Allison Gardner MP: speeches
Allison Gardner MP: full overview
4 Jul 2025–3 Jul 2026
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Our reporting years run from 4 July to 3 July, starting with the 2024 general election. They are not official parliamentary sessions. Office costs keep IPSA’s April–March financial years. Records may cover only part of a year; a missing record does not mean no work was done.
Parliamentary contributions: dates and coverage
- Source checked
- 19 Nov 2026
- Last successful import
- 19 Nov 2026
- Records dated through
- 18 Nov 2026
- Selected period
- Reporting year 2: 4 Jul 2025 to 3 Jul 2026
- Completeness
- Published snapshot: 20,988 records in the source window 21 Aug 2026 to 19 Nov 2026. The published snapshot covers its stated source window. Older imports can extend beyond it; not every public speech is included.
This page lists the parliamentary spoken contributions we hold for Allison Gardner in the reporting year 2 (4 Jul 2025 to 3 Jul 2026). It does not include every public speech, party-conference address or constituency event. Latest retained contribution in this period: 2 Jul 2026. The source check date and dataset limits are shown above. Open the Hansard link for the full debate and surrounding context.
Read what this MP said, asked and contributed in Parliament.
110 published records · newest first.
Speeches
- 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source
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I will defend myself: my point was not a criticism of the Government. I just know how hard it is for regulators to work together and iron out cross-working. They were very confident in their information-sharing skills, but it is more difficult than that. It was just a kindly meant reminder that there is not an easy solution, and that 12 months is a bit of a tight timeframe.
- 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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I worked for the AI and digital regulations service in the NHS. We were linking with all of the regulators to try to have a one stop, one shop door approach to how we do things. It was incredibly difficult, and three years on we were still ironing out all the glitches.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Police Efficiency: Technology · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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I recently met Home Office Ministers to discuss the use of synthetic cathinones, often referred to as monkey dust, in Stoke-on-Trent. These substances cause significant harm to users and, indeed, communities. They are frequently sold via the dark web and imported through the post.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Police Efficiency: Technology · Hansard source
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13. What steps her Department is taking to use technology to increase police efficiency.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q I am interested in who you report to should you identify a cyber-incident. I am talking about not just data breaches but wider ones that can affect operational systems. Which regulators do you deal with? If it is multiple regulators, do you feel there is a case for having one distinct regulator to cover cyber-resilience and manage that quite difficult landscape? Brian Miller: That is a great question.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q I am just thinking that if you are putting liability on someone, you need to make sure that they can apply the regulation in a simple and effective manner and ensure that it is enforced, so they do not carry the full burden of liability. Richard Starnes: True, but I would submit that under the Companies Act that liability is already there for all the directors; it just has not been used that way.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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I know, sorry. I collapsed it down from quite a few. Richard Starnes: There is any number of different reasons. You have 12 competent authorities, at last count, with varying funding models and access to talent. Those could vary quite a bit, depending on those factors. I am not really sure how to answer that question.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q I should point out that I once worked for the NHS AI and Digital Regulations Service and have also worked for a number of different regulators, including the ICO, so I have experience of the joys and frustrations of cross-regulatory working.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q You have answered the question I was about to ask. I may ask an addendum to that, but first I want to clarify something. If you put liability on an individual board member, that is going to cause problems. Do you think that there should be a statutory responsibility for the company to have a board member responsible for cyber-risk, and that the responsibility and accountability should sit at company level?
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q I will be quick. Much of my question was already asked. I will just say that proportionality is a known principle within regulation and I take that into account. I want to push on an issue that was raised. When you are dealing with different regulators with a cross-regulatory theme, you often get conflicting guidelines. It is a big headache for people. Again, you get the gaps and the duplication.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q Okay, I am glad I clarified, because that is quite interesting. I will ask my actual question, and I am trying to get my head around this. You recommend mandating that company boards be accountable for mitigating cyber-risks, and as we know from the annual cyber-security breaches survey, there are declining levels of board responsibility for cyber in recent years, which links to whether there should be a statutory duty.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q Thank you—that was quite detailed. I have a very quick question: what measures would you want the Government to take to enhance the cyber-resilience of the UK’s critical national infrastructure? I am interested in your thoughts on requirements for failsafes and risk management, and indeed on the non-technical resilience measures that would be needed in case of complete failure. Professor John Child: Again, I have to draw back to the criminal law aspects.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Q You mentioned stringent application of the regulatory regime. Could you explain the reasons for the lack of enforcement under the current NIS guidelines? Do you feel that the regulatory regime should be streamlined? Richard Starnes: That is a very broad question.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q I have a couple of unconnected questions. We have asked a couple of times whether senior board members should have legal, statutory responsibility for cyber. The pros are that it is not seen as a priority, and culture change has to be top-down. However, there are issues with smaller companies bearing a responsibility that is diffused along the supply chain.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q Very quickly—I apologise if I am taking too much time—accountability is slightly different from liability. In the case of a cyber-breach that has caused harm, where would you see the liability lying? Chris Parker: That is a harder question.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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Particularly between regulators, and how that would work. Carla Baker: I cannot necessarily talk in much detail about information sharing across regulators. It is more about information sharing across the technology industry that I can talk about.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Hansard source
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I think you are touching on the old problem of where liability lies when you have this long supply chain of diffused responsibility, but thank you.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Second sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q I have loads. Before I come to the question I was going to ask, I want to pick you up on the worry about information sharing. I have worked across regulators, and they seemed to be really confident about information sharing, but I know that is not always the case. There is some protection of turf, and other Acts might prohibit that information sharing. Could you expand on that area of concern? What would be your recommendation?
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q Ben, are you combining two risks? Ben Lyons: That is something we think very deeply about. We see AI as helping to mitigate some of the risks from cyber-security by making it possible to detect attacks more quickly, understand what might be causing them, and to respond at pace. We are an AI native company and we have thought deeply about how to ensure that the technology is both secure and responsible. We are privacy-preserving by design.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q It is interesting that you mentioned the complexity and skilled teams. Sanjana, you talked about the need for more skill and responsibility, and how distributed responsibility across supply chains is a big deal. That comes down to a duty of care on people who are procuring these things. The annual cyber security breaches survey found that board-level responsibility for cyber has declined in recent years. What explains that, and how could it be improved?
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q But do you think there should be a statutory duty to have a board member responsible? Jill Broom: Some of our members have pointed out that the number of organisations under cyber-regulations is very small, and it is only going to increase a small amount with the advent of this particular Bill. Similarly, in the different jurisdictions there are duties at the board level. There is an argument for it.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q I have a quick question. You mentioned vulnerabilities earlier, and you mentioned, Jen, the complexities of implementing cyber-security plans. As well as technological factors, human factors, not the least of which is the lack of skills, play a key role in cyber-resilience. How would or could the Bill address the human element in cyber-security? Jen Ellis: That is a great question, and a tricky one.
- 3 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (First sitting) · Read the full contribution in Hansard
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Q I have so many questions, some of which have been touched on; I will limit myself. I was interested in the CyberUp campaign that you mentioned. What other measures, both legislative and non-legislative, could the UK Government take to enhance the cyber-resilience of the UK’s critical national infrastructure? In terms of resilience, is there any requirement to look a bit more deeply at failsafes and non-technical failsafes that we might need, because we are always going to get that?
- 20 Jan 2026 · Mobile Phones and Social Media: Use by Children · Hansard source
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Organisations such as the Molly Rose Foundation highlight that evidence to support social media bans remains very uncertain and warn that blanket restrictions could unintentionally cause harm by pushing young people towards unregulated platforms, remove trusted online spaces, undermine digital literacy and, indeed, create a cliff edge at the age of 16. Does the Secretary of State agree that we must take a calm, evidence-based approach to this complex issue and ensure that children’s voices are central to the consultation?
- 14 Jan 2026 · Northern Powerhouse Rail · Hansard source
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I welcome the Government’s announcement today on Northern Powerhouse Rail. However, in Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent we are still in stasis, with legacy issues such as the HS2 compound at Yarnfield, which is costing millions. I ask the Secretary of State for clarity on plans for our railway services in Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent and for HS2 legacy issues such as the Yarnfield compound.
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4 Jul 2025–3 Jul 2026. Existing keyword taxonomy applied to official debate titles and contributions; a contribution may appear in more than one topic and unclassified records are retained.
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