.” The noise and vibration calculator provided by General Dynamics did not measure noise and vibration, which the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory raised concerns about. It estimated the maximum safe exposure time on Ajax vehicles for given conditions based on measurements from early trials. In August 2020, the first noise-induced hearing loss symptoms were reported by soldiers. In September 2020, DSTL discovered an error in General Dynamics’ measurements, which meant that vehicle crews might have been overexposed to noise and vibration. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry has told me: “Whole Body and Hand Arm Vibration Levels were well understood, and effective mitigations were in place.” But they cannot have been effective, or why would personnel still be suffering from noise and vibration-related sickness? Will the Minister confirm that any analysis of the root cause of the current noise and vibration sickness does not use the General Dynamics noise and vibration calculator, and instead seeks to use a metric that does not raise concerns with DSTL? The measures implemented by General Dynamics included the implementation of an effective hearing protection and combined communication system, an improvement to the overall Ajax build quality, a review and amendment of build tolerances for key crew interfaces, changes to seat structures to provide greater vibration attenuation—that sounds very much like new seat cushions—and improvements to track tensioning procedures to ensure correct track tension, which reduces vibration. On the track tension, I am aware that composite rubber tracks are now mature enough to be viable for a vehicle the weight of Ajax. Although there are still issues regarding track replacement, given that the whole track has to be replaced rather than a single track link, I note that the General Dynamics Ajax Blackjax demonstrator vehicle at DSEI had this fitted. I ask the Minister what assessment his Department has made of the feasibility of switching to composite rubber tracks as a potential solution going forward? The 2022 National Audit Office report outlined that there were 27 limitations of use on Ajax vehicles in September 2021; 22 were safety-related and 11 were critical to achieving IOC. Can the Minister give the House assurances that those 11 limitations were resolved prior to initial operating capability being declared in 2025? Could the Minister also confirm what contractual payments were made to General Dynamics on the achievement of the criteria for initial operating capability in July 2025 or the formal declaration of initial operating capability on 5 November 2025? What is the total amount paid to General Dynamics as of today, and how much still remains to be paid? What delivery milestone will trigger the remaining payments? With those resolutions to the previous issues identified in mind, we know that three exercises took place between IOC criteria being achieved on 23 July and ministerial IOC declaration on 5 November. We have not heard of any instances of noise and vibration sickness occurring among vehicle crews during those three exercises. Will the Minister confirm that there were no noise and vibration sickness issues among crews during those three exercises? I asked the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry what discussions his Department had had with General Dynamics, the senior responsible officer and the British Army regarding the Ajax programme between 23 July and Exercise Titan Storm in late November. Instead of a response, the Minister told me: “I have directed a Ministerial review that covers elements of his question. I will update the House in due course.” The Minister was happy to tell me that he met with key stakeholders, including meeting General Dynamics after the programme was paused, but, much as I have tried, the Government have scrupulously avoided disclosing any information about what ministerial discussions have taken place with stakeholders between 23 July and 5 November. On 1 January, I asked a named day question for answer on 7 January 2026. I asked: “how many noise and vibration injuries were sustained…between 23 July 2025 and Exercise Titan Storm”. Strangely, I have not received a response yet, a week after one was due—it is almost as if this is an issue that the Government do not want to disclose. Will the Minister clarify the answer to written question 101920 and put on the record how many noise and vibration injuries were sustained between the achievement of initial operating capability criteria by General Dynamics and the start of Exercise Titan Storm? The March 2022 National Audit Office Report states that the Department “knew of noise and vibration issues before soldiers reported injuries but was not aware of the severity of potential problems. Reporting of issues identified in trials was limited and slow, meaning that safety concerns were not shared or escalated by the Army or…DE&S”. Has that culture been addressed? Concerns were first raised about noise and vibration by the Army trials team in late 2019, but did not appear in quarterly programme reports until March 2021. To what extent have we seen the same issue repeat itself last summer? In December 2025, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed to me that “Of the 61 vehicles of all AJAX types involved in the exercise, 23 AJAX Vehicles were linked to soldiers suffering from noise or vibration injury.” I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed where those 61 affected vehicles were manufactured. Were they part of the first 100 Ajax vehicles manufactured and assembled in Spain, or were they later vehicles whose hulls were manufactured in Spain but were assembled at the Merthyr Tydfil facility? Can he also confirm whether the early production vehicles from capability drop 0 to 2, which were identified as not being fully compliant with requirements, have now been retrofitted and what capability drop are they currently equipped to? The Minister also confirmed that “On 22 November…during a routine training exercise, around 30 soldiers operating in Ajax reported being affected by noise and vibration exposure.” For 30 soldiers to be affected by the same noise and vibration sickness, with identical symptoms, as a result of a known issue supposedly resolved by 2023 is simply unacceptable. It is incredibly important that we are able to understand whether there were any instances during the three exercises prior to Titan Storm and indeed to identify whether there have been any instances of General Dynamics employees affected by noise and vibration exposure during the same period, prior to or after the 23 July IOC criteria achievement milestone. In November, I asked the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry how many compensation claims related to noise and vibration symptoms incurred during the use of Ajax variants had been made since the start of the armoured cavalry programme. The Minister informed me that it would take time to collate and review the information needed to answer the question, and that he would write to me. It is now mid-January and I would appreciate it if the Minister could provide that information in his response. It should not take two months to work out how many compensation claims have been made relating to Ajax. If I were Minister, I would have a close eye on the running tally, particularly in preparation for this debate. On 8 December the Minister confirmed: “We are currently undertaking reviews into the medical injuries sustained by Ajax crews, and more details on the findings will be published in due course.” Will the ministerial-led review he has commissioned or the report from the Defence Accident Investigation Branch contain the details of those findings? In that review, will he confirm how many service personnel are undergoing treatment or have been diagnosed with hearing loss following audiometry protocols after operating within an Ajax variant? Regarding when the vehicles will be able to recommence training, any decisions on the pause are to be made by Ministers after the investigations by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch have concluded. That suggests that the pause will be lifted after the investigation but before the conclusion of the ministerial-led review. Will the Minister clarify the timeline for the investigation, which he previously stated would take at least two weeks and so should be approaching conclusion, and the ministerial-led review, for which we are yet to see the terms of reference, which were due before Christmas? I appreciate it will still be autumn until the defence investment plan is published in March. Will the pause on the use of Ajax be lifted before the conclusion of the Minister’s review, given that the noise and vibration issues may not have been identified, let alone resolved? This debate is about the future of the Ajax programme. Although the near future revolves around the resolution of the immediate issues that followed Exercise Titan Storm, beyond that the programme will need to achieve full operating capability, but crucially, it will be the tip of the spear in our armoured doctrine. So, a good start would be to have an armoured doctrine that is coherent. In 2014, we ordered 589 vehicles out of an optional 1,328—below the Army’s required fleet size at the time of 686. Although that was not necessarily a defining error at the time, subsequent decisions, even as recently as last summer, have compounded the issue, bringing us to a situation where our armoured fleet is now completely unbalanced—increasingly so given the evolution of modern conflict since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the ubiquity of drones at all levels, and the current global arms race. When Ajax was commissioned, we were still undertaking combat operations in Afghanistan. Since then, we have had multiple defence reviews, and changed our focus to the Indo-Pacific and now to the High North, and now we are talking about putting troops in eastern Europe as a deterrent to a belligerent Russia. The irony is that we still have much of the same armour designed to do that job the first time round. The original plan was for Ajax, alongside Boxer and Challenger 3, to provide the backbone of the Army’s armoured capability within Integrated Force 2030. March 2021’s “Defence in a Competitive Age” outlines how the Army would use Ajax in its two close-combat armoured brigade combat teams, and as part of its deep reconnaissance strike brigade combat team—formations that are now putatively in place. We cannot discuss the future of the Ajax programme without discussing how the Army plans to use Ajax within those brigade combat teams. As somebody with a background in armoured infantry, who formerly held an admittedly niche specialisation in anti-tanks, I have more than a keen interest in the future of our armoured capability. Being something of a tank-spotter, I note some glaring capability gaps based on the information provided by Ministers over the past year or so. Let us start with the basics. In December 2024, the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle), the then Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry, stated in a written answer to my question: “On current plans, Boxer will be delivered to four Heavy Mechanised Infantry Battalions and Divisional Enablers.” Seven months later, however, on 15 July, she stated: “The Army intends to reorganise its Heavy Forces units in 3 Division, such that all four would become Armoured Infantry Units based on the Ajax and Boxer family of vehicles.” She subsequently went on to state: “The Army intends to equip the Regular Infantry Units within 3 (UK) Division with Ares in the infantry troop carrying role: 1 Mercian, 1 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, 1 Royal Welsh and 5 Rifles.” What happened between December 2024 and July 2025 that saw such a fundamental change to the future of the infantry, and indeed our entire armoured capability? The number of Ares platforms to be provided has not changed since 2014: just 93. For reference, the current land equipment table shows that we currently have 604 Warrior. Ares’s role was originally “protected mobility reconnaissance support” and latterly to “deliver and support specialist troops”. It has never once been earmarked as an infantry-fighting vehicle. The present Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), then gave this written response to my question: “The Ares variant of Ajax is designed for mounted close combat and is being delivered to the Field Army. The decision to field Ares with Infantry Battalions was taken after a considerable assessment programme.” I would be interested to know whether the aim of the Ares assessment programme was simply to justify the existing total of 589 vehicles, or actually to highlight the capability required, because whichever question the Army asks, the answer always appears to be 589 Ajax vehicles. I asked to see the outcome of that assessment programme but was told that its disclosure would “be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces”. I suggest that, given the enemy knows that Ares does not have any armour-defeating weapons capability, the issue around prejudicing capability lies elsewhere. Let’s walk that back a step. In my opinion, the Ares variant is not designed for mounted close combat. It is equipped with a remote weapon station that can mount a 50-calibre machine gun at the heaviest. As someone whose specialisation in the Army was armoured infantry, I know my way around a 30 mm canon. A 50-cal cannot defeat armour; it is no substitute for 40 mm APFSDS, which is the round that its Ajax brother uses. In September, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport stated in a written answer that Ares would be, “used to deliver and support specialist troops across the battlefield. The term ‘specialist troops’ is used informally, and in this context refers to Anti-Tank Javelin Teams, Snipers and Support Troops.” But by November that had changed again, with the same Minister contradictorily stating: “Anti-tank platoons within Armoured Infantry units will be equipped with Boxer variants”. So which is it: Ares or Boxer for Javelin platoons? Will armoured infantry battalions be tracked or a mix of wheeled and tracked, with the logistical implications of that? Will Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers light aid detachments have both Ajax and Boxer repair and recovery variants? Where are we going to keep the additional vehicles? What is the training burden of mixed armoured fleets, thereby doubling driving cadres, maintenance training, and vehicle commanders’ courses? Have we even bought a recovery variant of Boxer yet? The Army’s own website suggests it is not one of the variants within the 623. This approach is incoherent and suggests that the Army does not really know what to do with the capability it will shortly have.

• 27 Nov 2025 · Budget Resolutions · Hansard source

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  I wholeheartedly agree. I have spent the last year talking to small businesses in my constituency that have been crippled by the measures in the last Budget. When this year’s measures come in as well, some of those businesses will struggle desperately to keep on lower earners, particularly young people. My first job as a 16-year-old was working in a supermarket, and I am sure many Members had a similar experience. Those opportunities are going to disappear for young people as a result of these measures. What this Labour Government have not taken into account is that every above-inflation wage increase leads to higher business costs, lower investment and fewer opportunities for those we represent. Many businesses that want to employ people will now find themselves unable to take on staff or to take the risks that the Chancellor mentioned, meaning that businesses cannot grow. We are very likely to see the wage compression effect, whereby the gap between those on the minimum wage and those in more skilled or experienced roles becomes smaller. That, yet again, leads to a lack of incentive to develop skills and opportunities for those with them. The Government must address that, as it will curtail opportunities for young people and lower earners. Unemployment is now set to peak at 5% and the number of economically inactive people will also rise. The pay-per-mile tax on electric vehicles will surely disincentivise the switch to EVs before the ban on new petrol and diesel vehicles kicks in, and the OBR estimates that there will be 440,000 fewer EV sales over the next five years because of the tax. How much tax revenue will be lost because those sales never happen? Then there is the plethora of other taxes that are part of the smorgasbord: the tourism tax, the NI raid on pension contributions, the reduction in the tax-free cash ISA allowance and even a milkshake tax. We have not even touched on the absence of the commitment to 3% of GDP on defence anywhere in the Budget. There is not a single reference to it and I do not understand how. We saw today that the service chiefs will write to the Defence Secretary to tell him that it will not be possible to deliver the strategic defence review. I would love to hear from the Minister how Labour will facilitate defence in this day and age. The OBR has stated that not a single measure contained in the Budget will improve growth, which has, in fact, been downgraded from the figure forecast in the summer. Taxes on working people have been increased by stealth to pay for welfare. That will be Rachel Reeves’s legacy, and this is quite possibly her last Budget—

• 19 Nov 2025 · Local Government Reform: Huntingdonshire · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That this House has considered the impact of local government reform in Huntingdonshire. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. This debate comes at a timely juncture, as later today Huntingdonshire district council will vote for its preferred option for local government reorganisation in Cambridgeshire. For the avoidance of doubt, and for the benefit of any Huntingdonshire district councillors watching this prior to casting their vote, my preference is for option E: a Huntingdonshire unitary authority. I have already stated my preference publicly, but today, ahead of that vote, I wish to reiterate the point and warn of the dangers of voting for anything else. I am alarmed by reports that several councillors have opted to vote for option C, not because they passionately believe in the business case, but because they have apparently input option C and option E into ChatGPT and based their vote on the rationale it has provided, sharing it in WhatsApp groups with other councillors and influencing their decisions. If true, that is a hugely embarrassing way to decide on the future of Huntingdonshire. Although option C is debatably the least worst other option, if Huntingdon district councillors are not prepared to vote for option E and back Huntingdonshire, why should the Government? By voting against a Huntingdonshire unitary authority, those councillors are voting against Huntingdonshire. If they vote against Huntingdonshire, they are effectively saying they are prepared to see it broken up, which is exactly what Labour wants to do. Option D first surfaced supposedly as a proposal from two of Cambridgeshire’s Labour MPs. It was ostensibly pitched as their proposal, but we now know that it did not actually come from them. I have been reliably informed that option D emanated from the Labour east regional office and that Labour MPs were simply happy to put their names to it. Option D is clearly Labour’s attempt to pork-barrel the local government reorganisation of Cambridgeshire. Last week, Peterborough city council, the council responsible for the appalling management of the local authority, voted for option D. Without any consultation with the people of Huntingdonshire, it voted, purely out of self-interest, to conduct a land grab of Huntingdonshire in order to shore up the council’s terrible financial position and have somewhere to build its houses. I have read option D in detail, and nowhere does it articulate or explain what the benefit of splitting Huntingdonshire would be. I would be interested to see the engagement survey results and to know how many people across the whole of Huntingdonshire even knew that was a possibility. I suspect that the first that many people in my constituency will hear of it is when I post this speech on my social media.

• 17 Nov 2025 · Asylum Policy · Hansard source

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  In February, at Second Reading of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill, I raised the issue of the generous financial and accommodation package that is advertised on the Government’s own website under “Asylum support: What you’ll get”, which outlines the provision of an asylum support enablement—ASPEN—card with £49.18 of cash loaded on to it each week, on top of free accommodation, even if someone has been refused asylum. The cards can be used for gambling and have been over 6,000 times, according to a freedom of information request. In May, I raised this issue again when I asked the previous Home Secretary what she planned to do to address the pull factors of free cash and a free home. Can this Home Secretary now commit to address my previous calls that these pull factors must be mitigated to create a deterrent, and will those on section 4 or section 95 support have the benefit withdrawn under these measures?