Alex Barros-Curtis MP: speeches
4 Jul 2025–3 Jul 2026
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Read what this MP said, asked and contributed in Parliament.
9 published records · newest first.
Speeches
- 17 Jun 2026 · National Security (State Threats) Bill · Hansard source
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I want to begin by acknowledging what many colleagues across this House will believe: when a Government ask Parliament to extend their powers in the name of national security, scrutiny is not obstruction; it is our duty, as has been said already on the Opposition and Government sides. Civil liberties, the right to dissent, and the freedom to campaign, to report and to advocate—these are the very values that distinguish us from the states whose hostile activities this Bill is designed to confront. I know the Government understand that and, equally, I know that colleagues across the House will hold these expectations firmly. The threat facing the United Kingdom from hostile foreign states and their proxies is very real—we have heard some examples already in today’s debate—and it is growing, and our existing legal framework has not kept pace with it. I want to take the opportunity to endorse strongly what my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) said about the need for us to have a public conversation about the very real dangers that our democracy faces. In 2025, the director general of MI5, Sir Ken McCallum, reported a 35% increase in state threat activity from the previous year. Over that same period, MI5 tracked more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots on British soil. We have seen espionage threatening and targeting our Parliament, our universities and our critical national infrastructure. We have seen arson, surveillance and physical violence commissioned by foreign states, and we have seen those states hide behind proxies precisely because our current laws make it easier for them to do so. Following the start of the conflict between Iran and the US and Israel in February, there have been a number of attacks on Iranian and Jewish targets in the UK thought to be linked to Iranian proxy groups. Those include an attempted arson attack at the London premises of Iran International—a Persian language news channel opposed to the regime in Tehran—an arson attack on a synagogue in Finchley, and the stabbing of two Jewish men in Golders Green. In a statement on tackling antisemitism on 5 May this year, the Prime Minister acknowledged that one line of inquiry was whether a foreign state had been behind some of these attacks. He said that such “malign threats” from Iran or other states “will not be tolerated” and that the Government would fast-track legislation to deal with them. The Bill before us today is a result of that commitment and it is something that I fully support. As has been said, the National Security Act 2023 was a significant step forward, but as Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of state threats legislation, concluded in his May 2025 report, there remain gaps, particularly in our ability to disrupt proxy organisations acting on behalf of foreign powers, and the Bill seeks to fill those gaps. At its heart, as has been discussed, is a new designation power for the Home Secretary, equivalent to the proscription power that exists for terrorist organisations under the Terrorism Act 2000, but applied to bodies engaged in state threat activity. Crucially, the Bill also covers the aliases and proxy names through which hostile states so often seek to obscure their operations. These are serious powers and they must come with serious safeguards. The Bill has been drafted to be compatible with the European convention on human rights, and particularly article 10 on freedom of expression, and I welcome that, but compatibility is a floor and not a ceiling. I urge my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to ensure that the definitions of “support” and “assistance” are applied with precision and proportionality, because the offences created in the Bill can, by their nature, reach into areas of ordinary civic life, including journalism, academic research and political advocacy. I also want to raise a particular Welsh dimension. As well as the security services who work day and night to keep us safe, so too do our armed forces and our police officers. As the Bill progresses, I wish to place on the record my continued support for capital city policing status for Cardiff, with the resources to match the unique security and civic responsibilities that come with being a capital city. I urge my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to engage seriously with that as the legislation progresses and comes into force. Our constituents ask us to take tough decisions and to ensure that we exercise our judgment responsibly to ensure that our nation is protected. I believe that the measures in the Bill, taken together, will help to keep my constituents safe as it will make the operating environment for foreign intelligence services and their proxies much tougher. I support the Bill because the threats it addresses are real and demand a response. I do so with clear expectations that designation powers are used, as has been said, on solid evidence and building on established legal frameworks, that enforcement is proportionate and that civil liberties are treated as central to the legitimacy of the law, not as an afterthought. My constituents will be reassured to understand that the Bill provides that designation decisions will be agreed by Parliament, that it will be annually reviewed for efficacy by the independent reviewer of state threats legislation, and that individuals will have clear rights of appeal and access to independent review. These are important and welcome safeguards. We can be strong against those who threaten us, but we can also be strong in defence of the democratic values they are trying to undermine. The Bill, properly applied, will do all those things, and it is for those reasons that I am supporting it today.
- 19 Mar 2026 · National Security Strategy, Political Finance and Foreign Influence · Hansard source
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I thank my hon. Friend for that excellent statement. I fully welcome the report and its recommendations, which I will read very carefully. I share his concerns about cryptocurrencies. The first recommendation is about the need for a single centralised unit. Does he agree that the Government might consider the new National Police Service, announced as part of the policing reforms, a suitable vehicle to deal with the issues of electoral crime?
- 4 Mar 2026 · China: Foreign Interference Arrests · Hansard source
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I thank the Minister for his statement and for all the work he does on the defending democracy taskforce. I also put on record my thanks to the law enforcement authorities and national security agencies. From what I have read online, I understand that one of today’s arrests took place in my constituency. My constituents will obviously be concerned to hear that, and I wonder what the Security Minister can say to reassure me and my constituents that the police and all the relevant authorities have the resources needed to keep us safe and to keep our democracy safe. If I am right to assume that what I have read online is correct, will he meet me at the earliest opportunity to discuss this further?
- 2 Mar 2026 · Representation of the People Bill · Hansard source
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As a solicitor who previously advised in this area, I am grateful to be able to contribute to tonight’s Second Reading debate. I welcome much in this Bill, including automatic voter registration; honouring our manifesto commitment to extend the vote in UK-wide elections to 16 and 17-year-olds, following in the footsteps of Wales; and rectifying some of the discriminatory impacts of the Conservatives’ Elections Act 2022, a piece of legislation that in many respects was a solution in search of a problem. In the short time I have tonight, I want to focus on a theme that I have regularly spoken about: the threat to our democracy from foreign interference by both state and non-state actors, and the steps that we must take to cement our democracy from those malign forces. As has been said, these are not theoretical risks. We need only look at the former leader of Reform UK in Wales, who was previously in the UK Independence party and the Brexit party: Nathan Gill, who is now serving 10 and a half years in prison for eight counts of bribery. It is shameful that he took a minimum of £40,000 in bribes to make speeches in the European Parliament. He was meant to be representing Wales but instead did the Kremlin’s bidding. I welcome the Government’s setting up of the Philip Rycroft review, and I trust that the resulting recommendations will be included in the Bill as it progresses through this place. In particular, I am clear that we should ban all crypto donations to political parties and individuals. To my mind, there is no legitimate rationale for donating via such means, unless the donor ultimately wishes to disguise their true identity. I welcome the independence of the Electoral Commission, which was elaborated on by the Secretary of State, and the enhancing of its powers to provide clear deterrents against lawbreaking. I would be grateful if the Minister could reassure me that the Government will ensure that the Electoral Commission has all the necessary resources it needs to do its job effectively and efficiently. Improved co-operation between the Electoral Commission, the intelligence services, law enforcement and electoral authorities must be a priority. I have previously suggested to the Security Minister and I suggest again to the Minister that the Government should consider whether the recently announced policing reforms, most notably in setting up a national police service, may be a suitable vehicle through which to consider establishing dedicated police capability for electoral crime. Finally, we must urgently deal with disinformation and online operations, as has been mentioned, and treat them as the core national security threat that they are. The Electoral Commission, Ofcom and the police need the resources to deal with the threat of personalised algorithmic feeds and AI-enabled manipulation that feeds misinformation about our elections. I would be grateful if the Government synchronised that with other ongoing Government reviews to ensure that this Bill is as robust as it needs to be to cement our democracy.
- 9 Feb 2026 · Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy · Hansard source
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My hon. Friend makes an excellent point, and I fully agree. Of course, his point is about the donations that we know about, but when it comes to cryptocurrency, we do not know who the paymasters behind those payments are. Some of what the Government have announced in relation to the elections Bill—and the strategy beforehand —on toughening up the rules on political finance is welcome. However, for the reasons that have been mentioned, we must go further, and I urge the Government to ensure that this opportunity to safeguard our democracy is not missed. As my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk mentioned, the Kremlin has exploited loopholes in political financing rules for at least 15 years. That must be stopped. The Electoral Commission’s independence, enforcement powers and resources must be strengthened as a matter of urgency. We should ban all crypto donations to political parties and individuals. There is no legitimate rationale for donating via such means unless the donor ultimately wishes to disguise their true identity. The ban should be brought into effect urgently and capture donations made by any means, whether by principal donors or through intermediaries. Improved co-operation between our Electoral Commission, intelligence services, law enforcement and electoral authorities must be a priority. I suggest to my hon. Friend the Minister that the new national police service, part of the recently announced reforms to policing, might be a suitable vehicle through which to consider establishing dedicated police capability for electoral crime. We must urgently deal with disinformation and online operations, treating them as the core national security threat they are. The Electoral Commission, Ofcom and the police all need more resources and are underpowered for dealing with the threat of personalised algorithmic feeds and AI-enabled manipulation that feeds misinformation about our elections. This is not specifically about Russia, but when Iran was attacked by Israel and America in targeted strikes last year, it was reported that 20,000 bots advocating for Scottish independence were taken out in Scotland as a result. If that is what Iran could do, imagine what North Korea, Russia and China are doing. That is why we have to take these threats seriously. As the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) mentioned, the important May elections will be a real test of what we need to do to respond to such foreign narrative-shaping operations. I ask the Minister to urgently consider these measures and take this issue back to the various Departments to ensure we get a robust elections Bill that is ready for 2026 and for everything that is coming, given the way that technology is quickly changing. As part of this strategy, I ask him to join me in recommitting ourselves to the NATO alliance as a bulwark against Russian aggression—something that unserious politicians, such as the leader of the Green party, seem to doubt, thereby doing the Russians’ work for them. Alliances, resources and an elections Bill that seeks to support our democracy, not undermine it, are the critical tools we need to curb Russian interference.
- 2 Feb 2026 · China and Japan · Hansard source
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I thank the Prime Minister for his statement, and for what he said about calling on China to end support for Russia’s illegal war effort. We cannot ignore the threat to our shores from Russia, as we know very well in Wales. Nathan Gill, the former Reform UK leader in Wales, is serving 10 and a half years in prison for taking bribes from Russia. Will the Prime Minister join me in condemning that treacherous activity, and reassure me that he will continue to push China on that important point?
- 2 Feb 2026 · Topical Questions · Hansard source
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The ongoing threat to our nation’s security from grey zone activity illustrates the importance of international associations and alliances, such as NATO. Does the Minister share my concern at what the leader of the Green party said yesterday? In the same sentence, he said that he would both leave and reform NATO. Does that not show how unserious he is?
- 26 Jan 2026 · Police Reform White Paper · Hansard source
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I thank the Home Secretary for her statement, and I pay tribute to all those who serve to keep us safe. In respect of the impact that this will have on Wales, can she assure me that she will consult all local partners—MPs, police forces, local government and the Welsh Government—in order to determine what local scrutiny of governance looks like in Wales as part of these reforms?
- 13 Nov 2025 · Police Reform · Hansard source
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May I place on record my thanks to South Wales police and crime commissioner Emma Wools and her team, and Alun Michael before her, for the great work they have done for my community in Cardiff West? I note what the Minister said about the unique arrangements in Wales, so can I ask that when she consults the Welsh Government, as she is right to do, she also consults Welsh Labour MPs, to ensure that we get the best possible arrangement for Wales? Will she meet me and other Cardiff MPs to talk about a fairer capital city funding deal, and whether some of the money that will be saved through this reform could be ploughed into Cardiff?
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