Al Carns MP: speeches 2026

Speeches

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 48 amends the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 to align it more closely with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for England and Wales where there are references to UK armed forces. These are minor and technical amendments and do not change the substance of the legislation. Clause 48 simply substitutes the outdated reference to “the Royal Navy Regulating Branch” with “the Royal Navy Police”. It also removes reference to “the Royal Marines Police”, which has been incorporated into the Royal Navy police. Lastly, clause 48 omits reference to the repealed single service Acts: the Army Act 1955, the Air Force Act 1955 and the Naval Discipline Act 1957. I commend the clause to the Committee.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the right hon. Member for his views on the Bill and acknowledge his request for us to publish a defence readiness plan that must include information about the numbers and readiness of the reserve forces. One of the main reasons we are underinsured, underprepared and under attack is the systemic underfunding of defence over the last 20 years, and since the end of the cold war, and our pursuit of usually non-state actors at a cost to our state-countering capability. However, for the first time in decades, the Government have set a clear path for the next decade and beyond to transform and boost our reserve forces, through the strategic defence review. I reassure the Committee that we have been clear about our move to warfighting readiness, and the MOD is working around the clock to deliver that through our armed forces plan, as stated by the Chief of the Defence Staff at various recent briefings. However, for reasons that I am confident all Members of the House will understand, these readiness plans should not be subject to a statutory requirement for publication. The House is already equipped with robust and appropriate mechanisms to scrutinise defence and defence readiness, including this Committee, the House of Commons Defence Committee, the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, and the Intelligence and Security Committee. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence publishes quarterly personnel statistics containing data on strengths, requirements, intake, applications and outflow. The latest set, containing data up to 1 January 2026, was published at the beginning of the month. We already provide extensive information on the readiness of our reserve force, and disclosing comprehensive details of our readiness plans could risk giving our adversary a strategic advantage. I hope that provides the necessary reassurance to the right hon. Gentleman and, on those grounds, I ask him to withdraw the motion.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Seventh sitting) · Hansard source

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  The hon. Gentleman asks an impossible question. For example, there are sub-surface uncrewed systems, surface uncrewed systems, airborne uncrewed systems, airborne uncrewed systems that come off surface systems, and surface systems that deploy uncrewed below-surface systems. Trying to find an individual or body that will deal with all of those—across the totality of airspace, sub-surface and surface regulation—is exceptionally difficult. I can assure him that we are taking all our different defence regulators and putting them together—hopefully, over time, in one location—with the experts who know the good, the bad and the ugly when it comes to drones and uncrewed systems. That will make defence far more effective in articulating the requirement, procuring the systems and then pushing those systems into the Army, Navy and Air Force. That will come in due course. I will confine the rest of my remarks to the effect of the new clauses. New clause 9, as set out in the explanatory statement, would enable an authorised person to approve the use of drones for routine testing, evaluation and training. I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that the Defence Maritime Regulator and Military Aviation Authority can already authorise the use of uncrewed systems for routine testing, evaluation and training, and that more than 30 maritime systems are already approved for routine testing, evaluation and training. In addition, the Defence Maritime Regulator is bringing forward proposals to establish regulatory sandboxes for the testing and training of uncrewed maritime systems, in line with recommendation 39 of the strategic defence review. I think that that is due at the end of the month, but I will come back to the Committee on that. New clause 10 would create a new authorisation regime to designate offshore areas for drone operations. In bringing forward proposals in line with the SDR recommendation, the Defence Maritime Regulator will also increase access to areas for testing and training for non-sponsored systems. The proposals therefore do not require changes to primary legislation, and are under way already. New clause 11 would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to publish and lay before Parliament annually a review of the regulatory framework for uncrewed systems. Again, primary legislation is not required for such a review. The defence industrial strategy team within the MOD recently conducted a review of the regulatory system governing uncrewed systems. In addition, the Defence Safety Authority regularly conducts reviews of all defence regulations to ensure that they remain fit for purpose for new and emerging technologies. I turn to new clause 14. The explanatory statement sets out that this new clause would enable the Secretary of State to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships for domestic law purposes. However, the Defence Maritime Regulator already has the authority to disapply elements of civilian regulation for defence purposes. I will just make a couple of extra points. If there is no need for regulatory change, why are certain parts of industry unhappy? The Government are already engaging extensively with industry to understand the variety of constraints that exist and we have conducted multiple reviews within the Department, as well as with civilian organisations. I would argue that the Government are actually going faster and further to enable autonomy than ever before, and that is only going to increase. We are establishing the uncrewed centre of excellence to ensure that there is coherence. We are maximising the freedoms enjoyed by defence regulators to allow for more testing and training, and, over time, increasing capacity. Importantly, we are also exploring with the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency how they can further support civilian applications in the maritime domain. I hope that I have reassured the Committee on why new clauses 9, 10, 11 and 14 are not needed. I ask the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East not to press them to a Division.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells for tabling amendment 1. We owe a debt of gratitude to those who serve, and of course we have an ongoing duty of care to those who have given service to their country but can no longer serve due to medical issues, especially if those issues were a result of their service. Statistics show that there were about 1,900 people medically discharged in financial year 2024-25—700 of those were for musculoskeletal issues, and 800 were for mental or behavioural issues. Some of those individuals who have left—it could be for an Achilles injury, a break or a back problem—still wanted to serve, but they could not serve in their current role because of the medical requirements. That is not to say that they could not serve in another role at a later date when they had healed or recovered. Our current policies exclude those who have been discharged for a range of conditions from further service, but it would be wrong to exclude all personnel from further service permanently through a change in the law. Keeping these rules set out in policy and secondary legislation gives us a degree of flexibility. Should circumstances change and we require more of our ex-regulars—for example, in a war-like situation—we could give people who want to serve the opportunity to do so. I understand the concerns of the hon. Member for North Devon about the effect that further service might have on those service personnel. I assure the Committee that any recall into service will be done on a case-by-case basis. We will consider the serviceperson’s service record, including their medical status. Indeed, there will also be regulars who left the service fully medically fit but who, in the intervening years, have unfortunately become unwell and therefore may not be able to undertake further employment with the armed services. Those cases would also have to be considered. I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for his views on the Bill, and I acknowledge his concerns about the flexibility and readiness of our reserves. On amendments 20 and 21, we are increasing the age limit for recall liability to 65 for other ranks across all three services. That will enable defence to draw on the valuable skills and experience provided by former service personnel aged 55 and above. Recently retired non-officer personnel in the 55-plus age range who have knowledge, skills and experience from a full career provide a useful latent capability to draw upon when needed. Although I acknowledge the right hon. Gentleman’s proposal to raise the age to 67, which will shortly become the state pension age, my view is that it would not be the most prudent way forward. Recall liability in the reserves is a significant responsibility, because it demands that individuals balance their civilian lives with readiness to serve their country at potentially short notice, reflecting a profound personal and civic duty. Further increases to the liability from 65 to 67 would be an imposition, given that the measure already addresses the gap in capability. We estimate that the proposed increase in liability will affect only 1.1% of personnel between the ages of 55 and 65 who left the regular forces during the financial year 2024-25. There were no UK regular forces or other ranks personnel who left during that financial year between the ages of 65 and 67. It is worth noting that some individuals, depending on their service, can still serve up to 67. Therefore, the amendment would not achieve its intended effect, as it concerns a relatively small group of individuals already accounted for within the measure. Indeed, it undermines the balance between the responsibilities defence places on our serving personnel and the operational demands we face.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells for the amendment. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford, and I thank the Clerks and staff, who are doing a fantastic job. I acknowledge Members’ concerns about the importance of retaining skills in the armed forces, which we all agree is critical to ensuring that we have a fighting force. Let me address amendment 7. Despite the well-documented historical shortfalls in recruitment and retention, the figures are now far more positive. Under this Government, inflow is up around 13%, which we welcome, and outflow is down 9%. We have cut a lot of red tape—I will come back to that in a minute—addressed system blockages and established a ministerial board to oversee both inflow and retention, among many other improvements. However, we are not complacent, and we are looking to drive our retention rates up further. Transparency and parliamentary scrutiny are crucial throughout this process, so that the public can clearly see how the changes we are implementing are enhancing their experience and delivering good value for the taxpayer. I appreciate the call from the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells for an annual report, but I am concerned that that would create an additional layer of bureaucracy and red tape and largely duplicate information that is already available. As he mentioned, there is a need to step back and look at the issue holistically. To give Members a small example, we publish around 80 statistical reports every year—some quarterly, some yearly and some twice a year. That is a huge amount of data that is collated and presented both to Parliament and as open source. We already publish, and will continue to publish, information on the size and make-up of the armed forces through our quarterly personnel statistics, which will make plain the effects of retention measures for both regulars and reserves. We also continue to publish the outcomes of the various continuous attitude surveys that the MOD runs annually, where we can see the change in attitude to some of the key drivers that affect people’s desire to stay. One of the key measures to assist with this is clause 31, which will ensure that regulars do not have to leave their service to join the Volunteer Reserve, thus making career transitions and flexible careers far easier. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford mentioned some of the bureaucracy and difficulties in leaving regular service and joining the reserves, and a plethora of evidence highlights that difficulty. The clause will remove the requirement to leave one service and rejoin the next. Around 1,500 ex-regulars join the Volunteer Reserve every year—about a third of the total intake. Another issue with people going from the regulars to the reserves is that a lot of senior-ish ranks leave—OF-3s, OF-4s, majors or lieutenant colonels—and there is just not the space or requirement for them in the reserves, so sometimes they have to de-rank or join at a different level, creating another bureaucratic hurdle. Although the clause will make it easier for service personnel to transfer from the regulars to the Volunteer Reserve, and we encourage them to do so, it is on a mutually agreed basis; there must be a suitable role for them to go to—for example, rank, skills and so on—and the serviceperson will have to agree to the terms and conditions.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Because of the decentralised nature of the military, some units, depending on reserve liability, will absolutely try to recruit those individuals into the reserve immediately. There is not carte blanche across the entire military, because in some areas we do not necessarily need those individuals in the reserves—if that makes sense. Going back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble, there is a lot more work to do to make the transition much smoother. Clause 31 will reduce the huge bureaucratic hurdle of individuals having to leave the regular military to join the reserves. Over time, it should become seamless, so someone can also go from the reserves back to the regulars. We want to replicate a civilian job where, for example, if someone has welfare issues, they can leave and do a couple of years in the reserves, and then come back into the regulars far more seamlessly. That will also allow someone to pursue a career in the defence industry, for example, if they are a technical expert.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I thank the right hon. Member for his views on the Bill, and I acknowledge his concerns about reserve forces and cadets associations. The Government fully recognise the vital contribution that they currently play in supporting reservist cadets and in defence engagement across the entire United Kingdom, particularly through their close relationships with local communities and employers. I had never heard of the RFCA before I left the military, but after visiting it I can see that it is a fantastic, dedicated and focused group of people who engage across society and have an amazing network that is useful not just in peacetime, but on the road to crisis and indeed during conflict as well. However, I believe this amendment is not necessary. The Reserve Forces and Cadets Association will operate within a robust governance and assurance framework. Its performance, effectiveness and value for money will be subject to regulatory oversight through existing accountability arrangements, including formal assurance processes, reporting against key performance indicators, and ongoing engagement with the Ministry of Defence. Mandating a statutory plan to be laid before Parliament would risk duplicating existing mechanisms. That would add bureaucracy without delivering meaningful additional oversight or improvement. The Department remains committed to continuous improvement in how the Reserve Forces and Cadets Association will operate and work with reserve and cadet units, and we will continue to strengthen those arrangements through existing flexible governance structures rather than through new statutory requirements.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I would like to return to the hon. Gentleman with the detail around that vetting process, but I will give an example of some of the complexities. If an individual leaves and goes to work overseas for another company, that may invalidate their DV status, so we need to take it case by case. However, he is absolutely right that we need to make it easier, if we are going to adopt a zig-zag career process, for vetting to follow suit, almost by exception, but individual cases need to be taken into consideration. Clause 31 amends part I of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 and section 331 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, which concern the transfer between regular and reserve forces—something I just discussed. The changes to armed forces legislation will enable those of warrant officer rank equivalent and below to more easily transfer to the Volunteer Reserve. Further, they will permit a more seamless transfer into regular service for reserves. We will also amend the secondary legislation that covers officers, who are employed differently and therefore not covered by this legislation, so that the same effect is achieved for them. To address the comments made by the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford, the Strategic Reserve is slightly different. I will be relatively honest: the reserve architecture that we have inherited, which has gone on for multiple Governments, is a continual layering of bureaucracy, to such an extent that I describe it as a spaghetti soup of terms and conditions of service, pension payments, liability, skills, qualifications and patronage. It needs simplifying. Alongside other clauses, clause 31 is one of the first steps in moving towards a more simplified process that will allow us to capture data more effectively and use the Strategic Reserve as and when required. I give a couple of examples. The right hon. Member was right to mention that there are 2.1 million veterans out there. Most of them came from conscription or national service, and the reality is that we never kept records on any of those individuals. There are records on some pensions, but not all of them were entitled to pensions because the pension system was different. As a result, it is exceptionally difficult to map and track their skills and capabilities, and even how long they served. Those are some of the reasons why it takes so long to go through the claims process. There are warehouses full of documents and medical records that are still analogue, not digital. They require humans to go through big yellow pages of files to find data to cross-check with doctors and so on. The records and recording system have never been digitised, and it is exceptionally difficult to do so. On the Strategic Reserve and the numbers, circa 15,000 people leave the military every year. At the moment, for those in the Army, Navy or Air Force, whether they are an officer, warrant officer or another rank, depending on how long they have served, there is a different liability for return to service. That means that when they leave the gates, they still have a return of service and they can be called on by the nation to serve again. That can be for four years, six years or 18 years in some cases—it depends. It might be more for an officer or less for another rank. It is, again, a complete mess. The Bill simplifies it. Everybody will do 18 years. Whether someone is an officer, another rank, Army, Navy or Air Force, they will do 18 years when they leave the military. I am a marine, so Members should be careful of my maths, but 15,000 times 10 will give us 150,000 in the Strategic Reserve within 10 years. That is on top of what we already have—on top of those in the reserve and regular forces. That is probably two echelons of the Army. It is a fantastic clause that gives us more redundancy and resilience as a nation over the longer term, and ensures that we have a proper package. The critical part, highlighted by the right hon. Member, is how we collect the data. How do we ensure that we can track and pull back the right skills at the right time to deliver the effect we need, whether that be a Typhoon pilot, a nuclear engineer, a chef or an infantryman? We are working through the details. There is something clever to be done with the veteran ID card, with pensions—although there is a GDPR issue there—and with the individual’s requirement to stay in touch with the military. It is a combination of all three, while accepting that some people who leave the military want nothing to do with the military ever again.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  The clause amends section 2(4) of the Visiting Forces Act 1952 to make it explicit that a visiting force’s service court cannot impose a sentence of capital punishment while conducting proceedings in the United Kingdom. Under existing legislation, a scenario could potentially arise where a NATO sending state requests the transfer of one of its personnel into its custody in the UK and then conducts service court proceedings that may result in the death penalty. That could risk conflicting with the UK’s obligations under the European convention on human rights. The clause removes that possibility where capital punishment could be a potential outcome. By doing so, it ensures that UK practice remains fully aligned with long standing domestic and international commitments against the death penalty. Clause 41 updates the provisions of the Visiting Forces Act on how the UK determines whether a visiting force member was on or off duty when an alleged offence occurred. At present, the Act does not provide for direct state-to-state negotiation, as envisaged under the NATO status of forces agreement 1951, if there is disagreement about whether a service member was on duty. The clause empowers the Secretary of State to make a conclusive factual determination on the narrow issue of whether the individual was acting in the course of their duty at the time of the alleged offence. In reaching that determination, the Secretary of State must consider representations from the visiting force and the relevant UK prosecuting authority. The clause fulfils the NATO status of forces agreement obligation to engage directly with a sending state in cases of dispute, ensuring consistent and NATO-aligned handling of duty status questions. I therefore commend clauses 40 and 41 to the Committee.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 32 amends the Reserve Forces Act 1996 to enable the Secretary of State to disapply aggregate service for members of the reserve forces when making a call-out order under sections 52 or 54 of the 1996 Act. Currently, the maximum duration of service under a call-out order under section 52—for national danger, great emergency or an attack on the United Kingdom— cannot usually exceed three years, and is usually 12 months for “warlike operations”. This maximum duration is calculated by combining the current service of a call-out order under sections 52 or 54 with any relevant service in aggregate. “Relevant service” means any permanent service within the six years or three years immediately preceding a reservist’s current service under a call-out order. These clauses allow the Secretary of State to disapply those limits in extremis, allowing us to call out our reservists—this will apply mainly to the Volunteer Reserve—more often. They will thereby ensure that we have access to a full range of key skills, from cyber to logistics, in the event of a transition to conflict and war. Clause 33 makes five important changes in relation to recall to service, and it goes further to try to simplify the process I talked about previously. First, this provision introduces recall liability for former volunteer reservists of other ranks. Currently, only former volunteer reservist officers and former regulars of any rank have recall liability. Secondly, this provision will increase the age limit for recall for other ranks from 55 to 65. This will allow us to continue to access key trade groups, such as cyber and medical, where former members of the regulars are still using these skills in their civilian lives well beyond the age of 55. Thirdly, the recall liability for Royal Navy and Royal Marines personnel of other ranks will move from six years following discharge to 18 years; again, I am talking about the difference between terms. This will ensure consistency with the Army and the RAF, and put everyone on an equal footing. The fourth change, via proposed new section 69A of the Reserve Forces Act 1996, will provide an ability to recall certain individuals when warlike preparations are in progress. It will create a new power to make a recall order for this purpose. “Warlike preparations” means that we will be able to recall someone sooner than is the case presently, because the current threshold for being able to recall people—when there is a great danger, a national emergency or an attack on the United Kingdom—may be too late in a modern transition-to-war scenario. The relevant roles could include roles such as logistics preparations, planning and specialist capabilities. This measure brings those subject to recall in line with the call-out provisions of the Volunteer Reserve and ex-regular reserve. The fifth change in clause 33 enables the disapplication of aggregate service under a recall order made under the existing section 68 and proposed new section 69A of the Reserve Forces Act, mirroring the approach taken by clause 32. Clause 34 makes consequential amendments following the changes made by clauses 32 and 33. Clause 35 and schedule 5 introduce two new transitional classes to manage how the new liabilities apply to existing and former personnel. It is important to note that to ensure defence is able to access the right skills in its reserve, while also maintaining its commitments to those who have left, the MOD will introduce these measures via the following method. Unless individuals opt out, they will affect every member of the Regular Reserve and Volunteer Reserve who is in service when these provisions of the Bill come into force. Around 17,000 people leave the regular and reserve forces every year—I said, 15,000 earlier, but this number includes the reserves—of which the vast majority will now have some form of liability. Current ex-regular members of the reserve forces and those still subject to recall under part VII of the Reserve Forces Act—or those who will otherwise have recall liability solely as a result of these changes—will be able to opt in to the new system should they wish to do so. We are currently analysing how many people this might affect. That is an opt-in process if someone has left. It should be noted that the fitness or medical criteria applied to these individuals will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. A large proportion of individuals in the Strategic Reserve are in their 30s or early 40s and therefore may well still be medically fit for a large number of roles. In addition, the changing nature of modern defence also means that there are valuable roles, such as cyber and operating uncrewed aerial systems, that do not require the same medical and fitness standards as roles such as infantry or aircrew. In reality, the provisions will enable defence to access more of the right people with the skills and experience it needs at times of need.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Through continuation policies, and in some cases using over-age extension mechanisms, people can continue to serve, but changing 55 to 65 is about the liability, not necessarily the service, and capturing the most people in the liability process. Turning to amendment 22, while I recognise the right hon. Member’s proposal to extend the duration of a recall order from 12 to 18 months, I believe that this would not achieve the effect he desires. The changes in the Bill as drafted will allow us to extend the duration of a call-out order—we already have that power. The Bill’s provisions ensure that defence has the necessary powers to extend both call-out and recall periods up to two years when required, rendering any additional amendment to extend the period to 18 months in respect of recall unnecessary. On amendment 23, section 73 of the Reserve Forces Act already provides powers of exemption to recall. The existing provision allows the Defence Council, by regulations, to exempt individuals from, or relax, recall liability. Working across Government, defence requires the flexibility to determine critical roles in a warlike scenario. As a result, additional codification in primary legislation would restrict defence’s ability to maintain the necessary flexibility to safeguard critical roles. The Government are doing that in other ways. Last month, we launched the pan-defence skills framework, a whole-force initiative designed to strengthen defence capability through a unified, transparent focus on skills, which will allow us to identify and manage skills throughout the whole of defence. We recognise that our strength is not just in our equipment, but in the expertise of our people. We also maintain dialogue with our colleagues in other Government Departments, as well as the wider industry, to ensure that we understand the effect of any large-scale mobilisation on critical industries such as the NHS or the defence sector. Amendment 24 aims to increase the readiness requirement for reservists in Army Reserve group A from 180 days to 90 days. I take the point about getting the ground truth; I will take that away and see where we are from an internal perspective by speaking to the Department. I reassure the Committee that all Army readiness levels are subject to annual review and are set through the Army operating order, which aligns with defence-directed commitments within the framework of the armed forces plan. To fulfil its obligations effectively, the Army must review and adjust readiness levels across all elements of its force, responding to the evolving demands of the nation. It is essential that defence maintains the necessary flexibility to respond swiftly and appropriately to changing threat levels. Embedding such provisions in primary legislation would impose too rigid constraints, creating an obstacle rather than a suitable mechanism for setting and reviewing readiness levels. I am committed to taking the point away and having a look. I hope I have provided the necessary reassurance, and on those grounds, I hope that the amendments will not be pressed to a vote. Question put and agreed to. Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clauses 38 and 39 remove the statutory requirements to seek approval for the maximum numbers in each of the regular services and each of the reserve services, and also the maximum number of reservists who may be used for certain commitments. In an age in which we will increasingly need to call on our reservists at pace and adapt our force make-up to meet a changing threat, having statutory maximum limits—especially at such a granular level for reservists—can place operational constraints on the armed forces. However, we recognise the importance of parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, and that is why we continue to request a maximum for the overall number of the active force, mainly the regular and volunteer reserves for each of the three services, in Parliament through the votes A process. The quarterly personnel statistics that contain detailed information on the strength of all our armed forces—including all the types reported on in votes A—will continue to be published, allowing Members to hold Ministers to account for the size of the armed forces. The simplification will allow defence to maintain its ability to flex its force to meet operational needs, while allowing Parliament to retain its historical control over the armed forces. I commend clauses 38 and 39 to the Committee. Question put and agreed to . Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 39 ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 40 Prohibition on sentences of death Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I place on the record again everything that I have just said, which of course was about the NATO status of forces agreement and the changes that we want to make to ensure that UK law is reinforced here in this country, while also establishing a clear and precise relationship with individuals who come here under the status of forces agreement. Question put and agreed to . Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill . Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Christian Wakeford.)

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I mentioned some statistics about what we have now. It is circa 90,000 to 95,000 when we add in the four-year, six-year and 18-year mix that we have across our terms of service. If we then add on, say, five years times 15,000, we again get into the space of about 150,000 to just shy of 200,000. When we look at the maths for the Army, we see that it needs about an echelon to two echelons in depth, and then it needs a training cadre to deliver that capability. That training cadre will primarily be the reserve forces we have already. Consequently, I think we have done enough to move the dial to give us a big enough number and to standardise the process. As always with these things—I am not a data expert—the trick is collecting the data and then being able to analyse it at the right time to get the right force that we need, because we may not need all of those individuals back. We may need very specific skills or individuals. I will return to some of the tri-service changes. The tri-service transition framework will be launched this month. It aims to standardise the process for leaving, to tackle inconsistencies for vulnerable cohorts and in skills capture, resettlement, employment support and regular-reserve transfer. That is heading in the right direction. A lot of the changes that I have just talked about will bring immense benefit to both those in the regular service and the reserve service, by removing the administrative issues that service personnel face, and have faced in the past, when leaving and rejoining, or as they seek to move between regulars and reserves and vice versa. This is vital to the wider work that we are doing to create a new framework that will allow for a more flexible service, ensuring that we have access to the right skills and increasing retention by offering alternative forms of service. That reflects many of the recommendations in the Haythornthwaite review, which was conducted under the last Government. I hope that what I have said provides the necessary reassurance to the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells. I ask him to withdraw amendment 7 and I commend clause 31 to the Committee.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  My hon. Friend highlights a good point. That issue is replicated across the entire service—not in all cases, but in many. People are having to go back through medical within six months of leaving, having to go back through basic training, or having to redo the commando course—you name it. There is a litany of issues. The Minister for Veterans and People is looking at that to see how we speed up the process. Sometimes there is no room for those individuals in the reserve liability, given the rank and position they want to come in at, which can create a difficult discussion about whether they have to de-rank—joining at a lower rank than they left. I absolutely agree that we have to smooth out those issues, and the Minister for Veterans and People is on it.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  We do not have an estimate of how many people will opt in, and I think that would be very difficult to gauge. First, a lot of those individuals already have a liability, because they may be on 18 years already—some will be on six or four years, and some will be officers. To gauge how many people are already in and how many people are going to opt in is very difficult. I would like to think that a lot will opt in, but if they do not, we already have the existing Strategic Reserve, which is at circa 95,000, and the number starts flowing as soon as the Bill comes into force, when everyone who leaves will have 18 years. The number of people who are serving who opt out will also be an interesting reflection, and something to analyse after the event. Clause 36 corrects an anomaly in the existing legislation. Under section 96 of the Reserve Forces Act, failure to attend for service on call-out or recall is an offence of desertion or absence without leave. That is applicable to members of a reserve force as well as persons liable to recall. However, under section 98, there is no punishment for this offence for those with recall liability as there is for members of a reserve force. That produces an unintended anomaly: an offence is created without a penalty. The clause therefore removes that anomaly and ensures that legislation clearly sets out the possible consequences for an offence of failure to respond to a recall order. To sum up, the measures will help to maximise the number of personnel available to defence and will modernise the Reserve Forces Act. The measures align with the direction provided by the strategic defence review by allowing for a whole of defence approach, re-energising the relationship with the Strategic Reserve, and increasing our readiness for war. I will speak to the amendments in this group in my closing remarks.

• 16 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I place on record our SDR commitment to grow the cadet forces by 30%, which should equate to around 40,000 cadets and 8,000 adult volunteers, although those numbers will ebb and flow. The benefits of the cadet forces are not lost on me; the University of Northampton report is a prime example, and I recommend it to anyone who has a cadet force in their constituency. It demonstrates the benefits of being in the cadet forces, ranging from education and skills to mental and physical resilience. Indeed, people’s life chances go through the roof when they join the cadet forces. The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the specific issue of infrastructure, and I would be happy to take that offline and raise it with the Minister for Veterans and People. If people are willing to help, and if there is a way to get better facilities for cadet forces, we will double down to deliver them. Clause 37 creates a new public body to deliver vital support to the reserve forces and cadet communities. For more than a century, the regional reserve forces and cadets associations have supported defence through the management of the volunteer estate, the administration of reserve activity, and engagement with employers and communities. I reiterate my absolute support for the reserve forces and cadets associations, and for all the volunteers who come forward to help those organisations—they do a sterling job. Their contribution is significant and valued across the defence sector, industry and broader society. The structure of the reserve forces and cadets associations, however, still reflects that of the county associations set up in 1908, which does not meet today’s public sector expectations for governance, assurance or financial management. Multiple independent reviews, including the 2019 Sullivan review and 2025 reports by the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee, have highlighted structural weaknesses in the current regional associations and recommended reform. The clause implements those recommendations by creating a single national RFCA as a non-departmental public body, which ensures compliance with central Government governance standards. The clause provides for Defence Council appointments of an independent chair and non-executive board members; a clear reporting and audit framework consistent with the principles of “Managing Public Money”; and the transfer of assets, property and personnel via statutory schemes to ensure continuity of delivery. That reform ensures that the NDPB will maintain the local expertise and volunteer contribution that the existing RFCAs provide by moving them to the new regional councils, which will be committees of the new NDPB. For those reasons, I hope this provides the necessary reassurance and ask the right hon. Member to withdraw his amendment. I commend clause 37 to the Committee.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Clause 30, which introduces schedule 4, provides the statutory basis for extending the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth for raising the issue in a ten-minute rule Bill and getting it the attention that it deserves. Although the RFA is a civilian organisation, its personnel routinely operate alongside the Royal Navy. Indeed, they are essential to the Royal Navy. They face similar risks, pressures and, in many cases, operational demands. RFA personnel have distinct welfare needs shaped by long deployments, a demanding operational tempo and the challenges of supporting military operations. Bringing the RFA within the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner will ensure that those issues are visible at the highest levels of defence oversight. Clause 30 and schedule 4 will not alter the employment status of RFA personnel. They will remain civilian employees with full employment rights, including trade union representation. The extension to the Armed Forces Commissioner’s remit is designed to avoid interfering with existing statutory protections or established industrial relations frameworks and union representation. Clause 30 will insert into the Armed Forces Act 2006 a new subsection that introduces schedule 14ZB to enable the commissioner to conduct thematic investigations into systemic RFA welfare concerns, such as those relating to accommodation, on-board facilities, training, welfare support, access to welfare services or the effects of extended time at sea, enabling wider patterns and areas requiring improvement to be identified. It will also strengthen accountability by giving the commissioner a clear mechanism to raise concerns directly with the Secretary of State. This will ensure that identified welfare themes, whether they are linked to operations, to support arrangements or to wider Ministry of Defence responsibilities, are formally captured and considered. While clause 30 and schedule 4 expand the commissioner’s remit, they also set clear boundaries. Individual employment disputes, civil proceedings, matters covered by collective agreements or complaints brought by unions will remain outside the scope, preserving clarity and the integrity of the existing processes. Having served in the military for 24 years, I spent several months, if not years, on Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, or working with it, and I hold it in the highest regard. The RFA underpins the Royal Navy’s deployable standards and capabilities. I think this is a fantastic move to ensure that it gets the representation it deserves. In practical terms, clause 30 and schedule 4 will provide an independent avenue through which RFA personnel can escalate systemic welfare issues. Over time, that will strengthen support to the RFA and ensure that its personnel’s welfare is considered alongside that of service personnel, while respecting their distinct civilian status. I commend clause 30 and schedule 4 to the Committee.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  At present, service courts are empowered to make a driving disqualification order against an offender in proceedings for a service offence. However, there is no legal mechanism for service courts to reduce that period of disqualification from driving where the offender undertakes an approved course, unlike the civilian justice system. Clause 27 will enable the service courts—the court martial and the service civilian court—to make an order to reduce a period of disqualification from driving where the offender satisfactorily completes an approved course. This new power will be available to a service court where it convicts an offender of a certain road traffic offence, such as drink-driving, and imposes a driving prohibition of 12 months or more. These provisions address a gap in the existing legislation that has meant that the powers of service courts in relation to driving prohibitions are more limited than those of their civilian counterparts. It will ensure that the service courts have the same tools available to them as the civilian courts when dealing with these sorts of cases.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  Coming back to amendment 9, I agree that pulling together a court martial board to deal with senior officers poses more challenges than it does for junior personnel. Such cases are rare, and changes were made quite recently to address the issue. Changes were made in secondary legislation in 2024 to provide more flexibility in the formation of court martial boards for trials where the defendant is a senior officer, to address any potential difficulties in finding sufficiently senior personnel who do not know the defendant to sit on the board. Having boards that are tri-service has also helped assist with that. The changes ensure that the president of the board—the most senior person on the board—will be at least a one-star when the defendant is a one-star or above, and that practical attempts are always made to try to find a suitable two-star. When a two-star cannot be found, a one-star works. For defendants below one-star, the president of the board is always one rank higher. We talked about capacity and the availability of ranks, and we will look into the detail of how we ensure that the Defence Serious Crime Command has the authority to leverage people to deliver the right consistency on boards. In terms of capacity in dealing with senior officer trials, there are around 200 one-stars in the armed forces and around 470 personnel at one star or above. There are sufficient personnel to meet the few occasions when senior personnel are tried. We keep those matters under review through the governance board of the service justice system, the service justice board and the service justice executive group, in which all key stakeholders are represented. Clause 20 amends section 156 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, to correct an anomaly relating to those who are eligible to sit on a court martial board. The Armed Forces Act 2021 reduced qualification for those non-commissioned officers who were entitled to sit on a court martial board from a warrant officer to those of substantive OR-7 rank, for example a colour sergeant. However, a technical oversight meant that other subsections of section 156 were not also amended to reflect those changes. Consequently, only warrant officers and equivalent who became commissioned officers automatically qualified to sit on a court martial board, while OR-7s still had to undergo a three-year qualification period. Clause 20 simply enables those who receive their commission and were of former substantive OR-7 rank to automatically qualify to sit on the court martial board. I hope that provides the necessary reassurance to the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford on those grounds, and I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I am always very reticent to get into the detail and legalities of the exacts, given there are multiple variables that we are discussing, whether it be drugs or whether it be a criminal offence. If a person is serving and a crime is committed, they will not be allowed to leave until the process for dealing with the justice of that case is well thought through, whether that be within the military system or transferred into the civilian justice system, because they cannot just leave the military while there is a case ongoing. However, if the hon. Member has a specific concern about a specific case with correct parameters, we will ensure we write to him on it and all of its different variables. It is quite difficult to provide the specifics on that now.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  These are technical changes to enhance the service justice system that deal with some of those knotty issues such as mental health. I recommend that the Committee fully support them. Question put and agreed to. Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 22 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 25 Guidance on exercise of criminal jurisdiction

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  This is about improving our service justice system and, of course, the ability of our command chain to enact the highest standards. I commend clauses 28 and 29 to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 30 Commissioner’s functions in relation to Royal Fleet Auxiliary Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  First, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth. She generated this, and now it has come to fruition, so well done. The reality is that there is no Royal Navy without the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The RFA does an exceptional job across everything from high-end technical to refuelling and enabling our carrier strike group. When we talk about embarrassment and availability of capability, the unfortunate reality is that we have the cards that we have been dealt, after successive Governments under-invested in the significant hard capability that we require to deter hostile states. As a Minister in the previous Government, the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford owns an element of responsibility for that.

• 14 Apr 2026 · Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) · Hansard source

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  I would like to make a correction to an earlier statement about new clause 12, before I continue to address amendment 9. I would like to clarify a point that arose in the debate on new clause 12 in relation to service protection orders. The powers in the Armed Forces Act 2006 create a time limit for charging former members and ex-regular reservists with a service offence committed while subject to service law of six months from the date they ceased to be subject to service law. After a period of six months from the date on which they ceased to be subject to service law, a person may be charged with a service offence, committed while subject to service law, with the consent of the Attorney General. They do not remain subject to service law once they have left the armed forces, and the same time period also applies to civilians subject to service discipline. If there are any questions about the detail of that, I am happy to write to the Committee on anything specific that is required.