Aphra Brandreth MP: speeches

Speeches

• 21 May 2026 · Middle East: Economic Response · Hansard source

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  Although I welcome some of the measures announced today, the reality is that instability in the middle east is having a direct impact on the UK economy and on the price paid by British households. Can the Chancellor therefore outline what steps her Department is taking to work across Government to ensure a stable region, including by boosting our defence spending? Will she finally commit to spending 3% of GDP in this Parliament and to working collaboratively towards reopening the strait of Hormuz?

• 19 May 2026 · Lord Mandelson: Government Response to Humble Address · Hansard source

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  The Foreign Affairs Committee heard about the pressure that the Foreign Office was under to move quickly on the appointment of Peter Mandelson as ambassador to the United States. Now, concerns have been raised about the lack of transparency surrounding the papers connected to that appointment. If the Government have nothing to hide, why are they changing the terms and scope of the Humble Address, and withholding and redacting documents from the Intelligence and Security Committee? Will the Minster ensure that the UKSV summary document will be shared with the ISC?

• 20 Apr 2026 · Security Vetting · Hansard source

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  In a Foreign Affairs Committee meeting in November last year, I asked Sir Oliver Robbins whether the Foreign Office had a different view about who should be recommended for the posting of ambassador. Sir Oliver Robbins said to me that “the Prime Minister took advice and formed a view himself, and we then acted on that view.” Is it not the case that the Prime Minister was repeatedly warned before the appointment that Peter Mandelson carried reputational and political risk, including that due diligence was not exhaustive and vetting was not yet complete, yet he chose to proceed regardless, announcing the appointment, overriding civil service advice and putting our national security at risk?

• 13 Apr 2026 · Middle East · Hansard source

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  The war in the middle east is having a real effect on my constituents. From fuel to fertiliser, prices are increasing, and action needs to be taken to alleviate the consequences. Although there are immediate steps that the Prime Minister and the Chancellor should be taking, not least reversing the planned increase in fuel duty, the bigger picture involves reopening the strait of Hormuz. What thought has been given to the role that the UK can play in clearing the strait of mines? In particular, did the Prime Minister raise the potential deployment of our autonomous minesweeping capabilities, which are already in the region, during his discussions?

• 4 Mar 2026 · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office · Hansard source

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  Since the last estimates day, the world has grown even more volatile: war continues in Europe, and the middle east is once again descending into crisis. Recent events have underscored that although hard power is indispensable, soft power remains vital to a serious and effective foreign policy, protecting British citizens at home and abroad while sustaining our global influence. It is therefore concerning that we have now seen Britain fall below the US, China and Japan in the global soft power index. We have heard from my colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee today about the importance of the BBC World Service and the British Council to our soft power. In the brief time I have today, I want to focus my remarks on education, which is the essence of soft power; it is about supporting today’s young people and shaping the future. That is why I want to focus briefly on Foreign Office support for education in the middle east. Funding education abroad can help to create a more stable world and a more favourable environment for British interests and values. It is a long-term investment, but a vital one, because extremism taught in Palestinian schools run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency undoubtedly fuelled the hatred and terrorism seen on 7 October. In 2025, the Government pledged £101 million to the Palestinian Authority under a new memorandum of understanding, including £7 million to support its education reform agenda—and reform is necessary, because there are repeated examples of textbooks that promote violence and indoctrination. Students are shown examples of dead children and told that Israel had deliberately assassinated them; they are told that they will become martyrs at the hands of Israel through turning their bodies into fire to burn a Zionist tank. They are taught physics problems illustrated with slingshots, history framed around the rejection of peace, and literature portraying Israel solely as an aggressor. If British taxpayers are contributing millions of pounds to this reform, they will rightly expect to know that that money is driving genuine improvements. The Minister may say that changes to the curriculum are being introduced to different grades over time, but even grades 1 to 4 and grade 12, which both the Palestinian Authority and the European Union said were fully aligned with UNESCO standards of peace and tolerance, and from which antisemitic and violent material was supposed to have been removed last September, have been shown to remain virtually unchanged in classrooms today. The Minister for the Middle East, the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr Falconer), has said that it is for the Palestinian Authority to say which firm they have hired to audit the curriculum, but with Foreign Office funding being spent on this, surely the Government should know —and, in the interests of transparency, share—who is carrying out that review. Will the Minister therefore publish the methodology and scope of the audit? Will it examine all previously identified grades and materials, both new and existing? Crucially, what benchmark will be used to determine whether the content meets acceptable standards? If we want moderation to prevail over extremism and co-existence to prevail over perpetual grievance, education must be part of the answer. However, we must rightly ask whether British taxpayers’ money is being spent wisely and going towards genuine education reform.

• 2 Mar 2026 · Middle East · Hansard source

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  It is no surprise that drones have become a central element of Iran’s response. The Shahed drones that it deploys are relatively inexpensive, easy to mass-produce, and capable of causing significant damage. However, the interceptors that we use to bring them down are substantially more expensive. Given the rate at which Iran is deploying these drones against UK assets and our partners, and the scale at which they can be manufactured, that cost imbalance is a growing concern. What steps is the Ministry of Defence taking to develop effective but more cost-efficient countermeasures to address these challenges, and will the Prime Minister now look again at bringing forward the timescale for increasing our defence spending?

• 25 Feb 2026 · Ukraine · Hansard source

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  The contributions to the debate from right hon. and hon. Members have been a powerful reminder of the unity that exists across the House and, indeed, throughout our country, in steadfast support of the Ukrainian people. In April 2025, I had the privilege of visiting Ukraine, alongside fellow members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and seeing at first hand the courage and determination of Ukraine’s leadership, armed forces and citizens has stuck with me. It has reinforced the importance of our continuing to stand by Ukraine, and made me even more grateful for our armed forces, who every day stand ready to protect all of us. When we think of war, our minds often turn first to the battlefield. Yet war’s cruelty extends far beyond the frontline and its impacts can reach into homes and families. One example of that is the horrific impact of the conflict on Ukrainian children, whose treatment by Russian forces has been abhorrent, reflecting the same brutality and disregard for humanity that has characterised the invasion from the outset. Children have been killed, injured and displaced by the war, and at the same time, as other Members have noted, Russia has deported at least, but likely far more than, 20,000 Ukrainian children to Russia. Every day, Ukrainian parents face the unthinkable reality of their children being taken from them. Although the exact numbers are disputed, we know that the true figure is likely far higher than reported, and that alone should concern us all. I pay tribute to Save Ukraine, representatives of which I met during my visit, and the other organisations that are working tirelessly to locate and rescue the children abducted by Russian forces. They have brought hundreds home and deserve our deepest admiration and thanks. But for every child returned, many more remain missing. We must confront the grim reality that many of those children are subjected to indoctrination, and pressured to abandon their identity, their culture, and even their own families. Addressing the crisis demands determined international support, and the UK must stand ready to play its part. While the war is being fought on the battlefield in Ukraine, there are lessons that we here in the UK must learn from the conflict. The war has shown us that although high-intensity, attritional conflict has not gone away, the character of war is changing. Four years on, it is a grinding struggle of endurance, fought not only with artillery and armour but with technology that is reshaping how force is applied. One lesson is unmistakeable: the rise of drones and autonomous systems. These unmanned systems are now central to the battlefield. They are relatively cheap, widely available and capable of inflicting serious damage. They have lowered the barrier to air power and given small units unprecedented reach. Future wars will almost certainly feature drones as a core component of operations, so we must ask whether we are adapting quickly enough. We need to learn not only how to use the systems, but how to defend against them, as illustrated starkly by recent reporting on exercises in Estonia. A small team operating unmanned systems was reportedly able to destroy multiple armoured vehicles in a matter of hours. That is the reality of modern warfare: low cost and high impact. We must ensure that our armed forces are prepared for that reality—equipped, trained and funded to meet it. Thankfully, Ukraine has adapted with remarkable speed and courage. The use of drones and semi-autonomous systems, integrated cyber and electronic operations, and flexible, resilient supply chains have all been decisive. At the same time, the war has reminded us that some fundamentals never change. Logistics matter, supply lines matter and endurance matters. Armies still need ammunition, equipment and the ability to sustain operations over time. Ukrainian forces have shown how innovation, rapid decision making and co-ordination across land, sea, air and cyber can offset the abilities of a larger opponent. They have taken the fight to Russian forces in ways that few predicted at the start of the invasion. The lesson is clear: modern warfare is not just about numbers. It is about adaptability, resilience and the ability to evolve faster than an adversary. As we rightly admire Ukraine’s heroism, we must ask ourselves a serious question. Are our own armed forces equipped, organised and funded to meet that same test? Adaptation requires investment, and that is a conversation that must involve not only the Ministry of Defence but the Treasury. I want to talk briefly about one more aspect of the war in Ukraine and the lessons that we can take from it. From the moment that Russian tanks illegally crossed the border from Crimea into Ukraine, Britain and His Majesty’s Government have stood four-square behind our friends in Kyiv. We have provided financial support, trained Ukrainian troops, and convened international partners. We ought to be proud of the support that we—both the previous and current Government—have given to Ukraine. As this war marks its fourth year since the full-scale invasion, we must not let our unity and support be worn down by Russia. A lasting and just peace must be the aim, and I support efforts to end the war as quickly as possible, but as President Zelensky has said, we know that appeasement is not the answer, and that Putin is an irrational actor who will see only weakness if the west was to give in to his demands. We learned that lesson before, and we must remember it today. We must continue to strengthen the international coalition in support of Ukraine, and we must not allow it to be worn down. As we stand resolute in our support, alongside our partners, I urge the Government to continue to work with allies, in particular the United States, and reiterate how valuable they are to the collective stance that we are taking against tyranny in the form of Putin. Ukraine’s courage has shown us both the brutality of aggression and the strength of a nation determined to defend its freedom. Our duty is now clear. We must continue to stand firm with Ukraine, resist the temptation of complacency and ensure that Britain is fully prepared for the realities of modern conflict. That means sustained support for Kyiv, renewed resolve among our allies, and serious investment in our armed forces. It is not enough to be the coalition of the willing. We must be the coalition of the prepared—prepared to deter, prepared to defend, and prepared to lead.

• 4 Feb 2026 · Lord Mandelson · Hansard source

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  The Foreign Affairs Committee, on which I sit, called for Lord Mandelson to appear before us on multiple occasions to explain the circumstances and process of his unusual appointment. He did not adhere to that request. Does the shadow Minister agree that Lord Mandelson’s failure to come before the Committee sends the signal that the Government wanted to hide something, that there were issues in the appointment and vetting process, and that, had there been transparency in the early stages of his appointment, we would have avoided sending someone wholly unfit to fulfil one of the UK’s most senior diplomatic roles?

• 28 Jan 2026 · British Indian Ocean Territory · Hansard source

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  On every level, this is a bad deal. From the absurdity of paying £34.7 billion for the privilege of ceding our own territory to the implications for defence, from putting at risk one of the most pristine marine environments in the world to the complete disregard shown to the British Chagossians themselves, there is so much I could focus my remarks on today, but I want to highlight two issues in particular: perception and national security. Perception matters in geopolitics. The messages we send, intentionally or otherwise, are read closely by our allies and by our adversaries. They carry very real consequences. I need not remind the Minister of the comments made by the President of the United States just last week. Those remarks materially change the context in which this House is considering the deal. The 1966 treaty between the UK and the US agreed to retain sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory. It is clear that any attempt to surrender sovereignty violates international law and I commend my Conservative colleagues in both Houses for delaying the Bill’s passage. But delay is not enough. The surrender Bill should be pulled in its entirety. The UK-US relationship is built on trust, particularly in defence and security. When the President states publicly that a deal will damage that relationship and should not proceed, that this deal is an “act of great stupidity”, the Government should listen and act. I am not suggesting that the United States sees the UK as an unreliable partner—we have stood shoulder to shoulder for decades—but this deal is different. If it proceeds, it will reduce the operability of UK and US forces in the region, diminish our strategic reach, and weaken our influence. Responsibility for that lies squarely with this Government. The Prime Minister is in China today. Beijing will also be watching closely. China will welcome any increase in autonomy in the region and, with it, the opportunity to decimate the marine protected areas surrounding the Chagos islands with its fishing fleet. We know that those vessels will not simply be there to fish. They will be there to gather intelligence, probe our defences and gain strategic advantage near Diego Garcia. The message this deal sends to our adversaries is clear: the UK is retreating, diminishing and weakening. That is not the message we should be sending in an increasingly hostile and unpredictable world. I want to make one brief point on national security, which I have raised in previous debates and on which we have heard from many Members today. Under the Pelindaba treaty, neither the UK nor the US will be able to store nuclear weapons on Diego Garcia. We now have confirmation of that from the Deputy Prime Minister of Mauritius. That restriction significantly reduces our capability in a critical region, and weakens the security of both ourselves and our allies. Ultimately, the deal is not in the interests of the United Kingdom. It is not in the interests of protecting one of the most important marine environments on the planet, it is not in the interests of the British Chagossians, who have been ignored throughout this process, and it is certainly not in the interests of the British taxpayer. Those on the Labour Benches know that another U-turn is looming. The deal is indefensible. Today, Members have an opportunity to do the right thing, support this motion and bring this surrender deal to an end.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  I will make progress, because we are nearly out of time. Instead of pursuing the Bill, the Government could withdraw it, and redirect the vast sums involved towards addressing that shortfall and genuinely strengthening our national security.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  We are short of time. Ultimately, the Lords amendment is about accountability to Parliament and to the electorate. There is no mandate for the Bill. If the Government choose to force it through using their majority, they must, at the very least, be accountable for the cost. British Chagossians are the forgotten people of this Bill. They may have been forgotten by the Government, but they have not been forgotten by Conservative Members. We continue to oppose the Bill with them firmly in our minds. The Prime Minister has rightly stated that Greenland’s sovereignty and right to self-determination rest with the people of Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark. The question is simple: why is that same right not afforded to the British Chagossians? The Bill has profound implications for our national security and public expenditure. The amendments tabled by Opposition peers are there for a reason: not for political gain, but to make a bad Bill slightly less damaging, to introduce safeguards, to offer some reassurance to the British taxpayer, and to ensure that the voices of the British Chagossian people are finally heard.

• 20 Jan 2026 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  The Bill goes to the very heart of our national security, the safety of the British people, our global reach and our operational effectiveness in two of the most volatile and unpredictable regions of the world: the Indo-Pacific and the middle east. It also raises serious questions about the cost of this deal to the British taxpayer, which amounts to £34.7 billion. Even in the short time since the Bill was first brought to the House, the world has become even more unstable, yet the Government remain content to press ahead with the Bill. I struggle to see how it makes us safer, considering the requirement “to expeditiously inform” Mauritius of operational activity, and considering that Mauritius is a signatory to the Pelindaba treaty. The implications of the Bill for the basing of nuclear weapons, which are vital to our security and to our deterrence, and which have been deployed to Diego Garcia in the past, should concern every Member of the House. We need further clarity and assurance from the Government on that point. That brings me to the £28 billion shortfall in the defence budget that the Chief of the Defence Staff recently presented to the Prime Minister. It does not take a mathematician to see the point that I am making; indeed, the maths is so basic that I suggest that even the Chancellor could work it out.

• 20 Oct 2025 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend makes an important point. It has no navy and only nine coastguard vessels; it is not able to protect those waters. Even if illegal fishing were controlled, the Mauritian Fisheries Minister has already spoken of wanting to issue fishing licences around the Chagos Islands. The agreement provides no guarantees; the extent of future protections will be decided only after the Bill has passed. New clauses 3 and 4 are essential to ensure parliamentary oversight of any future agreement and regular reporting on coral health, fish stocks and biodiversity. As it stands, the Bill would hand billions of pounds of UK taxpayers’ money to Mauritius, with no guarantees of protection of the marine environment, no provisions to safeguard the rights of British Chagossians, and no mechanism for Britain to monitor whether the safeguards around the strategic military base on Diego Garcia are effective. The Conservative amendments offer a chance for the Government to be transparent, publish the legal advice on which they surrendered the Chagos Islands, and give the House a vote on the payment of £35 billion to Mauritius. The treaty is damaging in so many ways, but let us not make the damage worse by waving it through unchecked.

• 20 Oct 2025 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  The treaty that the Bill will implement is shocking for so many reasons: the security implications, the staggering costs, and the voices that it has ignored—the voices of British Chagossians. Their views and concerns are many and varied. I had the privilege of meeting members of the community when they came to Parliament, while the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), met British Chagossians only once, and that was on the very day that the treaty was signed—far too late for their voices to have any influence. They are rightly frustrated that they have been excluded from negotiations and denied meaningful engagement. It is painfully clear that their voices were not considered; if they had been, the treaty might have placed their rights at its very centre. Instead, article 6 gives Mauritius the freedom to resettle Chagossians, but not the duty to do so. After half a century of waiting for it, their right of return is left entirely at the discretion of a foreign Government. Under article 11, despite the billions of pounds that the Bill will transfer to Mauritius, only a fraction—in the form of a trust fund—is intended for Chagossians. Even then, it will be administered solely by Mauritius, with no guarantee that British Chagossians will have any say in how it is spent. The treaty says that the UK and Mauritius want to “recognise the wrongs of the past”, but how can we recognise a wrong if we refuse to listen to those who suffered it? New clause 7, tabled by the shadow Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel), is vital because it would require the Government to listen to and consult the Chagossian community here in the UK, and to report back on how their rights are being upheld. That would give British Chagossians the voice that they have been denied again and again. Another vital issue is the risk that the Bill poses to one of the most precious marine environments on earth. The waters around the Chagos Islands form one of the world’s largest and most pristine marine protected areas. As we have heard, it is a haven of biodiversity, untouched by industrial fishing since 2010. Yet the treaty places that fragile ecosystem in jeopardy. Mauritius has promised to establish a new marine protected area, but it lacks the capacity to enforce it. It has no navy, and its coastguard of nine vessels is already stretched by patrolling waters thousands of miles away. By contrast, the UK has spent over £1.2 million since 2022 on monitoring and protecting those seas, developing world-leading expertise in remote enforcement through ships, sensors and satellite imagery. Illegal fishing is already rife across the Indian ocean. China’s distant-water fleet is the largest in the world and the worst global offender for illegal fishing, according to the illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing index. What confidence can we have that Mauritius—a close ally of China—will be able or willing to resist such pressure and protect these fragile waters?

• 9 Sept 2025 · Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill · Hansard source

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  At the start of this Parliament, I could not have imagined that we would be asked to consider a Bill that is so uniquely detrimental to our national security, the British taxpayer, the British Chagossian people and the environment. Not only are we ceding sovereignty of a critical overseas territory, but we are paying a huge financial cost for the privilege of doing so. We have heard much today about the cost of this deal—a cost that the Government claim is £3.4 billion over 99 years, but in reality it is many times greater. This deal is unique: it will leave the UK strategically weaker in one of the most contested regions of the world, which is likely to shape the future direction of geopolitics, at a time when the world is more volatile than ever, with 2024 seeing the greatest number of conflicts around the globe since the second world war. Allow me to start with the finances of the deal. It took a freedom of information request for this Government to level with the British people that this deal would in fact cost £35 billion, with some analysis even suggesting it could be as much as £47 billion. It would have been far better for the Government to have come clean over the true cost of the Chagos deal, rather than trying accountancy tricks to pull the wool over our eyes. I would like to put into context the sheer scale of £35 billion of taxpayers’ money: it could be used to pay for 10 Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers; it is over half the annual schools budget; it is the estimated cost of the entire Hinckley Point C nuclear reactor project; it would pay for 70 hospitals, or a 5% cut on income tax—the list could go on and on. We knew this anyway, but it is worth reiterating that when the Prime Minister negotiates, Britain loses. The hard-working people of Chester South and Eddisbury deserve a better return for the tax they pay, and they ought not to have to watch as this Government sign away British sovereign territory. Adding to that, the omission from the Bill of a money authorisation clause, removing Parliament’s ability to vote on sending billions of pounds to Mauritius, is completely wrong. That leads me to the strategic implications of the Bill. The Diego Garcia base is one of seven permanent points of presence within the Indo-Pacific region. Owing to its position in the middle of the Indian ocean and proximity to shipping lanes, it is vital for our national security and regional influence. It is a key base from which our armed forces can protect us from hostile states and non-state actors and activity. From a security standpoint, it is deeply concerning that we are losing sovereignty over this base and the influence that we could exert from it. According to the treaty, the UK is compelled to notify the Mauritian Government on certain aspects of military activity in and around the base. This does not make us safer. Think back to earlier this year when our American allies conducted strikes against Iran. What if the UK were to support our allies in such action? This deal would require, as we have heard, for us to expeditiously inform the Mauritian Government of our actions. I appreciate that the Minister has clarified that no advanced notification is required, although one might ask why we should have to inform Mauritius at all, expeditiously or not. Perhaps the Minister can clarify whether the provisions under annex 1, paragraph 2 also extend to special forces operations, and, if so, what guarantee there would be that highly sensitive security information would not end up in the hands of our adversaries. China, Iran and Russia have all welcomed the deal. As the shadow Minister highlighted, the Chinese ambassador to Mauritius congratulated the Government of Mauritius and the Deputy Prime Minister in a press conference following the deal’s announcement, thanking China for its support throughout the process. China does not do geopolitical favours, so its support should cause the Government to pause and reflect. Iran has also welcomed the deal and we know that it is forging closer ties with Russia, so perhaps in his closing remarks the Minister can share with the House how Ministers have somehow come to a different conclusion and deduced instead that all three of those geopolitical threats are opposed to the deal. But it is not just the huge financial cost or the significant security implications of the deal that are deeply concerning, but that it has ignored the voices of British Chagossians. In June this year, I met people from the Chagossian community who came to Parliament to speak with MPs. Their message was very clear: they feel let down by a lack of transparency and consultation, and are deeply uncertain about their future. It is not surprising that they feel ignored and betrayed, given that the former Foreign Secretary met them only once—once—on a deal that is so significant for them. The Government must put that right and take the opportunity to implement a recommendation put forward by the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee and International Agreements Committee, outlined in the report that looked at the treaty. They urged the Government to “Enhance Chagossian engagement by establishing a formal consultation mechanism with the Chagossian community to monitor the Agreement’s implementation and ensure their meaningful inclusion in decision-making.” Will the Minister confirm whether that recommendation has been implemented? The deal provides British Chagossians with no guaranteed rights of return to their homeland. I therefore ask the Minister to state clearly whether the Government have negotiated an agreement in which British Chagossians’ rights to visit the Chagos islands are left entirely in the hands of Mauritius, and whether it is feasible that they may be refused the right to return or even visit. That would be wholly unacceptable. Further, the Chagos trust fund, established as part of the UK-Mauritius treaty and financed by the UK, is to be distributed solely under the control of Mauritius, yet the Bill contains no provisions to monitor whether the rights of British Chagossians are upheld or to create any statutory oversight of the trust fund. Have Ministers secured from the Government of Mauritius any firm commitment that British Chagossians will have a formal role in the oversight and decision making regarding the fund? Indeed, why was a model of joint governance not agreed, ensuring that British Chagossians themselves have a voice in how the fund is governed and can benefit directly from it? Added to all this, the deal currently risks leaving a pristine marine environment unprotected. The waters around the Chagos islands are home to 220 species of coral, 855 species of fish and 355 species of molluscs. These waters have been fully protected since 2010 by the UK Government. Although it is welcome that there is a commitment to continue with a marine protected area, we do not know what levels of support Mauritius will put into the MPA. Indeed, there are real concerns that the Mauritian Government do not have the capabilities to monitor, enforce and protect these waters, with no assurance that there will be no fishing and trawling in them. From the eye-watering costs to the grave security risks, the betrayal of British Chagossians and the environmental damage this treaty risks unleashing, this is a uniquely bad deal. It asks us to pay more, risk more and gain nothing in return. For the sake of our national interest and our duty to the Chagossian people, I cannot support this Bill.