Al Carns MP: speeches

Speeches

• 15 Jul 2026 · National Security · Hansard source

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  As Russia becomes increasingly boxed in in Ukraine, it looks towards horizontal escalation. I welcome today’s announcement and the move to proscribe some of these groups. The IRGC, GRU and the SVR—multiple different organisations—are seeking ways to undermine our democracy, using physical, electronic, financial, diplomatic and a multitude of other avenues to try to undermine the right to self-determination, the centrality of democracy in the western world, and, importantly, the way in which we govern. As we move towards an increasingly fractious and dangerous period of time with Russia and in the middle east, will the Minister, in her summing up, say what more we can do to clamp down on hostile state disinformation, Russian disinformation in particular, on social media?

• 15 Jul 2026 · Iran · Hansard source

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  Open-source media has highlighted that when the US and Israel struck Iran many months ago, a certain target was destroyed in Tehran. Overnight, a large proportion of Scottish independence media died, which underlines the point about division and protecting the right to self-determination and democracy in this country. Through social media and other means, we are allowing foreign states to play into political division in the United Kingdom. Could my hon. Friend give some insight as to what we are doing collectively to protect against those threats?

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. Data is the new gunpowder. AI is absolutely critical in defence, and we should use all of our technological advantage to move faster and further than ever before. We should be bold and jump to the next generation of systems, and not wait for anyone else to lead—we should lead ourselves. The lesson from my perspective is clear: stockpiles matter, but the ability to regenerate them matters even more. That is why I welcome the Government’s commitment to rebuild munition stockpiles, expand domestic production capacity and invest in British defence industry. Those are investments not just in military capability, but in national resilience. The same is true for technology. Ukraine has demonstrated that innovation cycles measured in months can outperform procurement cycles measured in decades. Drones, autonomous systems, software and artificial intelligence are changing warfare at an extraordinary speed, and it will only ever get faster. Readiness, therefore, means building a procurement system that can adapt just as quickly, giving innovative British companies a route into defence and ensuring that our armed forces can evolve as rapidly as the threats they face. We have at present over 10,000 people in Defence Equipment and Support—that is, 10,000 people doing procurement. I am not saying that it is inefficient, but I am saying that bureaucracy sometimes gets in the way of speed.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  I have been clear, since several weeks ago, that I was not content with the funding for the DIP or the transformational nature of it. I have been really encouraged in the last couple of weeks by the speed at which it is moving. We need to move more, and I think the spending review in due course will round that off. My perspective is that we must not underestimate the level of change that is required. This is systemic within the Department and within the single services, and it has to move a quantum leap forward—no pun intended—if we are going to deliver the change that is required. If Britain wants armed forces that are capable of fighting and winning, we must build a country that can endure, adapt and sustain them. In modern conflict, as Ukraine has taught us, the line between the military and civilian worlds has all but disappeared. That is what true readiness looks like, and that is the challenge before us.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  I completely agree with my hon. Friend. This is about cultural change as much as adopting technology. If we were to adopt even the very simplest AI models now in how we do procurement, and move on to the next generation, we would find that the system speeds up, efficiencies are made and the right kit gets into the right hands far quicker than it does now. Ultimately, rearmament is not about preparing for war because we expect it; it is about ensuring that war never happens in the first place. The purpose of rearmament is deterrence, and deterrence rests on three foundations: capable armed forces, political resolve and the industrial capacity to sustain both. If any one of those is missing, deterrence becomes far less credible when faced with an autocratic nation with huge industrial resilience. As we discuss rearmament today, let us think beyond platforms, procurement and spending lines. The defining lesson of modern conflict is that warfighting readiness is not simply a military condition; it is a national condition.

• 8 Jul 2026 · Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness · Hansard source

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  Everyone in this debate will rightly speak about defence spending, procurement and ammunition, and those things all absolutely matter, but I want to ask a broader question: what does warfighting readiness actually mean in 2026? For too long, we have measured military strength by the number of ships afloat, aircraft we fly or tanks we field, and those capabilities will remain essential, but recent conflicts have reminded us that wars are rarely won by militaries alone; wars are won by nations. They are won by industries that can out-produce an adversary, economies that can absorb shocks, and societies resilient enough to sustain conflict over time. I have seen this at first hand in Ukraine. Time and again, I have met individuals whose courage is beyond question, but courage alone is not enough. Success depends on whether ammunition arrives when it is needed, whether new technology can be adapted in weeks rather than years, and whether industry can keep pace with the demands of the battlefield. The side that learns, adapts and regenerates fastest gains the advantage, and that should challenge how we think about readiness. Warfighting readiness is no longer simply the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. It is an industrial strategy, an energy strategy and a technological strategy. Ultimately, it is a national resilience strategy. If our energy networks are vulnerable, if our communications can be disrupted, if our supply chains depend on hostile states, if our British industry cannot rapidly increase production when conflict begins, our armed forces will inherit those weaknesses from day one of any crisis. That is why resilience must sit at the heart of our national security. We often talk about stockpiles, and rightly so, but I think the more important question is not how many missiles are sitting in a warehouse today; it is how many missiles British industry can produce every month after six months of sustained conflict. Modern warfare consumes munitions at a pace that few of us can comprehend or imagine, but Ukraine is teaching us lessons: 7,000 to 10,000 drones flying a day; 12,000 artillery rounds fired a day; and 1 million drones, in some cases, produced over two months.

• 6 Jul 2026 · Defence Investment Plan · Hansard source

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  We have seen a 30% increase in Russian subsurface and surface activity, Russian proxies rampant across Africa, £15 billion-worth of cyber-attacks across Europe, sabotage and drone incursions across the border. Can the Secretary of State confirm that if the Russians were to test us on NATO’s eastern flank, they would look across that flank and see not a NATO brigade, but something that looks like a Ukrainian brigade?