Andrew Western MP: speeches

Speeches

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you both for joining us today. I have an overarching question about the impact of the proposed modernisation of DWP processes and whether you think that that will improve the detection of fraud and error. Joshua Reddaway: Specifically, do you mean the EVM—eligibility verification measure—stuff?

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q It was not, but we will leave it there, because clearly you are not aware of the powers that I am referring to. You talk about the inclusion of error, as well as fraud, in what we are attempting to do here. Do you accept that there is the potential, through the effective use of the eligibility verification measure, to detect overpayments through error sooner, thereby reducing any overpayment because it would come to light earlier? Jasleen Chaggar: Yes, and to stop people getting into debt is an incredibly laudable aim. The question is whether we are willing to infringe the privacy rights of the entirety of the population to do that. Perhaps a more proportionate solution would be to make it easier for those benefits claimants who are making mistakes to navigate the system in the first place. Coming back to your previous point, if you were happy to send me information about those powers, I would be happy to get back to you with our position on those.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I suspect Minister Gould will have the bulk of the questions for you, Mark, but I have a very general question. There has, understandably, been a lot of discussion and questions today about the balance between people’s privacy and being able to prevent fraud. What is your overall view on whether the Bill strikes the necessary balance between the two? Mark Cheeseman: My view is that the Bill does strike that balance, and it tries to strike the balance. It is difficult, because you need to balance the ability to take action against someone who has committed fraud against the state with having fair and reasonable processes for looking at someone who has not. The purpose of an investigation is not to find fraud; it is to find fact. That is why we have professionals who are trained and have a code of ethics around objectivity; their role is to find fact, not fraud. The Bill tries to strike that balance both by having authorised officers and by having the oversight that is in place. The Government structure, in having the counter-fraud profession, provides some of that as well. My view of the Bill is that there is a fair amount of independent oversight—that is a good thing—to increase how well things are done.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q One more, if I may, Chair? Richard, one of the powers we intend to take is around search and seizure for the DWP when investigating serious and organised crime. That is a power that HMRC have had for some time. Can you reflect on what the benefits of that have been for HMRC’s operations, in terms of no longer needing to rely directly on the police to fulfil that function? Richard Las: Ultimately, it allows us to operate immediately and with real clarity. We would be under the same kind of governance and restrictions as the police would be, in terms of having to go to a court to get those warrants, but, in terms of our ability to—

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I would argue that we are accepting a different level of checking on the eligibility verification measure for everybody in receipt of those benefits. I would be perfectly happy to accept that there may be some indirect discrimination against disabled people by virtue of the fact that they are over-represented in the cohort, but are you suggesting that this would amount to direct discrimination? Rick Burgess: I think it does edge into that. There is certainly established thinking and case law that begins to establish that. The Equality and Human Rights Commission need to be brought into this urgently. There need to be public and transparent equality impact assessments, because I do not see how this does not breach a right to privacy and represent discrimination against groups who are over-represented in these cohorts.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  I will not ask any more questions, but I just say to Rick that I think it might be helpful for a follow-up conversation to take place. Without wishing to get into a protracted argument, there were some things that I did not recognise as part of the Bill, but clearly that is how people are feeling and how the people you represent are feeling. I am very happy to ask officials to pick up a conversation to go through the detail.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you. Richard, you made a point around the existing powers that HMRC has had, since I think 2011, to request information on every interest-bearing bank account in the country, as I understand it. Could you explain what safeguards and oversight you have in place, because that feels like a similar bulk data exercise? Do you think the oversight that we are proposing to put in place alongside these powers is equivalent, or do these powers have more or less oversight than the powers that HMRC has enjoyed for 14 years? Richard Las: It is the Finance Act 2011 that you refer to, which allows us bulk data gathering powers on information that we believe will support our functions. I guess it is not just the banks, but we do get the information on interest-bearing accounts. It is an annual exercise, not a real-time exercise. It is clearly timed in such a way that it helps us understand whether the right amount of tax has been paid on interest that has been accrued. We are talking about large accounts because in most cases people’s interest is quite small, but there will be some people who get a lot of it. We have a huge amount of controls over how we manage that information and how we use it and protect it; they are our normal requirements as with any other taxpayer data. We gather other information from third parties. We have information from merchant acquirers on transactions that businesses might make, for example. We also have information that we get from online platforms in terms of sales and things like that. It is all part of bringing that information together. HMRC very much respects taxpayer confidentiality and manages that data responsibly. I guess those safeguards can exist in other organisations.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q To clarify, you accept that there are bulk data powers, but it is just a different cohort of people. Jasleen Chaggar: I am not aware of powers that are similar to eligibility verification notices that are exercised by the DWP. I am aware that they have similar powers in relation to direct deduction orders, and maybe that is the distinction that the witnesses earlier were making.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you for joining us today, and for the engagement that we have had so far; it has been incredibly helpful and you have my assurance that it will continue. I would like to test the point that you have just set out on the POCA measure within EVM, as well as rolling that out more broadly. Clearly we want to ensure that the burdens on banks that arise as a result of the EVM measure, and any of the other measures, interplay in an acceptable manner with the broad range of duties that fall upon you, including the consumer duty. In the interest of transparency, could you set out for the Committee your other concerns regarding potential conflicts if we do not get things right as we construct the code of practice? Daniel Cichocki: We are making this suggestion because under the Bill banks responding to an information request or a direct deduction order, would have to consider whether there is some indication of financial crime that under POCA requires them to make a suspicious activity report. We think it is simpler to remove that requirement, not least because where there is a requirement to make a suspicious activity report there is a requirement to notify the authorities; clearly, there is already a notification to the authorities when complying with the measure. Removing that requirement would avoid the risk that banks must consider not only how to respond to the measure but whether they are required to treat that individual account as potentially fraudulent. We are trying to manage risk out of the system more broadly with financial crime compliance, so we think it is much more proportionate and effective to simply apply the same exemption across all the measures in the Bill.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Given that we have no way of knowing if somebody is in breach of the capital limit once they have given their word that that is not the case, how would you suggest that we detect that particular form of fraud where there is no suspicion of fraud because we do not know what somebody has in their bank account? Jasleen Chaggar: I think that it is important that suspicion has already arisen before those policing powers can be enacted. The police already have powers to request that granular financial information where there is suspicion of fraud.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Just to test that a little further, were we to do anything in the prevent space on fraud and error that sought to increase the safeguards and checks in place for all benefit claimants, is it your view that all of those would directly discriminate against disabled people because they are over-represented in the cohort? Rick Burgess: It is about where that measure is one of a number of additional enforcement measures, rules or laws that would have negative consequences. The key to this is the trawling nature of the technology; it is not targeted, beyond being aimed at everyone on UC, everyone on ESA and so on. When you trawl, you do not target, and then you have a huge cohort. If, in that cohort, you have over-representation, without even thinking about it, you have then enacted a level of discrimination, because of the trawling nature of this approach. If this approach applied to everybody on benefits, that would also be slightly questionable, because you are applying a different level of privacy to people who get an award from the DWP versus people who do not. If it applied to the whole country, I suppose that would be fairer in one respect, but it would also be a breach of everyone’s privacy, which goes to another question. In terms of this measure being important for Government revenue, the amount lost to the tax gap is more than four times more—we are talking about £9.1 billion, but the tax gap is over £39 billion. You would recover more money if you subjected the whole country to this measure, but I would suggest that the reason you do not subject the whole country to it is that there would be outrage, because people would find their rights to privacy being completely abused. Applying this measure in these targeted ways suggests a level of, “Well, these are people who perhaps have less rights to privacy than the general population.” If you are happy to have your bank account monitored in this way, fine, but you have not suggested that this should apply to the general population. You have suggested that it should apply to a population who receive benefits, and within that population there is an over-representation of disabled people, who are already exhaustively monitored, reviewed and tested and having to provide proof, whether that is for a blue badge, personal independence payment, ESA, universal credit or a concessionary pass on public transport. The life of a disabled person is to be constantly tested and examined and having to produce proof, and this is another step in that. That is why this is germane to the United Nations report on the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. We have continued down the road of removing rights, not respecting them, and of subjecting disabled people to greater scrutiny, greater surveillance and greater tests of their basic rights to be a citizen of this country. It is really quite distressing for disabled people to be in this position. Not only have we had two really damning reports from the United Nations, but the new Government is actually adopting old policies of the previous Government and continuing on that road. The level of anger and distress in the disabled community is absolutely enormous. It is really difficult to explain to people that this is not an obvious attack, or one motivated by ableist assumptions about how disabled people run their lives or whether they are more or less honest, or more or less genuine, than people who are not disabled. It is really hard going for us—I have to tell you that. Disabled people in Britain have had a decade and a half of being the scapegoat of this country, and it has to stop. This measure is actually making it worse, as opposed to stopping that scapegoating. Geoff Fimister: I just want to add something to a point that Rick made. We both made the point that the discriminatory aspect relating to disabled people arises, in the immediate sense, from the fact that these means-tested benefits are primarily in scope at the moment, and disabled people are disproportionately likely to be on low incomes. It is worth adding that if this measure were to be extended at a future stage to a wider range of benefits, potentially bringing disability benefits into scope, that would be even more sharp discrimination against disabled people. They are not theoretical points that Rick has been making—there is a really raw feeling among disabled people that they are being targeted. In the context of quite a lot of negative media publicity around the interface between employment and unemployment among disabled people, there is an unpleasant atmosphere for disabled people. That is certainly the feedback that we are getting.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Just for clarification, is there an independent oversight mechanism in place for the use of those powers? Richard Las: I do not know, if I am honest, whether there is. I can look that up for you.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q We are looking to set a limit so the DWP would be able to deduct a maximum of 40% of an individual’s total capital as a lump sum. Would that satisfy you, or would you like us to look at that further? Eric Leenders: We would like to consider a specific de minimis. There are probably two approaches: an absolute amount or a relative amount, dependent on the individual’s essential expenditure—not their lifestyle expenditure. That is why we feel that the standard financial statement would be a useful tool.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you for joining us. I have a couple of initial questions. You have neatly set out your position that there is no circumstance in which you would support the eligibility verification measure. I was interested when you said there are no other laws like this in the country. We heard from HMRC today about its ability to receive bulk data with regard to every interest-bearing bank account in the country, and it does that on a regular basis. How do you consider this power to be different from that one? Jasleen Chaggar: What is really important about the Bill is the conflation of fraud and error. It is not just people suspected of serious crime, or even low-level crime, who are pulled into the net of surveillance. It is also people who, while navigating the complexities of the benefits system, may have found themselves on the wrong side of making a benefits claim and made a mistake. It also involves DWP’s own errors, which make up one in 10 errors. What is critical when we are thinking about the Bill is that it is suspicionless surveillance that applies to everyone.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I have one follow-up question to each of you separately, if that is okay. Joshua, you mentioned the challenge that we have at the moment in detecting capital fraud and our reliance on somebody’s word as the only real measure that we have in place to determine that. If we were not to pursue EVM, is there another way that we could assure ourselves, beyond just taking the word of a potential claimant that they do not have more than, for instance, £16,000 in their account? Joshua Reddaway: Is there an alternative? I am aware that DWP is thinking about open banking as an alternative, but that, of course, would have wider implications and at the moment is on a voluntary basis. You have got that. I honestly think that it fundamentally comes down to this: if you want to be able to detect, and if Parliament has set an eligibility criterion of capital as part of universal credit and some other benefits, DWP can either use that as a kind of symbolic deterrent so that you can opt out by owning up that you have that capital—that has a use—or if you want it to actually be enforced, you have to provide DWP with a tool that goes a bit further than just asking. There are various ways that you can get data matching from various different partners. This is the one that the Government have come up with.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Alex, I have a final question regarding what you said earlier about the level of fraud you have seen remaining fairly static but you have increased your prevention measures. Which of the new measures you have stepped up have been particularly effective? Alex Rothwell: Data analysis has been particularly effective, as has getting better at recording and reporting—for example, we now have a ubiquitous case recording system that exists across the national health service. The greatest value we have seen so far has been in improved data analysis on large datasets that exist on, for example, national contracting. That is where the value lies in future.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you very much for joining us today. I want to ask Dr Kassem a question, just for my own understanding. We have talked a lot about the definition of fraud and error and the Department’s approach to them. On the DWP side, to my knowledge, we are not planning to change the definitions of those within the scope of the Bill, but, clearly, we are taking new powers to enforce against them. Just out of interest, is there an academically accepted definition of fraud versus error that people work to, or is it ultimately a question of judgment? Dr Kassem: There are lots of definitions talking about fraud, including lies, cheating and misrepresentation for personal gain, but my point is that personal gain can be financial or non-financial. The Bill specifically mentions financial gain, but what would you do if you had a staff member working for a public authority who, for example, allowed unauthorised access or shared information out of revenge? There is no financial gain in that case. Would you treat that as fraud?

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q On your point about scope and the level of intrusion associated with the eligibility verification measure, you said you would like to see the power restricted to the most serious investigations. From our perspective, that would run contrary to what we are trying to achieve in capturing data that enables us to identify those who we had no idea were committing fraud or in receipt of an overpayment, albeit unwittingly. Is there another way you think we could achieve this? Helena Wood: That is a very good question. It goes back to the balance between individual rights to privacy and society’s rights as a whole. Only you can make the decision about where that balance falls. Going back to the previous question, I would like to see built into the oversight of the use of the power a specific requirement for the independent reviewer to look at instances of collateral intrusion and where mistakes have been made, and to report on those to Parliament. If we can build that into the code of practice—forgive me for keeping on going back to that code, but I think a lot of the use of this power hinges on how it will be used in practice and by whom. We need to build some significant guardrails against that. The second point I would make is that to my knowledge, this is an unprecedented power internationally, so how can we be sure it is going to be effective in practice? We know, for example, that individuals rarely have one bank account in one institution any more. In fact, numerous pieces of research—forgive me; I do not have the figures in my head, but I can refer those back to the Committee—show that individuals now have masses of bank accounts across five, six, seven and up to 10 or 20 institutions. By targeting one institution, are you really going to get a full picture anyway? If this is to be proportionate, we have to be clear that intrusion is proportionate and is going to be effective in practice. I am yet to see the evidence that it is, if it is used in a scattergun way. That is why it would be great to build into the code of practice something much more targeted around risk. For example, high-risk postcodes coming through in intelligence around organised crime attacks on the benefits system might be one way to look at this.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Part of the reason that we do not have a specific intent to look at organised crime is that it makes up less than 10% of the fraud that we see in the Department—certainly of the overall fraud and error figures. I am reflecting on your comments about balance, but I am then hearing the questions about the efficacy of going to look directly into only one financial institution’s accounts. My concern is about broadening the scope. We have taken significant steps, when set against previous proposals in this area, to narrow the scope of the Bill. For instance, we are initially looking only at the three benefits where we see the highest levels of fraud and error. Universal credit is obviously principal among those. Does the work that we have done to narrow the scope reassure you at all when you look at the Bill—for example, the removal of the state pension and the restriction to only one financial institution? Clearly, without that, we would have to look at every single bank account in the country in detail and investigate why every single person in the country has £16,000, if we are unable to see across the full range of bank accounts that they have. Helena Wood: Absolutely, and I will answer that question in two parts. If we compare this Bill with the predecessor Bill that was put forward by the previous Government, the concerns have been listened to. There is much more significant oversight and much more limited scope. If we look at that in comparison with the predecessor Bill, that is absolutely true. On the second part of your question, you make a very good point that this is not always organised crime. I would build on the point made by my predecessors in giving evidence that this is absolutely what we would refer to as a first-party fraud-driven approach. At Cifas, we run a fraud behaviours survey every year, questioning individuals about their general attitudes to fraud—individual-level fraud—and we see those numbers ticking up year on year about what individuals deem acceptable. Your point is well made and fully made about the rising levels of first-party fraud. We do have to look at it as both a first-party fraud and an organised fraud response.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I will ask one more question about the systems that we have in place. What do you perceive as the principal weaknesses in the DWP’s current powers to detect fraud? Helena Wood: A really good point was made, and others who follow me in this Committee’s evidence sessions will make it as well: fraudsters rarely simply defraud the public sector or the private sector. It is often the case that those with a propensity towards fraud will look at any channel through which they can gain financial benefits. This is very much a narrow-facing Bill, but we have to look at it in its broader context. I would question whether DWP could be doing more to share information with the private sector, using existing powers to do so. There are plenty of voluntary information and data-sharing schemes available to which DWP is not plugged in. It would complement this particular power to be able to layer the data picture and the intelligence picture, and not just look at this single piece of information in isolation. There will be a number of data points across the private sector that you could gain through voluntary data-sharing schemes that DWP is currently not engaging with.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I asked this question of the first panel, but I am interested, both in broad terms and specifically within the parameters of your role in the NHS, in whether you have seen changing attitudes to fraud in recent years. Obviously there are various public attitude surveys that would indicate that that is the case, but has there been an increasing prevalence of fraud that the NHS has had to contend with, and do you have any comments on general changes in attitudes? Alex Rothwell: I certainly echo your thoughts in terms of attitude. We have seen that expressed in a number of different ways through surveys and transparency—the international transparency index, for example. In terms of statistics, we have seen our fraud prevalence rate remain fairly steady over the last five to seven years, but it is a complex picture because I think that we have been increasing our fraud protection measures as well. What we have seen across the board are bitter pay disputes and a sense that contracts do not pay enough. We have extensive provider assurance programmes that are recovering funds through what we classify as error. I do not see any change in that climate necessarily. Opportunities to strengthen prevention, for us, are the most important factor to influence people’s decision making before they commit fraud. So it is a huge concern to me, but not necessarily in terms of statistics. Kristin Jones: During my career, I have seen sentences for fraud increase dramatically and that sends a clear message but, over my career, instead of only a few people being exposed to fraud, when you answer your telephone, there is a good chance you have a scammer at the other end; it could happen once a week, if not several times a day. If you are being targeted, it could be every mealtime, with the scammer hoping that while you are distracted you will fall for some con. The worry is that the public are exposed so much to fraud that its seriousness gets watered down in their mind. You have these forums where you can recommend how to claim various things from the Government and how to hit sweet spots to get that benefit or grant. So it has changed and perhaps people are not as shocked by fraud as they used to be.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Briefly, on the question of efficacy and scale, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs has powers at the moment to request information from banks en masse. Given the experience we have within Government of doing that, and from what I can see, the lack of problem with it, I wonder whether you feel—

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Thank you. I will just ask one more question; I am interested in your views on societal attitudes to fraud. Clearly, we have seen a significant increase in fraud and error within the DWP since the pandemic, with around £35 billion lost in total and upwards of £7 billion lost to fraud last year alone. We hear an awful lot about the changing attitudes that people have towards fraud. Is that something that you have seen, recognised and acknowledged? Are there other drivers that you think are behind those increased numbers? Dr Kassem: Yes, I have seen that in the literature, but not in practice yet. I think the way to go forward with that is by education and raising awareness about fraud and its impact, because those individuals committing fraud do not see the harm there. They see the Government as having lots of money in a rich country. They see themselves as entitled as well—more than others—and they take their fair share, or they might do it out of revenge, ideology or coercion, perhaps. There are lots of motivations for them to do that. Educating them about why this is wrong and what would be the consequences of committing fraud can help to reduce fraud over the long term and raise awareness about it. Equally important is training staff in public authorities about fraud, what it means and how to detect it. Prevention is better than a cure. Again, those have to go hand in hand. Yes, there has to be an investigation and a deterrent to discourage people from doing it, and this Bill is an excellent step in doing so. However, if you produce the Bill, with untrained staff members who are not able to identify fraud criminals individually or organisationally, it will not really work. Preventing fraud requires a holistic approach. You cannot focus on prevention alone or on enhancing accountability alone, or on deterrence or investigation. Everything needs to work together, and education plays an important part internally in public sectors and externally across the public. Professor Button: I have recently done some research where we replicated a study from 10 years ago. We sought a representative sample of the population and their attitudes to various deviant behaviours, including benefits fraud, and we found there was a significant decline in honesty. I think there are changes that are particularly pronounced among younger people. It has been driven by a whole range of factors, not least it is much easier to be dishonest now. If you go back 20 or 30 years, if you wanted to apply for a loan or a credit card you had to go to a bank. Now you just do it online on a computer. It is much easier to engage in dishonest behaviours in those types of ways. The other thing is that social media and different types of forums provide opportunities for people to discuss how to engage in dishonest behaviour. I am doing some research at the moment about online refund fraud. We have been going into forums where a wide range of individuals discuss how to defraud retailers and get refunds for stuff that they have bought online. I strongly suspect that that kind of thing is probably also going on for benefits fraud. All of those factors are making it much easier, so I think there is a much more significant challenge for not just the public sector, but private sector organisations in dealing with fraud because of that. Professor Levi: There is a lot of scope for unchallenged behaviour. Who gets challenged by people? If you do not have face-to-face relationships, the opportunities for moral education are much fewer. Personally, I think there needs to be a lot more in schools, but there is a lack of capacity in the schools curriculum for that kind of thing. Also, there should be more about how to avoid being a victim and discussions about money muling and so on. There is a broader spectrum of behaviours where people can get involved in fraud that we need to look at collectively.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q I have one further question. In considering the Bill and discussing it with various people and stakeholder groups, the one thing that seems to come through incredibly strongly is the importance of data sharing, as the single biggest thing that we can improve to tackle fraud. My general question is: would you share that view? More specifically, are we not sharing data with or receiving data from any organisations at the moment that you think we should be and that would help us to tackle fraud, both in the DWP and across the public sector? Alex Rothwell: Data sharing is critical to our ability to prevent fraud. We have a particular challenge in the NHS in that medical records are in a particular category, so we are exempt from the Digital Economy Act 2017. Perhaps I would focus in the first instance on the rich data sets that the Government actually hold and our ability to communicate inter-Department. Those data sets are critical, yet it is still challenging to obtain data. In many ways, the data protection legislation already provides the ability to share information, particularly where fraud is concerned, although the application of it is often quite risk averse. I wish it had been called the Data Sharing Act and not the Data Protection Act, quite frankly. Kristin Jones: I come from a slightly different angle on this. Having prosecuted for many years and had to deal with the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the responsibility to gather material and go through it, I think it is important, if you have data, to decide what you are going to do with it. In preparing for this Committee, I looked at the National Audit Office report on carer’s allowance. There you have a lot of data being gathered, passed and, if it is not addressed, discarded. For me it is important, if you gather data, to do something with it. There has been a lot of discussion about error. It is important for the public that, when they apply for something that they may not be entitled to, if that information is held, they can rely on that. If you apply for a passport and you fill the form in wrongly, you do not get your passport. It should be the same in other parts of government. You should be able to rely on the information the state already holds on you. This relates to the point about child benefit.

• 25 Feb 2025 · Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill (First sitting) · Hansard source

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  Q Anna, on your final point about engagement with customers, could you talk a bit about the partnership that the Department has with you and the MoneyHelper service, and the work that is done there to ensure that we seek to wrap appropriate advice and support around those who are indebted to the Department? Anna Hall: We work with the Department in a number of ways. One of the most recent initiatives is working with Jobcentre Plus colleagues to embed the Money Adviser Network referral system into that. That means that where people present at Jobcentre Plus for a variety of reasons and are identified as having some kind of debt or money difficulty, they can either be referred to the MoneyHelper website—that is the Money and Pensions Service website—which has a variety of information on money, debt and pensions, or they can get a referral through the Money Adviser Network to one of our funded debt-advice providers. It is as seamless as possible and it really enables someone who presents perhaps not realising that there is help out there. When someone interacts with a system that they have to interact with, it is great if we can offer a real range of support that allows them to get to debt advice as quickly as possible. I probably would say this, wouldn’t I, but debt advice can be absolutely life-changing for people? Its impact is huge. One thing we know is that people often do not know that debt advice exists. A huge number of people would benefit from debt advice. They do not know where to look or how to find it and think that is maybe is not for them, and they do not know what will happen when they get debt advice. If you have someone reassuring at the jobcentre saying, “This is a really independent, trusted service and it can help you sort out your financial affairs, and here is a seamless transfer through to that debt advice service,” that can be incredibly effective. We are working with the Department, in Jobcentre Plus and across the board, on where people are particularly vulnerable and where they really need that support before they can even start to think about finding work or engaging with other things. If you are worried about whether you have food, whether you have money coming in and what you are going to do about the bailiff who is coming to knock on your door, you really need to deal with that before you can look at your long-term future. The Department and all the officials we have been working with have been prioritising that. Being an arm’s length body of the Department for Work and Pensions is really helpful to make those connections, and embedding debt advice into all those systems has been really welcomed by the Department.