Ben Obese-Jecty MP: speeches

Speeches

• 13 Oct 2025 · Security Update: Official Secrets Act Case · Hansard source

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  Last month, the Security Minister came before the House and stated that he was not happy with the decision not to prosecute. I asked him why the Government were dithering over formally challenging China, having excluded it from the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, and he suggested that they were not doing so. Subsequent revelations have suggested that the Government have yielded to Chinese threats to withhold investment, and to offers to waive the outstanding debt owed to Jingye. Would the Minister like to correct the record and explain why China is not in the enhanced tier, given that we are discussing spying for China? Can he clarify what role the National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, has played in deciding that China should not be classified in the enhanced tier alongside Russia and Iran?

• 13 Oct 2025 · Digital ID · Hansard source

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  I am firmly against the Government’s plans to introduce digital ID, which is alarming state overreach. This pledge—seemingly made on a whim, given that it made no appearance in the Labour manifesto and there is no mandate for it—seems to be a desperate attempt to shore up Labour’s moribund pledge to smash the gangs. There appears to be little appetite or enthusiasm for this proposal on the Government Benches, and the claim that it will curb illegal immigration, when we are still offering asylum seekers somewhere to live and an asylum support enablement card of £49.18 a week, is not supported by the evidence. Having received a huge amount of correspondence on this matter, I ask the Secretary of State what guarantees she can give my constituents that the scheme can be afforded, that their data will be safe, and that the scheme will be never used to track their use of services.

• 16 Sept 2025 · Ambassador to the United States · Hansard source

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  The now former ambassador to the United States has been sacked due to the nature of his relationship with a convicted paedophile—a relationship that has come as no surprise to anybody except the Prime Minister, it would appear. The Prime Minister and the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), knew of Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Epstein, yet his appointment was felt to be worth the risk. That is despite warnings from President Trump’s co-campaign manager Chris LaCivita, who criticised the replacement of the former ambassador, Dame Karen Pierce, as replacing a “professional universally respected ambo with an absolute moron”. Even the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), who was effusive in her praise for Lord Mandelson, asked for him to come before her Committee to “allow my colleagues to hear directly why the Prime Minister has appointed him”. —[ Official Report , 14 January 2025; Vol. 760, c. 143.] With her face pressed up against the Cabinet Room window like Tiny Tim out in the cold, I am surprised that she could be heard, but the Minister for the Overseas Territories, who is looking sheepish in his place on the Front Bench, was emphatic. He stated: “We are absolutely convinced that Lord Mandelson will do an excellent job as our representative in Washington”. —[ Official Report , 14 January 2025; Vol. 760, c. 143.] Yet that whole time, the Government were aware of the security warnings that Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Jeffrey Epstein crossed the line of what is acceptable and failed to meet the standard expected of what is arguably our most critical ambassadorial appointment. The President of the United States arrives for his second state visit tomorrow, yet we now suffer the embarrassment and indignity of having had to sack our ambassador for his proximity to a man found guilty of soliciting prostitution from a child—a man whose girlfriend was convicted in 2021 of sex trafficking, conspiracy and transportation of a minor for illegal sexual activity. Indeed, an aspect of this matter that remains unclear is the nature of Lord Mandelson’s relationship with Ghislaine Maxwell. The New York Times has described this issue as “a stinging embarrassment” that “casts a shadow over the planned state visit”. How has the Prime Minister allowed this to happen, ignoring the advice from his security assessment to appoint him anyway, embracing the risk then having it blow up in his face? Prior to entering Parliament, I worked for Barclays bank. In 2021, the bank’s CEO Jes Staley resigned amid a regulatory probe into whether he mischaracterised his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. I actually raised a complaint with my managers, which was roundly ignored and never advanced beyond managing director level, such was the squeamishness that surrounded the story. I was furious that Barclays still paid Staley his £2.4 million salary and £120,000 pension contribution while being defenestrated for his relationship with Epstein. That is not privileged information—it was widely reported—yet while the financial world saw fit to wash its hands of Staley, this Labour Government welcomed Lord Mandelson with open arms. Those linked to Jeffrey Epstein who maintained a relationship with him after his conviction and who many times visited his island, where the crimes took place, have long since been deplatformed and deemed too toxic to hold positions of power, yet the hubris of the Prime Minister saw him ride roughshod over such glaringly obvious concerns. Being the Prime Minister is to take the mantle of the UK’s decision-maker-in-chief; it is to own the responsibility of making not just difficult decisions, but the most difficult decisions. Appointing an ambassador to the United States is not the political banana skin that should bring down the Government, yet here we are. The Government are teetering on the brink. Yesterday the Prime Minister gingerly began climbing down over his handling of the Mandelson sacking. When he came to the Chamber last Wednesday, he robustly defended Lord Mandelson and played to the baying crowd. He even had the chutzpah to claim that the Conservative party has a leadership contest going on—was it not interesting to see him in the Smoking Room last night between votes? [Laughter.] Last Wednesday, the Prime Minister stated that “full due process was followed during this appointment”. —[ Official Report , 10 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 859.] He said that twice. If that is true, the Prime Minister knew the full scope of Mandelson’s relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. If he did not know and new information subsequently came to light, either the vetting standards of the Government are incompetent or the claim of “full due process” is inaccurate. The Prime Minister also said that “I have confidence in the ambassador”. —[ Official Report , 10 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 860.] He said that twice, too. The Prime Minister’s explanation yesterday stated that there were three reasons for his tergiversation: “The nature and extent of the relationship being far different to what I’d understood to be the position at the point of appointment, the questioning and challenging of the conviction, which…goes to the heart and cuts across what this government is doing on violence against women and girls and the unsatisfactory nature of responses from Peter Mandelson last week to the inquiries made of him by government officials – I took the decision to remove him.” Can the Government lay out precisely what was the full due process that was followed? The Prime Minister claims that he did not learn the content of the Bloomberg emails until after his robust defence at PMQs, so did Lord Mandelson fail to disclose that information during his vetting interview? Was there even a vetting interview, or did Lord Mandelson disclose everything and the Prime Minister is displaying wilful ignorance?

• 16 Sept 2025 · Ambassador to the United States · Hansard source

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  I wholeheartedly agree with the hon. Member. It is incredible that the Government have engaged in such lax vetting regarding such an obvious conflict of interest. On the nature and extent of the relationship, we knew about Mandelson’s closeness to Jeffrey Epstein when the notorious birthday book was published, in which Lord Mandelson described the convicted paedophile as his “best pal” and signed off his many pages of unctuous praise with the line “yum yum”. What else did the Prime Minister learn beyond that? He claims that he knew only of Mandelson’s “association” with Jeffrey Epstein—that would appear to be questionable. Turning to Lord Mandelson’s questioning and challenging of the conviction, was he asked his opinion of the conviction of his “best pal” during his vetting interview? Did Lord Mandelson disclose that he felt, or had ever felt, that the conviction was unjustified? Either he was not asked, in which case the vetting was incompetent; he did not disclose it, in which case he was not a suitable appointment; or he did disclose it, and it was ignored by the Prime Minister. Which is it? The unsatisfactory nature of the responses is the only aspect of the investigation we are yet to learn about. The Prime Minister must publish the new information, so that this House can fully understand. If Lord Mandelson’s answers are unsatisfying now, but were not before, that suggests that full due process was not followed, in contradiction to what the Prime Minister claimed last week. This whole sorry episode looks set to derail the visit of the President of the United States tomorrow. We are a long way from the chummy bonhomie of the Prime Minister feeling that he had stuck the landing with his perfectly stage-managed hand delivery of an invitation letter to President Trump. I wonder how he is going to explain all this to the President tomorrow. The Prime Minister knows that his days are numbered; those in his new Cabinet know his days are numbered; his Back Benchers know his days are numbered—perhaps he should try talking to them on a regular basis, not just greasing up to them in the Smoking Room when he needs their support. If the Prime Minister cannot exercise the judgment required of his office, he must resign.

• 16 Sept 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  The right hon. Gentleman will not remember but I used to live adjacent to his constituency, and I remember what he was like as a local MP. He did not answer my question about the 1,468 places at HMP Millsike. He accuses me of “baying like a child”, and I appreciate that when he is on the back foot, he likes to give a little nervous chuckle to avoid answering the question, but instead of deflecting, will he address the point about the prison places that his Minister claimed this morning were built by his Government when they were in fact started four years ago by the last Conservative Government?

• 16 Sept 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  The expansions of the prison estate by 10,000 additional places through new houseblocks and through refurbishments, including for category D prisons, are rated “red” because the supplier has gone into administration. I heard nothing this morning from the Minister about what the Government are doing to ensure that the plans stay on track. Does the hon. Gentleman share my concerns?

• 16 Sept 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  It has become increasingly clear that we see huge discrepancies across sentencing for offences. Comparatively trivial offences receive stiff penalties, while serious crimes appear to go relatively or actually unpunished. There is an increasing feeling that the punishment rarely fits the crime, that the law is soft, that criminals act with impunity and that justice has become hard to come by. I would like to recount a story about a family from my constituency. Michael Gough was a keen cyclist and had been cycling weekly, on Saturday mornings, with a group of four friends for a number of years. He would head off early, before 8 am, and go out for three to four hours, returning home by lunch time. He rode all over Cambridgeshire, usually covering between 35 km to 50 km on a ride. As a keen cyclist myself, who rides the same roads and the same sort of distances, I know what a joy it is to get out on my bike at the weekend. On 16 March last year, Mike and the group went out as usual. His daughter, Kim, recalls what happened as the family waited for him to return: “I had gone to mum’s around 12.25 and we set off shortly after. Mum did think it was unusual dad wasn’t back yet, but he did like to talk so thought he’d probably had an extra cuppa at their cake and cuppa stop. We only made it round the corner when my phone started to ring. Mum picked it up and answered it as she noticed it was dad’s friend Tim calling. I pulled over as soon as I could. Tim had said there had been an accident and dad had been knocked off his bike”. The family made their way to the scene of the accident on George Street, in Huntingdon town centre. “We were stood in the street outside Elphicks, opposite Wetherspoons, waiting not having a clue what was going on. Lots of the public were walking up the street and being allowed to walk up and past the scene of the accident to get to where they wanted to go but we were told we had to wait. After a while an officer came down from the scene to talk to us. He asked us to sit in the back of the police car where we were told that dad had been knocked off his bike and had died from his injuries.” The post-mortem subsequently outlined that Mike had been crushed across his chest and could not be resuscitated. It was not until December 2024, some nine months later, that the Crown Prosecution Service charged the driver with causing death by careless driving. A further six months later, on 27 June 2025, the driver—Dennis Roberts, aged 74—plead guilty to causing death by careless driving. He was banned from driving with immediate effect. Roberts was given a one-year sentence suspended for two years, a two-year driving ban and 250 hours’ unpaid work, and was ordered to pay court charges of around £200. As Kim says: “The sentence is within the guidelines of the law, but does the law fit the crime? He has lived his life like normal for 18 months, whilst we have lost our dad, husband, friend, grandad, and lived the last 18 months encompassed in a whirlwind of grief. Even after sentencing he continues to live his life, just with a small inconvenience of not being able to drive and giving up a few hours to work unpaid. How is that justice?” Mike’s tragic and untimely death is sadly not an outlier, but the current sentencing guidelines for causing death by careless driving are far too lenient, given the impact that such a tragedy clearly has on family and loved ones. The factors determining culpability as “careless” as opposed to “dangerous” are largely subjective and the difference between them is opaque, but it is the factors reducing seriousness or reflecting personal mitigation that I find difficult to understand. A good driving record is taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. The inexperience of the driver is taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. Efforts made to assist or to seek assistance for the victim are taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. A lack of maturity is taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. A mental disorder or learning disability is taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. A deprived background is taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. The prospects of education are taken into account upon having killed someone through carelessness. What prospects do the victims have now—or their family or dependants? These mitigating factors beggar belief. This is not a trivial offence or a victimless crime; it is one that devastates lives. Would any one of us here who lost their partner, child or parent to the carelessness of someone’s driving be content to see that person leave court with little more than the inconvenience of having to get a lift home? Furthermore, the minimum level of sentencing starts at a medium-level community order to one year’s custody. The bare minimum must be a custodial sentence, and it must not be suspended. If we are to trivialise a crime with the most serious outcome—that of ultimately taking a life, even through carelessness—then what price stiffer sentences for less serious crimes? I would not wish anyone to suffer the trauma of enduring such a tragedy, but those who sadly do should at least take comfort that justice has been served. We must stiffen the sentence for causing death by careless driving. We must eliminate the ludicrous mitigation factors that offer too much opportunity for offenders to avoid justice. We must ensure that victims and their families get justice. To prevent others from suffering the lack of justice that Mike and his family have endured, I will table an amendment to address this issue and ensure that Mike’s death was not in vain.

• 16 Sept 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  You won’t.

• 16 Sept 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  Answer the question!

• 16 Sept 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  Will the right hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

• 16 Sept 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  rose—

• 16 Sept 2025 · Sentencing Bill · Hansard source

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  Earlier at Justice questions, the right hon. Gentleman’s Department attempted to take credit for HMP Millsike—and for its 1,468 places, which were confirmed to me in a written parliamentary answer—even though it was approved under the Conservative Government. Does he acknowledge that that prison was in fact started under the Conservative Government in 2021?

• 16 Sept 2025 · Topical Questions · Hansard source

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  The new Minister stated earlier that the Government have created 2,405 new prison places, but 1,468 of those are at HMP Millsike, which is part of the new prisons programme that was announced by the previous Conservative Government. The 10,000 additional prison places estate expansion programme—including the houseblocks and refurbishments programme, and the category D programme—has been downgraded from amber to red in the delivery confidence assessment, due to the programme’s key supplier entering administration. What steps is the Justice Secretary taking to put prison construction back on track?

• 15 Sept 2025 · Official Secrets Act · Hansard source

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  In early June, the Government told me that the report regarding the inclusion of China in the enhanced tier would come forward in due course. As the Minister said in his statement, the chargé d’affaires at the Chinese embassy has now been démarched. Can the Minister outline why China has not been included in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, because if national security is the first duty of Government and nothing will get in the way of that, why are the Government dithering when it comes to formally challenging China?

• 15 Sept 2025 · Neighbourhood Policing · Hansard source

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  Last week was Rural Crime Action Week. I recently had an opportunity to join Cambridgeshire constabulary’s rural crime action team to see the work that it does, despite having to cover a huge county of eight constituencies with just 14 officers. Those officers have recently been reallocated from being designated operational support unit officers to neighbourhood policing officers, thus bolstering the number of officers the Government will classify as neighbourhood police and helping them to reach the target of 3,000 officers. However, those officers are neither new nor dedicated neighbourhood police. Can the Home Secretary explain why she is artificially inflating neighbourhood policing numbers by reclassifying those in specialist roles?

• 10 Sept 2025 · Russian Drones: Violation of Polish Airspace · Hansard source

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  I recently visited the Royal Air Force in Poland during its recent deployment in NATO’s enhanced air policing mission during Op Chessman, where I saw at first hand RAF Typhoons scrambled to intercept a Russian signals intelligence Coot-A—Poland feels the threat from Russia much more keenly than I think we appreciate in this House. In the drones debate last week, I raised with the Minister that we have a paucity of counter-UAS capability. While we obviously do not face the risk that Poland does or have plans such as the East Shield, what steps are the Government taking to ensure that our own territory, critical infrastructure and military bases—both here and overseas—possess an organic capability that can be brought to bear?

• 8 Sept 2025 · Defence Industrial Strategy · Hansard source

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  I place on record my excitement at seeing RAF Wyton in my constituency directly mentioned in the defence industrial strategy. Last week, I was at RAF Wyton for a hugely successful discussion on its future as a defence technology cluster, with senior officers from the cyber and specialist operations command, the leadership of Huntingdonshire district council and planners from the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough combined authority. I invite the procurement Minister and the Defence Secretary to visit RAF Wyton—I believe they may be due to anyway—not only to see the tremendous work that defence intelligence does, but to see its suitability as the defence, energy and capability resilience centre of excellence. That would address my fears that the land may be sold off for housing by the Defence Infrastructure Organisation by accident in the interim. I also invite them both to the Huntingdonshire defence showcase right here in Parliament next month.

• 8 Sept 2025 · Defence Investment Plan · Hansard source

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  On Friday, I visited Paragraf, a local business in my constituency. Founded by Simon Thomas, it is a hugely successful spin-out from Cambridge University, developing and manufacturing next generation electronic devices using graphene. These products provide solutions in a range of industries, from quantum computing to diagnostics. As one can imagine with a world-leading technology, there is a huge array of potential military applications. Indeed, the company has already been contacted by our NATO allies. May I invite the Secretary of State and the new procurement Minister to visit Paragraf, meet CEO Simon Thomas and look at how we can seize the initiative in defence with an innovative and world-leading technology, and a real British and Huntingdon success story?

• 8 Sept 2025 · Defence Investment Plan · Hansard source

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  20. When he plans to publish the defence investment plan.

• 3 Sept 2025 · Use of Drones in Defence · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. The nature of warfare has changed. During the last three years of conflict driven by the war in Ukraine and, perhaps controversially, two years of Israel Defence Forces operations in Gaza, we have seen a paradigm shift in the nature of warfare—a tangential move away from the manoeuvre warfare that has shaped military thinking since the blitzkrieg illustrated the potential of speed and firepower. The previous Conservative Government recognised the direction of travel and introduced the UK defence drone strategy prior to the election, in February last year. Backed by an investment of £4.5 billion, the intention was to enable the rapid experimentation, testing and evaluation of uncrewed platforms. The past year has seen the publication of the strategic defence review, which reflects the continued change of focus. It makes much of the need to adopt a high-low mix, combining exquisite capability with attritable capability such as drones—for high-low, read “expensive-cheap”. At the recent Royal United Service Institute land warfare conference, the opening address of General Sir Roly Walker, Chief of the General Staff, directly referred to the change to a high-low mix in the British Army. He said: “I want 20% of our lethality to come from the survivable layer, 40% from the attritable, and 40% from consumable. That does not mean I want 1/5th the number of crewed platforms in the Programme of Record, it’s that I want each one to be five times more lethal, survivable and sustainable…And I want to spend 50% of our money on the 20% of crewed and expensive, and 50% on the remaining 80% of attritable.” We have all seen footage of first-person view drones and how they have been used in the Ukraine-Russia conflict. As a former infanteer, the sight of individual soldiers being stalked slowly by drones hovering just behind them, and menaced and killed at will, strikes fear into my heart for the future of being an infantryman. This is, hopefully, a temporary situation, and in much the same way that the improvised explosive device was in conflict with electronic countermeasures—ECMs—so too will drones find themselves, in time, at the mercy of counter-unmanned aircraft system solutions. Last week, there was an article in The Washington Post about the measures the Ukrainians are taking to combat Russian drone threats, which include going as far as using a biplane with a crew member firing them out of the air with a shotgun. That is the sort of inventive stuff that is currently going on in the east—we would not believe it if we saw it in a movie. We have already seen the RAF and the Army begin to employ agile combat employment such as the penetrative threat of drones, as illustrated by the bold attack by Ukraine on airfields deep inside Russian territory mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune). There is, however, very little in place to prevent a copycat attack against our forces in the UK. If RAF Brize Norton can be breached by civilians on scooters, it can be easily breached by a swarm of drones. What price our air-to-air refuelling or heavy lift capability? That is not easily replaced and fairly easily defeated on the ground. What efforts are the Government making to ensure that we have permanent counter-unmanned aircraft systems capability at all operational flying bases? Agile combat employment will get us only so far and, as we have seen, it takes only a couple of litres of red paint to destroy a jet engine. In Ukraine, we have seen that survivability is key: how we fight a vehicle is as important as how we physically protect it or conceal it. Before any talk about thermal camouflage or, increasingly, multispectral camouflage, we should consider how the age and capability of the kit we have makes it vulnerable to a drone threat it was never designed to encounter. The strategic defence review outlines the British Army’s intention to move to a dynamic high-low capability mix, as I alluded to earlier, of 20-40-40: that is 20% crewed platforms to control 40% attritable—preferably survivable—platforms, and 40% consumables such as shells and missiles, also including attritable one-way effector drones. For such a fundamental doctrinal shift in manoeuvre warfare around which the entire Army would need to be restructured, a single sub-paragraph on page 110 of the SDR does not really cut it. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s view on how he plans to extrapolate such a paucity of strategic intent. At the lowest consumable level, handheld off-the-shelf drones are a plentiful, cheap and effective tool. They are low cost and high volume. Our funding of capability in Ukraine should really be seen as an investment; it is not cynical to suggest that the current conflict is a helpful proving ground for our own future capability. First-person view drones have quickly become a stalwart of the modern battlefield and sit within what the Ministry of Defence considers to be tier 1 and tier 2—those that are consumable or attritable. It is those drones that will see the quickest development, the biggest leaps in capability, and the most effort going into combating them from an anti-personnel perspective. We have already seen the development of a counter-UAS ECM that has led to the impractical horizontal development of fibre-optic drones. The pace of development should force us to ask what the capability will be like by the time British troops are required to use them in anger.

• 3 Sept 2025 · Use of Drones in Defence · Hansard source

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  My background is in armoured infantry and warfare, and I completely concur that the weak spots of a tank are probably underneath it or to the rear. As the hon. Gentleman pointed out with the Armata tank, we should consider the use of drones to immobilise, and not just the engine block. The weak spot of any tank is its tracks, which are very easily disabled—that is the point of an anti-tank mine. During the second world war the Russians trained dogs to find food under tanks, so that they could then strap explosives to them, send them under German tanks and detonate them. Should we be looking at the protection that we provide to the side of a tank, to further protect its tracked infrastructure and prevent it from being mobility-killed?

• 3 Sept 2025 · Use of Drones in Defence · Hansard source

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  Recently, we saw the ACUA Ocean Pioneer granted a licence by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. Do we think that by pushing out more civilian licences to enable more companies to develop those autonomous platforms, including for things that have maritime applications, drones will be enhanced more quickly? I appreciate that a drone can be set up and flown relatively easily, but getting something that floats in the water, particularly something sizeable that has a civilian application, is quite difficult. Do we think that advancing the number of licences given to companies working on autonomous maritime capability would be an advantage?

• 3 Sept 2025 · Use of Drones in Defence · Hansard source

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  I think AI will increasingly become a mainstay of the battlefield, and how we employ it will become incredibly important. My concern is about the control of AI and knowing that the target we are trying to prosecute is indeed still viable right up to the last safe moment. Once we lose control of a drone and it becomes AI-capable, in theory it could switch to a more preferential target, which may be a good opportunity, or it may be a catastrophe that ends up as front-page news. We need to think carefully about how we employ drones. On the overall development of drones, another important factor to consider is how we employ the warhead. It is only a matter of time before we look at options such as the replacement of Javelin—I was a Javelin platoon commander when I was in the Army—which has a two-stage warhead, with the first stage penetrating the armour and the second stage going inside the vehicle, exploding and detonating to kill the crew. The application of something like a two-stage warhead to an FPV drone is going to become an increasingly potent threat. It will be interesting to see at what point that emerges on the battlefield. At tier 3—a level up—we have those platforms that are firmly considered to be survivable. The entry into service of Protector RG mark 1, replacing Reaper, illustrates how the Royal Air Force is moving further into the world of uncrewed air systems. With a ceiling of 40,000 feet and a mission endurance in excess of 30 hours, it marks the next evolution in our drone capability. With an ongoing project to enable it with the low-collateral Brimstone 3, it will be a potent weapons delivery platform, although that project is currently rated at amber. Indeed, the introduction of remotely piloted aircraft systems—RPAS—as its own stream within RAF pilot training illustrates the complexity of how drones will be used going forwards. We have already seen the SDR outline the desire to introduce a hybrid carrier air wing, with crewed and uncrewed platforms operating alongside one another from our carrier strike group. That leads us into the category of exquisite capability. The elephant in the room is GCAP—the global combat air programme—a trilateral endeavour with Italy and Japan that aims to deliver a sixth-generation fighter by 2035. I do not wish to derail the debate by talking about the merits and pitfalls of sixth-generation fighters, and whether by the time they arrive we will still need or want an exquisite capability, given how precious we are already about our fifth-generation F-35s, but there is a key issue with the platform as an exquisite capability. The intention of GCAP is not to have massed squadrons of fighters flying into dogfights over Russia. Those days are long gone; in future, we should expect most, if not all, engagements to take place beyond visual range. Any near-peer conflict will involve formidable air defence that will render the low-level bombing runs of yesteryear the stuff of Hollywood. No, the intention is to operate GCAP as a system of systems: a crewed platform where the pilot is less of a pilot and more an integrated part of the system—effectively, a weapons platform operator co-ordinating the battle space—and where the uncrewed autonomous collaborative platforms, or loyal wingmen, operate as a squadron and conduct the task as an attritable but very expensive asset that can complete the mission without risk to aircrew, impervious to being disabled by ECM, and operating networked to GCAP itself. The RAF’s autonomous collaborative platform strategy aims to have ACP as an integral part of the RAF force structure by 2030, and we have started to see that being rolled out in recent weeks. This is a concept that I do not believe we can fully afford. The National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority already has the future combat air system rated at red—that is not just GCAP but the ACP strategy that accompanies it. It would be one thing to achieve an ACP capability, and another to develop and deliver a sixth-generation fighter, whether on time or decades late, but to deliver both seems fanciful based on the Ministry of Defence’s procurement track record. In a world where the infantry are still using armoured vehicles that came into service the same year the Beatles released their debut single—closer to the end of the first world war than to today—with no current plans to replace them, I cannot envisage a situation where we have a sovereign fighter jet that ranks as the best in the world and a squadron of drone fighters operating alongside it. We urgently need to start managing our expectation. The Government talk a good game on RPAS but, for all the talk of increasing the defence budget, our drone strategy looks an incoherent mess. I am sure the Minister will set me straight on whether that is accurate. We are pouring money into exquisite capability while watching the war in Ukraine spiral-develop capability that we have no idea how to use in the last 100 yards. The pace of technological change that is driving the evolution of the threat environment is such that unless we leverage the spiral development capability that already exists here, coupled with the expertise that now exists in Ukraine, British forces will be left behind.

• 3 Sept 2025 · Use of Drones in Defence · Hansard source

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  If we are talking about those low-end, attritable systems being introduced at Army or Marine level as section-level capability, like a light machine gun, at what point will we look at redesigning our entire military capability in terms of logistical supply of batteries and parts for those? We all know that soldiers already carry too much kit, and carrying more batteries for drones will be key in that. How can we effectively redesign the section attack to incorporate drones? As I said in my speech, this is a fundamental shift in how the Army fights battles. I appreciate that the Minister is doing everything he can to introduce drones into the ecosystem, but it seems to me that we are making huge changes here. This is almost the same as introducing the machine gun and then wondering why we do not know how to fight it properly when we get to the battlefield. I would be interested to hear what we are doing to further that.

• 1 Sept 2025 · Borders and Asylum · Hansard source

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  The Home Secretary has touched on it a couple of times, but I am yet to hear from her about the scope of the Government’s asylum accommodation programme, which is currently rated “amber”. Despite the fact that 29,003 asylum seekers have arrived by small boat so far this year, the scope of the programme, following its strategic refresh, will mean the creation of only 5,000 bed spaces by the end of 2026, spread across three accommodation pilots. Where will those three pilots be, how many bed spaces will each have, and at what stage is each one?