Alison Griffiths MP: speeches

Speeches

• 14 May 2026 · Getting Britain Working Again · Hansard source

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  I thank the Secretary of State for giving way and for his astounding shopping list of action that he is taking, but the Conservatives can make life easy for him: if he had not put 2% on national insurance, increased the national minimum wage and used the Employment Rights Act 2025 to remove the option of zero-hours contracts, businesses in my constituency and across the country would not have been forced to remove jobs focused specifically on young people. It is this Government who are responsible for the increase in youth unemployment.

• 22 Apr 2026 · Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill · Hansard source

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  The House of Lords has identified clear gaps and proposed practical solutions, and has sent improvements back to us. The Lords has acted to put in place clear safeguards, and the Government respond by stripping them out and pressing ahead regardless. Let us take Lords amendment 38. The Lords were clear that they required action to protect children from harm online, including stronger age assurance and a clear expectation of progress within 12 months. The Government have chosen to strip that out, and replace it with a broad power to make regulations at some future point. If the Government agree that there is a problem, and Ministers clearly do, why remove the mechanism that would ensure something is actually done about it? Similarly, Lords amendment 102 was straightforward. It said that high-performing schools delivering good outcomes and in demand from parents should not have their admission numbers reduced unless that decision is necessary and proportionate. The Government have rejected that safeguard. Instead, they offer softer language, asking the adjudicator to “have regard” to certain factors, but “have regard” is not a protection. It does not guarantee that parental preference will carry any weight. I ask the Minister directly: why remove a clear safeguard for high-performing schools and replace it with something that offers far less certainty? Why take out measures that provide clarity, certainty and protection, and replace them with looser powers and softer language? Once again, we see the same approach—sensible safeguards that have been put forward are being swept aside by this Government. That is why I cannot support the Government’s position at this stage, and why I urge Ministers to think again.

• 22 Apr 2026 · Pension Schemes Bill · Hansard source

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  I think all of us on the Opposition Benches would be keen to understand why, if the Minister is so confident that pension funds will invest, he does not make it a choice rather than a mandate.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  In Wick in my constituency, over 1,000 local residents have raised with me their concerns about unfair and confusing parking charges, which are deterring shoppers and damaging local businesses. May we have a statement from the Secretary of State on the delay to the revised private parking code of practice?

• 15 Apr 2026 · Pension Schemes Bill · Hansard source

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  There is a simple question running through what we are debating today: who is ultimately in control of people’s pension savings? When I speak to residents in Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, they assume that the answer is straightforward. They assume that their pension exists to deliver the best possible outcome for them, not to serve a wider policy aim and not to be steered from the centre. That is why Lords amendment 1 matters. It would do something very simple. It would remove the ability for Ministers, through regulations, to require schemes to invest in particular assets, particular sectors, or in particular places. It would set a clear boundary. It would say that those decisions sit with trustees, acting in the best interests of savers. If the Government believe in the strength of their growth agenda, they should make the case for it. They should create the conditions for investment, and they should not need a reserve power to lean on pension funds if that case does not land. The same concern sits at the heart of the Lords amendments to clause 40. Those amendments would strip out what is known as the “asset allocation requirement”. In plain terms, they would remove the mechanism in the Bill that would allow Ministers to set conditions on how pension schemes invest their assets as part of the approval framework. We are told those are only backstop powers that may never be used, but if that is true, why fight so hard to keep them? Why remove amendments that simply take that power off the table? The Government have, in effect, acknowledged the issue by proposing limits in lieu—caps on how far they might go—but that does not answer the underlying question. It just manages it. Because this is not about whether the number is 5% or 10%. It is about whether that power should exist at all. There is a broader point here: bigger schemes and consolidation can bring benefits, but only if they improve outcomes, not if they are driven by a single model applied from the top down and not if well-performing schemes are pushed into structures that do not suit them. Lords amendment 77 would require the Government to publish a full review of public service pension schemes within 12 months, and not just their cost, but their long-term affordability, their sustainability, and whether they are fair across generations—a point made so well by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat). That is not a controversial ask. It is basic due diligence. People in my constituency are thinking about their own retirement, about what they can afford to save and about the pressures on public finances. They expect us to do the same at national level. Taken together, the Lords amendments would do something quite straightforward. They would protect savers from unnecessary interference, they would keep decision making where it belongs, and they would ask the Government to be transparent about the long-term picture. I do not think those are unreasonable tests, and the Government are wrong to strip them out.

• 12 Mar 2026 · Business of the House · Hansard source

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  The situation at Zachary Merton hospital in my constituency is causing deep concern locally. Services there were closed on what residents were told was a temporary basis, but that closure has now been made permanent. The evidence behind that decision has not been clearly set out. Communities rightly expect candour when decisions are taken about the future of local healthcare provision. Does the Leader of the House agree that there is a wider issue here about transparency and accountability for NHS service decisions, and will he consider granting a debate in Government time on the future of community healthcare provision?

• 12 Mar 2026 · International Women’s Day · Hansard source

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  Will my hon. Friend join me in thanking and celebrating the fantastic women of Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, who do exactly what she has just described in businesses, in our local democracy, in our third sector and in shaping the futures of our girls in community groups and schools?

• 11 Mar 2026 · International Women’s Day · Hansard source

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  Following International Women’s Day and with English Tourism Week approaching, I have been meeting female entrepreneurs across Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, including Kathleen at the Navigator Hotel, who featured on “The Hotel Inspector” only last week, and many others through my business club. These businesses are vital to coastal economies, but many women say it remains difficult to scale and grow. What assessment has the Minister made of the barriers facing women entrepreneurs in sectors like tourism and hospitality?

• 10 Mar 2026 · Draft Employment Rights Act 2025 (Investigatory Powers) (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2026 · Hansard source

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  Businesses in my constituency have told me categorically that they are very concerned about this. Entrepreneurs who have taken all the risks to create jobs in their communities run the risk of the Fair Work Agency, which will be given these powers, coming into their businesses and riding roughshod over the work they are creating. How is that liberal and democratic?

• 9 Mar 2026 · Unemployment · Hansard source

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  20. What assessment he has made of trends in the level of unemployment.

• 9 Mar 2026 · Unemployment · Hansard source

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  I recently launched my Bognor Regis and Littlehampton business club. Many who joined are independent hospitality and leisure businesses, and their No.1 concern is how difficult it is to take on new staff under this Government. What assessment has the Department made of the impact of the Treasury’s new jobs tax, and the Government’s new employment regulations, on job creation in coastal constituencies such as mine? What steps is the Secretary of State taking to mitigate those effects?

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clause 5 simply asks the Government to commit to reporting back on meeting the milestones they have set themselves for increasing cyber-security standards. Is the Minister confident in the Government’s ability to deliver on their cyber strategy, or is the document not worth the paper it is written on?

• 24 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The continued use of legacy IT equipment is a particular vulnerability across the Government estate. That will take some time to address entirely, but is there a strategy in place to prioritise the upgrading of this legacy equipment, given that it is one of the greatest areas of exposure?

• 24 Feb 2026 · Care in the Community · Hansard source

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  I am delighted to hear the Minister’s response. Zachary Merton hospital in Rustington was closed temporarily, but that closure became permanent and the site is being progressed for disposal. More than half of residents in Rustington are elderly, and rely on intermediate and step-down care. They have not been consulted on the permanent closure, despite assurances from Sussex community NHS foundation trust and NHS Sussex integrated care board. Will the Minister confirm whether he considers that a substantial variation in NHS services? Will he consider exercising his call-in powers before the site is irreversibly sold?

• 24 Feb 2026 · Care in the Community · Hansard source

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  15. What steps he is taking to increase access to care in the community.

• 23 Feb 2026 · Schools White Paper: Every Child Achieving and Thriving · Hansard source

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  In my constituency and across West Sussex, the number of EHCPs has risen by 75% since 2019, but the funding to support them has risen by only 37%. Can the Secretary of State reassure parents that the correct funding—not just £24,000 per school—will be in place for support?

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  New clauses 6 and 7 sit together and are linked by the same practical concern regarding clarity and workability when an incident is unfolding. I will start with new clause 6. Ransomware is no longer an occasional or unusual cyber-event; it is now one of the most common and disruptive threats facing essential services, digital providers and their supply chains. Written evidence to this Committee was clear that ransomware incidents are now routine, high-impact events, and that uncertainty at the outset of an attack often makes the consequences worse. The Bill rightly broadens the definition of an incident to capture events that are capable of causing harm, not just those that already have. That is the right direction of travel, but when organisations are under pressure, particularly in the first 24 hours of an incident, uncertainty slows action. Time is lost debating definitions rather than focusing on containment, escalation and reporting. New clause 6 addresses that problem directly. It makes it explicit that a ransomware attack is an incident for the purposes of the NIS regulations, and sets out clearly what is meant by ransomware attack. It would not create a new duty; it would remove doubt from an existing one. Clear definitions support better behaviour when organisations are operating under real pressure. New clause 7 follows naturally from that point. If we want faster and clearer reporting, the system into which organisations are reporting has to work in practice, not just on paper. The Bill expands reporting requirements and introduces new notification duties. That is understandable, but UK Finance told the Committee that many firms already support cyber-incidents under multiple regulatory regimes and that additional reporting layers risk duplication rather than resilience. When an incident is live, that duplication causes friction, slows the response and increases costs. It can reduce the quality of information being shared because teams are stretched across parallel processes rather than focused on managing the incident itself. We do not seek in new clause 7 to reopen the policy intent of the Bill; the new clause would require a review, once these changes are in force, of how the reporting requirements are working in practice. That review would consider costs and interactions with other reporting frameworks. The new clause would also require that proposals for a single cyber-incident reporting channel be published. That is not a bureaucratic exercise; it reflects concerns raised in evidence that resilience is undermined, not strengthened, when reporting becomes fragmented at moments of stress. Taken together, new clauses 6 and 7 are about making the system clearer at the front end and more usable overall. Clear definitions encourage timely reporting and coherent reporting channels make that reporting effective. I hope that the Committee will give serious consideration to both new clauses.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I want to use new clause 1 as a lens to view a wider question that sits underneath clause 24, rather than as a verdict on the clause itself. That question is how we decide, in a disciplined and credible way, which activities are sufficiently critical to be brought into the scope of the regime, and how that judgment is applied consistently over time. New clause 1 would bring much of the food supply chain directly into scope through primary legislation. I understand the instinct behind that. Food supply is fundamental to public confidence, and disruption would be felt very quickly. However, if the underlying test for inclusion is systemic impact, food is not the only sector that raises these questions. I am vice-Chair of the Business and Trade Committee, and over the past year we have taken evidence on economic security from major UK firms that have experienced serious cyber-incidents. One example everyone here will be familiar with is Jaguar Land Rover. Evidence to our Committee indicated that the cyber-incident there contributed to UK GDP being around 0.1% lower than expected in the third quarter last year, which was not a marginal effect. That reflected disruption to tightly integrated manufacturing systems, with production lines brought to a halt and knock-on impacts across just-in-time supply chains and regional economies. I make that point to underline something simple: cyber-risk presents simultaneously as operational, financial and reputational risk, and in combination those effects can be felt economy-wide. If that is the rationale for bringing food into scope early, it inevitably raises questions about other high-value sectors where a single incident can have national economic consequences. That brings us back to clause 24 and the role of the Secretary of State. The Bill is clearly designed to allow scope for provisions to evolve through secondary legislation as risks change. That flexibility is sensible, but flexibility works only if the criteria for widening scope are clear, predictable and capable of being explained to industry, regulators and Parliament. If decisions appear to be reactive or driven by the most recent or most visible incident, confidence in the regime will suffer rather than strengthen. That concern is reflected in the written evidence we have received. The Association of British Insurers, for example, supports higher standards of cyber-resilience, but it also emphasises the importance of clear definitions and coherence between regimes, particularly where firms are already subject to overlapping regulatory requirements. Its point is not about resisting regulation, but about avoiding uncertainty and duplication, which do not improve resilience. My questions are ones of principle rather than position. First, what is the settled test that the Secretary of State will apply when deciding to bring a sector into scope under the clause 24 powers, and how will that judgment be made transparent to Parliament? Secondly, if Parliament were to require rapid expansion of scope, how confident are the Government that regulators would have the capacity to supervise a much larger and more diverse population without diluting oversight elsewhere? I am not seeking to land a conclusion on new clause 1 today—I understand why it has been tabled and I recognise the seriousness of the issues that it highlights—but if we are going to widen scope, to food or otherwise, the Committee is entitled to press the Government on the discipline and guardrails that will sit behind those decisions. This needs to remain a targeted and credible regime, rather than one that expands without a clear and consistent logic.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  As the Minister is saying, clause 28 is meant to help Parliament understand how regulators are responding to the statement of strategic priorities. Can he say a little about how substantive that reporting will be, and whether it will genuinely allow Parliament to assess how those duties are being exercised in practice?

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We heard from the Information Systems Audit and Control Association that codes work best when they reflect operational reality. Given their evidential status, can the Minister reassure the Committee that codes will remain practical and iterative and not quietly harden into rigid compliance rules?

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Further to that point of order, Mr Stringer. Genuinely, I simply need the Minister to speak slowly and clearly. Yes, I am wearing hearing aids; I am sure that others wear them too. I am doing my very best to make sure that I can lip-read, but that is almost impossible given the speed the Minister is speaking at. One cannot lip read when he is looking down all the time either.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the Minister for his patience. He mentions a specific example of where he will ensure that the NCSC is resourced up. Do we have specific examples that have happened already of those powers having been put in place successfully? From conversations with the NCSC, I understand that it is reliant on its accredited bodies across the country, but we have not yet—I am touching the wood of my desk, as I speak—had to respond to a complex multi-sector issue. I challenge the Minister on whether he is confident about our capability to respond to one.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Having worked in business, I know that the words we use to ensure that the capabilities are there are easy to say but not always easy to deliver. How will the Minister ensure that when we have a multi-sector issue, which could easily come up—particularly, as we have already discussed, around OT and the use of IEDs across multiple sectors—the National Cyber Security Centre and other regulators will have access to the skills, people and resources necessary to manage what could be a catastrophic incident? We already know that cyber-skills are in short supply as it is, even in the commercial sector.

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  These procedures are standard, but the powers they apply to are significant. Where regulations under part 3 would materially expand duties or bring new actors into scope, have the Government considered whether those should receive deeper scrutiny in practice, even if the formal procedure remains the usual one?

• 10 Feb 2026 · Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My question relates to clause 29 but also clause 30. As the Minister says, the powers are deliberately wide. The Institution of Engineering and Technology noted in evidence that predictability matters more than compliance. Will the Minister explain exactly how the Government will judge when risks require new statutory duties rather than updated guidance, so that businesses are not left guessing?