Angela Eagle MP: speeches

Speeches

• 15 Jul 2026 · National Security · Hansard source

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  I beg to move, That the draft National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 13 July, be approved. I am grateful to the House for its consideration of this draft statutory instrument, which will see three bodies designated: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, and the GRU Volunteer Corps. Threats from foreign powers and their proxies have grown in scale and complexity, and we have just had a debate about one of the areas of the world from where these threats emanate. Designation is a powerful tool for disrupting state bodies and those acting in concert with them, and it sends a strong message about the UK’s commitment to tackling foreign power threat activity globally. The Home Secretary has determined that the three bodies are involved in foreign power threat activity, so we propose to designate them under this new power. Before I give more detail on the bodies in question, it is worth setting out the legislative basis of the decision. For a body to be designated, the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that it is involved in foreign power threat activity, as defined in the National Security Act 2023. The definition of “foreign power threat activity” covers the most serious offences in the Act, including espionage, sabotage and foreign interference. It also covers broader activity that constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety when carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. If that test is met, the Home Secretary must then consider whether designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. She will take account of considerations such as foreign policy and the impact on human rights. Once a group is designated, it is a criminal offence within the UK’s jurisdiction to support, assist or obtain material benefits from that designated body, and the penalties for such offences are imprisonment for up to 14 years and/or a fine. Where an individual commits certain espionage conduct or sabotage for a designated body, this can attract sentences of up to life in prison. Designation therefore enables law enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt designated bodies more effectively. Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary will exercise this power only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence, including intelligence material and cross-Government advice. A decision to designate is only taken after great care and consideration, and it must be approved by both Houses. I turn now to the bodies in question, starting with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The long-standing threat posed by Iran and its proxies is well established; indeed, we have literally just debated it. We know that the Iranian intelligence services have a pattern of targeting dissidents, Persian-language media organisations and journalists, and Jewish and Israeli communities globally. The IRGC Quds Force and the IRGC Intelligence Organisation, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. As a key component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, the IRGC is answerable directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Its role extends beyond conventional military operations and includes intelligence activity, the use of proxy actors, and influence operations that are designed to advance Iranian state objectives. Activity linked to the IRGC has involved threats to life and intimidation on UK soil, including credible plots to target individuals in the United Kingdom. The IRGC also supports militant groups overseas, and has been associated with cyber-attacks and other state threats that are actively aligned with Iranian state objectives. I will move on to the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right. The IMCR has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities and to Persian-language media, including the antisemitic arson attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March. Sitting behind the IMCR are members of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, who almost certainly directed attacks across Europe by the IMCR. These incidents, including acts of arson and intimidation, have caused real fear and distress, and they have a profound effect on the communities affected. It is clear that this sustained activity directly threatens the safety and the interests of the United Kingdom. On the GRU Volunteer Corps, Russia’s threat to the United Kingdom extends far beyond conventional military action. The Kremlin increasingly relies on proxy organisations to pursue its objectives, seeking to undermine our security while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The so-called GRU Volunteer Corps is a clear example of that approach. It is not an independent force or a loose collection of volunteers. It is a proxy organisation operating under the direction and control of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service. These formations are directed, supported and sustained by the GRU, and they are already operating across conflict zones, most notably in Ukraine in support of Russia’s illegal invasion. We are seeing a conscious attempt by the Russian state to blur the lines between military action, intelligence activity and criminality, using deniable forces to carry out sabotage, destabilisation and violence beyond its borders. This is not conjecture; it reflects a pattern of behaviour that underpins Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and has been seen repeatedly across Europe, including here in the United Kingdom. In 2024, two men organised an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned business in east London on behalf of the Wagner Group, another proxy body that acts on behalf of the Russian state, and which is proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the UK. It is notable that large parts of the Wagner Group have been absorbed into the so-called Volunteer Corps, which demonstrates the threat posed to the UK. With the House’s consent, these bodies will be designated. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary has decided that there is sufficient evidence for her reasonably to believe that each body is involved in foreign power threat activity, and that designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. Designation will strengthen our ability to disrupt these bodies and those who support and facilitate them. More broadly, it sends a powerful message to any foreign power or proxy intent on harming the United Kingdom or our interests. We will do whatever it takes to prevent such activity on our soil. This debate is a significant moment, because this is the first use of a new power introduced by this Government to answer an urgent need. We are taking action because the three bodies in question, in their different ways, pose a threat to our country, and because designation is a necessary and proportionate response to their activities. With that, I commend the regulations to the House.

• 14 Jul 2026 · Extreme Heat: Preparedness · Hansard source

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  It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Christopher, in this debate on a matter that has affected a great many of our constituents and all Members who are struggling through the London heat. I am grateful to Members for their valuable contributions. I thank the hon. Member for Waveney Valley (Adrian Ramsay) for securing the debate. I hope to give all Members some confidence that we are making progress in what is an extremely complicated and interconnected problem. It is not only interconnected in this country; it requires action locally, nationally and internationally, and it cannot be solved easily or quickly. Despite some of the issues and considerable challenges—they are considerable—that hon. Members have pointed out in their contributions, I want to cheer people up slightly with the statement that the Nature Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry East (Mary Creagh), made on the Floor of the House yesterday. She pointed out that before the Paris agreement, the world was on track for 4% of warming, but we have now got it down to 2.5. That is still way too high, but I use that example because I want to inject a little bit of confidence that if we can get our processes right—internationally as well as nationally—we can do something about this. Such issues are so complex and interrelated that it is easy for people to think that the problem is too great and we cannot possibly deal with it, and then be despairing about it, so I wanted to inject that little bit of optimism. We have made progress, and we have to make sure that we carry on making progress. The Government recognise that extreme heat fuelled by climate change is no longer a rare seasonal event to be managed with temporary emergency measures; it is a chronic, recurring, structural risk to our economy, public health and national security. Every hon. Member who has contributed today has recognised that point. Our response to extreme heat is built on a combination of tried and tested plans and capabilities that have been refined over time, and also longer-term programmes to meet the specific challenges of climate change. Evidence suggests that without action, the physical impacts of climate change could cost England’s economy between 1.1% and 3.3% of GDP by 2050, and at least 7.4% by the end of the century. We are taking action now in recognition that it is economically beneficial to invest early to reduce emissions. As Nicholas Stern said many years ago, the more money spent on investing to prevent, the cheaper it is to deal with the consequences. The Government have put clean energy and climate action at the heart of their agenda, which includes showing global leadership by setting a world-leading target to reduce emissions by at least 81% by 2035. Cutting emissions remains our first line of defence, but it is harder when the political consensus that existed about climate action has broken down globally and in this country. There are still people who claim that climate change does not exist and that we are spending a load of money for no particular reason, when we know that scientists are universally agreed that the increase in heat and changes in climate that we are talking about have been caused by human effects on our planet’s climate. The sooner that everybody recognises that globally, the easier it will be for the great ingenuity of the human race—when it is in a good mood—to deal with the consequences of what was done in the past with industrialisation. We are taking action as well as mitigation to prepare the UK for the impacts of climate change. Under the Climate Change Act 2008, we maintain a robust climate change risk assessment, and through the national adaptation programme, DEFRA co-ordinates a rigorous cross-Government response to ensure that our sectors remain resilient.

• 6 Jul 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  I am grateful for the contributions of all right hon. and hon. Members. The hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers) was worried that we had changed the Bill in a way that would make it less effective, and my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) still made the case for having an exemption rather than a defence for humanitarian assistance. I confirm that in our view the Bill as originally written would have excluded humanitarian assistance completely, because of the primary purpose rule, but we felt that there was some merit in the argument about the chilling effect of not having a defence. That is why we accepted the amendments in the other place, but that is belt and braces—nothing has changed. We are trying to accommodate potentially legitimate worries and chilling effects that might have an effect on the operational effectiveness of some NGOs, even though the law itself would not have caught them.

• 6 Jul 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  The first duty of any Government is and will forever be to secure this country and keep all its inhabitants safe. It is a mission that has challenged us relentlessly, but it has grown and evolved in recent years. The threat posed by foreign powers will be known by all here: physical threats against individuals and property; theft of trade secrets; attempts to interfere in and influence our democracy; and cyber-attacks targeting both the state and the private sector that disrupt critical infrastructure and compromise sensitive data. As the House has heard many times before, the source of those threats has come predominantly, though not exclusively, from three countries: Russia, China and Iran. The threats from each present differently, but those threats are very real, and they are evolving. The Bill before us will strengthen the Government’s ability to disrupt hostile intelligence services and their proxies by adapting counter-terrorism tools to tackle state-based security threats to the UK. In developing this legislation, we have worked closely with the police, security and the intelligence agencies. The Bill gives our operational partners the powers that they need, and it does so in a way that reflects the differences between state and non-state actors. As Jonathan Hall himself has said, this Bill “does the job”. As the Bill progressed through its stages, the Government listened carefully to the arguments about legitimate humanitarian assistance, as well as concerns expressed by non-governmental organisations and the International Development Committee. The Government’s position remains that the Bill should not criminalise legitimate humanitarian aid work or the important work of journalists and diplomats.

• 6 Jul 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  Yes, my hon. Friend may know her Pepper v. Hart, and I have just put it on the record in this House, but obviously I will take a close look at the guidance as it is developed. The hon. Member for Woking (Mr Forster) made a powerful speech, particularly about the rising level of threat that we face. That is why the Bill needs to be on the statute book as quickly as possible. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) asked about the designated threats defence. Again, the answer is the same: it is about the chilling effect.

• 6 Jul 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source

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  We are very confident that the Bill as it is written does not place journalists in any jeopardy. In fact, these measures allow us to act against those who are conducting harmful activity in the UK, including targeting journalists here in the UK because of their attempts to expose activities in other regimes. The right hon. Gentleman makes a more general point about the jeopardy in which journalists put themselves in war zones, and I would agree that their news reporting is some of the bravest. We all support a free press and journalists’ ability to report in war zones, but I would say respectfully to him that these things are slightly different and he is combining the two issues. We are convinced that this Bill does not and will not put journalists in any more jeopardy in this country—certainly not for reporting. Baroness Northover tabled amendments 1, 2, 4 and 6 in the other place. They introduce a new defence into the offences at new sections 17B and 17C of the National Security Act 2023, specifically to cover legitimate humanitarian aid activity. This means that non-governmental organisations that have to engage with a designated body in order to carry out legitimate humanitarian activity will benefit from the same protections under the Bill as do UK diplomats. The Government also supported amendments 3 and 5, which were tabled by Lord Anderson. These amendments were based on the advice of Jonathan Hall KC and also had the support of Lord Carlile. They add a reasonable excuse defence in new section 17C of the 2023 Act for obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from a designated body. This means that where a person has a reasonable excuse for receiving information from a designated body, they benefit from a defence. This might include, for example, a journalist conducting an interview or a charity receiving information on the location of landmines. The Government considered the case for exempting humanitarian NGOs from the offences, but we were advised by our operational partners that this would provide a loophole that hostile actors would seek to exploit, which in turn could make the NGOs themselves a target for infiltration. In fact, that is the case that I made to this Chamber in Committee. I am grateful to the other place and the International Development Committee for their engagement on this Bill and for the constructive amendments, which have helped strengthen the Bill and broaden its support. The Bill represents an important new addition to our toolkit to address the growing threat from foreign powers. As I said in Committee, my officials have worked closely with operational partners in the creation of this power and the accompanying offences, and our partners are fully supportive of the Bill. It closes a gap, and they have been explicit that it provides them with vital tools capable of addressing the sharpest threats that they are tackling.