Aphra Brandreth MP: speeches

Speeches

• 19 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As we have heard, the clause removes police stations and prisons as designated places of safety for individuals in mental health crises, ensuring that they are instead taken to appropriate healthcare settings. In my view, this is a pragmatic and practical part of the Bill that supports patients going through an extremely challenging time. Perhaps, in the past, it has been all too easy to look to police stations as, if not the default option for those suffering a mental health crisis, certainly an easy one. That is not because police stations are the right place for patients, but because alternative provisions were not readily accessible. Clause 49 brings about several critical changes. First, it redefines “place of safety” so that for adults it now refers exclusively to hospitals that are willing and able to provide care. For children and young people, the definition aligns with the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 but crucially, it explicitly excludes police stations. Furthermore, the clause repeals section 136A of the Mental Health Act 1983, which previously allowed police stations to be used in so-called exceptional circumstances. The crux of the clause is to recognise that a mental health emergency is a medical crisis rather than a criminal one, and our system must reflect that.

• 17 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to support amendments 54 and 55, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, but I will first briefly speak to clause 24, which is an important and long-overdue step towards modernising the Mental Health Act 1983, crucially strengthening the rights, dignity and autonomy of individuals subject to it. The reform of the existing nearest relative provisions, replacing them with a new system that allows for the appointment of a nominated person, is an important part of ensuring that individuals get the right support, and modernises an outdated system. The current model is based on a rigid and outdated hierarchy in which the role of the “nearest relative” is determined by law, not by the wishes of the patient. This one-size-fits-all approach fails to account for the complexities and nuances of individual relationships. It can result in someone unsuitable, or even actively harmful, being placed in a central role in a person’s care and treatment journey. Indeed, the limitations of the system have been acknowledged by practitioners, patients and policymakers alike. It is too often disempowering, and the patient can lose agency at a time when they need to be empowered to feel in control of the situation as much as possible. As the shadow Minister says, clause 24 is the cornerstone of the reforms. It is an important change to the current legislation to reaffirm the commitment to patient-centred care, to dignity and to the principle that those receiving treatment under the Mental Health Act should have a voice in decisions about their support network. The aim of the clause—to put the patient first—is important. It acknowledges that the person best placed to advocate for the patient may not be their closest relative. In some cases, family dynamics are fraught. In others, the designated relative may hold views about treatment that conflict with the patient’s wishes or medical advice. We have seen real-world examples in which the imposition of the “nearest relative” role has led to tension, distress and, ultimately, a breakdown in trust. That is not the kind of environment in which recovery is fostered. Amendments 54 and 55 would address the specific issue of nominated persons and those with parental responsibility for children under the age of 16. It is important that we consider situations in which a young person may be in a vulnerable position and their decision on who their nominated person should be may not be in their best interests. We have a particular duty to ensure that children are safeguarded. Clause 24 as it stands will allow under-16s to choose someone who is not the parent to have significant power, including the ability to discharge the child from hospital. We must listen to and actively try to support any young person who needs that kind of intervention—it is not that their views should not be considered. However, there is a very real risk that a vulnerable child or teenager might be coerced by or under the control of an older partner, for example, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth pointed out. Perhaps they might choose an older friend. We need to consider that a decision made by the nominated person, such as an older friend, may have implications for those with parental responsibility. For example, that older friend may decide to discharge a child from hospital and into the care of the parents, who would not provide advocacy or be part of that decision making. The Minister said that safeguards will be put in place, but can he expand on that? There are some real concerns here. Let us consider a situation in which there has been a decision by a court to determine which parent has responsibility for the child. If complex family issues have already been considered by the family court, it is right that the decision be followed. I respectfully ask the Minister to reconsider this point. We must respect the fact that parents of those under 16 are best placed to advocate for, support and act for their children. This is about capacity, consent and, ultimately, safeguarding.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Furniss. Government amendments 26 to 29 risk undoing some of the good work done in the other place, where careful improvements were made to strengthen the Bill and ensure a more compassionate and effective response to mental health crises. I am concerned that by removing the words “by a constable or other authorised person” and deleting clause 5(7), which provides a clear definition of who the authorised persons are, we will open up ambiguity about who is permitted to detain someone under the Mental Health Act. This is not just a technical or drafting issue; it has very real consequences for the people involved. I understand and support the principle of enabling more flexible and clinically led responses to mental health incidents. We all recognise that the police should not be the default option in every case. The amendments made in the Lords acknowledged that and broadened the group of people who could respond to mental health crises beyond police officers to trained and equipped professionals: mental health nurses, approved mental health professionals, paramedics and, crucially, someone trained and equipped to carry out detentions under the Act and who would not be put at unnecessary risk by doing so. “Trained and equipped”—that is the key point. The definition of “authorised person” in the Bill as it stands makes it clear that those given such a serious responsibility must have the appropriate training and experience and must not be “put at unnecessary risk” when carrying out that role. That wording is important. As the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, said, it provides a framework of accountability, not a free-for-all. By removing that structure, the Government’s amendments will leave a legal vacuum. The law will say that someone must be detained, but not by whom. That uncertainty will create a risk that services will simply revert to defaulting to the police. I stress again that that is not fair on the police, who are already under immense pressure. Yes, they are used to seeing people at their most vulnerable, but dealing with someone in a mental health crisis is a very particular challenge, and one that they might not be fully trained to manage. The College of Policing’s 2019 mental health snapshot found that almost 95% of police call-outs flagged as involving mental health did not actually require a police response, yet police officers continue to be sent out because the system lacks clarity and capacity elsewhere. Baroness May, speaking from real experience as a former Home Secretary, made that very point in the other place. She said that police officers were being sent to mental health incidents for which they had no training or clinical expertise, and were being asked to make judgments that they simply were not equipped to make. She went on to say that “the very essence of a police presence—somebody in the uniform coming to deal with them—could actually exacerbate their mental health situation”. —[ Official Report, House of Lords, 20 January 2025; Vol. 842, c. 1525.] I would add that, for the individual experiencing a mental health crisis, being approached by the police may feel criminalising rather than supportive. It reinforces a justice-led response rather than a health-led one. That is not the direction in which we should be going. Although I welcome the Government’s intention to offer more flexibility in emergency and clinical settings, we have to be careful about how we achieve that. Removing the wording inserted into the Bill will not create clarity; it will create confusion. In a system already under pressure, confusion tends to mean delay, risk aversion and inappropriate responses. Removing the specification will not free professionals; it will expose them, and it will expose patients to the possibility of being handled by someone without the right qualifications, which may worsen their condition or create a longer-term distrust of mental health services. I hope that the Minister can offer some reassurances, both about who will be expected to carry out these detentions and about how we can ensure that they have the proper training, resourcing and protection. Without a clear definition of “authorised person”, we cannot be confident that those involved will have the right expertise to support extremely vulnerable individuals at times of acute need. I want to touch briefly on the importance of early intervention and de-escalation. Situations involving mental health crises can often be tense, and support in the early moments can be critical. De-escalation is a vital skill; the presence of a calm, trained mental health nurse, for example, in those early moments can change the outcome of a person’s crisis. Having the right professional present—someone who can act without waiting for the police to attend—can be the difference between escalation and calm. The identity of the responder matters. This is not just about outcomes, but about the experience of the individual. Removing the criminal justice framing from the outset is essential to delivering dignity and the right kind of care.

• 12 Jun 2025 · Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend helpfully expands on the points that I and other Opposition Members have been making. If we are not careful, the Government amendments will move us further away from the aim of a person-centred approach. I urge the Minister to reconsider the amendments. The wording inserted in the other place struck a thoughtful balance. The wording inserted in the other place struck a thoughtful balance. It allowed flexibility, but grounded it in clear criteria of training, safety and competence. Removing that definition will weaken the Bill. It will make it harder, not easier, to ensure that the right person is supporting someone at their moment of greatest need. We owe it to patients, professionals and the police themselves to get this right.

• 21 May 2025 · Dogs (Protection of Livestock) (Amendment) Bill · Hansard source

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  It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Western. Before I start, I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, as a director of a veterinary business. I thank hon. Members for joining the Committee to consider this important Bill, which will do so much for animal welfare and supporting our farming communities. The Bill was initially introduced in the last Parliament. I am grateful to those who have worked so hard to see it progress, and I welcome the new Government’s continuing the support for the legislation. I have spoken to farmers in Chester South and Eddisbury who have seen their livestock brutally attacked. I have heard at first hand the very real impacts, both emotionally and financially, so I am grateful for the opportunity to speak today. I will set out why the Bill is vital to help better protect livestock, support farmers and enable more effective enforcement and efficient use of police time. The financial impacts of livestock attacks are substantial. The National Farmers Union estimates that UK farm animals worth approximately £1.8 million were severely injured or killed by dogs in 2024. But it is not just the financial cost to which I wish to draw attention; there is also an animal welfare cost to livestock worrying. I represent a largely rural constituency, where the predominant mode of farming is beef and dairy. I met a farmer from Kelsall, a rural village in my constituency, who showed me pictures of his cattle following a livestock attack. A dog had broken into a barn where calves were resting and had attacked them in their pens. I am sure the Committee does not need me to go into detail about the extent to which the calves were injured. Needless to say, it was a horrific attack. That is just one example, but there can be other horrific consequences. If attacked, pregnant livestock often miscarry, and there are instances of mothers being separated from their young, leading to hypothermia and starvation. Let us also not forget the human toll of a livestock attack. I have only seen pictures of the aftermath—thankfully, I have never seen an attack unfold before my eyes—but for farmers witnessing it, it can be extremely emotionally distressing. Of course, we want and need to see dog owners behaving responsibly in the countryside, but we must recognise that there is a gap in existing legislation to support a more effective and efficient collection of evidence following an attack, and to implement the necessary deterrents to better encourage responsible ownership and handling of dogs around livestock. It is for those reasons that I have introduced the Bill, and why we must pass it. I will now set out the Bill’s clauses and explain why they are necessary. Clause 1 gives effect to the schedule, which sets out amendments to the Dogs (Protection of Livestock) Act 1953, relating to scope and the consequences of an offence. Times have changed since the 1953 Act came into force. The number of livestock farmed in England and Wales has doubled, bringing agriculture closer to those of us who use the countryside recreationally. The Bill is intended to tackle the issue of livestock worrying in a way that constructively strengthens existing legislation to decrease incidents of livestock worrying and attacks. In doing so, the Bill focuses on three key areas. First, it will modernise the definitions and scope of the 1953 Act and extend the locations and species in scope—to include roads and paths, and to cover species such as camelids. Secondly, important changes will be made to strengthen police powers, including powers of entry, the seizure and detention of dogs and the collection of evidence where samples and impressions can be taken from dogs and injured livestock. Finally, the Bill will increase the maximum penalty from a fine of £1,000 to an unlimited fine to act as a deterrent. Clause 2 will amend existing powers available to the police to seize and detain dogs suspected of having attacked or worried livestock. Existing legislation allows the police to seize an unaccompanied dog that is believed to have attacked or worried livestock, to identify the owner of the dog and to detain it until the owner has claimed it and paid any associated expenses. The Bill will go further, providing greater clarity and confidence to farmers. The proposed reforms extend the powers so that the police can seize and detain a dog that they have reasonable grounds to believe has attacked or worried livestock and may attack or worry livestock again, for the purpose of preventing repeat incidents. Extending the police powers is crucial, and it is appropriate that the deterrent properly reflects the significant consequences of an attack. Clause 2 addresses the limited scope of current powers at the disposal of the police and strengthens deterrence, helping to address the issue of reoffending. Subsections (1) and (2) of proposed new section 2 of the 1953 Act explain that a police constable may seize and detain a dog that they believe to have “attacked or worried livestock on agricultural land or on a road or path, and nobody present…admits to being the dog’s owner or in charge of it.” Building on the current power in section 2(2) of the 1953 Act, proposed new subsection (2) sets out for how long a dog seized under subsection (1) may be detained, namely “until the owner has claimed it and paid all expenses incurred by reason of its seizure and detention.” To give greater clarity, subsections (3) and (4) are necessary to explain that seized dogs may be disposed of if the owner does not claim the dog and pay the associated expenses of seizure and detention within seven days. They clarify that if the police gift or sell the unclaimed dog to someone, that person becomes the dog’s owner. Subsections (5) and (6) explain what kind of register is to be kept of seized dogs. The register must include a brief description of the dog, the date of seizure and, if the dog is disposed of, how. The register must be available for inspection by the public and free of charge. Subsection (7) explains that the disposing of a dog under proposed new section 2 of the 1953 Act includes: “causing it to be disposed of, and destroying it or causing it to be destroyed, but does not include disposing of it for the purposes of vivisection.” Subsections (8) and (9) explain that a dog may be seized and detained until the end of court proceedings if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the dog may otherwise pose a risk of attacking or worrying livestock again. Quite often, the dog owner has shown no signs of taking preventive measures against attacks or worrying following previous incidents, such as by putting their dog on a lead near livestock when the dog has previously shown signs of being dangerously out of control or has attacked or worried livestock. Both those factors could be considered relevant to a constable’s assessment of whether they believe that a dog suspected of attacking or worrying livestock could do so again. Finally, section 3 of the Dogs Act 1906—so far as still in force by virtue of section 68(2) of the Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005—will be repealed, as it is no longer needed in consequence of the provision made by clause 2. Clause 3 will introduce new powers to improve the police’s ability to investigate incidents of dogs attacking or worrying livestock by enabling the collection of samples and impressions. This concern was raised directly with me by farmers in my constituency. Farms are businesses, so when a livestock attack takes place, it is understandable that farmers should seek justice. If there was an arson attack on a shop, for instance, I am sure we would all agree that the perpetrator should be held to account for their actions. Attacks on livestock too often go unprosecuted because collecting evidence takes too long and the powers afforded to the police to do so are limited. Subsections (1) to (4) of proposed new section 2ZA of the 1953 Act will enable a police constable to take samples or impressions from a dog believed to have attacked or worried livestock, or from livestock, where this might provide evidence of an offence having been committed under section 1 of that Act. Crucially, subsection (5) explains: “If taking a sample or impression…would amount to veterinary surgery, it must be done by a veterinary surgeon.” Subsection (6) explains how long samples or impressions may be retained: “A sample or impression taken…may be retained until an investigation has been carried out into whether an offence under section 1 has been committed…or if proceedings are brought…until those proceedings have been determined or withdrawn.” Veterinary bodies, forensic specialists and the police have been consulted on this new provision, affording them the opportunity to feed into its development. Lastly, subsection (7) defines the meaning of the words “sample”, “veterinary surgeon” and “veterinary surgery” for the purpose of clause 3. These are all important steps to increase the effective collection of evidence following an attack. Clause 4 will enable a justice of the peace, also known as a magistrate, to authorise the police to enter and search premises where they believe there is a dog that has attacked or worried livestock. Currently, the police can enter and search premises with a warrant from a justice of the peace to identify a dog that is believed to have worried livestock. It is proposed to extend this to allow the police also to obtain a warrant to enter premises to seize and detain the dog, as outlined in clause 2; to take a sample or impression, as outlined in clause 3; or to search for and seize evidence of an offence. Specifically, subsections (1) and (2) of proposed new section 2A of the 1953 Act will allow the police to apply for a warrant to enter and search premises to identify, seize and detain, or to take samples or impressions from, a dog that is believed to have attacked or worried livestock. Subsections (3) and (4) will allow the police to apply for a warrant to enter and search premises to seize any evidence of an offence under section 1 of the 1953 Act. Examples of such evidence could include a bloody collar or towel. Subsection (5) sets out that the warrant may authorise the police to use reasonable force, if necessary. These new powers are needed to allow the police to gather evidence to investigate these crimes effectively. I have already touched on the frustration that farmers feel when an attack goes unprosecuted, and this Bill will help to increase the chances of a just outcome. Clause 5 includes a standard provision on the extent, commencement and short title of the Act, once it receives Royal Assent. The Act will extend to England and Wales. I felt it was important to speak to people on both sides of the border to better understand the situation in Wales; I put on record my thanks to Rob Taylor, the Welsh wildlife and rural police and crime co-ordinator, for his work in this field over many years, and for taking the time to meet me to talk through livestock worrying in Wales and offer his support for the Bill. The Bill will come into force three months after it is passed. Clause 5 also includes transitional provision to clarify the availability of the new powers in clauses 2 to 4 in relation to any, or any alleged, incident of livestock worrying or attack that takes place before the Bill comes into force. The Act’s short title will be the Dogs (Protection of Livestock) (Amendment) Act 2025. The schedule to the Bill will make several amendments to the 1953 Act to extend its scope. It also provides clarity on offences, the applicable penalty and court powers. Specifically, paragraph 1 brings incidents of dogs attacking or worrying livestock on roads or paths within the scope of the offence in section 1 of the Act. This will provide greater protection for livestock in instances where they are moved along a road or path to another field or a milking parlour, for example. For clarity, paragraph 1 also updates the terminology used in relation to attacks. “Attacking” livestock is dealt with separately from “worrying” livestock. The term “worrying” may dismiss the severity of some offences. Adding the word “attacking” better highlights the violent nature of incidents involving attacks on livestock. The provision will not create a new offence, but will clarify the language throughout the 1953 Act. Both attacking and worrying are already covered in that Act; however, that is not clear throughout. Paragraph 1 also sets out the penalty for the offence in section 1 of the 1953 Act. It is currently set at a maximum fine of £1,000. The maximum penalty will be increased to an unlimited fine to act as a deterrent. It is worth noting that the level of fines will not affect the level of compensation a farmer may receive, and farmers can still seek compensation through civil claims. Paragraph 1 will amend the 1953 Act to exempt a dog owner from liability for an offence under section 1 where they can prove that the dog was in the charge of another person at the time without the owner’s consent, such as if the dog had been stolen. Paragraph 1 will also empower a court to order a convicted offender to pay expenses associated with the seizure and detention of a dog, irrespective of whether the court imposes a fine for the offence. Any sum that a person is ordered to pay will be treated for the purposes of enforcement as if it were compensation payable under a compensation order. Paragraph 2 expands the definition of “livestock” in the 1953 Act to include camelids, such as llamas and alpacas, as they are commonly farmed. I will take a moment to address the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Caerfyrddin. She is very knowledgeable on these matters, and I thank her for agreeing to sit on this Committee and for her support. We are often in rural affairs debates in the Chamber or Westminster Hall together, and her contributions are always well informed. As a farmer herself, I am sure she will agree that the Bill is necessary and welcome. The hon. Lady’s amendment would require that a dog be kept on a lead of 1.8 metres or less in a field or enclosure containing sheep, or in sight of the person in charge, who should be confident that the dog will recall on command. Although I understand why she tabled the amendment, it is worth noting that the 1953 Act already makes it clear that a dog is “at large” if it is “not on a lead or otherwise under close control”. That approach places certain requirements on dog walkers to behave responsibly, and it provides sufficient flexibility for a court to assess whether, on the facts before it, there is evidence that the dog was under close control. Such evidence does not need to be limited to proving specific elements. Setting out the meaning of “close control” also risks inadvertently narrowing the circumstances in which a court would naturally conclude that a dog was not under close control. Furthermore, the countryside code highlights that it is best practice “to keep your dog on a lead around livestock”, including sheep. Because there are existing provisions and guidance, and because there is flexibility for judgment in the courts, I urge the hon. Lady not to press her amendment. I hope I have laid out clearly why the Bill is necessary to support our farmers, reduce livestock attacks and better equip the police with the powers they need to investigate, prosecute and deter livestock attacks. I hope the Committee will support the progress of this important Bill.

• 21 May 2025 · Dogs (Protection of Livestock) (Amendment) Bill · Hansard source

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  Thank you for chairing this Committee, Mr Western; it has been a pleasure to serve under you. I thank the Minister for his support for the Bill and those who have worked incredibly hard on it behind the scenes. I am extremely grateful to all Members who have served on the Committee for taking the time to listen to why I and others feel the Bill is necessary, and for all their thoughtful contributions. At the heart of this Bill are farmers and livestock. The Bill will give farmers greater confidence that livestock attacks will be dealt with in a timely, effective and appropriate manner, reflective of the damage an attack can do. It is our hope that deterrence in the form of greater penalties and powers for the police to investigate livestock attacks will reduce the number of those attacks. The fewer farmers who witness an attack, deal with severely injured animals in the aftermath and face the economic costs as a result, the better. They deserve this Bill, and I am sure that they, like me, are incredibly grateful to all who have given their support today. Question put and agreed to. Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 2 to 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Amendment proposed : 1, schedule, page 5, line 8, at end insert— “(3A) In subsection (2), omit ‘(that is to say not on a lead or otherwise under close control)’. (3B) After subsection (2) insert— ‘(2ZA) For the purposes of subsection (2), a dog is “at large” unless— (a) it is on a lead of a length of 1.8 metres or less, or (b) it is within sight of a person and the person— (i) remains aware of the dog’s actions, and (ii) has reason to be confident that the dog will return to the person reliably and promptly on the person’s command.’”— (Ann Davies.) This amendment would change the definition of the term “at large” for the purposes of the offence under section 1 of the Dogs (Protection of Livestock) Act 1953. Question put, That the amendment be made. Question negatived. Schedule agreed to. Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill to the House.

• 13 May 2025 · Product Regulation and Metrology Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  I want to make a few brief points in support of the Opposition amendments. Taken together, they serve a simple but essential purpose: they seek to ensure that the powers granted under the Bill are used transparently, responsibly and with full parliamentary oversight. Let me be clear: this is not about rehashing the debates of the past. It is about making sure that future decisions, especially those that could have profound consequences for British industry, trade and product standards, are subject to democratic scrutiny. As it stands, the Bill gives sweeping discretion to Ministers to align domestic product regulations with European law. As my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire said, it enables the potential for dynamic alignment, which the impact assessment essentially spells out as the aim, without any binding requirement for parliamentary approval, debate or even explanation. Amendment 5 would change that by requiring the Secretary of State to explain the rationale for alignment and seek Parliament’s consent before any such decision takes effect. This is not obstructionism; it is good governance. As has been noted, the Bill also risks undoing the progress made by the previous Government in removing excessive red tape and regaining regulatory autonomy. Through sovereign decision making the UK has created trading opportunities on the world stage. That is why amendments 3 and 4, to remove automatic mechanisms to treat compliance with EU rules as equivalent to UK compliance by default and without justification, are vital. This is not about rejecting co-operation where it is in our interest; it is about avoiding automatic alignment without accountability. As was raised in the other place, the powers are not just technical; they are significant policy decisions that deserve primary legislation. The democratic will of the British people, expressed in the referendum when we decided to leave the European Union and in elections since, was to restore British sovereignty. It is only right that no authority based outside the UK, whether it be the European Commission or the Court of Justice of the European Union, can unilaterally shape the enforcement or interpretation of our rules. Amendment 21, in particular, would ensure that any EU-derived product standards must first be brought into UK law by regulation before they can be treated as equivalent. That would both protect sovereignty and provide certainty. Ultimately, there must be proper scrutiny, and if Ministers are confident in their decisions, they should have no concern about being asked to report back to Parliament on any regulations aligning with EU law and to ask Parliament to approve their continuation. That would enable proper oversight while guarding against regulatory drift.

• 11 Feb 2025 · Employer National Insurance Contributions: Police Forces · Hansard source

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  I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way and for securing this debate. She is making an excellent speech, as always. She and I are both Cheshire MPs, and we are fortunate to work with the Cheshire constabulary, one of the best forces in the country. Like me, however, she will know the challenges that Cheshire police face with rural crime. It is estimated that the changes to employer national insurance contributions will cost the force £3.7 million. Does she share my concern that that could have a significant impact on rural crime, in particular, especially if cuts are made or funding is diverted away from rural into urban areas?